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JOHN LEIGHTON STUART: THE MIND AND LIFE OF AN AMERICAN MISSIONARY IN CHINA, 1876-1941

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YU-MING SHAW

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CR	The Chinese Recorder, 1867-1941. Shanghai.
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States. Washington, D.C.
JLS-RYU	J. Leighton Stuart File, Records of Yenching University, United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia, 475 Riverside Drive, New York City.
MP	Edward Mack Papers, Presbyterian Historical Foundation, Ashville, North Carolina.
MS	The Missionary Survey.
RYU	Records of Yenching University (Other information, see JLS-RYU).
SDA	State Department Archives. National Archives, Washington, D.C.
SLF	Stuart Letter File, Board of World Missions, The Presbyterian Church of the U.S., Nashville, Tennessee.
TBMB	The Bi-Monthly Bulletin.

If men cannot lift their fellowmen in the process of saving themselves, I do not see that it is very important that they should save themselves. . . . Christianity came into the world to save the world as well as to save individual men, and individual men can afford in conscience to be saved only as part of the process by which the world itself is regenerated.

--Woodrow Wilson (1909).

CHAPTER I

AMERICAN MISSIONARIES IN CHINA: A HISTORICAL SURVEY

A. The Protestant Church and Missionaries in American History

Professor John K. Fairbank has remarked that "the missionary in foreign parts seems to be the invisible man of American history."[1] This remark fully attests to the importance of the missionary in American history, an importance readily apparent from the relationship that has been maintained between the American Protestant Church and the U.S. Government since the early nineteenth century. The following is a survey of this relationship up until the late 1910's, the approximate time at which Dr. Stuart's career as an evangelist ended.

The first missionary body -- The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions -- was founded in 1810, and the first two American missionaries reached China in 1830, more than a decade later than Robert Morrison, the first Protestant missionary from England.[2] By the 1930's the number of missionaries from America had risen to almsot 3,000 and far surpassed the number from England. Moreover, the initial meagre support for a few missionaries in the 1830's had grown to an annual budget of

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[1]John K. Fairbank, "Assignment for the '70's," American Historical Review 74, No. 3 (February 1969): 877.

[2]Clifton Jackson Phillips, Protestant America and the Pagan World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 172-75.

several million dollars in the 1930's.[1] Why this missionary urge and phenomenal growth?

The first American missionary organization was the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), founded in 1810 in Boston.[2] In November 1812, the Board published its address to the Christian public, in which the objectives of its foreign missions were explained:

> Every thing which has a direct tendency to promote the salvation of immortal souls is great beyond the power of language to express, or imagination to conceive. . . . Who shall adequately declare the magnitude of an attempt to evangelize the whole nations, and ultimately to renovate a world; an attempt to disenthral the slaves of Satan, and bring them into the glorious liberty of the sons of God . . . .?[3]

Thus, their objectives were two: the salvation of individual souls and the evangelization of the whole world. From then on, missionary activity became a permanent establishment in the Protestant Church in America and maintained a constant growth. By 1851, American missionaries in China rose to eighty-eight, more than half of the total Protestant missionary force in China, and by 1900, their number reached 1,000.[4] This surge in missionary activity corresponded closely to the national chant of "Manifest Destiny" in the 1840's and 1850's.

In 1844, the same year President John Tyler was promoting the annexation of Texas, Ralph Waldo Emerson, a clergyman and also one of the

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[1] Joseph I. Parker, ed., Interpretative Statistical Survey of the World Mission of the Christian Church (New York, 1938), p. 22.

[2] Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China (New York: Russell & Russell, 1929 & 1967), p. 207.

[3] Quoted in H. Shelton Smith et al., American Christianity: An Historical Interpretation with Representative Documents, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1960), 1:4-5.

[4] Phillips, Protestant America, p. 198; Liu Kwang-ching, ed., American Missionaries in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 1.

most eloquent spokesmen for Manifest Destiny declared:

> It seems so easy for America to inspire and express the most expansive and humane spirit; new-born, free, healthful, strong, the land of the laborer, of the democrat, of the philanthropist, of the believer, of the saint, she should speak for the human race. America is the country of the future . . .[1]

The religious sector was for national expansion, for it would open new territories for mission work; therefore nearly all the churchmen welcomed American victory in the war with Mexico in 1847.[2]

After the Civil War, Protestant Church membership grew from four and a half million in 1860 to about twelve and a half million in 1890.[3] Foreign missions now came to be even more eagerly advocated. For example, a Southern Baptist report of 1872 expressed its fervor in foreign missions in these words: "contemplating the salvation of the millions of China, it presents to us the true idea of the sublime."[4]

During the Gilded Age (1870-1898) and the Progressive Era (1890's - 1910's) foreign mission work reached its peak, as evidenced by the work of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions which adopted a motto "The evangelization of the world in this generation." Founded in 1886, its membership grew by leaps and bounds. Between 1886 and 1936 the movement enrolled 50,000 college students, out of which 13,000 sailed to the foreign mission field to constitute half of the total number of

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[1]Quoted in Norman Graedner, ed., Manifest Destiny (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1968), pp. 8-9.

[2]Smith, American Christianity, 1: 4-5.

[3]Robert T. Handy, A Christian America: Protestant Hopes and Historical Realities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 79.

[4]Quoted ibid., p. 82.

missionaries sent abroad.[1] Another major development of Christian student work in this period was the establishment of the World's Student Christian Federation in 1895 in Sweden. American church leaders and Christian students formed the major constituents of this world-wide organization. It is said that "its work and world conferences held since 1900 have established the pattern for the ecumenical World Council of Churches and most of the leaders for movements of the Church have come from its ranks."[2]

The 1890's was a crucial decade that transformed the United States from a regional power to one with global concerns. A recent study concludes that in this decade both American imperialists and anti-imperialists "foresaw for the United States nothing less than the moral and material leadership of the world." The nation's interest in the Far East further grew.[3] To Alfred T. Mahan, for instance, the world was divided between civilization and barbarism and was engulfed in a struggle between the "Slavonic" and the "Teutonic" peoples with China as the battle area. Two years before Kaiser Wilhelm drew his famous "Yellow Peril" picture warning Europe of danger from the East, Mahan was already worried about Chinese barbarism. His basic solution was simple -- go to China and Christianize her. President William McKinley shared this mood and declared in 1898 that "wherever our flag floats . . . , it is always for the sake of humanity and the advancement of civilization."[4] Senator Orville

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[1]Vergilius Ferm, ed., An Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: Philosophical Library, 1945), p. 741.

[2]Ibid., p. 738.

[3]David Healy, US Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890's (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), pp. 247, 253-54.

[4]Quoted ibid., pp. 128-30.

H. Platt of Connecticut also asked in the same year: "Does not Providence, does not the finger of God unmistakably point to the civilization and uplifting of the Orient, to the development of its people, to the spread of liberty, education, social order, and Christianity there through the agency of American influence?"[1] These resounding proclamations for expansion soon carried the whole nation. Their overshelming effects on the public can be seen from an advertisement put out by Pears' Soap, in which these words appeared, "The first step towards lightening the White Man's Burden is through teaching the virtues of cleanliness. Pears' Soap is a potent factor in brightening the dark corners of the earth as civilization advances, while amongst the cultured of all nations it holds the highest place--it is the ideal toilet soap."[2] Under the public pressure for expansion, the voices of the Anti-imperialist group, consisting of men like Carl Schurz, William James and Andrew Carnegie, failed to change the course of expansion.[3]

Religious leaders also lent their voices to the national outcry for expansion. The Reverend Josiah Strong, General Secretary of the Evangelical Alliance for the United States, wrote in 1891 that the two great blessings of mankind were "a pure, spiritual Christianity" and "civil liberty," and that, since the Anglo-Saxon was the "greatest representative" of these two blessings, he was "divinely commissioned" to be his brothers keeper.[4] Reverend Richard S. Storrs,

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[1]Quoted ibid., p. 131.

[2]Quoted ibid., p. 143.

[3]Regarding the anit-imperialists, see Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Paperback ed., 1971).

[4]Josiah Strong, Our Country (New York: Baker & Taylor Co., 1891), pp. 209-10.

president of the ABCFM, declared in 1897 that it was an American duty to spread Christianity and that "every time this thought has come before me, it has grasped me with a more prodigious power. This nation, the great minister of God for doing this, his transcendent work, in these tremendous times."[1] When the nation finally went to war with Spain in 1898, this religious fervor for spreading Christianity made the majority of Protestants support the war.[2] Though there were some eminent Protestant leaders opposing the taking and holding of overseas possessions, most of them, as pointed out by Professor Robert Handy, "came to accept a distinction between imperialism and expansionism and were willing to support missionary work where it was possible, including the new territories."[3] Even after the nation had overcome its imperialist urge by 1900, the religious leaders still believed in their right to "Christian imperialism." The statement by Lyman Abbott, a Christian leader and editor of the influencial journal The Outlook, was very expressive of this belief: "I deny the right of a barbaric people to retain possession of any quarter of the globe. What I have already said I reaffirm: barbarism has no rights which civilization is bound to respect."[4] When a survey was made by Boston Herald in 1900 to determine attitudes toward expansion among five occupational groups in fifteen cities, ministers led the list in every city.[5]

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[1]Quoted in Healy, US Expansionism, p. 134.

[2]Handy, Christian America, pp. 124-28.

[3]Ibid., p. 126.

[4]Quted ibid., pp. 126-27.

[5]Marilyn Blatt Young, The Rhetoric of Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 143.

The decades between 1890's and 1910's saw a parade of American statesmen supporting foreign missions. President McKinley noted that missionaries had been "among the pioneers of civilization."[1] Former President Benjamin Harrison, who was the honorary chairman of the Ecumenical Missionary Conference of 1900, stated that "God has not set a uniform pace for Himself in the work of bringing in the kingdom of His Son. He will hasten it in His day. The stride of His Church shall be so quickened that commerce will be the laggard."[2] President Theodore Roosevelt supported American missionary work in China for it would avert revolutionary disturbances there.[3] William H. Taft, although he lamented that the Western merchants were milking the Orientals and that they were "not the best representatives of western civilization," nonetheless praised foreign missions profusely. He said, "It is through the foreign missions that we must expect to have the true picture of Christian brotherhood presented to those natives, the true spirit of Christian sympathy. That is what makes, in the progress of civilization, the immense importance of Christian missions."[4]

Perhaps no American president in those decades was more supportive of mission work abroad than Woodrow Wilson, son of a prominent Southern Presbyterian church leader. The statements made by him in this regard are too numerous to cite here. To reciprocate this support the

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[1]Quoted in Handy, Christian America, p. 134

[2]Quoted ibid.

[3]Paul A. Varg, Missionaries, Chinese and Diplomats (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 79.

[4]William H. Taft, an address delivered on April 20, 1908, reprinted in The Missionary (the official organ of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.) 41 (1908): 379.

missionaries also gave their unlimited endorsements to Wilson's policies, especially those relating to foreign affairs. They endorsed his declaration of war against Germany, and backed up his League of Nations. The Federal Council of Churches declared in 1919: "In international relations, a League of Nations is, in effect, an attempt to apply Christian principles to the dealings of nations with one another."[1] A statement signed by 15,000 clergymen in December 1919 urged the U.S. Senate to ratify the Paris Peace Treaty, including the part dealing with the League of Nations, at the earliest possible date and without amendments or reservations.[2] Wilson's mother church, the Presbyterian Church of the U.S., organized a conference which one hundred and thirty-five prominent members of mission boards and related agencies attended in December 1918 to promote an Interchurch World Movement for world evangelism and for meeting the challenges of the postwar world.[3]

It is generally agreed that in the decades between the 1890's and the early 1920's religion and nationalism worked hand in hand toward progress. Professor Robert Handy's succinct statement can not be challenged: "For many in the nation and in the churches, Christianity and American civilization seemed so intimately related that religious duties and patriotic feeling appeared to be but the two sides of the same coin of Christianity. Religion and nationalism lived in intimate association, long after the fact of the separation of church and state."[4]

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[1]Quoted in Handy, Christian America, p. 186.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., p. 187.

[4]Ibid., p. 143.

B. The Missionary Response to Chinese Problems

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because of changing political and religious conditions in America and China, American missionaries in China had taken up different strategies to fulfill their goals. In the nineteenth century such missionaries were strongly obsessed with the desire to save the heathens' souls, so they concentrated on individual evangelism and looked askance at social service, such as medical and educational work. Professor R. Pierce Beaver aptly described their motives for most of the century: "Obedience to Christ is the foremost motive and mission is the central function of the Church of Christ. Seeking the salvation of souls because of love of Christ is his second motive, and the opportunity of meeting the greatest need of the world is the third."[1]

But by the turn of the century, this emphasis on man's duty to obey Christ and to save souls was replaced by the desire to live up to the true nature of Christianity in serving mankind. For the following decades, with the rise of America as a leading world power and under the impact of the Social Gospel doctrines, many American missionaries in China gradually began to spend more time and money in social service work, and by 1930's such work had greatly overshadowed other types of church activities .[2] And yet other changes in their approach were demanded as the

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[1]R. Pierce Beaver,"Missionary Motivation through Three Countries," in Reinterpretation in American Church History, ed. Jerald C. Brauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 141-42.

[2]In 1935-36, for example, of each dollar raised in China 42 cents was spent for education, 32.5 cents for medical care, and 15 cents for church support, leaving about 9.5 cents for other forms of Christian activity. These statistics are found in Parker, Interpretative Survey, p. 278.

missionaries encountered new problems of the twentieth century. The Chinese revolution of 1925-27 brought Chinese anti-foreignism to a new height. Japanese aggression in the 1930's not only caused untold suffering for the Chinese but also threatened Western mission work. In this section we shall discuss the missionary responses to the altering Chinese situation in the first three decades of the twentieth century, and will stress the responses of the liberal missionaries, especially those of the educators.

The Adaptation of Christianity to Chinese Conditions

The ultimate aim of the Christian mission was to evangelize China through the adaptation of Christianity to Chinese conditions. But to do so required the resolution of two basic problems. First, what attitude should Christianity adopt toward Chinese native religions and cultural traditions? Second, how could a self-supporting, self-controlling, and self-propagating Chinese church be established?

The adaptation of Christianity to Chinese conditions was an old problem. The Jesuit fathers in China between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries had faced it,[1] and so had the Taipings in the mid-nineteenth century.[2] The nineteenth-century Western Church and its missionaries had generally considered Chinese religions to be nothing but superstitions.

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[1]See Donald W. Treadgold, The West in Russia and China, 2 vols. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973), vol. 2: China, 1582-1949, pp. 32-34. See also, Ch'en Sou-i, "Ming-mo Ch'ing-ch'u Yeh-ssu-hui shih ti ju-chiao kuan chi ch'i fan-ying (The Confucian Views of the Jesuits in the Late Ming and Early Ch'ing Times and Their Repercussions)," Kuo-li Pei-ching ta-hsüeh Kuo-hsüeh chi-k'an (The Chinese Studies Quarterly of National Peking University) 5:2 (1935): 10-31.

[2]Treadgold, China, 2:45-56.

And yet this condemnation gave way to a higher regard for heathen religions in the twentieth century -- at least until the late 1930's, when they began to lose respect once again. Dr. John A. MacKay, the former President of Princeton Theological Seminary, gave a very concise survey of this change of attitude. The first major sign of change occurred in the 1910 Edinburgh Conference, the largest missionary gathering ever held by that time. Though the mood of the conference was that the East was destined to be permanently dominated by the West and that Christianity was the absolute revelation, it recognized that some nobler elements might be found in other religions which were reflective of God's influence. In 1928, the Jerusalem Conference (successor of the Edinburgh Conference), still upheld the superiority of Christianity, but claimed that its superiority was not grounded in culture or theology, but in Jesus Christ, the Spirit of God and the supreme value of life. It also accepted other religions as useful partners in combatting secularism. In 1932 when Re-Thinking Missions, the findings of the Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry of 1930, was published, the non-Christian religions were given the highest recognition. Professor William E. Hocking, the spokesman for the Laymen's Inquiry, declared that Christianity was not the final religion, which had not yet appeared, and it was only one of the many religions in the world. Therefore, he suggested that Christianity should march together with other religions toward the goal of a final world religion. The liberality of this new interpretation was unprecedented and was reflective of the religious liberalism and modernism of the 1920's and early 1930's. But liberalism and modernism declined beginning in the 1930's, and as the writings of Kierkegaard and Barth became popular the traditional condemnation of non-Christian religions came to be reasserted, most forcibly by the Dutch

theologian Hendrik Kraemer. Therefore, in the 1938 Madras Conference, the prevailing mood was to downgrade other religions and to assert the uniqueness of Christ and of Christianity. Hocking's attitude, that of respecting other religions, was brought under attack.[1]

In the twentieth century the biggest obstacle in the way of converting Chinese intellectuals was still their attachment to Confucianism. Though many of them had found Confucianism irrelevant to modern China, their attachment to it was still strong, expecially when they were confronted with the Christian doctrines presented to them by the aggressive missionaries. One of the strangest phenomena in twentieth-century China was the intellectuals' ambivalent attitude toward Confucianism. On the one hand, Confucianism was vehemently denounced or opposed by many leading Chinese intellectuals: Chang T'ai-yen, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei objected strongly to its establishment as a state religion in the 1910's;[2] in the late 1910's and the 1920's Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Hu Shih blamed it as the root cause for some of China's political and social evils; and finally Lu Hsün and other leftist writers carried this attack to the extreme during the 1920's and after. On the other hand, Confucianism also enjoyed a revival in modern China. The new rationalistic Confucianism of Fung Yu-lan and the new idealistic Confucianism of Hsiung Shih-li are good examples.[3] And even the detractors of Confucianism have admitted that certain elements of it are beneficial for China. For

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[1]John A. MacKay, "Christianity and Other Religions," in Protestant Thought in the Twentieth Century (New York: Macmillan Co., 1951), pp. 275-95.

[2]Wing-tsit Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), pp. 9-13.

[3]Ibid., pp. 33-49.

instance, Hu Shih in 1934 stated that "not only is it my opinion that Confucianism will furnish very fertile soil on which to cultivate modern scientific thinking but Confucianism has many traditions which are quite favorable to the spirit and attitude of modern science." And the Marxist Kuo Mo-jo declared in 1945 that Confucius and his pupils were always on the side of the rebels and were sympathetic to the liberation of the people; and that their fundamental standpoints were social progress and social welfare.[1] It is because of this ambivalent attitude of the Chinese intellectuals toward Confucianism that the Christian missionaries still had to take it very seriously in the twentieth century.

While the evangelical-minded missionaries (such as those of the China Inland Mission) were only interested in conversion, the liberal-minded, especially those working in educational circles, were burdened with the problem of compatibility between Christianity and Confucianism. As to the liberals' ideas on this question, probably the best and most representative were those advanced by Dr. Frank Rawlinson, a seasoned China missionary for several decades, a lecturer at Yenching University and the Union Theological Seminary, New York, in the 1920's, and also the editor of Chinese Recorder, the most influential missionary journal in China. In 1927 Dr. Rawlinson published his Naturalization of Christianity in China. The appearance of this book on the eve of the 1928 Jerusalem Conference was prophetic. The book argued that "a world-wide Christian civilization can only be secured by the weaving together of the good in all civilizations"; and that "before Christianity can become a wide-spread vital force in China there will have to be a synthesis of China's religious

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[1]Ibid., p. 24.

experience with that of the Christians."[1] In his view, since Christianity has assimilated the influences of the Jewish, Greek, Roman and European civilizations, it should now also assimilate the Chinese religious experience.[2] Probably the most liberal idea in Dr. Rawlinson's religious syncretism was his suggestion that "the West also needs missionaries from the East. Through such an exchange can world-wide fellowship and understanding be built up."[3]

If Christianity and Chinese religious experience should merge, were there common grounds between the two that could make possible this merger? Dr. Rawlinson definitely thought so. First, the Chinese ideal of personality and society were compatible with that of Christianity. The Confucian ideals of personality were the concepts of loyalty (chung), reciprocal love (shu) and sincerity (hsin). The Chinese social ideals were those of universal love (jen), right behavior (i), social obligations (li), wisdom (chih), and sincerity (hsin). Rawlinson believed that these ideals were "also included in Christian idealism."[4] Second, Chinese religious attitudes were very close to those of the early Christians; therefore, it would be a mistake to consider the Chinese as pagans.[5] Third, the social conscience of Christianity was in agreement with Chinese social concern -- that is, concern for the salvation of the whole society.[6]

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[1]Frank Rawlinson, Naturalization of Christianity in China (Shanghai, 1927), pp. iii-vi.

[2]Ibid., p. 175.

[3]Ibid., p. 201.

[4]Ibid., p. vi.

[5]Ibid., p. 181.

[6]Ibid., p. 182.

While asserting such common grounds between Christianity and Chinese religious and cultural tradition, Rawlinson also acknowledged some differences between the two. The major difference was the absence of any equivalent to the Christian doctrine of substitutionary atonement in the Chinese religious system.[1] But here, precisely, lay the distinct contribution of Christianity to the Chinese experience.

In the end of the book Dr. Rawlinson offered the most basic justification for the naturalizing of Christianity in China: it would not only contribute to spiritual and material progress in China, but would also help the West when China became Christianized.[2] Dr. Rawlinson's ideas were indeed an extension of the late nineteenth-century concept that the Christianization of China was for the benefit of the world.

The next major problem for the adaptation of Christianity to Chinese conditions was the establishment of a Chinese church that was self-controlling, self-supporting, and self-propagating. To the missionaries, this was the ultimate aim of their efforts in China, but it was also a perplexing problem for them: the faster the growth of this church, the sooner would be their own departure. Those who had been living almost all their lives in China and doing missionary work as a life-long vocation were understandably reluctant to work themselves out of their jobs. While it is difficult to assess the effects of this missionary dilemma, we should nevertheless keep it in mind when we try to examine the development of such a church in China.

If self-control means that the Chinese religious workers are in

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[1]Ibid., p. 179.

[2]Ibid., p. 187.

total control of their own church affairs, then the Chinese church at least up to the 1930's had not achieved it. Table 1 demonstrates this fact clearly.

TABLE 1

PARTIAL STATISTICS FOR THE GROWTH OF THE PROTESTANT CHURCH IN CHINA, 1807-1936.

Year	Foreign Workers		Chinese Workers		Total Communicants
	Ordained Workers	Total Foreign Workers	Ordained Workers	Total Chinese Workers	
1807	1	1	0	0	0
1889	(Unknown)	1,296	211	1,657	37,287
1915	1,092	5,338	764	20,460	268,652
1920	1,268	6,204	1,305	28,396	366,524
1935-36	1,084	5,747	2,135	11,662	536,089

SOURCE: Milton T. Stauffer et al., The Christian Occupation of China (Shanghai, 1922), pp. xc, civ; Parker, Interpretative Survey, pp. 18, 20.

In this table, although the total number of Chinese workers (including the ordained and all other kinds of helpers) is always larger than that of their Western counterparts, the number of ordained Chinese--those influential in church affairs--does not surpass that of ordained Westerners until 1920. Even as late as 1935-36, foreigners still constitute one-third of the total ordained Christian workers in China.

If self-support means that the Chinese church and its related enterprises, such as schools, hospitals, orphanages, etc., are all or substantially financed by the Chinese church itself, then by 1935-36 it also had not achieved self-support. For instance, in that year the total foreign contribution is $6,826,298 and the total Chinese contribution

$4,916,131 -- only 42% of the total.[1]

If self-propagation means that the Chinese church assumes all or at least a substantial part of the proselytizing work, the Chinese church also failed to achieve self-propagation. For instance, in the year of 1920, although there were twenty-five Chinese home missionary societies,[2] the total foreign missionary workers during that year still constituted nearly one fourth of the total Christian force in China and the foreign ordained workers numbered nearly the same as their Chinese collegues. Therefore the Chinese church was probably assuming only half of the total church responsibilities in that year. This situation did not change in any significant way through the 1930's.

From the above information we can conclude that though the Christian Church in China had been growing steadily since 1807, it had not achieved self-control, self-support and self-propagation by as late as the 1930's, or even the 1940's. Professor Kenneth S. Latourette pointed out very correctly in 1928 that the Chinese church was still in its embryonic stage, that its level of spiritual quality was low, and that without continuous support from the West it might gradually disappear.[3] His observations in 1928 would also be true in the 1940's. In 1948 there were still as many as 2,246 American and Canadian missionaries in China.[4] As long as large numbers of foreign missionaries were still busily doing their work in China, a totally independent Chinese church

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[1]Parker, Interpretative Survey, p. 22.

[2]Stauffer, Christian Occupation, p. 386.

[3]Latourette, A History, pp. 809-10.

[4]Varg, Missionaries, p. 278.

could never be realized.

Within this general slow growth of the Chinese Church, many liberal-minded missionaries tried to push for a quicker self-sufficiency. One of them in the 1920's even urged that foreign staffs not be increased and that a date be fixed for the withdrawal of all alien workers.[1] While such a radical position was definitely an extreme minority view, many of the liberal-minded missionaries did try to change their roles from directors and supervisors to partners or co-workers with their Chinese collegues. Dr. John Leighton Stuart was one of this liberal group.

Christian Higher Education in China

The first mission school that offered work at college level was probably Tengchow College (the precursor of Shantung Cheloo University), whose curriculum in the 1880's offered more courses than other so-called Christian colleges.[2] By the 1930's the number of Christian colleges with genuine college standards had grown to thirteen, and this figure remained until 1949.[3]

In the first half of the twentieth century, enrollment in such schools constantly increased. For instance, in 1900 there were 200 students enrolled; in 1926 there were 3,500; and in 1947, 12,000.[4] Their percentage of the total Chinese college student body, as far as the

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[1]Latourette, A History, pp. 809-10.

[2]Jessie G. Lutz, China and the Christian Colleges, 1850-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 29.

[3]Ibid., pp. [531-[illegible]].

[4]Ibid., p. 491.

decades of the 1930's and 1940's are concerned, was anywhere between 12 to 20 percent.[1] These figures show how large a contribution was made by the mission colleges to modern Chinese education. They also reveal how extensively missionary education touched elite Chinese youth; probably very few nations in the twentieth century have relied as much as China upon foreign funds and staffs to educate one-eighth to one-fifth of their college youth.

The mission colleges and their missionary educators faced several major problems in carrying out their work. The first of these was the relationship between educational work and evangelism. In the nineteenth century, the question of whether mission education was a legitimate occupation for missionary workers would usually incite heated discussions. Not until the end of the century did mission education receive official blessings from the majority of church boards and from the mission fields. Reaching the twentieth century, not only was it fully accepted, but it became the major part of mission work in China. While there are no detailed statistics on the percentage of the distribution of mission funds for all years of the century, we know that in the year 1935-36 every dollar raised in China was spent in this fashion: 42 cents for education; 32.5 cents for medical care; 15 cents for church support; and only 9.5 cents for other types of Christian activity.[2]

A second problem is related to the raison d'être of mission higher education. The early mission educators were strongly motivated to convert the children of the Chinese upper classes so as to gain an upper-

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Parker, Interpretative Survey, p. 278.

class acceptance of Christianity. They also believed that Western knowledge would enlighten the Chinese and thereby make possible their conversion, since Western knowledge and Christianity were thought to be inseparable.[1] By the 1920's and 1930's a further justification was offered in that mission schools could serve the Chinese political, economic, and social needs by offering professional courses and training.[2]

The third major problem was the status of mission schools within the Chinese educational system. Before 1925 they had generally been run by missionary administrators and with aims geared toward the conversion of their students. But in 1927, as a result of the rising anti-foreign sentiment and the emergence of strong Chinese nationalism, religion courses had to be made elective.[3] Furthermore, after 1928 the chancellor or president of a mission college had to be a Chinese, and the majority of members in the board of managers of this college also had to be Chinese.[4] These new demands from the Chinese Ministry of Education greatly shook the control that the missionary educators had been exercising. Another challenge faced by the mission institutions was the accusation made by anti-Christian Chinese that mission schools were undermining the Chinese heritage by not offering Chinese courses, or by not teaching them effectively. Because of this challenge, many mission colleges had to develop decent programs in Chinese studies.[5]

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[1]Lutz, Christian Colleges, pp. 19-21.

[2]Ibid., pp. 276-82.

[3]Ibid., p. 254.

[4]Ibid., p. 264.

[5]Ibid., pp. 175-76, 315-16, 511, 519.

The fourth major problem faced by mission schools was their need to compete with Chinese public schools for academic excellence. On the college level the strength of such institutions as Peking, Tsing Hua, and Nankai Universities were threatening the pride and reputation of the mission colleges. The large number of returned students teaching at Chinese owned institutions made the quality of mission school faculty seem lower by comparison.

The last major problem for the Christian colleges was how to survive Chinese political storms. The most crucial test for all Christian institutions was the Chinese revolution of 1925-27. When the KMT and the CCP cadres and troops carried their struggle into many cities that they had occupied, the mission institutions were usually at their mercy. Furthermore, besides making constant adjustments to the changing political realities, the mission schools after 1931 also had to meet certain demands issued from the Japanese military authorities. Also, whenever a large-scale student movement broke out, such as the December 9 Incident of 1935, the mission school authorities had to take measures to appease both the students and the ruling Chinese government. Any false step made by a mission school authority could mean serious trouble, if not the demise of the institution.[1]

The Missionary Reaction Toward Chinese Political Developments and National Crises

In the nineteenth century the relationship between the American government and the American missionaries in China was indeed like that between fish and water. Almost all missionaries supported their govern-

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[1] Ibid., chaps. VII, IX.

ment, and some even served as U.S. foreign service officers in China. For instance, Rev. Peter Parker, after having served as a missionary for twenty years, became American minister to China during 1855-57. While in office, he echoed the national mood of Manifest Destiny by suggesting in 1856 that the United States should annex Taiwan for the sake of "humanity, civilization, navigation, and commerce."[1] Two other former missionaries also served for twenty-two years as secretaries in American legation in China: S. Wells Williams (1861-76) and Chester Holcome (1876-83).[2]

In the twentieth century this close relationship continued generally, though after the late 1920's it cooled somewhat. For the period of the 1890's to 1910's, the missionaries in general gave support to the following U.S. policies toward China: the Open Door notes of 1899-1900; the American intervention in the Boxer Rebellion; American recognition of the Yüan Shih-k'ai government in 1913; Wilson's intervention in the Twenty-one Demands in 1915. In this period the only U.S. policy toward China that the American missionaries found disagreeable was that over the Shantung question in 1919. But even this disagreement was only expressed in a mild way.[3] Since the so-called "missionary diplomacy" of President Wilson had previously served the missionary interests so well, the missionaries all had faith in Wilson's personal integrity and larger ideals.

But after the May Thirtieth Incident of 1925 the missionaries began to see things in China in a somewhat different light. They became

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[1]Liu Kwang-ching, "America and China: The Late Nineteenth Century," in American-East Asian Relations: A Survey, ed. Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 71.

[2]Ibid., p. 79.

[3]Eugene P. Trani, "Woodrow Wilson, China, and the Missionaries, 1913-1921," Journal of Presbyterian History 49, No. 4 (Winter 1971): 348-50.

dissatisfied with the lukewarm attitude of the American Government toward the support of the Chinese government and its demands. Therefore, many important groups of missionaries, both official and unofficial, passed pro-Chinese resolutions calling for revision of the unequal treaties and cancellation of the "toleration" clause. The mission boards and other leading church organizations in the United States all gave their support to these resolutions. For instance, the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, representing more than twenty million members, issued a statement in 1925:

> The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America . . . urges all Christian people to join in creating a public opinion which will stand unequivocally for the abolition of extraterritoriality, will favor the restoration of tariff autonomy to China . . . We believe that our Government should act in concert with other nations, and use its full influence to that end; if, however, international agreement should prove impossible, we urge our Government to act independently in securing full justice between the United States and China.[1] (Italics mine)

But American diplomats in China such as Minister John V. A. MacMurray were in general opposed to the missionary position and took a negative view toward the Chinese nationalistic movement.[2] Though Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and President Calvin Coolidge were more sympathetic toward the missionary and the church position, they were only trailing behind the latter in implementing a policy that was to gradually meet the Chinese demands.[3] Indeed, the hand-and-glove relationship which existed between

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[1]Quoted in Dorothy Borg, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928 (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947), p. 81.

[2]Ibid., pp. 123-31.

[3]Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965; reprint ed., New York: Atheneum, 1969), pp. 63-64; Borg, American Policy, p. 431.

President Wilson and his missionary friends was to a certain extent missing in the Coolidge administration.

In the 1930's the American missionaries in China further surpassed their Government in giving support and assistance to China. For instance, after the Sino-Japanese War finally broke out in 1937, American missionaries became very vocal in demanding that the U.S. Government take measures to help China repel Japanese aggression in China.[1]

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[1]Varg, Missionaries, p. 262.

PART I.

THE EARLY LIFE AND THE NANKING DECADE

CHAPTER II

THE FORMATIVE YEARS (1876-1904)

A. Family Tradition and Childhood in China

In a family history book the origins of the Stuarts were traced as far back as the eleventh century, when the Stuart forefathers accompanied William the Conqueror to England. Later on, one of them was appointed as Steward of Scotland by King David I (1124-53), a hereditary position for the Stuart family. In 1371 Robert Stuart became King Robert II of Scotland. Because of the religious persecution in the Reign of James I, Lord Andrew Stuart, a lineal descendant of the family, moved to Northern Ireland in 1619, and his descendants later migrated to Pennsylvania and then to Virginia between 1725 and 1745.[1]

It was this Scotch tradition of religious freedom and family experiences of religious persectuion that made the early Stuart settlers in this country very active in the American Revolution.[2] In addition to engaging in anti-British causes, the Stuarts were also prominent in religious and educational work. The first member in the Stuart family that became a pastor and missionary was Robert Stuart (1772-1856), John Leighton Stuart's great-grandfather. Robert Stuart first worked as a missionary in Virginia and in 1798 moved to Lexington, Kentucky, to teach Latin and

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[1]Robert Stuart Sanders, The Reverend Robert Stuart, D.D. 1772-1856 (Louisville, Kentucky: The Dunne Press, 1962), pp. 7-8.

[2]Ibid., p. 13.

Greek at Transylvania University.[1] Robert's second wife was Hannah Todd, sister to President Abraham Lincoln's wife, Mary Todd. One of Robert's sons, John Todd Stuart, later became Lincoln's law partner.[2]

David Todd Stuart, John Leighton's grandfather, started his career as a pastor in Shelby county, Kentucky, and from 1851 to 1868 was president of Shelbyville Female College.[3] Samuel Davies Stuart, John Leighton's grand uncle, was also an educator, firstly as a fund-raiser for Washington College (today's Washington and Lee University) and later a founder and president of Stonewall Jackson Female Institute in Abingdon, Virginia, between 1868 and 1873. He also served as Commissioner to the General Assembly of the Southern Presbyterian Church in Augusta, Georgia in 1861.[4] Altogether, in five generations, the descendants of Robert Stuart have produced thirteen Presbyterian ministers and many of them have also been Ruling Elders and Deacons in the Southern Presbyterian Church. John Linton Stuart, John Leighton's father, was a third generation minister.[5]

Rev. John Linton Stuart, a graduate of Washington and Jefferson College and Princeton Theological Seminary, and a school teacher for several years in Kentucky,[6] came to China at the age of twenty-eight to

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[1]Ibid., p. 17.

[2]Ibid., p. 18; John Leighton Stuart, Fifty Years in China: The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart, Missionary and Ambassador (New York: Random House, 1954), pp. 10-15.

[3]Sanders, The Reverend, p. 118.

[4]Ibid., pp. 147-48.

[5]Ibid., p. 161.

[6]E. C. Scott, comp., Ministerial Directory of the Presbyterian Church, U.S., 1861-1941 (Austin, Texas: Press of Von Boeckmann-Jones Co., 1942), p. 693.

begin his missionary career. He was first assigned to work with Rev. E. B. Inslee, who had started the work at Hangchow the previous year as the first Southern Presbyterian missionary. Less than one month after Stuart's arrival they and two other workers gathered together to form "The China Mission of the Southern Presbyterian Church in the United States."[1] The proselytizing strategy adopted by Stuart and his co-workers was three-fold: evangelical, medical, and educational. In the evangelical work, they preached in street chapels, sold gospel books, and visited households along the banks of the Grand Canal. In medical work, they set up small clinics to take care of local patients. In educational work, they established day schools and boarding schools.[2]

Mrs. Stuart was a mayor's daughter from Mobile, Alabama. When young she had already developed a broad compassion; she once asked herself, "What can I do for the starving millions in India . . . for the suffering women and children in China toddling on bound feet?"[3] She once served as principal of the Barton Academy and also conducted a private girl's school.[4] She married Stuart in 1874 and they came to China the same year.[5] She gave birth to four sons, John Leighton (June 24, 1876),

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[1]James E. Bear, Jr., "The China Mission of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S., 1867-1899," 5 vols., Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Virginia, 2: 71-73.

[2]Mary Horton Stuart, "Autobiography," chap. XV, Christian Observer, January 24, 1923.

[3]Elizabeth Logan Davis, Mothers of America: The Lasting Influence of the Christian Home (Westwood, N.J., 1954), p. 55.

[4]The Presbyterian Church in the U.S., The Missionary Survey, May 1914, p. 342 (hereafter cited as MS).

[5]Stuart, Fifty Years, p. 12.

David, Warren, and Robert, all of whom were born in China.[1] With no American school available, she taught all her children, and taught them well. John Leighton claimed that her teaching "must have been good, for my brother David and I were entered in the Mobile public schools without handicaps and were able to keep up in our classes."[2]

Mrs. Stuart found educational and medical work most effective in winning the Chinese to Christ.[3] At one time she was in charge of a girls' boarding school of approximately one hundred students and of two other day schools. She also founded a YWCA organization in her girls' school, the first such organization in China.[4]

In 1887 Rev. and Mrs. Stuart had their first furlough after having been in China for thirteen years. They brought their children with them to Mobile, Alabama. Since there would be no suitable secondary education in China, the Stuarts left their two eldest sons, John Leighton and David, in Mobile to start their high school education and took the two younger ones back to China the following year.[5] Because of his work in China, Rev. Stuart was awarded a D.D. degree by Southern Presbyterian University in Tennessee in 1906 and by the University of Omaha, Nebraska, in 1907. He died on November 24, 1913, in Hangchow after forty-five years of service in China.[6] Mrs. Stuart died in January, 1925, in Peking,

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[1]Ibid., p. 14.

[2]Ibid., p. 15.

[3]Mary Horton Stuart, "Autobiography," chap. IV, Christian Observer, November 8, 1922, p. 15.

[4]Idem, "Autobiography," chap. XXIII, Christian Observer, August 22, 1923, p. 15; chap. XXV, Christian Observer, September 5, 1923, p. 15.

[5]Stuart, Fifty Years, pp. 16-17.

[6]Scott, Ministerial Directory, p. 693.

having just celebrated her fiftieth anniversary of missionary work in China. She was buried in Hangchow.[1]

As to John Leighton's brothers, Robert died at the age of seven and was known by family friends as a "Little Missionary."[2] David was killed in a gun accident at the age of thirty-one while serving as a doctor and administrator in a missionary hospital in Soochow.[3] Warren was more of a scholar. Educated at Virginia, Union Theological Seminaries (Richmond and New York), and Columbia, he obtained a Ph.D. from Yale. Between 1910 and 1927 he served first as professor and then as president of Hangchow College and Nanking Theological Seminary. In 1927 he came back to America, and from then on he taught at several small American colleges until his death in the 1960's. He was the author of Use of Material from China's Spiritual Inheritance in Christian Education of Chinese Youth - A Guide and Sourcebook for Christian Teachers in China.[4]

B. Education and Early Consecration in America

During the furlough of John Leighton Stuart's parents in Mobile, in 1887, he and his brothers were taken to various meetings to arouse people's interest in mission work. The experiences of going were so unpleasant that he still remembered them years later:

> We little boys were made to dress in costume, eat with chopsticks, sing hymns in Chinese -- especially "Jesus loves me, this I know" -- and otherwise furnish an exhibit. When, later on, the two

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[1] P.F.P., "In Remembrance Mrs. Mary Horton Stuart," The Chinese Recorder, March 1925, p. 188 (hereafter cited as CR).

[2] Mary H. Stuart, "Autobiography," chap. VII, Christian Observer, November 29, 1922, p. 22.

[3] Bear, "China Mission," 3: 125-26.

[4] Scott, Ministerial Directory, p. 694.

older of us were left in Mobile this aggravated our unpleasant notoriety.[1]

In order to rear the boys to become good missionary stock their foster-parents imposed strict discipline. For instance, they had to walk, rather than take a streetcar, to church on Sunday and were denied such worldly pleasures as dancing and theatre going.[2] According to Stuart all this had created "an aversion for missionary life which lingered long."[3]

The stigma of being a missionary's son was not gradually removed until Stuart entered Pantops Academy at Charlottesville, Virginia in September, 1892 at the age of sixteen.[4] Pantops Academy was one of the best private academies in the South and a preparatory school for the University of Virginia.[5] Here Stuart developed his interest in Latin and Greek, and his academic performance was so excellent that he won the highest honors and the Gold Medal for the best average of the year.[6]

In the fall of 1893 Stuart was admitted to the Sophomore class of Hampden-Sydney College, Hampden-Sydney, Virginia. Stuart reported that by the 1950's it altogether turned out "one president of the United States, thirty members of Congress, eight governors of states and twenty college and university presidents."[7] As late as 1931 the precentage of its alumni listed in Who's Who surpassed that of Amherst and Harvard.[8]

Hampden-Sydney College enforced strong religious influence on students. All students were required to take Bible courses to fortify

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[1] Stuart, Fifty Years, p. 17.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 19.

[4] Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[5] Ibid., p. 19.

[6] Ibid., p. 20.

[7] Ibid., p. 21.

[8] Ibid.

them "against the materialistic and skeptical tendencies of the age."[1] The college authority also established the Foreign Mission Class and The Missionary Library on campus.[2]

Stuart revealed his missionary inclinations early in his college life. One year after entering college he submitted a short story, "The Lesson of Life," to a campus magazine. In the story he described how remorseful a British knight felt for his many senseless killings and how he finally decided to dedicate his life to the service of mankind.[3]

Stuart's religious interests were further revealed in a short commentary he wrote on Percy B. Shelley's Queen Mab. Though he claimed Shelley was his literary love, he nevertheless criticized his atheism:

> I was exceedingly grieved on noting his contempt of all Christian belief, and felt genuine pity for his vain attempts to indulge in logical argument.[4]

But having all these religious sentiments did not make Stuart eager to seek a missionary career: in fact, the very thought of becoming a missionary frightened him greatly. In his memoirs, published in 1954, he explained his dilemma at that time:

> My father's experiences seen through a little boy's impressions, the childish sorrows all blamed upon this origin, the increasing attractiveness of life in Virginia and of the teaching profession had all developed in me a violent reaction against foreign missions as a career.[5]

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[1]Hampden-Sydney College, Annual Catalogue, 1896, (Hampden-Sydney, Va., 1896), p. 24.

[2]YMCA of Hampden-Sydney College, Students Hand Book (Petersburg, Va.: Fenn & Owen, 1895), No. 2(September 1895): 37.

[3]Stuart, "The Lesson of Life," The Hampden-Sydney Magazine (Hampden-Sydney, Va.) 12, No. 2 (November 1894): 63-66.

[4]Stuart, "A Literary Idol," The Hampden-Sydney Magazine 7, No. 8 (May-June 1895): 303.

[5]Stuart, Fifty Years, p. 24.

This dilemma became more acute when he was confronted by the recruiting representatives of The Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, for it was then regarded "as almost axiomatic that any sincerely Christian young man or woman must show why he should not be a foreign missionary."[1] Though he was able to resist their recruitment efforts he admitted that he was "not able to evade the haunting issue."[2]

Stuart graduated from Hampden-Sydney College in June, 1896, second in his class, and delivered an oration in Greek at Commencement.[3] Beside this academic achievement, he had also figured prominently in many campus organizations and activities. He was president of the YMCA for three years, editor of the Students' Handbook and vice-president of the Junior Class, and Historian of the Senior Class.[4]

After graduation Stuart accepted a position at Pantops Academy to teach Latin and Greek. The teaching life was enjoyable and his relations with his students were extremely satisfactory to him. Stuart often asked himself this question, "Are you teaching Latin or are you teaching boys?" He claimed that his almost instinctive relationship with students was subsequently carried into Nanking Theological Seminary and Yenching University.[5]

During this time Stuart also developed further interest in religion. He attended two summer Christian conferences at Northfield,

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., pp. 22-23.

[4]Hampden-Sydney College, The Hampden-Sydney Kaleidoscope (Hampden-Sydney, Va.) 4 (1896): 21.

[5]Stuart, Fifty Years, pp. 25-26.

Massachusetts under the sponsorship of Y.M.C.A. and the Student Volunteer Movement. He was greatly impressed by famous evangelist Robert E. Speer's presentation of Jesus Christ, who now "became an adored Master and ideal object of a young man's enthusiastic devotion, instead of being primarily a theological doctrine about whose mysteriously sublime nature and attribute it was heretical to have any doubts."[1] This conception of Jesus was to remain with him for all his life.[2] Stuart's religious experience at Northfield plus his best friend's entrance into Union Theological Seminary at Richmond, Virginia, for theological studies finally prompted him also to seek his religious education there in the fall of 1899.[3]

The Society of Missionary Inquiry, one of the campus organizations at Union Theological Seminary, offered public addresses given by returned missionaries.[4] The leading textbook in the Society was The Evangelization of the World in This Generation by John Mott, a worldly renown evangelist.[5] Living under the influences of such missionary efforts Stuart could not but feel their pressure, and never more strongly than when a travelling secretary of the Student Volunteer Movement arrived on campus to recruit workers. The recruiter asked Stuart point-blank whether he would become a missionary. Confronted with this, Stuart was

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[1]Ibid., p. 26.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., pp. 26-27.

[4]Union Theological Seminary, Annual Catalogue of the Officers and Students of the Union Theological Seminary in Virginia for the Session 1898-1899 (Richmond, Va., 1899), p. 42.

[5]Stuart, "The Growth of the Missionary Spirit Among Us," The Union Theological Magazine (Richmond, Va.) 12, No. 2 (December 1900-January 1901): 45.

very tormented. In his memoirs, he recollected how he finally came to accept the call:

> That night I lay awake and heard the clock in the tower strike the hours until after five o'clock the next morning. It is difficult to exaggerate the aversion I had developed against going to China as a missionary. It was not the country so much as what I conceived to be the nature of the life and work -- haranguing crowds of idle, curious people in street chapels or temple fairs, selling tracts for almost nothing, being regarded with amused or angry contempt by the native population, physical discomforts or hardships, etc., no chance for intellectual or studious interests, a sort of living death or modern equivalent for retirement from the world. . . . Finally, I decided to put my religious belief to what was for me then the ultimate test. I would decide to be a missionary and have the satisfaction of proving to myself that Christianity was for me the supreme value . . . .[1]

Once the decision was made Stuart said he felt "contented, relieved, even enthusiastic."[2] He was now firmly convinced that missionary work was a worthy dedication. In an article he contributed to a campus magazine he declared,

> . . . the spirit of missions is indeed . . . the spirit of our Master, the very genius of our religion. The evangelization of the entire race is the only adequate object for such a life and death as that of Jesus, and the reason for existence of His church.[3]

From this time on, Stuart actively joined various religious activities both inside and outside the seminary. Several months before his graduation, the Fourth International Convention of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions was to be held in Toronto between February 26 and March 2, 1902. Stuart was selected as one of the four Seminary student representatives to attend this convention.[4]

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[1]Stuart, Fifty Years, pp. 28-30.

[2]Ibid., p. 30.

[3]Stuart, "The Growth of the Missionary Spirit Among Us," p. 152.

[4]The Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, World-Wide Evangelization: The Urgent Business of the Church (New York, 1902), p. 651.

Approximately 10,000 persons -- 2,995 of the college representatives -- attended this Toronto Convention.[1] The missionary task confronting the convention was forcibly explained by Dr. Robert E. Speer, one of the keynote speakers. In a speech entitled "The Abounding Resources of the Church," Speer first discussed the material resources of the leading Western nations. He pointed out that the amount of money spent by Great Britain in the war in South Africa and that spent by America during the three years of the Spanish and Philippine wars was "more than enough money to maintain 20,000 missionaries on the foreign field for more than an entire generation."[2] He further pointed out that "the United States was maintaining in the Philippines more soldiers than we would need missionaries to evangelize the world."[3] Next he discussed the moral resources of the Christian church. He claimed that "no other religion can provide the moral sanctions with which civilization can live, except Christianity."[4] He attributed the transformation of Japan since the 1860's to the influence of Western or Christian ideas. He therefore asserted that "the missionary enterprise is the supreme enterprise of moral glory and power in the world."[5] In view of all these abounding resources of the Christian Chruch, Speer concluded his speech by asking the student delegates in the convention, "shall we not rise up tonight in the power that He can give, in answer to His appeal, and go after Him?"[6]

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[1]The Presbyterian Church in the U.S., The Missionary 35, No. 4 (April 1902): 163-64.

[2]The Student Volunteer Movement, World-Wide Evangelization, pp. 210-11.

[3]Ibid., p. 214.

[4]Ibid., p. 215-16.

[5]Ibid., p. 216.

[6]Ibid., p. 220.

Many students were deeply moved by Speer, and Stuart was one of them. In an editorial he wrote for the Seminary magazine after the convention, Stuart remarked that the Toronto meeting was "a splendid triumph for evangelical Christianity;" "The greatest student gathering the world has yet mustered together;" and "one of the most transforming experiences" in the lives of many student attendants. To summarize the entire convention Stuart quoted John Mott's parting benediction, "Therefore be ye steadfast, immovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, for as much as ye know that your labor is not in vain in the Lord."[1]

Besides Stuart's being tremendously affected by the convention, a more consequential occurrence was his decision to launch a "Forward Movement" for his church. During the previous summer, Stuart had worked for Charles A. Rowland, a broker in Athens, Georgia, and an active layman who had been conducting a student missionary compaign. For many summers Rowland had sent many seminary students to various churches to promote general interest in foreign missions.[2] At this time the mission work of the Southern Presbyterian Church had reached a standstill for lack of funds, and Stuart and Rowland decided to join in efforts to supply them. They had heard about the "Forward Movement" that had been promoted by a Christian layman, Dr. Luther D. Wishart. This movement was to send special workers to visit various churches to secure their pledges to support one or a number of missionaries or mission stations. The revolutionary nature of the whole movement was that a direct and intimate relationship could be developed between the sponsoring church and the sponsored

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[1]Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Virginia, The Union Seminary Magazine 12, No. 4 (April-May 1902): 313-15.

[2]The Missionary, March 1902, p. 104.

missionaries in the field, a relationship like the one between Apostle Paul and the church at Philippi. This arrangement was entirely different from the previous one in which the churches were only contributing to general missionary funds and had no direct contact with the distant missionaries. This method of securing mission support had been practiced by Northern Presbyterian and Congregational Churches.[1]

After coming to the convention, Stuart and Rowland immediately sought Dr. Luther D. Wishart's advice regarding introduction of this movement into the Southern Presbyterian Church. Wishart strongly endorsed the idea, so they decided to initiate the plan upon their return to the States. At the convention a young man from Princeton Theological Seminary, J.F. Preston, expressed interest in the movement, so he was invited to join. Later, Stuart also recruited his roomate at the Union Theological Seminary, Lacy I. Moffett.[2]

Upon their return they immediately presented their plan for approval to the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions of the Southern Presbyterian Church. The Committee readily gave its approval, and appointed Stuart, Preston, and Moffett as the special representatives of the Forward Movement in May 1902.[3] In the same month Stuart graduated from the Seminary with high honors;[4] and was also ordained and licensed

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[1]Interview with Rev. J. F. Preston, Decatur, Georgia, April 19, 1973; also, The Student Volunteer Movement, World-Wide Evangelization, pp. 191-97.

[2]Interview with Rev. Preston.

[3]The Missionary 36, No. 4 (April 1903): 149-51.

[4]An examination of his academic record at the Seminary shows that he maintained one of the highest grade averages in his class of about twenty-five. See, Union Theological Seminary, "Record of Examinations, Grades and Absences in Union Theological Seminary, 1893-1918."

by the East Hanover Presbytery, Virginia.[1]

From May 18, 1902 to October 31, 1904 Stuart worked with his two co-workers in many parts of the South. Their first goal was to secure support from churches for the missionaries already in the field. When this was accomplished, they then sought their support for the outgoing missionaries.[2] They sought funds not only from the churches but also from such groups as Ladies' Missionary Societies,[3] and they visited educational institutions to recruit more mission volunteers.[4] Through two years' hard work they had gathered 307 churches and twenty-seven individuals to support the Forward Movement. The per member annual contribution to mission funds within this group increased from $1.00 in 1902 to $1.58 in 1904.[5] The aggregate amount of money contributed in 1902 was $66,672 and in 1904 it shot up to $102,615. This increase in mission donations was larger by percentage than that of any other denominational church in North America.[6]

Despite all these successes, a crisis developed between Stuart, his co-workers, and some returned missionaries on the one hand, and Dr. S. H. Chester, Secretary of the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions, on the other. In their close contact with Dr. Chester, Stuart and his

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[1]See the folder on Stuart in the Library of the Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Virginia.

[2]The Missionary 36, No. 4 (April 1903): 151,153.

[3]The Missionary 36, No. 4 (April 1903): 156.

[4]The Missionary 36, No. 6 (June 1903): 253.

[5]The Missionary, May 1904, p. 212. Also, The Presbyterian Church in the U.S., Presbyterian Standard, June 1, 1904.

[6]The Missionary, May 1904, p. 212.

friends found that the Secretary, ignorant of missionary work and having little interest in the Forward Movement, was mishandling his administration and becoming an object of widespread dissatisfaction to missionaries in the foreign field.[1] Therefore, in May 1904, they appealed to the Executive Committee on Foreign Missions for his removal. This immediately triggered an acrimonious exchange of arguments and denunciations. Dr. Chester's supporters denounced Stuart and his friends as demagogues,[2] spies,[3] and traducers[4] in need of scourging and also the time to grow up into better men.[5] They also attributed the phenomenal success of the Forward Movement to Chester's able leadership.[6] When the votes were finally taken in the General Assembly to decide this matter, Chester was retained by a margin of 83 to 58.[7]

This whole episode was the first taste of defeat for Stuart in church politics, foreboding his difficulties with the Southern Presbyterian Church in the 1920's, which we shall discuss in a later chapter. But Stuart was not subdued by this defeat nor discouraged in his fervor for mission work. Since his work with the Forward Movement was largely done now, and since he felt that he should live up to his original pledge to become a missionary at the first opportunity,[8] he and Moffett petitioned

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[1] Presbyterian Standard, June 1, 1904, p. 16.

[2] Ibid., P. 17.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., June 22, 1906, p. 4.

[5] Ibid., pp. 4-5.

[6] Ibid., June 1, 1904, p. 21.

[7] Ibid., p. 17.

[8] Stuart, Fifty Years, pp. 32-33.

the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions to allow them to go to China. The Executive Committee first gave its consent in June,[1] later changed its mind and asked them to continue their work for the Forward Movement until October 31, 1904. Both accepted this request, and they further raised $11,500 for seven physicians to go to the mission fields.[2]

Before their departure for China, both decided to get married, and at the same time. During their Forward Movement trips to New Orleans they had met Stuart's two distant cousins and become interested in them. In a double wedding on November 17, 1904, in New Orleans, Stuart married Aline Rodd and Moffett, Kate. The two couples sailed for China and reached Shanghai toward the end of December, where they were met by Stuart's parents.[3] For all the Stuarts this was a family reunion after a separation of sixteen years.

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[1]The Missionary, July 1904, p. 358.

[2]Ibid., August 1904, pp. 393-94.

[3]Stuart, Fifty Years, pp. 33-35.

CHAPTER III

TO CONVERT THE CHINESE COMMON PEOPLE IN HANGCHOW

Hangchow had been the capital of the Southern Sung Dynasty from 1132 to 1276, and in the Ch'ing Dynasty was capital of Chekiang province. It had a population near one million in 1904.[1] Its fame was based on its cultural attainments, its economic prosperity, and its scenic West Lake. Hangchow was among the prefectures of unusual academic success in Ch'ing times and produced 1,000 doctoral graduates (chin-shih), the second highest number in the empire.[2] Furthermore, it boasted of "more nationally famous libraries than any other large urban center" in Ch'ing times.[3] According to Ho Ping-ti, the chief reason for all these achievements was "that the delta along the Hangchow Bay and the T'ai-hu Lake was among the country's most advanced areas of rice, tea, and silk production and that this area's great economic and human resources could not in the long run fail to be translated into academic success."[4] A U.S. consular report of 1904 pointed out that Hangchow was a commercial center, wherein

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[1]The Missionary, May 1904, p. 226.

[2]Ho Ping-ti, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368-1911 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), pp. 246-47. The highest was the metropolitan prefecture of Shun-t'ien, producing 1,038 chin-shih.

[3]Ibid., p. 253.

[4]Ibid., p. 252.

Anhwei's teas and Chekiang's silk were transported to Shanghai, and then from there to the U.S. and elsewhere. Its trade volume for 1903 was worth $5,742,118 in gold.[1]

Stuart and his wife reached Hangchow on the New Year's Eve of 1905.[2] At this time China was more receptive toward mission work than during the pre-1900 period. After China's humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and especially after the Boxer fiasco, China, both its officialdom and people, had become more fearful of the foreigners and more submissive toward things foreign, such as modern sciences and alien religions. A missionary speaker before the Tientsin Missionary Association in 1904 claimed that the Sino-Japanese War "pricked the bubble of Chinese superiority," and the "civil and military officials are more courteous and respectful than formerly," and that "the scholars and the gentry . . . are more social and willing to come into friendly relations with us as never before."[3] But the situation in the Hangchow and T'ai-hu Lake areas was not as friendly as this speaker might have thought.

Several months before Stuart's arrival, a Bostonian, who worked in the Imperial Maritime Customs at Hangchow, raped a Chinese country woman at Kashing, a nearby city northeast of Hangchow. The person who brought the charge against this rapist was Rev. John Linton Stuart, Stuart's father.[4] At Hu-chou, also a nearby city, a serious land dispute

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[1]U.S. Consular Archives, M-106 (Hangchow), 1904-1906, Consul George E. Anderson to Honorable Francis B. Loomis (Assistant Secretary of State), November 24, 1904.

[2]Stuart, Fifty Years, p. 35.

[3]C. A. Stanley, "The New Conditions in China," CR, June 1904, pp. 289, 291.

[4]U.S. Consular Archives, M-106, September 30, 1904.

developed between the Southern Methodist Mission and some of the local gentry; they could not reach any satisfactory solution after several years' litigation.[1] But in the process some of the gentry called mass meetings, trying to intimidate the missionaries involved.[2] The local governmental officials would not restrain these agitators for fear of being impeached by them.[3] Also, several American missionaries were attacked and the property of many Chinese converts damaged by Chinese rioters in the vicinity of Hangchow.[4] In late 1905 a nearby magistrate even ordered several Chinese converts beaten to death.[5] During the 1905 Chinese anti-American boycott in China, a protest against the Exclusion Act restricting Oriental immigration, the American vice-consul at Hangchow reported many anti-American posters.[6] A few months later, he complained to the State Department that some American missionaries were interfering with "purely native suits at law," with "such cases arising in this section of the country almost daily."[7]

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[1]U.S. Consular Archives, M-106, 1904-1906, passim.

[2]Ibid., Vice-Consul Frederick D. Cloud to Honorable Robert Bacon [Assistant Secretary of State], March 29, 1906.

[3]Ibid., Cloud to Honorable W.W. Rockhill [American Minister in Peking], April 5, 1906.

[4]Ibid., Consul George E. Anderson to Governor Nieh, January 2, 1905; Vice-Consul Frederick D. Cloud to Honorable Francis B. Loomis, April 21, 1905; Cloud to Loomis, April 25, 1905.

[5]Ibid., Cloud to W.W. Rockhill, November 17, 1905.

[6]Ibid., Cloud to Robert Beacon, December 9, 1905. As to the anti-American boycott in 1905, see Akira Iriye, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Case of Late Ch'ing China," in Approaches to Modern Chinese History, ed., Albert Feuerwerker et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 223-31.

[7]Ibid., Cloud to Bacon, February 20, 1906; Cloud to Rev. J. E. Shoemaker, February 18, 1906.

It was in this tense atmosphere that Stuart started his missionary career in Hangchow. His initial attitude was anything but enthusiastic, for he admitted that "now there began for me the revival of my old aversion as I realized the feeble results of my father's life-long labors, the small church membership of very humble people."[1] His first year's task was to study the Chinese language, and in this he succeeded rather well, probably due to his impressions of it in his childhood and to his previous general training as a language teacher. Because he was born in China and the son of Rev. Stuart, he was treated very well and taken into confidence by many Chinese around him.[2]

The Southern Presbyterian Church had established two missions in China, the North Kiangsu Mission and the Mid-China Mission. The geographical dividing line between the two missions was the Yangtze River. The famous missionary in the North Kiangsu Mission was Rev. Absalom Sydensticker, the father of Pearl S. Buck. In the Mid-China Mission the total staff in the year of 1907 was about 50 foreign missionaries and 100 native workers. But since the goal for the mission was to convert the entire 5 million people living in North Chekiang and South Kiangsu, the ratio was 1 foreigner and 2 natives for each 20,000 Chinese.[3] Its actual achievements, in contrast to its ambitious goals, were disappointing. After nearly 40 years of labor since its founding in 1867 and more than 5 million dollars spent,[4] the number of actual communicants of the mission

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[1]Stuart, Fifty Years, p. 35.

[2]Ibid., p. 36.

[3]The China Mission of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S., The Bi-Monthly Bulletin, July-October 1907, p. 118 (hereafter cited as TBMB).

[4]Bear, "China Mission," 3: 354.

was only about 1,000 in 1906.[1] The total number of ordained Chinese pastors was only 3 by 1908.[2] Altogether the Mission had established 12 central, organized churches and 27 outstation (chapel) congregations.[3] Probably the only impressive achievement was in the area of education. The Hangchow station, for example, had established 7 elementary schools, 2 boarding schools, and 1 girls' high school; the total enrollment of all these schools was 275.[4]

After having intensively studied Chinese for almost one year, Stuart in late 1905 was ready to join in the evangelistic work. His salary came from the Central Presbyterian Church of Washington, D. C., where he had tried his first Forward Movement appeal, and which now appointed him its field missionary.[5] From late 1905 to the fall of 1908, Stuart's main responsibilities at the mission station can be divided into three areas: pastoral, educational, and social service. After 1908 he joined the Presbyterian Union Theological Seminary of Central China, the forerunner of the later reknowned Nanking Theological Seminary.

In his pastoral service his first assignment was to be in charge of Tso Kya Gyao in Hangchow, a city church of about 25 worshippers, and the Teh-tsing field, which included about 50 villages with 208 Christians.[6]

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[1]Ibid., p. 355.

[2]Ibid., p. 357.

[3]Ibid., p. 355.

[4]Ibid., p. 174.

[5]Stuart, Fifty Years, p. 31; Central Presbyterian Church of Washington, D.C., "Minutes of Session, April 10, 1905," p. 103.

[6]TBMB, "The Year 1905," May-June 1906.

Within the year Stuart baptized his first Chinese convert; but to his chagrin this man was afterwards repeatedly persecuted for trying to observe the requirements of his faith, such as not working on the Sabbath.[1] Despite some successes Stuart found people at Teh-tsing "the hardest to reach."[2] Their difficulty with Christianity, according to Stuart, was not necessarily in its theology, but rather in its high standards of conduct. For businessmen, keeping the Sabbath would put them behind their competitors. For the people who were working for the local government, it was impossible to live a Christian life while serving in a system which was absolutely corrupt and decadent. Since Teh-tsing was the seat of a district magistrate, and many local people were in one way or another connected with the local yamen, many of them could not accept Christianity. For the opium addicts, who made up sixty per cent of the city population, accepting Christianity would mean the termination of their habits.[3] As to the theological conflicts with the Chinese social norms, Stuart admitted that ancestor worship was one of the major obstacles to conversion.[4] At this time Stuart shared the view of the fundamentalistic missionaries that ancestor worship was in clear violation of Christian faith, and favored its abolition.[5]

In 1907 Stuart was sent to oversee the work at Lingan District,

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[1]TBMB, "Persecution and Progress at Tso Kya Gyao," November - December 1906, p. 132.

[2]Stuart, "From the City of Teh-Tsing," The Missionary, February 1906, p. 68.

[3]Ibid., p. 69.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Stuart, "A Pastoral Visit," The Missionary, January 1906, p. 29.

still within the Hangchow prefecture. One of the two outstations in the district was Wang-pan. The work there was much harder, for the area was infested with robbers. Though these robbers were hesitant to attack foreigners, they were ruthless toward Chinese church helpers and converts. Stuart claimed that the local officials were in league with these robbers so as to get shares in the spoils. In any lawsuit involving a Chinese convert, Stuart refrained from exerting his influence on the local magistrate. But this restraint on the part of Stuart made the magistrate "more unwilling than ever to help the Christians, and their own clan and village have disowned them, so they are humanly helpless."[1]

In educational service Stuart was appointed Secretary to the Joint Educational Committee, which had been established by the Central China Mission of the Northern Presbyterian Church and the Mid-China Mission of the Southern Presbyterian Church. The Committee was to find ways to coordinate the programs of various schools that had been set up by both missions so as to avoid duplication and waste. Though we do not know the exact contribution made by Stuart to the work of the Committee, we can get some impressions from the recommendations submitted by the Committee regarding mission education. These recommendations can also give us some idea of the extensiveness of mission education in the lower Yangtze area. The Committee made the following suggestions in 1907: the Hangchow College and the Hangchow Girls' School would become the colleges for both missions, offering four-year courses; the schools for boys and for girls at Shanghai, Ningpo, Soochow, and Kiangyin would constitute academies, with four-year courses and a uniform curriculum; and primary schools should

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[1]Stuart, The Work at Wang-pan, China," The Missionary, May 1907, pp. 198-99.

be provided as far as possible among the stations and outstations.[1]

Stuart was very enthusiastic about mission education, especially after the Ch'ing court both abolished the examination system and inaugurated a modern educational policy in 1905. Stuart pointed out that Western education was "most eagerly sought after in China now."[2] He was very happy to see that women's education had begun to develop in China. In his article discussing the Hangchow Girls' School Stuart stated that after China had "disregarded the betterment of its women" for milleniums, now it was imitating and patronizing Christian woman's education.[3] Stuart proudly pointed out that the Hangchow Girls' School, in which his mother had labored for so many years, was the third oldest girls' school in China, and that "we are now able to gradually get away from the old charity pupil era into one of complete -- or, at least, partial -- self-support."[4] However, Stuart's enthusiasm for girls' education was not only for its intrinsic value, but also for its evangelizing effects. He said that through this educational work the opportunity was created to "mold lives that can become centers for good all through this region as Christian wives and mothers whose characters and culture shall win others around them to the Master,"[5] and "to reach classes hitherto inaccessible, and still remaining so."[6]

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[1]"Report of Educational Committee," TBMB, January-February 1907, pp. 8-9.

[2]Stuart, "The Mid-China Mission: 'And Shall We not Look for a Larger Rate of Increase,'" The Missionary, February 1907, p. 63.

[3]Stuart, "The Hangchow Girls' School Building," The Missionary, June 1907, p. 281.

[4]Ibid., p. 282.

[5]Ibid., p. 281.

[6]Ibid., p. 282.

In addition to championing coordination in, and strengthening of, regular mission education, Stuart from 1907 to 1911 also personally conducted many Bible Training Cleases for Chinese lay workers. The purpose of these classes was "to give Biblical instruction and practical training for Christian service, especially with a view to qualifying and inspiring the Christians themselves to act as voluntary leaders for local congregations."[1] These classes usually lasted about two weeks with an attendance of anywhere between thirty and fifty people. The students paid for their own rice, and the missionaries supplied fuel, sleeping quarters, and other necessities.[2]

In social service, Stuart once joined with others to form a relief mission to go to famine-stricken North Kiangsu in 1907. He must have been terribly affected by the scene he saw there, for he reported that the starving were eating "the cakes that were made of bark ground into meal and mixed with weeds, leaves of sweet-potato vines, wild violets and other green stuff, with a little flour, when it could be obtained." Stuart and his group labored there for some time to assist their fellow workers of the North Kiangsu Mission.[3] In other areas of social service, Stuart also participated in some campaigns against opium smoking and gambling which had been organized by the local gentry in 1907.[4]

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[1]Stuart, "Tung-Teh Training Class," TBMB, January-February 1910, p. 21.

[2]P.F.P., "The Teh-tsing Training Class," TBMB, March-April 1907, pp. 43-45; Stuart, "The Tunghsiang-Tehtsing Training Class," TBMB, January-February 1909, pp. 163-64; Stuart, "Tung-Teh Training Class," TBMB, January-February 1910, pp. 21-23; Stuart, "Tehtsing Training Class," TBMB, January-February 1911, pp. 185-86.

[3]John Linton Stuart, "Notes from Hangchow," The Missionary, October 1907, p. 489.

[4]Stuart, "Hangchow Notes," TBMB, March-April 1907, p. 51-52.

In February, 1908, Stuart wrote an article entitled, "The Missionary and the Chinese," in which he summarized the things in China that had repelled him and those that had attracted him. It is worthwhile to review his thoughts here, for they represented the result of his first three years of evangelical service in China. Among the things Stuart disliked were China's omnipresent dirt, the universal disrepair of things Chinese, the tedious monotony of the land and her people's "wickedness, dishonesty, greed, and immorality." Qualities which attracted him included the endurance and glory of Chinese civilization and the intense Chinese desire to modernize according to the model of the West. But China's modernization also frightened Stuart, for she would eventually turn into a great power, a power that might threaten the whole world because of her size and population. Noting the rise of Japan after modernization, Stuart asked his readers: "What will be the result when she [China] enters the fellowship of those who think?" He also feared that China would seek progress at the expense of her cultural heritage. Stuart proposed to avert the dangers in China's rapid change by Christianizing her and by encouraging her to maintain her humane traditions. (However, he did not define these traditions.) Stuart's argument makes clear that at this time he saw no incompatibility between Christianity and a respect for Chinese culture. Although he felt that Christianity would most benefit China when together with a respect for native traditions, his emphasis is clearly upon proselytizing for Christianity. He reminded his missionary friends that they were in China "at the making of a nation," and that the Church had called them to evangelize the world in this generation and only twenty-one years were left to complete that job in China, a job he termed as the most

"daring and stupendous" in the history of the Church.[1]

In restrospect, Stuart's ideas in this article can be compared with those of the leading thinkers of his day. On the one hand, he seemed to agree with Mahan that the best way to arrest the Yellow Peril was to Christianize it. But on the other, since he did not consider China a barbarous state, he seemed to agree with men like Andrew Raymond that the blessings of the West should be given to the East, or even with Ernest Fenollosa that a common humanity between East and West should be formed based on mutual experience and merits.[2] Furthermore, he echoes many American church leaders of the 1890's and early 1900's in making no differentiation between Christianization and Westernization; to such churchmen, the two were essentially the same.[3]

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[1]Stuart, "The Missionary and the Chinese," The Missionary, February 1908, pp. 61-63.

[2]Akira Iriye, "East and West in Nineteenth-Century American Thought," in Papers on China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960) 14: 84.

[3]Handy, Christian America, chap. V.

CHAPTER IV

ACADEMIC AND MINISTRY WORK AT THE NANKING THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Stuart's parish work with the Hangchow Station reached an end in late 1908, when he was invited by the Presbyterian Union Theological Seminary of Central China in Nanking to become its Professor of New Testament Language and Literature. From our available records, this offer was not solicited by Stuart. In fact, he had even refused it two or three times earlier and his final acceptance was only made after his mission station had urged him to do so.[1] Therefore, Stuart's acceptance of seminary teaching was not because of his dislike of routine parish work. But he was not strongly interested in parish work either, for besides his childhood abhorrence of it, he also found the mission atmosphere at Hangchow to be "severe" and "repressive."[2] At any rate, he expressed doubts about his suitability as a parish evangelist: "Whether or not I could have spent my life happily and successfully as a typical 'evangelical missionary' is a question about which I have more than once whimsically speculated."[3] But Stuart was never to regret his decision to accept the seminary position. It was in Nanking that he experienced the major political turbulence during and after the 1911 Revolution, and there his horizon of service was raised to include Christian enterprises

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[1]Stuart, Fifty Years, pp. 39-40.

[2]Ibid., p. 37.

[3]Ibid., p. 39.

larger than his routine and simple work as a country pastor.

There, also, were recognized those talents as an excellent Christian educator which were to lead him to become president of Yenching University in 1919. But at this time he was certainly not aware of such a future and responded to the seminary calling only in the way a good Christian worker should. With such an attitude he proceeded to Nanking early in 1909 to take up his assignment with the Presbyterian Union Seminary.

From early 1909 until early 1919, Stuart performed many duties both within and without the Seminary. Besides teaching, he produced several significant publications. Having been situated in Nanking and having witnessed major political developments there, he made many incisive comments in his communications with friends and in his published writings. Stuart had always viewed the conversion of Chinese intellectuals as an important step in the total conversion of China; for that reason, he engaged in some evangelical work among them. During these years his views on foreign missions and the problem of domestication of Christianity in China became mature and pronounced. His own theology was visibly affected by the influence of the social gospel and liberal theology that had gained momentum in American Protestantism since the turn of the century.

A. Academic Service at the Nanking Theological Seminary

The history of the Presbyterian Union Theological Seminary of Central China can be traced to 1854, when a Bible Training Class was established in a Presbyterian Boys' Boarding School at Ningpo. The purpose of this class was to raise up a native ministry. In 1864 two graduates

from this class were ordained.[1] As the work of the Presbyterian missions in the lower Yangtze area increased, more native workers came to be needed. Therefore, Presbyterian missionary conferences in 1893, 1901, and 1903, all recommended the establishment of a union theological seminary in central China.[2] Finally the Northern and the Southern Presbyterian Missions elected a board of directors for the proposed seminary, and the latter convened its first meeting on November 10, 1904. At this meeting the name of the seminary was chosen to be the Presbyterian Union Theological Seminary, and its program was to be for three years and to follow the traditional western theological curriculum of that time. Since it was very difficult to find students for seminary education at the time, no special scholastic standards were required for admission. As to the creed of the Seminary, it was decided that "the standards of doctrine shall be the Word of God as interpreted by the Westminster Confession of Faith, the Catechisms, and other standards as are held in common by both Churches controlling the Seminary;" and "each professor was asked to qualify for service by subscribing to a pledge to support these standards."[3]

After almost another two years of preparation, the first term of the Seminary began in October,1906, with 34 students, 10 of them enrolled in the regular seminary program and 24 in the lower-grade Bible training program.[4] When Stuart started his career at the Seminary its student body

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[1]Frank Wilson Price, History of Nanking Theological Seminary, 1911 to 1961 (New York: Board of Founders of Nanking Theological Seminary, 1961), p. 2.

[2]Ibid., p. 3

[3]Ibid., p. 4.

[4]Ibid.

increased to 43, from 4 provinces.[1]

During this period the Seminary underwent many changes. In September, 1911, when the Nanking Bible Training School was established, the Seminary first lent its buildings for the former's use, and later incorporated the Training School as a department of the Seminary.[2] In 1912 the name of the Seminary was changed to Nanking School of Theology.[3] In December 1913 it was joined by the Nanking Bible College (Disciples) and the Methodist Fowler School of Theology at Kiukiang, Kiangsi, to thus make it an interdenominational institution.[4] In 1917 it came to be called the Nanking Theological Seminary, a name which remained until 1952.[5] From 2 professors and 34 students in 1906, it had grown to at least 20 faculty members and 106 students by 1919.[6] From a non-degree program in 1906, it had developed by 1919 a three-year graduate B.D. program for college graduates, a four-year diploma program for regular students, and also a primary-grade Bible program for lay workers.[7] Despite this impressive growth, the Seminary nevertheless suffered some internal dissension. This occurred in 1916, when the North Kiangsu Mission of the Southern Presbyterian Church became very suspicious of some alleged heretical or liberal teachings by

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Ibid., pp. 5-7.

[3]Ibid., p. 7.

[4]Ibid., p. 9.

[5]Ibid., p. 10.

[6]Ibid., p. 4; Nanking Theological Seminary, Nanking Theological Seminary, 1918-1919: Annual Meeting, March, 1919 (n.p., n.d.), pp. 6-7.

[7]Price, History of Nanking Theological Seminary, pp. 11-12.

certain faculty members in the Seminary and brought charges against them. When the Seminary authority refused to honor these charges, the North Kiangsu Mission withdrew its support of the Seminary.[1] During this heresy hunt Stuart was also suspected, though no action was taken against him. However, Stuart believed that had he stayed longer in the Seminary, "it is quite possible that with the growth of aggressive fundamentalism among China missionaries, I might have become a target and involved the Seminary in a theological controversy than which none can be more obnoxious."[2]

Stuart contributed to the growth of the Seminary in both administration and scholarship. In 1913 he was in charge of the management of the Bible Study Classes, which were organized by the Seminary and which had an enrollment of 150 students from the government schools in Nanking.[3] In the same year he was awarded a Doctor of Divinity degree by his Alma Mater, Hampden-Sydney College, for his work in China.[4] In 1915, during his furlough in the United States, he was asked to do fund-raising for the Seminary.[5] In the same year he also served as chairman of the faculty of its Presbyterian Department.[6] In 1916 Stuart was involved in solving the problem of its legal status. Because of the refusal of the state of

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[1]Ibib., p. 10

[2]Stuart, Fifty Years, pp. 44-45.

[3]Nanking School of Theology, Third Annual Meeting of Board of Managers, May 20, 1913 (n.p., n.d.), p. 13.

[4]Hampden-Sydney College, Bulletin of Hampden-Sydney College, 1913 (Hampden-Sydney, Va., 1913), p. 10.

[5]Nanking School of Theology, The Fifth Meeting of the Board of Managers of the Nanking School of Theology, February 2nd-3rd, 1915 (Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1915), p. 5.

[6]TBMB, January-February 1916, p. 739.

New York to grant a separate incorporation for it, the Seminary asked the trustees of the University of Nanking, also a missionary-operated institution, to hold the Seminary's property in trust on behalf of the missionary societies which owned it. Since the Seminary had its own board of managers and would have liked to maintain its autonomy, Stuart was asked to seek legal opinions clarifying, first, the ownership of the facility, and, second, the legal relationship of the trustees to it.[1] In 1917 Stuart was appointed as a committee member to study a proposed cooperation plan in the work of the affiliated Bible Training School. He was also asked to seek the Southern Methodist Mission's cooperation and financial contribution to such a plan.[2]

In his academic work at the Seminary Stuart taught a variety of subjects: New Testament, History of Modern Missions, Church History, and New Testament Greek.[3] His chief contribution to scholarship was probably his publication of a Greek-Chinese-English Dictionary of the New Testament in 1918. (Before its publication Stuart had already published a primer for his Greek class, Essentials of New Testament Greek in Chinese.) Stuart spent about five years compiling this dictionary, which was praised by a Chinese Biblical scholar, Dr. Cheng Ching-i, as an epoch-making contribution to the subject, the most outstanding since the beginning of the

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[1]Nanking School of Theology, Sixth Meeting of the Board of Managers, January 25th-27th, 1916 (Shanghai, 1916), pp. 4-5.

[2]Nanking Theological Seminary, Eighth Meeting of the Board of Managers, June 5-7, 1917 (Shanghai, 1917), pp. 3,6.

[3]Presbyterian Union Theological Seminary of Central China, Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Board of Directors, 1908-9 (Shanghai, 1909), p. 9.

Christian Church in China.[1] This dictionary was used for many years in Chinese theological seminaries.[2]

On December 10, 1918, Stuart received a cablegram from the board of trustees of Peking University, a union mission institution in Peking that would later become Yenching University, inviting him to become president. In February, 1919, he accepted the invitation and resigned his position at the Nanking Theological Seminary. In a letter to his home church in Washington, D.C., he offered two reasons for his decision. First, Peking University was located in the nation's capital, and missionary education could be most adequately visualized there. In this regard, Stuart indicated that he had been advised by Dr. Paul Reinsch, American Minister to China, that Peking offered "the most important educational opportunity in the East." Second, since Peking University had a School of Theology and could be developed into the best theological institution in China to train college graduates, Stuart felt that his long-held ambitions in theological education could be realized by going there. In conclusion, he believed that Peking would be the place where he "could count most for the Christian Movement in China," and that his acceptance of such a call was "the greatest venture of faith and courage" that he had ever attempted.[3]

With great reluctance the Nanking Theological Seminary accepted

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[1]Cheng Ching-i, Preface to Greek-Chinese-English Dictionary of the New Testament, by John Leighton Stuart (Hankow, 1948), p. i.

[2]Ibid., "cover page"; Interview with Professor M. Searle Bates, Union Theological Seminary, New York, on various occasions in 1972.

[3]Stuart, "My dear friends," February 13, 1919, Board of World Missions, Stuart Letter File, pp. 1-2 (hereafter cited as SLF).

Stuart's resignation; its Faculty Report praised Stuart as "the leading spirit in the development of the ideals and in outlining the program for which this school stands."[1]

With the blessings of his colleagues and students at the Seminary, Stuart arrived in Peking in early June. Even though the first days of his duties at Peking University were interrupted by the May Fourth Movement, he was very much excited to see that a young China was on the rise.[2]

B. To Convert the Chinese Students and Intellectual Class in Nanking

In the summer of 1910 Stuart wrote a letter to his friends in America which described conditions in China, and which identified forces there both for discord and for harmony. On the one hand, the nation was politically "in a state of seething change and unrest of every kind, and daring rapid reform along all lines of modern civilization," but on the other hand, "the masses, especially in the interior, are going on with their grinding struggle for more existence very much as they did two or three thousand years ago with little either of help or hindrance from the new order."[3] In mission work he saw causes both for discouragement and joy. On the one hand, the traditional prejudices of the official and literary classes against Christianity still persisted. On the other, those classes seemed to have "a growing recognition of the need of some moral or

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[1]"Report of the Faculty of the Nanking Theological Seminary, March 23, 1919," MS, January 1920, p. 10.

[2]Stuart, "My dear friends," June 16, 1919, SLF, pp. 1-4.

[3]Stuart, "Conditions in China," The Missionary, November 1910, p. 540.

religious basis not at present at their command and a turning intellectually toward Christianity."[1] The Chinese church, though its growth was slow and only reached the lower classes, had developed "an increasing national Christian consciousness, and a desire for independence." Stuart concluded his letter by saying, "It is a thrilling time to live and work for China."[2]

This letter pretty much portrayed the problems that all China missionaries faced on the eve of the collapse of the Manchu dynasty. In fact, the problems raised by Stuart were the ones that he tried to solve in his next decade of work at Nanking. He and many similarly-minded missionary workers saw their mission in China to be threefold: first, to evangelize her intellectuals and masses and to make the former become leaders of a new moral or social order; second, to assist China in her efforts to make domestic reforms and to resist foreign aggression; third, to naturalize Christianity and to establish a truly Chinese church that would be self-independent, self-supporting, and self-propagating. This section will present only his work in the first area.

In 1910, the same year in which Stuart wrote the above letter, the first World Missionary Conference was held in Edinburgh, Scotland. Among many decisions reached by the Conference was one establishing an International Missionary Council; in order to establish this Council it was further decided that regional committees would have to be first formed as constituent members. For this purpose, the Edinburgh Conference set up a Continuation Committee and appointed Mr. John Mott its chairman. Mr.

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Ibid., p. 542.

Mott came to China in 1913, and within the year six regional conferences were held and the China Continuation Committee was created.[1] In a conference held in Shanghai in February, the chief emphasis was placed on evangelical work. Stuart represented his Presbyterian mission in this conference, along with such eminent missionary leaders as Timothy Richard and such Chinese Christian leaders as C. T. Wang.[2] This call for more intensive evangelical work must have received Stuart's sincere approval. Ever since his assumption of seminary duties he had never forsaken for one moment his evangelical work. The only difference for now was that the objects of his evangelism were the students and the intellectual class in Nanking rather than the masses in the Hangchow area.

Partly because of his new teaching position and partly because of his old experience, Stuart was now convinced that the Chinese students and intellectuals were the most important social class in China to be evangelized. One of the frustrations for him in his early rural pastoral days had been that the missionaries could hardly reach the gentry or scholar class. As any person well-informed on Chinese affairs knew, in those days the members of the gentry and scholar classes were the pacesetters in Chinese society. To effect any large-scale spiritual or religious transformation of China, the support of the Chinese elites seemed indispensable. Since Stuart now was situated in an influential metropolitan center and in a much better position to reach the Chinese elite, he

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[1]Latourette, A History, p. 669.

[2]The Continuation Committee [of the World Missionary Conference, Edinburgh, 1910], The Findings of the Continuation Committee Conferences held in Asia, 1912-1913 (New York, 1913), pp. 243-44.

therefore concentrated his evangelical work on them.

In an article published in early 1915, Stuart elaborated on the importance of doing evangelical work among Chinese students. He pointed out that they were the medium of change and that through them China had received transforming ideas and influences.[1] Their further importance was that "they interpret Western civilization to their people, " and that "they largely determine the forms into which the nation will recast its science, literature and social institutions, its ethical doctrines and religious beliefs."[2] Judging from the events in the post-1911 period, Stuart's statement was certainly no exaggeration. Among the student class, he singled out those returned from Japan as the most important, and believed that they would exert more influence on China than those returned from the West.[3] Then Stuart gave an analysis of the tendencies among Chinese students as a whole. Morally, having abandoned Confucian standards, they assumed various physical vices, especially among those who had gone to Japan. Socially, they became commercialized, utilitarian, and selfish as a result of their Western education. Philosophically and religiously, they were contemptuous of Christianity and had become followers of Nietsche, philosophic scepticism, and materialism.[4]

In view of these hard facts, Stuart offered the following solutions, Chinese students abroad, and especially those in America, should be guided in their moral upbringing by attending YMCA summer conferences

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[1]Stuart, "Chinese Students and the Christian Faith," The Union Seminary Review 26, No. 3 (April 1915): 260.

[2]Ibid., p. 263.

[3]Ibid., p. 261.

[4]Ibid., pp. 263-64.

and by residing in American Christian homes. Chinese students in government schools should be made intensively involved in YMCA programs of scientific lectures, evangelical meetings, and summer gatherings, and should also be periodically evangelized by gifted speakers brought from abroad for conversion trips. Finally, students in missionary schools might be made more dedicated Christian workers through a strengthening of the existing Chinese Student Volunteer Movement for the Ministry, which had been founded in 1910 by Chinese pastor Ting li-mei.[1] At this juncture, Stuart also mentioned the strengthening of theological education in the seminaries,[2] which we shall discuss later.

Generally speaking, besides his own seminary students, Stuart's off-campus evangelical work covered three groups of people: government school students, returned students, and officials and gentry members. In 1917 Stuart and four other workers organized seven Bible classes in eight government schools in Nanking, such as the Nanking Naval College and Nanking Teachers College. Stuart personally taught one of these classes in Chinese.[3] Because of the deep-seated prejudices of government school students against Christianity and missionaries, Stuart and his co-workers had to do all this in a less obvious way. In December, 1917 they planned a charity party on New Year's Day of 1918, in which students from each school would perform one number, music, jokes, speeches, etc. The admission fee would be for poor relief. They also planned some athletic

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[1]Ibid., pp. 265-67.

[2]Ibid., pp. 266-67.

[3]Stuart, "Work for Government School Students," an Enclosure in his letter, "My dear Friends," December 12, 1917, SLF, p. 1 (of the Enclosure).

events for the students from government schools.[1] The results of this slow and cautious approach were meagre, and even these were achieved with difficulty. For instance, the decision of three students in one school to accept Christianity was met with violent opposition from both their fellows and the faculty, and they were even threatened with expulsion.[2]

The second group of concern to Stuart's evangelical work was the returned students in Nanking. They numbered about forty and were all in positions of commanding influence. Generally speaking, they were friendly toward Americans. To convert them Stuart and his co-workers adopted a sort of "host-family" approach. They linked up every one of them with a missionary home in which "he is to be made specially welcome, and where we hope more than one can be helped toward a personal faith in Christ."[3] Stuart believed that "the potential influence for the Christian Movement in such men is incalculable."[4]

By 1918 Stuart's evangelical work was enlarged to include government officials and members of the gentry. This took place when Dr. Sherwood Eddy, the foreign work and world service secretary of the YMCA, came to Nanking for another of his frequent evangelical appeals to Chinese students, officials, and gentry members.

To prepare for Dr. Eddy's visit (this time he came straight from the battlefront in France), Stuart was elected as chairman of the Nanking

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[1]Ibid., p. 2.

[2]Ibid., p. 3.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

committee to be in charge of making all the preparations.[1] These preparations included not only the routine arrangements of finding meeting places and issuing invitations, but also included doing advance personal work among the invited guests, so as to make them spiritually ready for Dr. Eddy's sermons and lectures. The invited guests were exclusively men of influence: officials, gentry members, returned students, and students from both government and mission schools. Advance personal work came in the form of social contacts and in holding classes for Bible study or religious discussion.[2] Stuart gave an example:

> As one illustration, tomorrow night we are giving a reception to the forty returned students . . . and their wives. This will be a time of rollicking good fun and a play in the nature of a burlesque of a Chinese student's experiences in America. All the students have been invited to one or another of our homes for dinner, and from there they will come to the entertainment. Then we have a group of personal workers who are to "cover" all these men with direct religious effort.[3]

With this kind of careful preparation, the success of Dr. Eddy's visit was assured. The success of the occasion was truly phenomenal, for, according to Stuart, out of one thousand in attendance, half of them "took a stand for Christ."[4]

Probably the most heart-warming experience in Stuart's evangelical life was his witnessing over a hundred students and scholars join the Stuart Memorial Church as inquirers on May 5, 1918.[5] The church had been

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[1]Stuart, "Four Events," May 1, 1918, SLF, p. 3

[2]Stuart, "To the Members of My Church," March 14, 1918, SLF, p. 2.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Stuart, "Four Events," May 1, 1918, SLF, p. 2

[5]Stuart, "A Sunday at the Stuart Memorial Church, Hangchow," MS, September 1918, p. 569.

recently built near the shore of the beautiful West Lake in Hangchow as a memorial of his father's forty years of service there, and its pastor was a former pupil of his father's school.[1] On this particular Sunday, twelve of these more than one hundred inquirers were receiving baptism, and they were "teachers in government schools, classical teachers, Japanese returned students, and others of high standing and recognized scholarship."[2] In these moving words Stuart commented on the scene:

> It was still more impressive to note humble unlettered elders and members of the old church sitting near the front and to realize that these people, poor in all that this world counts precious, were pioneers and spiritual supporters of the crowd of aristocrats whom they were receiving into their fellowship. . . . For those of us who knew the old stump, it was of thrilling interest to see this grafting on of a new branch and to know that the life begun over forty years ago amid persecutions and contempt was breaking forth into new vigor and beauty under the promising conditions of the new church. . .[3]

From the above account of Stuart's religious work in Nanking, and with Chinese materials unavailable for corroboration, it appears to have been a successful one. At least, it was possibly the best result that any missionary educator could expect under the circumstances.

Stuart's residence in Nanking is significant in that he obtained valuable experience both in academic affairs and in religious work among students and other members of the Chinese elite class. This experience would later prove useful during his work at Yenching University.

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL OBSERVATIONS AND ACTIVITIES DURING THE TURBULENT DECADE OF 1911-1919

When the October 10th Revolution broke out in Wuchang, Stuart was in Nanking. Immediately after the revolution, he reported that in Nanking it had been genuinely supported by many levels of people, including the government troops, the students, the general populace, and foreigners. He observed that the local Manchu Viceroy had even refused ammunition to his troops.[1] Stuart was very enthusiastic about this revolution, which he considered to be "carefully planned and energetic,"[2] and which he termed a Chinese "War of Independence."[3] Though foreigners generally were trying to remain strictly neutral, their sympathies were definitely on the side of the revolutionaries. Stuart himself said, "We cannot forget our own nation's birth, especially when our Revolution, our form of government, our Washington, are the ideals of the present revolutionaries."[4]

In Nanking the immediate consequences of the Revolution were political paralysis and social chaos. In an article sent to his mission bulletin on November 6, Stuart reported that "perhaps six-tenths of the

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[1]Stuart, "Conditions in Nanking," MS, January 1912, p. 166.

[2]Ibid., p. 165.

[3]Stuart, "Nanking Notes," TBMB, November-December 1911, p. 328

[4]Stuart, "Conditions in Nanking," p. 166.

citizens had fled; the officials had almost ceased all attempts at maintaining order; looting was becoming daily more serious as the economic crisis grew worse."[1] Despite the turmoil, on that same day the Nanking Theological Seminary was performing the ceremony of laying the cornerstone for a new dormitory building, donated by a young lady in Nebraska. As the ceremony went along, Stuart was obviously touched by the sight before him, for he offered the following moving description:

> It was a dramatic moment for dedicating a building for theological teaching. For, as the chief Chinese speaker said, the success or failure of the new government on lines of liberty and human brotherhood will depend on the importing of new ethical standards to the nation, and this will depend more than on any others upon the Chinese students who dedicate their lives to the service of Jesus Christ.[2]

The situation in Nanking worsened. Though the imperial edict had ordered the Manchu Viceroy there to surrender to the revolution, Chang HsÜn, the Chinese Commandant in Nanking, refused to obey and put up a strenuous fight against the besieging revolutionary army.[3] On November 9, both American and British consuls in Nanking ordered the evacuation of all American and British women and children from the city.[4] Since many of the students in the Seminary were revolutionary sympathizers and had cut their queues, Stuart and his colleagues decided to escort them out of the city to ensure their safety.[5]

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[1]Stuart, "Nanking Notes," p. 328.

[2]Ibid., p. 329.

[3]Ibid., p. 331.

[4]Stuart, "War Experiences at Nanking," MS, March 1912, p. 387.

[5]Stuart, Fifty Years, pp. 102-03.

After the departure of the students, Stuart also left Nanking, together with the American consul. He then joined his parents in Hangchow. There he was asked by the American Associated Press to serve as its "war correspondent" on Nanking news, a task that Stuart "never dreamed of as a part of my missionary life."[1] Stuart was very happy with his job with the Associated Press, for he said that it afforded him "a chance to utilize the secular press in the United States for missionary purposes, and to get in touch with the leading men in the new government."[2] Stuart was full of praise for the leading men, noting that many "are products of our mission schools and professing Christians, sons of pastors, or at least western educated men free from the old superstitions and ambitious to have their country share in the standards of our Christianized political and social morality."[3] When he attended a meeting of the Provisional National Assembly in late March, 1912, in which he was the only missionary present, he claimed that 90 per cent of the Assemblymen were western educated, including Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Premier T'ang Shao-yi, and that 25 per cent of them were professing Christians.[4] It was at this meeting that Dr. Sun formally delivered his resignation address, and the newly-named Premier T'ang Shao-yi submitted his list of cabinet members

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[1]Stuart, "War Experiences at Nanking," p. 389. In an undated news account it was claimed that the AP had first approached Dr. Sun Yat-sen to name someone to serve as his English press secretary for the outside world; and that Sun then personally chose Stuart for the position with the AP. See, "Some Highlights of Convention," John Leighton Stuart File, Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Va.

[2]"Missions and Missionaries," MS, May 1912, pp. 513-14.

[3]Stuart, "At Nanking, China, After the Revolution," MS, June 1912, p. 617.

[4]Stuart, "Meeting of National Assembly of China," MS, July 1912, p. 665.

for the approval of the Assembly. Stuart was very much impressed by both the spirit and the actions of the Assembly. He listed the following as his major impressions of the Assembly: the simplicity in the style and behavior of the Assemblymen; the genuine republican standards maintained through the nomination and rejection of cabinet ministers; and the noble resignation of Dr. Sun together with the idealism of the revolutionary group. Stuart concluded that all these achievements were due to "the evident influence of our own land chiefly, and in a less degree other western nations, and of the missionary enterprise."[1]

After the 1911 Revolution, the foreign community in Nanking was very friendly toward the revolutionary group. As a matter of fact, the former was trying to establish cordial relations with the latter. Two weeks before the convocation of the Provisional National Assembly, the Nanking Association, a social club for British and American residents and missionaries in the city, gave a reception for Dr. Sun and his family, the cabinet ministers and their wives, the Kuomintang leaders, and Yüan Shih-kai's representatives in Nanking. In his report of this reception Stuart praised Sun again as "a man of stainless honor, a statesman of rare ability, and a patriot who has served his country with selfless devotion."[2] In the evening, after the Assembly session had ended, Dr. Sun, Premier T'ang, a number of the cabinet members and assemblymen were given a party by the YMCA in Nanking. At the party the aims of the YMCA were explained, and there was an illustrated lecture on electrical phenomenon, the gyroscope car on a suspended wire, and wireless effects. Stuart con-

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[1]Ibid., pp. 664-65.

[2]Stuart, "A Reception to the President of China and the Cabinet," MS, July 1912, pp. 672-73.

sidered the presence of the revolutionary leaders at this party an "evidence of their hearty sympathy with missionary work and Christian education."[1]

During the Second Revolution of 1913, Nanking was caught between two contending forces, the Kuomintang, led by Huang Hsing, and Yüan Shih-kai's force, led by Chang Hsün. Stuart reported that when the city finally fell into Chang's hands in early September it was looted and many women raped, not only by the victorious forces, but also by the defeated rebels. With human casualties of several thousand and a totally sacked city, Stuart observed the most tragic bloodbath in the Second Revolution.[2] In view of such chaos and bloodshed, Stuart became convinced that the most urgent need of China was law and order under a central government. Because of this conviction, Stuart's enthusiasm for the revolutionaries began to dampen and he also began to place his hope on Yüan's government for the following two years. He revealed this attitude in many of his utterances during that time.

On the Second Revolution, though he admitted in late 1913 that the Nanking bloodbath was a "serious arraignment against the Yüan administration," he criticized the revolutionaries for their rebellious act and for not "proceeding through legitimate means to a constitutional remedy."[3] In mid-1914, he continued to support Yüan's government, for Yüan was doing the best he could to restore order in China.[4] Meanwhile

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[1]Stuart, "Meeting of National Assembly of China," pp. 665-66.

[2]Stuart, "The Looting of Nanking," MS, January 1914, p. 11.

[3]Ibid., pp. 13-14.

[4]Stuart, "Letter from Rev. J. Leighton Stuart," MS, August 1914, p. 588.

he criticized the revolutionaries for their having "very little knowledge of China as it is." He felt their essential weakness was their failure to recognize that

> . . . political liberty cannot be given to any people. The right of self-government cannot be bestowed; it can only come when the people have prepared themselves for it, and China is not ready yet for a thorough-going democratic government.[1]

To him, the difference between YÜan and Sun seemed to be "between the practical and somewhat cynical point of view of the experienced politician, and the noble but somewhat visionary standards of political theorists."[2]

Stuart's views on YÜan did not differ in any major way from those of his American contemporaries. YÜan represented the only possible force to ensure law and order for China. Law and order were what China needed for her gradual march toward political stability and economic progress, and what the Western powers needed for the expansion of their interests in China. They would have liked to see reform take place in China, but not revolutionary change. The U.S. Government, from its Peking representatives, such as E. T. Williams (the charge d'affaires) and Paul S. Reinsch, (the minister) to its leaders in Washington, such as President Wilson and Secretary of State Bryan, held to these views on YÜan.[3] Not only did U.S. officials support YÜan, but also the American missionaries. Since the downfall of the Manchus, they had been welcoming YÜan as a patronizer of the faith. YÜan had not only decreed religious freedom for

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[1]Ibid., p. 589.

[2]Ibid.

[3]On the U.S. Government officials' attitude toward YÜan, see Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, 1913-1917 (New York: University of Kansas City Press -- Twayne Publishers, 1952), chaps. III and V.

the Republic, but had also attended many Christian meetings and had thereby delighted the missionaries.[1] Therefore, they had sided with Yüan consistently since the founding of the Republic.

Stuart became disillusioned after Yüan pursued his monarchical ambition in the latter part of 1915. On December 13 Yüan decreed that his imperial reign, Hung-hsien (Glorious Constitution), would trace from 1916. About two weeks later Stuart commented that Yüan "had made a blunder and has aroused a storm of hate and opposition which will make itself felt before many years." However, Stuart did not want to hold Yüan solely responsible for this blunder; and he agreed with an interpretation offered by some influential Chinese that the monarchical scheme was prevailed upon Yüan by the selfish official classes and his own ambitious son, and that Yüan was only "half willing" in the scheme.[2] By March, 1916, though Stuart admitted his amazement at Yüan's "stupidity," he nevertheless still tried to defend Yüan's part in the monarchical movement. Stuart said that Yüan's action was the result of a genuine conviction that "the Chinese are not yet ready for self-government on a nation-wide scale;" and that Yüan was "victimized by those closest to him and was led by them to believe that the people really wanted the change."[3]

On the day of Yüan's sudden death on June 6, 1916, Stuart interpreted the meaning of the monarchical movement. Besides showing his dismay

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[1]Varg, Missionaries, pp. 88, 136-37.

[2]Stuart, "Christmas at Nanking Seminary," December 30, 1915, SLF.

[3]Stuart, "My dear Friends," March 2, 1916, SLF.

at it, he now claimed that "the absolutely splendid thing in all this colossal display of vanity and trickery, had been the reaction of the nation, its moral revolt against the perfidy of its government." He now praised this moral revolt:

> For it shows the spirit, the moral idealism, of the Chinese race. It glorifies the struggle as being ethical rather than political or partisan. . . . It makes one optimistic about China, and China's service to moral progress.[1]

In view of the subsequent political chaos and social disintegration during the warlord era in China, it is amazing to find someone like Stuart who held such an optimistic or faithful outlook. Two years later, Stuart repeated his moral interpretation of the monarchical movement. "What foiled YÜan," he said, "despite all his resources and ability, was public opinion, a mingled dislike of YÜan individually, attachment to the republican idea, and moral disapprobation of YÜan's method."[2]

With the collapse of Yuan's monarchical scheme and the restoration of a republican form of government for China, Stuart's hope for China's future became unbounded, and he asserted that "fifty years of the present republican ferment are better than a cycle of the old stagnant Cathay."[3] By placing such faith in restored republicanism and in China's future, Stuart seemed now to have ignored the turmoil in the aftermath of YÜan's demise and discarded his earlier preoccupation with law and order. In other words, whatever the turmoil, he believed that a restored republicanism would eventually offer a better future for China.

In the turbulent years of 1911 to 1919, Stuart felt that the

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[1]Ibid., "The Moral Significance of the Latest Chinese Revolution," (enclosure).

[2]Stuart, "China Since the Revolution," The Union Seminary Review 29, No. 4, (July 1918): 355.

[3]Ibid., p. 353.

United States should give moral support to China. Immediately after the Second Revolution, he urged:

> The Republic is going to win out. Meanwhile America has a supreme opportunity to show her sympathy and by believing in the new experiment of Republicanism , despite its difficulties, to help China toward the realization of that democratic government, "of the people, for the people, and by the people," to which our country has already attained, and for which she has been chief inspiration to Chinese patriotism.[1]

When the Twenty-one Demands were revealed in January, 1915, Stuart was extremely alarmed. Two months later, when he was on his furlough in the United States, he and three other missionary friends went to Washington, D.C., and requested to see President Wilson, with whom Stuart had maintained a good relationship. In his letter of request to Wilson on March 24, Stuart expressed their "very oppressive sense of the gravity of this issue for China," said that they "have lived long in China and are working for her welfare," and explained that they "have certain facts and convictions which may be of assistance to the administration."[2] To their dismay, Wilson found no time for them and directed them to see Secretary of State William J. Bryan instead.[3] Though no record can be found on the meeting between Stuart and his friends and the Secretary of State, the former must have impressed on the Secretary that the U.S. Government should do everything possible to help China resist the Demands, and the Secretary must have given them a very sympathetic ear. For, three years later, Stuart claimed that from another interview with Bryan he was convinced that "perhaps more than any other single influence, China missionaries secured Japan's withdrawal of the obnoxious

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[1]Stuart, "The Looting of Nanking," p. 14.

[2]Stuart to Wilson, March 24, 1915, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

[3]Wilson's note to his secretary, inserted in the above letter file.

Section V of the Twenty-one Demands, by making representations to the American government, which in turn remonstrated quietly but firmly with the Tokyo government."[1]

Many American missionaries in China besides Stuart had urged President Wilson to help China. For instance, during the crisis, Bishop J. S. Bashford of the Methodist Church of Peking urged Wilson to adopt a firm policy in regard to the Japanese demands, for such a policy "will conserve interests of priceless value to humanity and will win lasting renown and the just gratitude of posterity for the statesmen who maintain it." Rev. Charles E. Scott, Wilson's former student and a frequent correspondent with him, gave the president an alarming report concerning Japanese aggressions in Shantung. Also, a group of American missionaries in China telegraphed Wilson about conditions there and asked him to release their anti-Japanese statement to the American people.[2] As to how much the missionaries affected Wilson's final decision of non-recognition of the Twenty-one Demands, a recent study concludes that "the opinions of the missionaries confirmed his [Wilson's] judgment" and that when the missionaries "felt that the President should go on record against the Japanese aggression, Wilson agreed."[3]

After the Twenty-one Demands issue, Japan began to loom large in Stuart's mind. To judge from all available sources, the next occasion on which Stuart spoke up against Japanese aggression in China was right after the conclusion of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement in November, 1917. In the

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[1]Stuart, "China Since the Revolution," p. 358.

[2]Eugene P. Trani, "Woodrow Wilson, China, and the Missionaries, 1913-1921," Journal of Presbyterian History 49, No. 4 (Winter 1971): 340-45.

[3]Ibid., p. 345.

midst of the negotiations, some Chinese students in Japan had drafted a strong statement denouncing Japanese aggression against China since the annexation of Ryukyu Islands in 1879.[1] When this statement was brought by a student to Stuart for translation, he readily consented. After translating it, he sent it together with a letter to his friends in America. In this letter of December 12, Stuart urged a stronger U.S. policy toward Japan:

> Nothing that concerns the future peace of mankind is of more importance than America's attitude to the Chinese-Japanese issue. America and only America, will have the power to restrain Japan's policy of aggrandisement in the immediate future. But if she delays too long even she will not be able to interfere.[2]

Though alarmed, Stuart did not lose his faith in Wilson's presidency, and he concluded by writing, "Contrary to nearly all Chinese and many Americans out here I believe our government sees the situation. For this reason I am hopeful."[3]

By March, 1918, while American soldiers were fighting in Europe, Stuart was in Nanking contemplating his own role as citizen in a time of national crisis. He justified his work in China by saying that since the Far East would be "the seat of the next disturbance," what he and other missionaries were doing in China would "avert, if anything can, the outbreak which will otherwise embroil our country." He gave his other duties as being to make China strong and righteous and to promote understanding between China and the United States.[4]

Shortly afterwards, in an article entitled, "China Since the

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[1]Enclosure in Stuart, "My dear Friends," December 12, 1917, SLF.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Stuart, "To the Members of My Church," March 14, 1918, SLF, p. 3.

Revolution," Stuart renewed his urging for stronger U.S. action to check Japanese aggression in China. He pointed out that China would be "the disturbing influence in international relationships in the immediate future." He warned the United States that Japan's ambition was not just towards China but across the Pacific; therefore, if the U.S. "remains indifferent or unaware of what is happening in China, it may be too late not only to do her duty in China and keep her pledges, but even to avert a disastrous war herself." Stuart analyzed the respective roles that China, Japan, and America were or would be playing. Through China lay "the road to the world-peace of the twentieth century;" Japan was "the most active and determined element of discord;" and America was "the main hope of restraining Japan's predatory ambition." In order to help the U.S. government to do so, and to counter such Japanese propaganda and special missions as the one led by Viscount Ishii, Stuart asked his missionary friends from now on to constantly urge upon the U.S. administration the need for stronger action, to educate the American public with a knowledge of the real issues, and to serve as ears and eyes for the State Department. He said: "This is where American residents in China can serve both their native land and the one of their adoption."[1]

By October, 1918, the First World War was approaching its end, and Stuart looked at it in increasingly moral terms. He viewed it as a conflict between German militarism and the Christian principles which had to prevail if world peace were to be achieved. "The missionary enterprise," according to him, "is only another way of doing what our armies in France are working for."[2] Stuart at this time also expressed his

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[1]Stuart, "China Since the Revolution," p. 358.

[2]Stuart, "My dear Friends," October 16, 1918, SLF, p. 1.

heartfelt support for the proposed League of Nations.[1] A month later, on Thanksgiving Day, Stuart wrote to his church friends again, discussing in detail some Chinese "Peace Celebrations" after the First World War and the overall Chinese impression of President Wilson and his professed ideals. He also discussed his speaking engagement at a Peace Celebration ceremony to illustrate Chinese enthusiasm for the United States, especially for President Wilson. He first related that on his way to and from the Celebration, he was carried by the district magistrate's sedan-chair and accompanied by a squad of soldiers and a military band, and that he saw "marvellous banners describing the Allied Victory in glowing phrases." Then he deduced the following significances of these peace celebrations: that the Chinese people had finally "come to understand the moral significance of the War;" that America was admired and Wilson was revered "next to Confucius and their Model Kings;" that the outcome of the War should be interpreted in religious terms so as to "lead to a change of [Chinese] attitude toward Christianity." In conclusion, Stuart expressed his hope that the year 1919 would be the "beginning of a New Era."[2]

Stuart's views were very comparable to President Wilson's.[3] Wilson, too, believed that YÜan was an indispensible leader for China in maintaining law and order, and that because republican government and

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[1]Ibid., p. 2.

[2]Stuart, "To the Pastor and Members of the Central Church, Washington City," Thanksgiving Day, 1918, SLF, pp. 2-3.

[3]For Wilson's views on foreign policies, see Arthur Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality: 1914-1915 (Princeton University Press, 1960); Link, Wilson the Diplomatist (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957). For his views on Chinese issues, see Roy W. Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957) and Li Tien-Yi's Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, cited before.

self-government could not be achieved overnight, China deserved patient support from America. Wilson also agreed with Stuart's stand during the Twenty-one Demands crisis as demonstrated by his nonrecognition policy. Wilson did not try to sacrifice Chinese interests in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement and therfore did not betray Stuart's confidence in him.[1] The well-known Wilsonian view that the First World War was a war between predatory militarism and Christianity (or, Western civilization) was exactly the same as that of Stuart. Wilson's propositions of self-determination and the League of Nations were all shared by Stuart.

Stuart and Wilson had much in common. Both were of Scotch-Irish-American ancestry.[2] Both were Southerners, but with sympathies

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[1]Prof. Burton F. Beers in this Vain Endeavor (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1962) criticized the ambiguity of the Lansing-Ishii Notes and Wilson's failure to strike a bargain with Japan on the formula suggested by Lansing and Japanese Foreign Minister Ichiro Motono (p. 118). Their formulas were in essence, 1) To distinguish China proper on the one hand, and South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia on the other; 2) The U.S. would recognize Japan's special interests in the latter areas while Japan would not discriminate against the U.S. there in commercial opportunities and transportation rates (pp. 39-40; 105-06). According to Beers, such a bargain could not "have encouraged greater Japanese penetration of China than she undertook in the aftermath of the Lansing-Ishii negotiations, and it is possible that Japan would have abided by the bargain." I tend to disagree with Beers' opinion here. A bargain of such a nature might have indeed served the short-term interests of both the U.S. and China; but the lofty principles declared in the Agreement and the ambiguity of certain phrases therein left room for future interpretations and actions, and therefore they served the long-term interests of both the U.S. and China. Sometimes, Wilsonian idealism did become a "higher realism," as Arthur S. Link so cogently pointed out. (See Arthur S. Lind, The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and Other Essays [Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971], pp. 127-39.) Wilson himself saw the Agreement as a "distinct gain for China." (See Curry, Woodrow Wilson, p. 182.)

[2]Link, The Higher Realism, p. 3.

to Northern views on certain issues.[1] Both were sons of pastors of the Southern Presbyterian Church: while Stuart's father was an illustrious China missionary, Wilson's father was for almost forty years the highest officer of the Church's General Assembly.[2] Both were reared in the strict Calvinistic and Presbyterian tradition. Stuart's family influences were those related to missionary evangelism, and Wilson "grew up on family worship, Bible reading, study of the Shorter Catechism, and stories of Scottish Covenanters."[3] Moreover, Wilson in his youth served as "his father's righthand man in correspondence relating to church business and in preparing the minutes of the General Assembly for publication."[4] Young Wison also at one time helped his father in editing a church newspaper and contributed a series of articles to it.[5] For college education, both men went to leading Southern Presbyterian colleges -- Stuart to Hampden-Sydney and Wilson to Davidson College in North Carolina -- and both were very religiously oriented there.[6] Both supported the dynamic and aggressive world-wide missionary endeavors of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: Stuart joined the Student Volunteer Movement, while Wilson became a member of the World Student Movement of the YMCA.[7] Though Wilson himself did not volunteer to be a missionary, he fully

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[1]Stuart was sympathetic toward Northern theological views; see his Fifty Years, pp. 26-27. On Wilson's support for Northern views, see Link, The Higher Realism, pp. 27-30.

[2]Link, The Higher Realism, p. 6.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid., p. 24.

[7]Ibid., p. 19.

supported the missionary cause and was especially impressed with Stuart's work in China. For instance, when speaking at the Central Presbyterian Church, Washington, D.C. during April of 1915, Wilson said:

> When I hear men like Mr. Stuart pleading for the means to introduce this great influence [the principle of Christianity] into a part of the world [China] , . . . I wonder if it is possible that the imaginations of Christian people will fail to take fire.

In the same speech Wilson also pleaded the importance of the mission work in China:

> . . . this is the most amazing and inspiring vision that could be offered to you, this vision of that great sleeping nation suddenly cried awake by the voice of the Christ. Could there be anything more tremendous than that? Could there be any greater contribution to the future momentum of the moral forces of the world than could be made by quickening this force which is being set afoot in China?[1]

To be sure, Wilson was familiar with Stuart's work!

Wilson and Stuart also had many common church friends. For instance, Rev. S. I. Woodbridge, who had married Wilson's niece and who was a frequent correspondent with Wilson, was the editor of Chinese Christian Intellegencer in Shanghai, for which Stuart had served as secretary of the board of directors.[2] In all these connections, Wilson was very solicitous for Stuart.[3]

Furthermore, theologically they shared many assumptions and new religious emphases. Both viewed Christianity as synonymous with reform and progress. Under the influence of the social gospel and liberal theology in American Protestantism, Wilson, like Stuart, gradually changed

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[1]Woodrow Wilson, "Remarks of Honorable Woodrow Wilson," TBMB, May-June 1915, p. 665.

[2]"Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Board of Directors of the 'Chinese Christian Intelligencer,'" TBMB, January-February 1912, p. 26; also, "Report of the Publication Committee of the Chinese Christian Intelligencer, 1913-1914," TBMB, May-June 1914, p. 473.

[3]Stuart, Fifty Years, p. 92.

from a fundamentalistic and individualistic emphasis in his Christianity to an emphasis on social reform or social service.[1] For instance, Wilson stated in 1909:

> If men cannot lift their fellowmen in the process of saving themselves, I do not see that it is very important that they should save themselves. . . .Christianity came into the world to save the world as well as to save individual men, and individual men can afford in conscience to be saved only as part of the process by which the world itself is regenerated.[2]

This stress upon social reform was reflected in the social legislation that Wilson proposed after 1916.[3]

In the case of the China problem, Stuart and Wilson both were adequately informed. Stuart's knowledge of China was somewhat deeper due to his many years of living there, but Wilson also acquired sufficient knowledge of China by reading both books on China and those reports sent to him by his many missionary friends in China. Therefore, when Stuart and Wilson came to evaluate a particular China problem using the same religious or political standards and supported by comparable knowledge, it was no surprise that they should reach similar conclusions.

But we should remember that the ideas and opinions of Stuart and Wilson on this issue were no more exceptional or creative than those of their missionary friends. Much literature on this subject has shown that they all shared the same assumptions about the superiority of Western civilization, the Christian burden in heathen lands, the forward concept of progress, and the spiritual and material missions of the American republic. They all believed that Japan was a force of militarism and evil,

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[1]Link, Higher Realism, pp. 17-18.

[2]Ibid., p. 17.

[3]Ibid., p. 18.

and that China was an underdog, but a moral underdog and one deserving American salvation.[1] Viewed from these perspectives, the ideas or opinions of Stuart and Wilson were only the reflections of the dominant ideas of the social gospellers and the liberal expansionists,[2] or the liberal-internationalists.[3] These groups temporarily enjoyed an influential position in the American religious and political scenes during Wilson's presidency.

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[1]Such as John R. Mott, The Evangelization of the World in This Generation and Varg, Missionaries.

[2]Both the phrase "liberal expansionists" and its implications are borrowed from Professor Akira Iriye's unpublished essay, "The American Liberal Tradition and East Asia," first draft, Decmeber, 1969. Prof. Iriye defines "the liberal expansionists" as "those who believe in America's expansive role in Asia, but not primarily for the nation's self-interest but for Asia's sake." The underlying assumption of these liberal expansionists is that "Asia does need America and that it is incumbent upon the Americans to do what they can to answer the call " (p. 5). And their basic aim has been, in the words of Woodrow Wilson, "to release the intelligence of America for the service of mankind " (p. 20). Prof. Iriye's liberal expansionists include Adoniram Judson, David Abeel, William Clark, W. A. P. Martin (p. 8), William G. Sumner (p. 10), Charles E. Hughes, Frank B. Kellogg (p. 16), and some American liberals "found in Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters and later, after their disillusionment with him, in Yenan in search of liberal Chinese " (p. 18).

[3]Prof. N. Gordon Levin, Jr. employed this term to describe the essence of Wilson's diplomacy as a reforming crusader for a liberal international order, which would transcend traditional imperialism and "represent the realization of American liberal mission to lead mankind to a victory over the unenlightened past." See Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 3.

CHAPTER VI

IDEAS ON FOREIGN MISSION WORK AND THE NATURALIZATION OF CHRISTIANITY WITHIN THE CHINESE ENVIRONMENT

During Stuart's years as a member of the Christian mission force, and especially while a teacher at the Nanking Seminary, he developed many ideas on foreign mission work. He concluded that the Christianization of China, the final goal of the missionaries, could only be possible through adapting Christianity to the Chinese culture, thereby making it easier for the Chinese to accept. To adapt Christianity to China would require the accomplishment of at least three tasks: first, to create a ministry manned by Chinese pastors; second, to establish a Chinese national church which would be self-governing, self-supporting, and self-propagating; and third, to reconcile Chinese culture with Christian doctrines.

A. On Foreign Mission Work

From late 1911 to early 1912, Stuart and Rev. K. Y. Chen, a colleague at Nanking Seminary, published their joint work, Sheng-chiao pu-tao chin-shih (Lectures on Modern Missions) in three volumes. In it they discussed the origins of the modern mission movement since the nineteenth century, its past and present situation, and its future directions. Also, they gave brief accounts of Christian mission work on each continent of the world.

In their book's introduction, Stuart and Ch'en first affirmed their faith in the final coming of the Kingdom of God. They considered

modern inventions of the nineteenth century such as electricity or the telephone to be instruments that would facilitate the final coming of this Kingdom. International trade, religious evangelism, and reforms based on an international spirit of Christianity were also agencies toward the coming of the Kingdom.[1] Then they borrowed "Ta-t'ung chu-i," a Confucian term for the ultimate utopia, to describe the goal of Christianity and asserted that only through the instrument of the Christian Church could such a goal be realized.[2] Their appropriation of a Confucian term to describe Christian ideals was an obvious effort to make such ideals intelligible to the Chinese.

They criticized other religions: Gautama Buddha's doctrine of "the salvation for all beings" was seen as nothing but an escape to otherworldliness. That is, they felt that Buddhism had failed to emphasize human efforts in this world, and that the Buddist concept of "all beings" did not distinguish between human beings and non-human beings. This failure rendered the Buddist doctirne both "deviate" and "confused," and was the reason why Buddhism had failed to gain world-wide acceptance.[3] As to Mohammed, they charged that he had espoused force and not virtue, and that the spread of his religion into Asia had been dependent solely upon the physical force of the Moslem nation. Since this physical force had declined, so the Moslem Church had also declined.[4]

After these dogmatic and rather shallow criticisms of both

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[1]Stuart and Rev. K. Y. Ch'en, Sheng-chiao pu-tao chin-shih, 3 parts (Shanghai, 1911-1912), 1: 1-2.

[2]Ibid., p. 3.

[3]Ibid., pp. 17-18.

[4]Ibid., p. 18.

Buddhism and Islam, Stuart and his co-author turned to the virtues of Christianity. They claimed that its doctrine had been one of universal peace and its propagation dependent more upon the efforts of its disciples than on the power of Christian states. Therefore, they continued, though many Christian states had perished, Christianity had survived.[1] Finally, they warned the Christian faithful that in the battle of religions "survival of the fittest" was the harsh rule; therefore, they should all redouble their efforts to create a Christian world-order for humanity.[2] Stuart and Ch'en also attacked materialism as an "unreliable" guide for human living. However, their attack stopped short with that one-word denunciation, and no further explanations or elaborations were offered.[3]

Lastly, they offered many imperative reasons for foreign mission work, pointing out the duties of mission workers. First, the workers should guide the peoples of foreign nations who were experiencing temptation and bewilderment at the daily importation of Western vices and contaminating ideas into their countries.[4] Second, the missionaries should take advantage of the foment for political reforms in foreign lands by associating the nobler ideals of such reforms with the image of Christ. In that way they could preach for Christ while helping the natives toward a better future.[5] Third, in the wake of the popularization of education in these nations, most of the governmental schools had been emphasizing

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Stuart and Ch'en, 3: 64.

[4]Ibid., p. 66.

[5]Ibid.

matters of political consequence and omitting religion from their curricula; this trend should be corrected.[1] Fourth, since patriotism had become the order of the day, the mission forces should try to impress upon the patriots of these nations that there was no conflict between patriotic nationalism and Christianity and that the two should be mutually supportive.[2] To realize all these mission duties, Stuart in the end of this work implored all Christian youths to answer Christ's original calling to go to "the uttermost part of the earth" to be His witnesses and His workers.[3]

The significances of Stuart's and Ch'en's book are several. First, it was probably the only such work ever written in Chinese and published at such an early date in China. Since most of the Chinese seminary students in the early decades of the century could not read English works easily, this work was probably most influential for them. Second, many of the ideas expressed here anticipated the future direction of Stuart's career in China: the missionaries should "lead" the reform efforts in China; they should join Chinese education, but infuse religion into its curricula or into the students' life; they should demonstrate the compatibility between Christianity and Chinese nationalism. Third, this work reveals a theology which was a mixture of liberal and orthodox positions. On the one hand, Stuart welcomed modern progress as instrumental to a final coming of the Kingdom of God in the forseeable future. (Here he seemed to imply its coming being within the span of history.) This is a liberal position. On the other hand, his deprecation

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Ibid., p. 67.

[3]Ibid., p. 68.

of non-Christian religions such as Buddhism and Islam in uncompromising terms was a very orthodox position. Here we should further note that his denunciation of non-Christian religions did not include Confucianism. Whether this was due to Stuart's refusal to recognize Confucianism as a religion, to his having a special favor for it, or to his reluctance to offend the Chinese intelligentsia, he gave no indication. Whatever it was, this omission anticipated his later effort to syncretize Christianity and Confucianism.

B. The Raising of a Chinese Ministry

The task of raising a ministry is twofold: first, to secure a sufficient number of people for the profession; and second, to give them adequate theological training so as to fit them for their work. Regarding both the securing and the training of the ministry, Stuart held definite opinions and made many efforts.

The Securing of a Ministry Force

Among all sources for ministerial personnel, the best was the mission school graduates themselves. However, for years the number of mission school graduates entering the ministry had been rather disappointing. For instance, a survey made in 1913 on ten of the largest missionary institutions in China indicated that from the time of their founding to the year of 1913 they had altogether graduated 1,171 students from college courses, of whom only 138 entered the ministry.[1] Because of the reluctance of students to join the ministry, the total Chinese ministry force had remained a small one. By 1914, while there were 526,108 members in the Chinese Protestant community, only 764 ordained Chinese ministers were in

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[1]Latourette, A History, p. 635.

service.[1] This meant that each Chinese pastor would have to take care of 688 members. Although there were then roughly two thousand male foreign missionaries in China,[2] such foreign workers could not remedy all the deficiencies in pastoral care both because of their foreign background and because not all of them were ordained ministers. Therefore, the securing of more Chinese workers for the ministry became imperative.

In answer to this serious problem, Christian leaders in China took example from the almost inspirational successes of an American-based organization, the American Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions. The effectiveness of this movement was evidenced by the number of mission workers it sent abroad. It was estimated that between 1866 and 1936 there were 13,000 student volunteers who had entered foreign mission fields, representing half of the total number of missionaries sent.[3] A Chinese church leader in Shantung was very much impressed with the result of this movement and decided to start a similar movement to recruit volunteers for ministry work in China. Thus, Rev. Ting Li-mei, who had suffered during the Boxer Rebellion and had subsequently developed a serious religious purpose, started a campaign in the spring of 1909 at Shantung Union College at Weihsien.[4] Before long he secured over one hundred boys dedicated for Christian ministry, a sort of Chinese counterpart to the "Mt. Hermon Hundred," who were the first volunteers for the American movement in 1886.

Following the example of the American YMCA, the Chinese YMCA,

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[1]Ibid., p. 680.

[2]Ibid., p. 606.

[3]Ferm, An Encyclopedia of Religion, p. 741.

[4]Latourette, A History, p. 592.

which had been functioning in China since 1885, immediately took control of this movement. When the YMCA's North China Student Conference was held at Tungchow in June, 1910, the Chinese Student Volunteer Movement for the Ministry was formally brought into being. The motto for this movement was almost the same as that of its American parent movement: "the evangelization of our mother country and the world in this generation."[1] The growth of this Chinese movement was rather slow compared with that of its American predecessor. For instance, by 1916 only 125 had entered the ministry and only 225 had begun their theological studies.[2]

Stuart, a member of the Volunteer Movement in America who had been sent to China by it, was understandably happy to see the development of this Chinese movement. When Rev. Ting came to Nanking for promotional work in 1910, Stuart was delighted to lend him a hand. Forty-one students finally responded to Rev. Ting's call and volunteered for the ministry; Stuart was quite moved by their courage. In a report to his home church journal, he recorded his feelings:

> As I watched them, almost spellbound, I thought of the sneers and bitter opposition that many of them were facing from schoolmates parents, friends; of the sacrifice of worldly prospects such as are specially open to the graduates of mission schools. Then I thought of the constituencies in the homeland who sacrifice to keep us here, and wished you might all have witnessed the triumph of faith.[3]

After Rev. Ting's departure, Stuart willingly took over the duty of caring for this volunteer band.

In order to determine the reasons for the paucity of mission

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[1]Ibid., p. 593.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Stuart, "Our Two Institutions at Nanking: The Presbyterian Seminary--The Union Medical School," The Missionary, June 1911, p. 298.

school graduates entering the ministry, the Chinese Volunteer Movement sent out an inquiry in early 1913 to the presidents of twenty-six mission colleges and theological schools in China. From their replies, the causes can be divided into three categories: lack of deep spiritual consecration, the attractiveness of other professions, and the difficulties of the ministry profession itself.[1] Since the first two categories are self-explanatory, we shall concentrate on examining the last--the difficulties within the ministry profession itself.

The replies pointed out several major hindrances that had made people hesitant to join the work. First, ministerial salaries were inadequate. Salaries paid to Chinese pastors either by their Chinese converts or by foreign mission boards were so low as to be almost starvation wages. A self-respecting man could not live on them. Second, the estimate of the ministry in the popular mind was low. Many potenital candidates believed that the ministry would exclude them from social and national movements, or feared that they would be condemned to a dull life among villagers. Third, foreign control dominated the Chinese church. One respondent bluntly stated that, in order to attract college men to the ministry, the Chinese church must become a fully Chinese institution, founded and propagated without reference to foreign treaties. Fourth and lastly, standards of theological education were poor. A common Chinese complaint was that the ministry was not sufficiently educated to command the respect of the student class, and that the theological schools were of lower grade than the secular colleges.[2]

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[1]Stuart, "Education for the Ministry," China Mission Year Book 1913 (Shanghai, 1913), pp. 225-28.

[2]Ibid.

Stuart read these replies and was generally in agreement with them. Of the four criticisms revealed by the survey, he felt that the first, second and the fourth were very true and offered further analyses regarding them. Stuart addressed the problem of low ministerial salaries by citing two shallow arguments in favor of them and subsequently rejecting both: first, a low salary would preclude unworthy men from entering the ministry; second, a generous salary paid by foreign missions would hinder Chinese self-support. Stuart replied that a decent salary need not be large enough to tempt insincere candidates, and that the size of ministrial salaries had little to do with the ability of the Chinese church to support itself. To the contrary, Stuart argued that adequate salaries would strengthen the finances of the native church by attracting refined, ministerial candidates who could win conversions and financial support from the wealthy upper classes.

On the problem of Chinese resentment of foreign domination in church affairs, Stuart did not give an over-all answer but did offer one solution regarding the situation in the seminaries. He suggested that in theological education union boards should be established composed equally of Chinese and foreigners. Stuart believed that "Chinese would doubtless willingly contribute to such boards, thus making the students still more at ease about using foreign money." Stuart replied to the third problem by totally agreeing that the standards of theological education needed to be raised.[1] Finally, he criticized the tendency in ministerial recruitment to place undue stress upon leadership qualities. Stuart believed it would be better to de-emphasize leadership and to stress instead a heroic loyalty to the Master and a loving service to men.

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[1]Ibid., pp. 229-30.

Stuart heartily endorsed a statement made by one of the respondents that "ultimately, the idea of sacrifice and humble service will attract more and better men than that of 'leading.'"[1]

The Training of the Ministry

Stuart's ideas for the training of applicants to the ministry can be divided into two categories. Stuart proposed to send the extremely gifted volunteers first to the United States for a sound liberal arts and theological education, and then, upon their return to China, to employ them in church services.[2] In addition, he suggested upgrading the theological education for the ordinary students in the seminaries so as to give them a good theological training there. We shall discuss these two of Stuart's ideas separately.

In 1910 Stuart discovered at St. John's University in Shanghai a Chinese student who was a third-generation christian and who had excellent religious and intellectual qualifications. Stuart immediately drafted a plan for his further education in the United States, and then submitted it to his home church journal--The Missionary--for popular support. Stuart proposed that this student study for three or four years at a first-rate college or university and then take a three-year theological course at a seminary (preferably at Stuart's own seminary--The Union Theological Seminary at Richmond, Virginia).

Stuart argued that a man so educated could be valuable in three important respects upon his return to China. First, he could meet the work demands of an increasingly independent Chinese church. Men so

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[1]Ibid., p. 230.

[2]Stuart, "Proposed Plan for the Education of Liu Ting-fang," The Missionary, August 1910, pp. 403-04.

educated could become very useful in matters such as religious instruction, preparation of textbooks, the formation of doctrinal standards, courses of study, books of worship and polity, etc. Stuart remarked, "Such men, educated abroad, can give expression both in writing and in speaking as no Westerner ever could, and can furnish more information to their own countrymen than Chinese without Western education." Second, such a man could impress and win mission-school students for the ministry. Stuart claimed that if, upon his return to China, a church-educated man would enter church services rather than the more lucrative government or business careers, the students in mission schools would be so impressed with his sacrificial attitude, they would themselves become more inclined to join the ministry. Third, so well educated a man would serve the needs of the Nanking Theological Seminary. Stuart argued that by giving a first-rate theological education to promising Chinese students, the Chinese in the Seminary would be impressed with missionary sincerity and would increase their confidence in the missionaries. Also, the linguistic fluency of so well educated a Chinese could be invaluable in reaching the students, especially in conveying subtleties of spiritual truths.[1]

Besides giving special educational training for those extremely gifted, Stuart's next concern was with the strengthening of general theological education in the Protestant seminaries of China. In the Edinburgh Conference of 1910, the inadequacy of theological education in mission fields was recognized and stressed. The Conference's Commission of the Church in the Mission Field declared:

> Perhaps we may venture to say that in no department of mission work are the efforts at present made more inadequate to the necessities of the case than in that of theological training;

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[1]Ibid.

and that

> it is evident that in the great civilized countries, such as India, China, and Japan, the time has fully come for giving greatly increased attention to the highest grade of theological education. The new movements in these lands demand Christian leadership of the highest kind.

Therefore the Commission made the following recommendations to improve the situation:

> We urge on all missionaries, and on their supporters at home, that theological training, in apologetic, Biblical criticism, Church history, and dogmatic, with relevant philosophy and ethics, should be adequately taught in all theological colleges of the higher grades. Now that the battle is joined, contentment with make-shift courses of training for our best men in the mission fields would be disloyalty to the Christian cause.[1]

To echo the call of the Edinburgh Conference, the members of the Chinese Volunteer Movement for the Ministry met in December, 1912 in Peking and passed resolutions to the following effect: in theological teaching more emphasis should be placed on the Bible, on comparative religion, evolution, logic, and sociology. In entrance requirements, the Seminary should be limited to college graduates. And in curriculum, four-year courses should replace those of only three years. Also, one first-class theological school should be established as a model for all of China.[2]

Not only the Chinese Student Volunteer Movement, but also the China Continuation Committee put great emphasis on the importance of theological education and of establishing an adequately trained ministry force. After the 1911 Revolution, the missionaries in China were all

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[1]China Continuation Committee, Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the China Continuation Committee, Shanghai, April 17 - May 2, 1916 (Shanghai, 1916), p. 43.

[2]Stuart, "Education for the Ministry," China Mission Year Book 1913 (Shanghai, 1913), pp. 228-29.

encouraged by the friendly attitudes toward Christianity and missionaries expressed by the leaders of the Kuomintang and of YÜan's government. Since American democracy was presumably the model of the Chinese Republic, they all hoped that the American religion--Protestantism--could become the people's new faith. In view of the intellectual ferment both before and after the Revolution, their hope became heightened that Christianity could earn a place in the people's mind. Since the scholar-officials and the students were the leaders of Chinese society, the missionaries decided to launch a systematic evangelistic campaign directed especially toward these groups. Sherwood Eddy made many preaching trips to China expressly for this purpose. Rev. John Mott also made many similar efforts.[1]

Besides these evangelistic campaigns, the missionaries began to realize the importance of raising an adequately trained ministry for the task of converting especially the intellectual and official classes in China. This state of mind was fully revealed in the statement issued by the Hankow Conference of the China Continuation Committee in March, 1913:

> In these days of awakening there is urgent need of a type of leader, and especially of a type of clergy, who shall be able to appeal to the larger numbers of scholars and officials as well as to other classes who are open as never before to the message of the Christian Chruch.[2]

The essence of this statement was repeated in several other conferences held by the China Continuation Committee in 1913.

Stuart was in hearty agreement with the call for an able Chinese ministry, though he was not sure that the Chinese scholar-official class had really become "open as never before to the message of the Christian Church," as the Hankow Conference had so earnestly professed. Instead,

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[1]Latourette, A History, pp. 591,620,669-71.

[2]Stuart, "Education for the Ministry," p. 224.

Stuart noticed "the spread of philosophical skepticism and of moral laxity among the higher class, notably the students destined to be poured out of government schools in rapidly increasing numbers and to leaven the thought of the nation."[1] However, his notice of this trend made Stuart more eager to support the cause of raising an able ministry. Furthermore, the need for such a ministry was imperative in meeting the challenge of the growing nationalistic spirit of the Chinese church, and in fulfilling the ultimate missionary goal--the evangelization of China within the present generation.[2]

Based on these considerations, Stuart now criticized those who had argued against the missionary's educational work and favored only evangelical work as men with "lack of vision."[3] He declared that "at the present stage of the Christian Movement in China the supreme question is the securing and equipping of adequately trained native leaders, and that the ultimate success of the missionary enterprise awaits a radical change of policy and a shifting of emphasis before we can hope to have anything approaching a sufficient proportion of really efficient Chinese preachers."[4] One kind of radical change that Stuart had in mind was to raise sharply the quality of education in the seminaries.

At that time, the majority of the students graduated from the seminaries could not be called college graduates. For instance, a survey made in early 1913 by the Executive Committee of the Chinese Student Volunteer Movement showed that, up to 1913, of the 370 graduates of 9

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 225.

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seminaries, only 79 were classed as college graduates.[1] ("College graduate" meant those whose educational training in the seminaries was of college level.) A study of the catalogues of these seminaries convinced Stuart that the number of bona fide college man (or those of similar grade) was considerably less than the 79 cited above. Therefore, Stuart suspected that the quality of these so-called college graduates not only could not match that of Western-educated students, but also might not match that of those graduated from mission and government colleges. Thus, Stuart in 1913 strongly urged the upgrading of theological education in order to produce more college-level graduates.[2]

Because of this concern with the problem and his years of agitation for a better-trained ministry, Stuart was chosen in the spring of 1916 as acting chairman of the Special Committee on Theological Education of the China Continuation Committee. In that capacity, he presented a report to the Fourth Annual Meeting of the China Continuation Committee, held in Shanghai from April 27 to May 2, 1916. The report repeated many of his earlier ideas on the subject but also offered some new arguments. For instance, to those who were afraid that more intellectual equipment for the seminary students might reduce their religious fervor, Stuart argued that there was not "any inherent antithesis between scholarship and spirituality, between ministerial education and efficiency." Stuart pointed out that the experience of the missionary body and of the ministry in the West had never shown such an antithesis. If higher standards for the Chinese ministry should create some new and delicate problems

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[1]Ibid., p. 223.

[2]Ibid., pp. 223-24.

for the missionary, the latter should accept this new situation candidly and thoughtfully.[1] At the end of his report, and together with other members of the Committee, Stuart made two important recommendations: first, cooperation in advanced work should be undertaken by all theological seminaries so as to avoid duplication and waste; and second, suitable theological textbooks and a theological quarterly should be prepared.[2]

During his last two years at the Nanking Theological Seminary, Stuart became even more outspoken about the need for a high-quality theological education. In 1917, Dr. William Adams Brown of the Union Theological Seminary, New York, investigated the theological education in both China and Japan and offered this comparison: "In their standards of requirement they [Chinese seminaries] are at least a generation behind the schools of Japan; many of them are really Bible schools rather than theological seminaries, as we understand the term."[3] Stuart now quoted these comments in arguing for a strong theological education program. He proposed that from the autumn of 1918 the Nanking Theological Seminary should "add a new department limited to college graduates prepared to take the course in English and with proficiency in Chinese."[4]

In early 1918, Stuart criticized the negligence of his Southern Presbyterian Mission in training a native ministry. After examining the

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[1]China Continuation Committee, Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the China Continuation Committee, Shanghai, April 27 - May 2, 1916, p. 48.

[2]Ibid., p. 14.

[3]Stuart, "The Securing and Training of a Chinese Ministry," CR, November 1917, p. 701.

[4]Ibid.

results of half a century of mission efforts at Bible training and theological education, Stuart found that the proportion of converts per missionary for the Mission was the lowest in China--26 as against 109 for the Northern Methodists and 84 for the Northern Presbyterians. Stuart attributed this meager result to two mission policies: due to the Mission's fallacious idea that it was here solely to preach the gospel, it had neglected ministry training; and for fear of recruiting men influenced by financial considerations, it had paid the lowest possible salaries to native workers, thus providing a deterrent to really competent men entering the ministry. Because of these erroneous policies, Stuart pointed out that the Mission had "until comparatevely recent years been compelled to utilize any available material--servants, shopclerks, artisans, farmhands, indigent literati."[1]

In late 1918, just a few months before his resignation from the Seminary, Stuart cried out that the chief weakness of Christianity in China had been the poorly-trained Chinese ministry. Because of this, Stuart pointed out, two dangerous tendencies had developed that might result in serious injury to essential Christian faith and in an ignorant dogmatism among the Chinese workers:

> One is that men with rich Chinese culture, but with little Christian knowledge, in accepting Christ, will undertake to interpret Him and His message, and because of their literary style and psychological sympathies, will win a wide acceptance which may result in serious injury to essential Christian faith. Another is that in the present currents of theological thought, scientific and philosophical study, conflicting views of a transition period, our Chinese ministry, unfamiliar with the issues, unable to argue with, or even to understand, those in need of intellectual guidance, will take refuge in an ignorant dogmatism, from which the foreign missionary is protected by his general culture and special training.[2]

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[1]Stuart, "Half a Century of Bible Training and Theological Education," TBMB, March-April 1918, p. 1038.

[2]Stuart, "The Chinese Ministry." The Union Seminary Review

Besides these "two dangerous tendencies," Stuart also feared another "real danger," the danger of causing a division among Chinese workers, which might be produced because of their deficient theological education:

> Real . . . as is the possibility of cleavage hereafter among missionaries on traditional versus modernizing views, the real danger is among the Chinese, where a superficial knowledge and a sincere desire to popularize Christianity on the one hand, with a loyal intention of the other to stand for what are supposed to be fundamental doctrines, may produce an alignment among Chinese, which, while perhaps unnecessary, would yet prove more disastrous than any present lack of unity.[1]

"If such ruptures come," Stuart declared, "we missionaries will have been chiefly responsible through failing to furnish the leaders competent to appreciate historic Christianity, and to express its essential teachings with convincing power to thoughtful Chinese." In view of these chilling dangers, Stuart was convinced that a solid theological education for the Chinese was most urgent, and suggested the establishment of one, or at the most two, first-class theological colleges for all of China.[2] To carry out this proposal, Stuart not only made efforts to develop the B. D.

(October 1918), pp. 66-67. In this statement, Stuart, on the one hand, offered a qualification for naturalizing Christianity into the Chinese soil: the naturalization should not take place at the expense of the "essential" Christian faith. On the other hand, he seemed to have seen no conflict between a high-quality education for Chinese ministers bearing a Western religious and cultural orientation, and the task of mediating Christianity to Chinese people in terms of Chinese tradition. To succeed in his type of naturalization would require the Chinese ministers to acquire a solid education in both Western thought and Chinese culture. Whether or not Stuart was aware of this problem in the 1910's, in his Yenching years (1919-1941) he did make efforts to solve this problem by maintaining a first-rate theological school and a respectable institute of Chinese studies--an effort which will be discussed in later chapters. For Stuart's detailed idea about the compatibility of Christianity and Chinese culture, we shall discuss it in the next section (D).

[1]Ibid., p. 67.

[2]Ibid.

program at the Nanking Theological Seminary, but also in the 1920's and 1930's initiated efforts to make Yenching's School of Religion a first-rate school of theological training.

So far, we have discussed Stuart's ideas on both the securing and the training of a Chinese ministry. Let us now examine Stuart's concluding thoughts on the whole problem, which he expressed not long before his resignation form the Nanking Seminary. First, every missionary, whatever his or her time or type of service, should become a recruiting agent, always on the alert for capable, promising, young workers. Second, the finances of missions should be readjusted. The funds scheduled for missionaries' work appropriations, better buildings, and more mission workers from home should be saved "for securing and training and supporting properly every available consecrated and capable Chinese student." Stuart seemed to feel particularly strongly about mission money used for retraining old or sending in new missionaries. He even suggested that when money was scarce for educating Chinese workers, it would have been better to retire some missionaries so as to release enough money. Third, a more calculated and comprehensive mission policy should be adopted. In this regard, Stuart suggested the establishment of a highly centralized organization for studying the mission fields, estimating the needs, and then searching out and dealing with the young men with whom to meet these needs. Fourth, the quality of teaching in theological colleges should be raised. Fifth, more support should be given to the Chinese Student Volunteer Movement for the Ministry.[1]

Finally, he concluded that the whole problem of ministry was a spiritual one, and that its solution was dependent on the change of mental

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[1] Ibid., pp. 72-76.

attitude on the part of the missionaries. He pointed out that in the last period of Jesus Christ's ministry life, Jesus turned to ministry training among the disciples and was willing to leave His work to them for completion after His departure. Citing His example, Stuart now reminded the missionaries that they should prepare to leave their fields so as to make room for their Chinese workers, but before their departure they should also give adequate training to the Chinese workers. He declared that "for we missionaries succeed in proportion as we make ourselves dispensible."[1] However painful it might be for the foreign workers to relinquish their duties and to entrust to others the fulfillment of their own mission, Stuart insisted that it was their obligation to do so. Stuart believed that only by turning the work over to Chinese who were adequately trained could the ultimate evangelization of China be assured.[2]

C. The Establishment of a Chinese National Church

Between the arrival in Canton of Robert Morrison, the first Protestant missionary of the London Missionary Society, in 1807 and the time of Stuart's departure from Nanking in early 1919, no church run and supported by Chinese Christians themselves had been established. But the movement for a Chinese national church gradually gained momentum, and by 1907 the China Centenary Missionary Conference, meeting in Shanghai, gave its strong support for such a national church. The Conference recommended that the Chinese churches be organized into this national church "in

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[1]Stuart, "The Securing and Training of a Chinese Ministry," CR, November 1917, p. 695.

[2]Stuart, "The Chinese Ministry," The Union Seminary Review (October 1918), p. 77.

accordance with their own views of truth and duty."[1] Though the Conference allowed Western missionaries their continued representation on the governing bodies of the churches, it exhorted them to "abstain from claiming any permanent right of spiritual or administrative control over these churches."[2]

The next important Christian gathering which dealt particularly with the problem of establishing a Chinese church was the series of conferences held by the China Continuation Committee in 1913. At this time, the realization of a Chinese church was still a remote possibility. Foreign dominations in church leadership, funds, theology, and daily activities continued; and the adaptation of Christianity to a Chinese environment had not passed the discussion stage.[3] Concerned at the slow pace, the China Continuation Committee sought more action. According to available records, Stuart attended one of the conferences, held in Shanghai in February, 1913. The increased willingness of the missionaries to take Chinese workers into their confidence and the more active Chinese participation in church affairs were demonstrated by the number of Chinese delegates to this Shanghai Conference. While there had been only 6 or 7 Chinese delegates among the 1,170 participants attending the China Centenary Conference in 1907,[4] now the respective Chinese and foreign contingencies were 33 to 60.[5]

The following were the major decisions reached by the Shanghai

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[1]Latourette, A History, pp. 673-74.

[2]Ibid., p. 674.

[3]Ibid., p. 679

[4]Ibid., p. 665.

[5]Stuart, "Dr. Mott's Shanghai Conference," TBMB, March-April 1913, p. 202.

Conference for the gradual realization of a self-governing, self-supporting, and self-propagating church in China. First, a gradual process for the organization of a Chinese church was carefully planned. At the provincial and district levels, Provincial Federation Councils and District Councils were to be first formed, consisting of both Chinese and foreign members. At the national level, a National Federation Council was to be established and joined by existing churches for mutual counsel and cooperation. Then, a national conference of the churches should be convened to discuss the establishment of a national church.[1]

Second, the Conference reached several decisions toward the promotion of Chinese Christian leadership in church affairs. In church appointments and opportunities, "there should be no distinction between foreign and Chinese workers." In financial administraiton, although the Chinese workers had often been given nominal positions before, now their representation would be a real one.[2] Third, in such church enterprises as educational, literary, and medical work, more active Chinese participation was essential.[3] In addition to the above decisions, the Conference also made many recommendations regarding the securing, training, and supporting of Chinese workers.[4]

Stuart was very much impressed by these decisions and praised them very generously. He commented that "the recognition of Chinese as being entitled to a large share not only in the administration of

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[1]China Continuation Committee, The Continuation Committee Conference in Asia, 1912-1913 (New York, 1913), pp. 223-24.

[2]Ibid., pp. 225-26.

[3]Ibid., pp. 229-30, 237.

[4]Ibid., pp. 224-27.

ecclesiastical affairs, but also sharing in the determination of what has hitherto been regarded as 'mission policies,' was a revolutionary advance." Stuart believed that the Conference's recommendations for securing, training, and supporting Chinese workers revealed "a radical change of attitude" and demonstrated "how ready the missionary body is to adjust itself to new conditions." Finally, Stuart acclaimed the Conference for having brought "a vision of hope and expectancy, a thrilling sense of a wide-spreading movement working with amazing power, in this generation, for the evangelization of the world."[1] In view of the feeble existence and slow growth of the Chinese church at the time, Stuart's praises for the Shanghai Conference seemed unwarranted.

There were many other problems in the establishment of a Chinese national church: how to overcome theological differences; how to give adequate financial support to union church enterprises; how to overcome Chinese provincialism among Chinese workers. Such practical difficulties would have to be solved before a united Chinese church could be built, and in January, 1914, Stuart addressed himself to them. He commented on doctrinal differences: "This issue is not so much denominational as concerning the so-called liberal and conservative views of Biblical interpretation," and "this divergence of view is a serious hinderance to the efficiency of united effort." In commenting on financial support for union work, Stuart pointed out that many missions, while keeping their own workers well supported, had not been very loyal in voting adequate appropriations to their union enterprises with other missions. He considered this tendency one which "may do more to impede union work than any amount of theoretical objection." Another serious problem for Stuart was

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[1]Stuart, "Dr. Mott's Shanghai Conference," p. 203.

Chinese party-feeling. Stuart believed one of the Chinese racial characteristics to be their "party-feeling," which was revealed in their apparent inability to unite through mutual confidence,in their instinct for maintaining an accustomed order, and in their lingering provincialism.[1]

The problem faced by the Chinese church was not just foreign domination, but also its own weakness and lack of enthusiasm for the propagation of faith. Until 1918 there had been no single united agency established, manned, and supported by Chinese Christians to do home mission work in China. The Chinese Christians found little interest in mission work outside of their immediate locale. Their lack of enthusiasm for remote mission work was the grave concern to Stuart. To him, it seemed necessary that the existing Chinese churches understand the importance of home missions and engage in them in order to grow eventually into a dynamic and unified Chinese church. Therefore, when the Mid-China Mission of the Southern Presbyterian Church in Hangchow passed a resolution to open a new station in central or western Yunnan in 1916, Stuart expressed his approval for the resolution on the grounds that this would show an inspiring example for the Chinese churches and would move them to more active proselytizing activities. He remarked, "The Chinese Christians ought to be trained to the idea of organized evangelistic efforts, not only in their own localities, but also in distant regions; some such place as Yunnan would be in effect a foreign mission, while appealing to their newly developing national self-consciousness."[2]

Stuart's dream of seeing a Chinese force doing mission work was

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[1]Stuart, "The Progress of the Union Movement," CR, January 1914, p. 28.

[2]Stuart, "A Forward Move," The Chinese Christian Intelligencer, (Shanghai), October 15, 1916, p. 139.

finally realized two years later. In August 1918, at a mission leaders' conference attended by both Chinese and foreign church leaders at Kuling, Kiangsi, the idea of a home mission to Yunnan was approved by all those present, and an organization by the name of the Chinese Home Missionary Society was later created in Shanghai. The Chinese assumed all practical duties on the 69-member staff, while the 17 foreigners (one of them Stuart) served as advisors.[1] In its statement, the Society observed that out of 12 million people in Yunnan there were only 7413 Christians, and that out of 120 evangelists there was not even one ordained Chinese minister.[2] Since all the expenses for the Yunnan mission would be met by Chinese funds and since almost all the mission workers would be Chinese, this was truly the first important effort made by Chinese Christians in home missionary work.

During the same year, Stuart was also involved in the formation of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of China, which would include the Presbyterian missionary societies from all over the world and the churches founded by them in China.[3] By this time, the highest ecclesiastic body for the Presbyterians, both of foreign and Chinese believers in China, was the Presbyterian Synod for Five Provinces [Chekiang, Kiangsu, Hupeh Hunan, and Anhwei], established in the early 1910's.[4] The formation of this proposed General Assembly was the last important step for the final

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[1]"Statement to the Christians of China regarding The Chinese Mission to Yunnan," p. 1, an enclosure in Stuart's letter to "My dear Friends," October 14, 1918, SLF. Also Stuart, "My dear Friends," October 14, 1918, SLF, p. 2.

[2]"Statement to the Christians of China regarding The Chinese Mission to Yunnan," p. 4 [2].

[3]Stuart, "To the Members of My Church," March 14, 1918, SLF, pp. 1-2; Stuart, "My dear Friends," May 1, 1918, SLF, pp. 1-2.

[4]Stuart, "To the Members of My Church," March 14, 1918, SLF, p. 1. As to the origins of this Synod, see Bear, "China Mission," 3: 359-62.

establishment of the National Presbyterian Church of China, which was projected to be consummated in 1920.[1] Due to the unavailability of source materials, we cannot elaborate on Stuart's detailed involvement in this task.

In late 1918 and early 1919, Stuart was also involved in another church union movement. He was chosen as chairman of the Organizing Committee coordinating all six churches in Nanking. Though the movement was not to be strictly an organic union among these churches, Stuart thought it was a constructive step toward such a union and toward the removal of the barriers among churches. He declared: "I believe thoroughly in these movements looking toward the establishing of one Chinese Christian Church free from the western sectarian divisions which are so meaningless to the Chinese and are such a source of weakness in all of our larger activities."[2] He further reported that several other cities in China were watching the developments of this movement in Nanking and might make similar attempts. Finally he stressed the importance of this movement by quoting Dr. Sherwood Eddy's statement that the movement was "one of the most remarkable and promising movements he had heard of since reaching China and he believes that it will be of worldwide consequence."[3]

D. <u>The Adaptation of Christianity to Chinese Environment</u>

The naturalization of Christianity into Chinese soil raises problems beyond the mere securing and training of a Chinese ministry and the formation of a Chinese church. What should the relationship be between Christianity and Chinese cultural tradition? Should Christianity be adapted to that tradition?

Stuart's ideas on the adaptation of Christianity to Chinese

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[1]Stuart, "My dear Friends," May 1, 1918, <u>SLF</u>, p. 2.

[2]Stuart, "My dear Friends," January 10, 1919, <u>SLF</u>, pp. 2-3.

[3]Ibid., p. 3.

tradition were expressed in three articles written during 1916 and 1917. The first article, "The Christian Apologetic for China," appeared in the Chinese Recorder, the leading journal for all Protestant missionary workers in China. Of the questions discussed, the most important were three. First, what are the vital elements in Chinese religious ideas that tend to influence character and conduct? Stuart answered that there were three such vital elements: the concept of T'ien or Shangti, the Tao (the Way or Order of the Universe), and the Chinese gods whose worship revealed Chinese moral idealism. Stuart did not discuss the ontological nature of Shangti, but claimed that it was "at least that of omnipotent right;" and that it had left enduring effects, such as "standards of personal rectitude and social justice, as heaven's law, political solidarity and reverence for the Emperor, heaven's visible viceregent, with the corresponding antidote to despotism in the right to rebel against him when he had proven false to heaven's will."[1] Stuart said of the "Tao" that it was the "living, moving, creating order of the Universe" with which the Chinese sought to harmonize, to attain fellowship and to realize their inner human aspirations.[2] Stuart considered many of the Chinese gods the people had been worshipping to be idols, but nevertheless recognized that they were usually "men of distinguished virtues" whose canonization was "an evidence of the inherent moral idealism of the Chinese race."[3]

Starting from this generally favorable consideration of Chinese religious ideas, Stuart also viewed many Chinese religious practices in a positive light. For instance, he departed from his earlier impression

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[1]Stuart, "The Christian Apologetic for China," CR, April 1916, p. 222.

[2]Ibid., p. 223.

[3]Ibid., p. 222.

that Chinese ancestor worship was nothing but a superstitious practice, and now considered it to be an act which had sprung "in part at least from noble sentiments" and which had asserted "the yearning belief of the Chinese soul in immortality despite canonical agnosticism."[1] Furthermore, Stuart suggested that missionaries take an open-minded attitude toward Chinese social customs, for "much that we stigmatize as idolatrous rites may be in essence only the manifestations of those same normal impulses which in other forms we enjoy and have largely sanctified by our religious associations."[2] He also praised the Chinese habit of uttering prayers and claimed that prayer had always been "a vital element in their life."[3]

The second issue vital to forming a national Chinese church was, what elements in Chinese religious ideas and practices (with the exception of Islam) present points of contact with Christian theology and ethics and may be used as a foundation on which to build? According to Stuart, there were four points of contact. First, the ethical and social concern of Chinese religions and philosophies coincided with that of Christianity.[4] Second, there were common grounds between Chinese Buddhism and Christianity. Here Stuart was inclined to accept the fashionable missionary's interpretation of the time that many Buddhist doctrines and practices had been influenced by the Jewish conception of God and by the Christian and Gnostic thought existing in Alexandria in pre-Christian times.[5] This school of interpretation also asserted that the ideals of

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[1]Ibid., p. 223.

[2]Ibid., p. 225.

[3]Ibid., p. 223.

[4]Ibid., pp. 224-25.

[5]Ibid., p. 229; A. Lloyd, The Wheat Among the Tares (London: Macmillan and Co., 1908), p. 71.

the incarnated Buddha, such as love, humanity, peace, and compassion, were likewise truly Christian elements.[1] Furthermore, that certain Buddhist sects, such as the Jodo-shin-shu (True Pure Land Sect) in Japan, held a similar concept of Trinity (that of Amida, Kwanon, and Seishi), was held to be another evidence of Christian doctrinal sway on Buddhism.[2] Because of these and other evidences, this school of interpretation furthur claimed that the Lotus Sutra (Saddharma Pundarika Sutra) of the True Pure Land Sect had received heavy Western Christian influence.[3]

Stuart was never a scholar of Buddhism, but he generally subscribed to these interpretations:

> It may be that it can yet be shown that much in Buddhism has a Christian origin, the Goddess of Mercy--a female deity only in the last few centuries--with her saving sacrifice and divine compassion, being Jesus Himself brought to India by sailors and merchants voyaging west.

And,

> There are many specific points of resemblence (between Christianity and Buddhism): . . . Buddhist ideas of a Trinity, Incarnation, the quest after holiness and immortality on the part of numberless anchorites and pilgrims.[4]

Thirdly, a spiritual affinity between Christianity and Chinese religions did exist. Stuart pointed out that since "the Chinese Shangti of the ancients was invisible, glorious, omnipotent, inflexibly just, compassionate, no mere tribal god of this race, but supreme in all the world they knew," he approximated to the Jehovah of the Old Testament. Stuart also noted that the Chinese immanental conception of God as contained in

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[1]Stuart, "The Christian Apologetic for China," p. 229.

[2]Lloyd, Wheat, pp. 70-71.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Stuart, "The Christian Apologetic for China," pp. 229-30

Chinese philosophy, asceticism, and even popular idolatry had an obvious bearing on the Christian doctrines of Revelation, Incarnation, and the Holy Spirit.[1] Furthermore, Stuart listed several examples of the affinity between Christian doctrines and Chinese philosophy: the Sabbath and the "Cycle of Seven Days" in the Book of Changes, the Christian Golden Rule and Confucian ideas of Jen (benevolence) and Shu (reciprocity).[2] But however great these affinities, Stuart cautioned that there was still a fundamental difference: while the Chinese philosophies or religions "naturally rely on man's own strength, the Christian depends on the grace of God."[3]

Fourth, to point out the spiritual connection between certain Chinese religious practices and those of Christianity, Stuart singled out the Chinese Ching Ming Festival (Spring Festival) and Winter Solstice Festival as occasions that corresponded to the Christian Easter and Christmas. Since the Chinese Ching Ming comes approximately at the same time as Christian Easter, and since it commemorates the dead and celebrates the arrival of Spring as the rebirth of nature out of the death of winter, Stuart suggested that these two festivals be combined into one.[4] Stuart suggested that "the Chinese festival of the winter solstice (held on December 22nd or 23rd each year) could be made the occasion for worshipping the Sun of Righteousness, which, reinforced by their emphasis on the family and their fondness for children, gives the basis for a thoroughly Chinese Christmas." Stuart frankly admitted that the purpose of moulding

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[1]Ibid., p. 230.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid., p. 226.

these Chinese festivals into Christian celebrations was not only for their intrinsic worthiness, but also for their consequent apologetic value.[1]

A third question for national church advocates was, what elements in the Christian Gospel and the Christian way of life possess the greatest power of appeal? Stuart believed that there were five major elements attractive to Chinese in the Christian Gospel and Christian life style. First was the ethical concern and the social emphasis of Christianity. Stuart pointed out that "the Chinese have always had a generous sense of social morality both in its political and philanthropic implications," as shown in the two common Chinese concepts, "right living" (i) and "benevolence" (shan). Furthermore, Stuart claimed that the Chinese concept of duty was "not abstract unrelated righteousness but something obligatory only in its bearings on those with whom one has relationship." Because of the existence of these Chinese moral concepts, Stuart recommended that "the Christian movement can wisely stress all forms of social activity as at once expressing its true spirit and functioning in a field where the Chinese mind is prepared to be peculiarly responsive." By so doing, Stuart believed that the fine Chinese traits of loyalty (chung) and fidelity (hsiao) could "be enlarged to include the new Christian relationship of helper and helpless."[2]

A second source of appeal to the Chinese was the surpassing and unique moral beauty of the character of Jesus. Stuart asserted that while the Chinese found the teachings of Jesus could be "more or less matched from their own books," they recognized "His character, its inspiration, the moral power which flows from it" as something unique.[3] To illustrate

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Ibid., p. 225.

[3]Ibid., pp. 224-25.

a feeble equivalent to Christ's teaching in the Chinese literature, Stuart pointed out a pathetic passage in Book VI, Chapter 8, of Mencius as a good example demonstrating the moral impotency of Chinese philisophy. The passage referred to by Stuart was one dealing with the nature of the human mind. For clarity, we quote all the related passages in order to show Stuart's thought in this matter:

> Therefore, if it [the mind] receive its proper nourishment, there is nothing which will not grow. If it lose its proper nourishment, there is nothing which will not decay away. Confucius said, "Hold it fast, and it remains with you. Let it go, and you lose it. Its outgoing and incoming cannot be defined as to time or place." It is the mind of which this is said. (Italics mine)[1]

Here Stuart seemed to say that the Confucian mind lacked steadiness or permanence, while a Christian mind, a mind modeled after Jesus, was much more reliable.

A third source of appeal was the intellectual element in Christianity. On this point Stuart wrote:

> Its [Christianity's] world-view, its range of interest, its infinite adaptability as a religion of principles rather than of institutions, its attitude of fearless welcome to all new light from scholarship and science, its historic influence on human progress and enlightenment, all commend it to a nation [China] of acute reasoning power and inherited respect for knowledge.[2]

Stuart also quoted an English bishop's dictum that "all truth is Christian truth" to emphasize this point.

A fourth appeal was the true Christian hope for the future, with its consummation in eternal holiness as the reward of present virture. Stuart considered the Chinese consept of rewards and penalties for human behavior as too materialistic and mundane. This was evidenced in Confucius'

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[1]Ibid., p. 225; James Legge, trans., The Four Books (Taipei: Culture Book Co., n.d.), p. 871.

[2]Stuart, "The Christian Apologetic for China," p. 227.

comments on Chinese ancient mythical Emperor Shun: "His virtue was that of a saint. Having such great virtue, it could not be but that he should obtain his throne, his riches, his fame, his longevity."[1] As to Chinese idolatry, Stuart shared the criticism made by Prof. J. J. M. DeGroot of the University of Berlin that it was full of materialistic selfishness, that its aims and ends were the promotion of the material happiness of the world, and that it had not a trace of a higher religious aim.[2] In view of such materialism in Chinese ethics, Stuart believed that the Christian rewards for present virtue, such as giving the faithful a higher morality and eternal life, were of such a contrast as to surely win Chinese appreciation.[3]

Fifth, the moral dynamism of the Holy Spirit in Christianity was thought to appeal to the Chinese. Stuart pointed out that "Chinese systems have their founders, their sacred books, their lofty ethics; but nothing that corresponds to the New Testament doctrine of the Holy Spirit;" and that "the vindication of the Gospel will never win its way among them merely by the presentation of a moral ideal; still less by any statement in terms of philosophic thought; least of all by objective arguments to a people so curiously devoid of interest in mere facts of history. It is only as a dynamic that Christianity will recommend itself to them."[4] But would the Chinese accept this indwelling Spirit of God as a moral dynamic? On this, Stuart had much faith, not only because it was something that

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[1]Ibid., p. 230-31.

[2]Ibid., p. 231; J. J. M. DeGroot, Religion in China (New York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1912), pp. 214-15.

[3]Stuart, "The Christian Apologetic for China," p. 231.

[4]Ibid., pp. 231-32.

China did not have, but also because "Chinese immanental conceptions should make them peculiarly receptive to this doctrine."[1]

In this article Stuart also very briefly discussed two other issues. He responded to Chinese dissatisfaction with existing religious ideas and practices by simply pointing out that Neo-Confucianism was being decried as obsolete and inadequate to meet Chinese needs; that Buddhism in its more philosophic aspects was said to be impractical; and that Taoism was hopelessly superstitious.[2] Also, he singled out two elements in Christianity that had aroused the most opposition from educated Chinese: the concepts of the Trinity and of the Person of Jesus. He did not explain how to introduce the Trinity to the Chinese, but he did suggest that in explaining Jesus a "more modern statement in terms of immanence and personality can easily awaken their enthusiastic allegiance."[3]

What he so simply said allows for only a few general comments here. It is true that Chinese religious concepts have a strong strain of immanence. It is also true that some Chinese intellectuals are attracted to the moral beauty of Jesus. An illustrative case was that of Ch'en Tu-hsiu. In his famous article, "Christianity and Chinese," which appeared in February, 1920, he pointed out that, because of Chinese culture's emphasis on ethical moralism, it had become deficient in pure religious passion, which was rather abundant in Western civilization. To remedy this situation, Ch'en suggested that Chinese emulate Jesus' "supreme and great personality" and his "enthusiastic and deep passion."[4] Although Ch'en did

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[1]Ibid., p. 232.

[2]Ibid., p. 224.

[3]Ibid., p. 228.

[4]Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Chi-tu-chiao yü Chung-kuo-jen," Hsin ch'ing-nien 7, No. 3(February 1, 1920):18-21.

not in this article come right out and suggest that all Chinese should become Christians (he also had serious objections to many other Christian doctrines[1]), his attraction to Jesus Christ as a great person was obvious.

But here we must recall that Ch'en's attitude was rather an exception to that of most Chinese intellectuals in the late 1910's and early 1920's. With a few exceptions, almost all of them held either contemptuous or ambivalent attitudes toward Jesus Christ.[2] Therefore, Stuart's hope that a more modern explanation of Jesus' immanence and personality could awaken Chinese devotion seems to us to be rather unfounded. If we consider the small number of Christian converts among the educated Chinese in modern Chinese history, Stuart's undue optimism seems even more evident. Perhaps Stuart's zeal for Christian evangelism led him to hope for too much.

The second article, "Confucianism as a State Religion," was written some time after August, 1916, when the Chinese conservatives' movement to make Confucianism into a state religion had become a national controversy.

In 1912, a Confucian Society was established in Shanghai by K'ang Yu-wei's disciples and some old literati. The first organized effort to make Confucianism into a state religion was a proposal presented by the Chinese Chinputang (Progress Party) to the Constitutional Commission of Parliament that had gathered in July, 1913 to draft a constitution for the newly-established Republic. But because of the strong opposition to

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[1]Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "K'o-hsüeh yü Chi-tu-chiao," New Youth 3, No. 6; 4, No. 1.

[2]Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 320-27.

this proposal on the part of Kuomintang members in the Parliament, a compromise was reached and incorporated into Article XIX of the Draft Constitution: "Confucius' principles (tao) shall be the basis for the cultivation of character in national education."

The agitation for state religion gradually went hand in hand with Yüan Shih-k'ai's monarchical movement. Between 1913-1915 in Chili, Honan, Hunan, Shantung, and Hehlungchiang provinces many Confucian societies were established. On January 1, 1916, the first day of Yüan's monarchy, the lineal descendent of Confucius, K'ung ling-i, was made "the Holy Duke" (Yen-sheng-kung). After Yüan's death, this state-religion agitation continued and reached a climax when the parliament again debated, in August 1916, the previously passed Article XIX. K'ang Yu-wei, the most forceful spokesman for this agitation, now sent a personal letter urging President Li Yüan-hung and Premier Tuan Ch'i-jui to support the conservatives' action. The gist of K'ang's argument was that Confucianism had dominated China for two thousand years and had become China's spiritual foundation, and that its abandonment would cause the elimination of Chinese civilization. Therefore, "No Confucianism, no China."[1] The final result of the parliamentary debate over Article XIX was the passage of an amendment which read: "The people of the Republic of China have freedom to worship Confucius and freedom of religion which shall not be restricted except by law."[2]

It was in the midst of this turmoil that Stuart wrote his article, "Confucianism as a State Religion." He first explained that because of the absence of a continuous, strong national feeling in China, Chinese

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[1]Ibid., pp. 291-93

[2]Ibid., p. 293.

leaders had been searching for some means whereby a national unity of spirit could be attained. Hence, the movement to make Confucianism into a state religion. Therefore, in Stuart's view, it was for the Chinese a self-strengthening movement rather than an anti-foreign or anti-Christian movement:

> It is a movement of, by and for Chinese, and its effect upon foreigners or "foreign religions," namely Christianity, has hardly been considered. In fact, the leaders in the agitation scarcely consider Christianity a religion indigenous to China, and the protest likely to arise from Christian, or foreign, sources has not caused them a tithe of the concern that a protest coming from Buddhist quarters would cause.[1]

Stuart might have underestimated here the common resentment of Chinese Confucianists toward Christianity and the potential danger for Christianity inherent in this movement, but, judging by K'and Yu-wei's main arguments for a Confucian state religion, Stuart was right in asserting that the basic motive of the movement was for national fusion and spiritual regeneration.

Stuart was not only convinced that Christianity would not be damaged by this movement, he even believed that it would soon become a blessing in disguise to expedite the growth of Chinese Christianity into a native religion and to win vindication for Chinese Christians from their own compatriots. He remarked:

> The present agitation has already proved a good thing for native Christians. Some slight element of persecution is not to be regarded as an unmixed evil, and this movement has provided impetus for the fusion of Christians into an integral portion of the nation, capable of self-expression. If this pressure continues, the self-consciousness of the Christians must be increased, and soon will result in the appearance of spokesmen capable of completely vindicating the place of Christians among the patriots of China.[2]

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[1]Stuart, "Confucianism as a State Religion," Enclosure in "Letter to My dear Friends, March 2, 1917," SLF, p. 1.

[2]Ibid., p. 4.

Here again Stuart revealed his religious optimism.

The third article by Stuart, "The Chinese Mind and the Gospel," appeared in October, 1917, in The International Review of Missions, the official organ of the Continuation Committee of the World Missionary Conference. The burden of it was Stuart's frustration over the meagre results of those massive Protestant efforts undertaken for more than a century in China. In the article he discussed root causes of failure and offered his solutions.

In part one, Stuart examined the Chinese images of the missionaries and of their work, images not very pleasing to the missionaries:

> It would be an amazing illumination if we could see our missionary enterprise through Chinese eyes-- . . . our assumption of the role of teacher coupled with our amusing linguistic limitations and much more jarring ignorance of Chinese proprieties; our insistence upon their becoming identified with an alien organization which if not in some mysterious way related to the designs of the Great Powers is at least an adjunct to the imposing institutions and subject to the autocratic control of its foreign promoters; our very philanthropies, promoted by the natural but egoistic desire to acquire merit in the other world, and our ethical teachings, which at best are about as good as those of the Chinese sages, though dreamily impractical in certain respects, weighted with outworn superstitions and lacking in some fundamental virtues.[1]

Stuart neither denounced these Chinese images nor accepted them all as legitimate. But he did indirectly show his sympathy for the Chinese position by offering criticisms of certain missionary practices and by offering some recommendations for their improvement.

He criticized the missionary's blind effort to maintain certain unimportant religious traditions, such as the "various ecclesiastical units, not merely the distinctive doctrines and polities but many trivial accessories or conventions of worship and even the geographical names of

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[1]Stuart, "The Chinese Mind and the Gospel," The International Review of Missions, October 1917, pp. 547-48.

many societies."[1] He recommended that the missionaries should instead "emphasize the dynamic realities of Christianity while disregarding its non-essential trappings, and thus to find a fellowship too fundamental to be thwarted by any racial differences."[2] In addition, Stuart suggested that missionary workers should try to adapt Christianity to the Chinese environment. On this point he shared the conviction, advanced by a British scholar whose book he had just read, that the modern Western Church should follow the example of the early Church in the Greco-Roman world: the early Church had saved itself from extinction by breaking away from its Jewish mold and adapting its rights and philosophical interpretation to the new pagan environment.[3]

Stuart believed that if the Chinese church would carry out all the above suggestions, the Chinese people would surely respond to its call. He offered two reasons. First, Chinese nature was especially suitable to Christianity. He explained that his claim was based on his "contact with Chinese life."[4] Probably he also based his claim upon his earlier assertion that, because there were many points of contact between Chinese and Christian religious ideas and practices, the Chinese should find Christianity easy to accept. His second reason was that the objective circumstances in China would induce its people to embrace Christianity. He said, "The breaking up of the old order, the restless struggle after better things, the futilities of recent political, educational and other

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[1]Ibid., p. 549.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., p. 546. The British scholar was Kirsopp Lake, and his book was The Stewardship of Faith: Our Heritage from Early Christianity (London: Christopher, 1915).

[4]Stuart, "The Chinese Mind and the Gospel," p. 548.

reforms, all . . . should tend to make the people peculiarly receptive."[1] After having justified his optimism in this matter, Stuart even let himself be carried away by it to describe his dream of seeing the day when Christianity had finally triumphed in China:

> One can easily spin daydreams of the time, when, discovered as theirs at last, accepted alike by scholars and patriots and toiling masses, re-interpreted in Chinese terms and revivifying Chinese traditions, Christ will be worshipped in many a picturesque Chinese fane, with a richness of ceremony and a reverent dignity peculiarly their own, with their marvellously fluid and expressive literary vehicle consecrated to reveling His glory, with their finest traits of character--loyalty, moral idealism, practical benevolence, patient endurance--quickened by His power, He Himself becoming the new and greater Master of a race who have ever been quick to recognize and steadfast in honoring moral leaders as sent to reveal the will of Heaven for human life.[2]

In part two of the article of October, 1917, Stuart attempted to fathom the Chinese mind. In his veiw, there were two conflicting strains among Chinese moralists, ethical utilitarianism and ritual mysticism. Of the ethical-utilitarian strain, Stuart declared that the "utilitarian gospel of common sense and homely virtues" was the glory of Confucius. Then he praised many aspects of Confucianism and also the moral righteousness of the Chinese people:

> It [Confucianism] has developed in the Chinese an ethical passion which demands fruition in practical life; an unsurpassed knowledge of human nature; a view of education which has made the saint and the scholar equivalent terms at least in theory, learning being in order to moral ends; a narrowing of intellectual and political interests to the field of morals, so that in some such sense as we speak of the Hebrews as having a genius for religion, may we also say that the Chinese have developed a genius for righteousness.[3]

But following the above praise began Stuart's harsh and sharp attacks on the defects of Confucianism. He first denounced the Confucian,

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[1]Ibid., p. 547.

[2]Ibid., p. 548.

[3]Ibid., p. 550.

pragmatic treatment of truth and the damaging spiritual consequences of it. Stuart cited a dialogue between Confucius and one of his disciples to make his point. To the question, "Do the dead have knowledge of our service and worship?" Confucius replied, "If I say yes, the filial sons and grandsons will ruin themselves in such services and offerings. If I say no, the unfilial will leave the dead unburied." Stuart charged that so pragmatic an attitude toward such inquiries had resulted "in the most radical defect not only of Chinese character but of their mental processes as well, not only their immoral indifference to truth but their illogical indifference to fact." "All that matters" to the Chinese, said Stuart,"is whether it [truth] functions well."[1]

Stuart further charged that this pragmatic attitude had damaged Christian proselytizing, especially with regard to the concepts of God and immortality. To illustrate this point, Stuart again quoted from Confucius: "While I do not know life, how can I know death?" and "while I cannot serve men, how can I serve their spirits?" To Stuart, these two statements perfectly revealed Confucius' reticent and agnostic frame of mind toward God and immortality, one which had significantly affected all Chinese of the succeeding generations.[2]

The next great Confucianist that Stuart attacked was Chu Hsi, whom he called the "greatest commentator" on Confucius. Stuart also called Chu an agnostic and a materialistic monist, because of his "evolving all phenomena from an unintelligent First Principle operating through the dual forces of Yang and Yin, then through the five material elements--metals, plants, water, fire, earth."[3] Stuart's criticism of Chu was also

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[1]Ibid., p. 551.

[2]Ibid., pp. 551-52.

[3]Ibid., p. 552.

directed at Chu's insistence on outward rites, the performance of which was to not only reveal, but to prompt and preserve, the proper state of heart.[1] Stuart charged that this insistance had fixed "a morality of externals;" that it had caused the Chinese consciousness of saving face; and that it had made them "a nation of Pharisees, rigidly scrupulous and zealous but deficient in any disturbing sense of sin or eager seeking for salvation."[2]

Another defect of Confucianism was its lack of imagination due to its being "a religion of common sense and regulated propriety." In Stuart's judgement, this defect was the reason for the material backwardness of China:

> The people who invented printing, gunpowder and the mariner's compass lacked the imagination to apply these and have remained static. When all life is cramped into regulations based on existing political and social relationships, the look is backward and there is neither any motive to progress nor the means of readjustment to the new condition of world-contacts.[3]

Next, Stuart undertook to criticize ritual mysticism. He believed that it could be found in three areas: Chinese metaphysics, such as the Book of Changes; the universal concept of Tao or Way; and the polytheism and demonolatry of the latter-day Taoism and Buddhism.[4] Excepting Stuart's respect for the universal concept of Tao, which he considered as the groundwork of all Chinese religions ("a Chinese can be at once a Confucianist, a Buddhist and a Taoist"),[5] he had a rather low opinion of Chinese

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[1]This was obviously referring to Chu Hsi's theory of "holding fast to seriousness" (chü-ching). To obtain this "Seriousness," people should "be correct in movement and appearance and be orderly in thoughts and deliberations" and "be correct in your dress and dignified in your gaze." See Wing-tsit Chan, trans. and comp., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 606- 7.

[2]Stuart, "The Chinese Mind and the Gospel," p. 552.

[3]Ibid., p. 553. [4]Ibid., pp. 554-57. [5]Ibid., p. 554.

polytheism and demonolatry. Of the Chinese metaphysics he merely said that it was "after all quite naively simple."[1] The polytheism and demonolatry of the latter-day Buddhism and Taoism in China he depreciatingly associated with witchery, demon-possession, werwolves, dragons, idolatry, geomancy, exorcism, incantation, burial rites, ancestor worship, the search for the elixir of longevity through escetic practices, and the quest for peace through pilgrimages, monastic vows, and ritual observances.[2]

But was there any positive value in Chinese mysiticsm? Stuart could find only one benefit, which was that it had kept the Chinese from wrongdoing and had helped them to realize their inner spiritual aspirations:

> The positive value of Chinese mysticism is the vital belief it has maintained in the moral nature of the Tao or cosmic force. . . . Through all the vagaries of Chinese superstitions and the villainies of Chinese life, religious ideas have been a powerful deterrent to vice; . . . they have inspired the striving to keep in harmony with this living, moving, creating order of the universe which those of all three religions call Tao or Way; thus they have aided this people to realize in conduct many of the finer urgings of the human spirit.[3]

In part three of his article of October, 1917, Stuart offered some suggestions to his missionary colleagues for most strategically propagating Christianity among the Chinese. To win Chinese to Christ, Stuart believed that the missionary workers should demonstrate the quality of their insight, sympathy, and respect to the Chinese. To be able to do so, they had to acquire "the ability to read the literature and thus to learn the soul of the people, or to employ whatever other method will

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Ibid., p. 555.

[3]Ibid., pp. 556-57.

serve to bring one into such an understanding." Success could only come "in the suppression of one's prejudices, and the determination to know the inner thought of individual Chinese by intimate contact and then to give all possible play to their self-expression."[1]

From the above articles written by Stuart we may now draw some tentative conclusions. Generally speaking, the strength of his arguments lay in his adequate knowledge of Chinese Confucianism and his perceptive understanding of the Chinese mind. This was shown in his generally accurate appraisal of the utilitarian strain in Chinese moral tradition. His claim for the attractiveness of the personality of Jesus and for the uniqueness of the concept of the Holy Spirit was also well-founded; both doctrines had the possibility of gaining eventual acceptance by the Chinese. He was also right in noting that besides political reforms China needed spiritual regeneration. The efforts made by men like K'ang Yu-wei, Wu chih-hui, Hu Shih, and Ch'en Tu-hsiu in the late 1910's all testified to the need for such regeneration. But the solution offered by each one of them was different. While Stuart believed that only Christianity together with democracy could generate enough "power" to save China, K'ang's solution was Confucianism, Wu's was scientism, Hu's was individualism and liberalism, and Ch'en's was firstly individualism and liberalism, and then Marxism.[2] Stuart was politically more akin to Hu, while religiously he was almost all alone by himself.

However, there were also many shortcomings in Stuart's arguments. I have already pointed out his over-optimism in believing that "more modern statement in terms of immanence and personality" would win Chinese

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[1]Ibid., pp. 557-58.

[2]Chow, The May Fourth Movement, pp. 295-96, 337, 347-48.

intellectuals to the person of Christ. He had offered no solution to the problem of explaining the concept of the Trinity to the Chinese. Besides these two shortcomings, his suggestion to purify the Chinese Spring and Winter Solstice Festivals, making them into Christian ceremonies, was also mere wishful thinking, unwarranted by the Chinese reality. The total failure of the Chinese, including the Chinese Christians, to respond to this suggestion fully testified to its impracticality. But the chief weakness of his arguments lay in his discussion of the mystic strain of Chinese religion.

In his discussion of Chinese religions, Stuart fiercely denounced their polytheism and demonolatry. The only positive value in Chinese religious mysticism which he recognized was its deterrent effect on vice. Stuart found almost nothing to say about the intrinsic value of it or of its value in terms of religious experience, aspirations, and salvation. We can only assume that he was either ignorant of, or he did not want to admit, such a value. But some liberal Christian theologians and missionary spokesmen in the 1920's did come forth to affirm such values. For instance, Rudolf Otto, one of the leading Protestant theologians of the century, spoke of both western and Buddhist mysticism in these words:

> In mysticism we have in the "beyond" (ἐπέκεινα) again the strongest stressing and over-stressing of those non-rational elements which are already inherent in all religion. . . . Not content with contrasting it with all that is of nature or this world, mysticism concludes by contrasting it with Being itself and all that "is," and finally actually calls it "that which is nothing." By this "nothing" is meant not only that of which nothing can be predicated, but that which is absolutely and intrinsically other than and opposite of everything that is and can be thought. But while exaggerating to the point of paradox this <u>negation</u> and contrast--the only means open to conceptual thought to apprehend the <u>mysterium</u>--mysticism at the same time retains the <u>positive quality</u> of the "wholly other" as a very living factor in its over-brimming religious emotion.
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> But what is true of the strange "nothingness" of our mystics holds good equally of the <u>sūnyam</u> and the <u>sūnyatā</u>, the "void" and

"emptiness" of the Buddhist mystics [italics Otto's].[1]

Dr. Kenneth J. Saunders, a well-known missionary leader, in a paper prepared for the 1928 Jerusalem Meeting of the International Missionary Council, completely shared Dr. Otto's positive view of Buddhist mysticism.[2] Saunders also gave a positive interpretation to the Buddhist ideal of Nirvana in contrast to misinformed opinions that it was "mere negation, or mere pessimism." He wrote:

> Nirvana means an ethical as well as a mystical experience. It is the end of Tanha (desire) as well as the unspeakable joy of transcendental experience. We might say, without going far wrong, that when the Fourth Gospel [the Gospel of John] speaks of the "Son of Man which is in Heaven" it describes an experience of other-worldy peace in the midst of time which is akin to that of the Buddhist Arhat [Buddha, or the saint of Hinayana].[3]

Here Dr. Saunders almost equated the bliss of Buddhist Nirvana with that of a Christian Heaven. To show that he was not alone in this position, he cited similar opinions from another eminent German theologian, Friedrich Heiler, and from several Baptist missionaries.[4]

Though there were shortcomings in Stuart's arguments, his efforts in trying to adapt Christianity to the Chinese environment were very timely. The state-religion movement promoted by the ultra-conservative Confucianists had created pressure on all other religious faiths. The Buddhists felt especially threatened. This was why both Buddhist laymen and clergy in 1912 founded, for the first time in their history, their respective

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[1]Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1923; A Galaxy Book, 1958), pp. 29-30.

[2]Kenneth J. Saunders, "Christianity and Buddhism," in The Jerusalem Meeting of the International Missionary Council, March 24 - April 8, 1928, 8 vols. (New York: 1928), vol. 1: The Christian Life and Message in Relation to Non-Christian Systems of Thought and Life, p. 99.

[3]Ibid., p. 101.

[4]Ibid.

national organizations.[1] Various reforms in Buddhism were also undertaken. For instance, as early as 1915, T'ai-hsü tried to build a new sangha (Buddhist order) "which would be a society of men and women well selected, who would not officiate in masses and funerals for money but would do productive work and demonstrate a truly religious life."[2] After the May Fourth Movement, the need for reform was more pressing. In the 1920's, many new Buddhist institutes were established in Nanking, Wuchang, and other cities. Their lecturers included Liang Ch'i-ch'ao.[3] Also, important Buddhist sutra were printed through the efforts made by scholars like Liang and Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei.[4]

Stimulated by the social service programs of the Christian church, Chinese Buddhists also formed such organizations as the Young Men's Buddhist Association to engage in all kinds of social services, including "first aid during the war, hospitals, orphanages, famine and flood relief, collection and distribution of clothing, visits to prisons, caring for and liberating living creatures, and so forth."[5] But most important of all, eminent Buddhist leaders, both clergy and laity, such as T'ai-hsü,[6] Hsiung Shih-li,[7] Ouyang Ching-wu,[8] and Yin-kuang,[9] tried to further the

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[1]Wing-tsit Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), p. 57.

[2]Ibid., p. 82.

[3]Ibid., p. 61.

[4]Ibid., pp. 60, 83.

[5]Ibid., pp. 82-83.

[6]Ibid., pp. 118-26.

[7]Ibid., pp. 126-35.

[8]Ibid., pp. 105-18.

[9]Ibid., pp. 65-68.

synthesis between Buddhism and Confucianism, and to make Buddhism an effective religious and social force in China. Generally speaking, they succeeded in the former task,[1] but failed in the latter.[2]

Within this general religious ferment, Stuart struggled to find ways to adapt Christianity to the Chinese environment. He and his Buddhist counterparts were being confronted with similar problems, and were equally beset by the need to solve them. Since Christianity had not harmonized so well with the Chinese cultural and religious tradition as Buddhism had, and since it was still viewed as a foreign religion, Christian propagators obviously had a harder and longer way to go. From this perspective, Stuart's analyses of the problems and his proposals for solving them were impressive indeed. And, acting on his convictions, Stuart tried to integrate Christianity and Chinese tradition at Yenching University in the 1920's and 1930's through stressing their comparable elements.

But we should note here that in the 1920's the Chinese intellectual scene changed. Though Neo-Confucianism survived through such able apologists as Liang Sou-ming, Feng Yu-lan, and Hsiung Shih-li,[3]

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[1]Ibid., chap. III.

[2]Ibid., chap. II.

[3]As to the fate of Neo-Confucianism after the 1910's, this author agrees with Professor Wing-tsit Chan that it has survived in the decades after 1910. (See his, Religious Trends in Modern China, chaps. I and VI). The Kuomintang's indoctrination program since the 1920's has been based partially on Confucian tracts. Liang Sou-ming's Tung-hsi wen-hua chi ch'i che-hsüeh (Shanghai, 1934) ran eight editions in the decade after its first appearance in 1921. The recent anti-Confucian campaign on the Chinese mainland, whatever its political nature and purpose, indicates that at least in the Chinese mind Confucianism is alive enough to deserve attack. For these reasons, Stuart after the 1920's continued his syncretive effort to reach some common ground between Christianity and Confucianism or Chinese traditional values.

Chinese nationalism, Marxism, liberalism, and scientism overshadowed it. The intellectual enemy of Christianity suddenly changed faces, and new arguments against Christianity and religion were developed. A simple syncretism between Christianity and Confucianism for the purpose of religious mediation was no longer a solution. To meet the changing times, Christianity would have to come to terms with the new intellectual and political currents. Therefore, the missionary workers avoided any conflict with Chinese nationalism by strongly supporting it, especially after 1925. They responded to the social message of Marxism and Communism by engaging in various types of social service. Threatened by liberalism and scientism, they tried to affirm that both democracy and science were the products of a Western, Christian heritage. Stuart, also, was forced to accomodate his strategies to such historical changes, as we shall see in the following chapters.

CHAPTER VII

THEOLOGICAL THINKING AND POSITION

The American, Protestant, theological world for the period 1865-1930 can be divided into three major constituencies: 1) the radicals, who had been influenced by new scientific, historical, and philosophical currents of thought and had made radical revision of the orthodox theology; 2) the orthodox, who were determined to resist any theological change by upholding a "scholastic" theology and the infallibility of the Bible and by resorting to pietism and apocalypticism; and 3) the Christocentric liberals (to whom Stuart belonged), who mediated between religious radicalism and historical orthodoxy by effecting a Christ-centered theology, by employing historical criticism in the study of the Bible, and by devoting themselves to social services and reform movements.[1] In this chapter we shall examine Stuart's theological ideas within this larger framework by comparing his ideas with those of the various religious constituencies.

The most important single document containing Stuart's theological ideas was a published report of a series of lectures that he had delivered before the Fourth Secretaries' Conference of the Chinese YWCA, which

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[1]Smith, American Christianity, 2: 215-368. In this work there was a fourth group, which can loosely be classified as social gospellers, whose concern was to relate Christian principles to both domestic and international ills. Since many of them, such as Walter Rauschenbusch, were also Christocentric liberals, I include them in the Christocentric liberal group.

was held from January 25 until February 4, 1919. The secretaries present were mostly Chinese, and the four lectures, delivered in a question-and-answer form, pertained to four major issues: God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Scriptures.[1]

Of God. In his discussion of this issue, Stuart immediately revealed his liberal stand through his suggestion of using modern scientific knowledge to understand religion and to make religion respectable in an age dominated by science. He said:

> We want to be thoroughly modern; we are living in the twentieth century and we shall be dealing chiefly with people who are living and thinking in twentieth century terms. We want to get away from that which has been outgrown or corrected by modern science, and yet we want to be true to the eternal facts, God's infiniteness and His revelation.[2]

To Stuart, this liberal or scientific approach to religion was very important in reaching the Chinese, especially the Chinese students, for they were afraid of "being thought of as behind the times."[3]

Next, Stuart discussed the nature of God. Here his definitions were exactly those of the Christocentric liberals: God had revealed Himself in Christ and was Christlike, and God was the Father of man.[4] Stuart stated:

> Revelation has come from God according to the ability of the people to receive it. . . . And yet the living God who has been revealed

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[1]Stuart, "The Addresses of Dr. J. Leighton Stuart Before the Fourth Secretaries' Conference of the YWCA of China, January 25-February 4, 1919 " (1919; reprint ed., Columbia, S.C.: McCaw of Columbia, 1924), 33pp., Union Theological Seminary Library, Richmond, Va.

[2]Ibid., p. 3.

[3]Ibid., p. 4.

[4]Smith, American Christianity, 2: 257.

> completely in Jesus Christ has always been leading the race, trying to get into the minds of men. (Italics mine.)[1]

And,

> I doubt if Jesus would ever have tried to define God. Perhaps his word "Father" is better than any definition. When we think what the word "Father" means, any attempt to define it would seem useless. The relation between Jesus and God was "Fahter and Son." . . . The more we think of it, the more we feel the word "Father" the very best human relation and it is better than any formal definition Jesus could have given . . .[2]

Thirdly, Stuart dealt with the controversy between orthodox and liberals over whether God was transcendent or immanent, or both. On this issue, Stuart's stand was entirely parallel to that of the leading Christocentric liberal theologian, William Nelson Clarke, who had argued that God is both transcendent and immanent. Stuart said:

> We want to combine the two. Mere immanence is pantheistic. The God that is "closer than breathing" is the conception of Jesus. There is the danger, perhaps, in modern thinking of over-emphasizing the immanence. God transcendent and God immanent--God who is outside and a part of all, and who is yet in His world. "Without all things, not shut without; within all things, not shut within,"[3]

Lastly, Stuart touched upon the problem of the relationship between Christianity and other world-religions. As pointed out in Chapter I, the traditional, orthodox position usually denied that any intrinsic value existed in non-Christian religions, and held that Christianity was the only religion which contained truth. In contrast, the Christocentric liberals believed that other religions were also divine revelations, and

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[1]Stuart, "Addresses," p. 5.

[2]Ibid., p. 8.

[3]Ibid., p. 9. As to Clarke's position see Smith, American Christianity, 2: 258. For Clarke's fuller treatment, see his The Christian Doctrine of God (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), pp. 311-43.

that Christianity was a last and best revelation in which the nobler elements of other world religions could be fulfilled. Stuart fully shared this view:

> The Christian religion is the fullest, the finest and the final revelation, but not different in kind from the revelation of earlier ages, when you get down to reality, through the encrustations on the outside.[1]

Furthermore, the superiority of Christianity was made even more evident because some of the other religions had retrogressed throughout the ages. Stuart singled out the Chinese religion as a good example of this religious retrogression:

> Take the Chinese for instance; their [religion contained] very much purer, nobler ideas of religion three thousand years ago than the past few hundred years. The revelation as it began may have come as God's helping those early Chinese into more pure living, but through certain faults of the Chinese nation, they have lost that pristine image of God.[2]

Of Jesus Christ. First, Stuart shared the position of all other Christocentric liberals that Christ was the center of Christian theology. He endorsed their cry to get "Back to Christ": "How easy it would be for us to admit that Christianity is the great ideal or a great divine doctrine, but how essential it is to bring the fact that it is not a moral doctrine, but Jesus Christ."[3] Therefore, he cautioned the YWCA secretaries that they were not in China to preach "doctrines" but to present Christ to the Chinese.[4]

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[1]Stuart, "Addresses," p. 6.

[2]Ibid., p. 5.

[3]Ibid., p. 11.

[4]Ibid.

Second, he emphasized that Christianity was a historical religion, and that its facts were historical truths. In Stuart's view, these points were extremely important in explaining Christianity to the Chinese, for otherwise they might misunderstand Christianity, and might believe it to contain only moral doctrines and not necessarily religious truths. Stuart criticized the Chinese for being interested only in systems that had worked well but not in whether the systems were true. To him, this utilitarian standard was a moral defect and a mental deficiency of the Chinese people. To cure it, the Chinese should be made to develop a habit of seeking truth, not for its utilitarian benefits, but for its intrinsic worth. But how could such a habit be developed? In Stuart's view, the Chinese should start with Christianity. If they could accept Christianity through being convinced by its historical truthfulness, then they could gradually develop a habit of truth-seeking. If accepted, Christianity could thereby make a tremendous contribution to the character-formation of the Chinese:

> Therefore Christianity is not only saving the Chinese but is helping to reconstruct China's mental processes. The Chinese should come to see the important facts, and to get the facts about Jesus is helpful in forming a new habit of thinking which means a very much better type of Chinese character.[1]

Stuart's emphasis on the historicity of the Christian faith, rather than on some doctrinaire and static view of religion, was a position typical of all other Christocentric liberals.[2]

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[1]Ibid., pp. 12-13.

[2]Kenneth Cauthen, The Impact of American Religious Liberalism (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 218-19.

Third, Stuart discussed the relationships among God, Christ, and man. As to the relationship between God and Christ, Stuart said it was a two-fold relationship: both a moral relationship in terms of father and son, and a relationship of love, for Christ "drew all the time upon his Father's love." Stuart stressed this latter relationship, for it "will most appeal to the Chinese mind."[1] Stuart and other Christocentric liberals saw eye to eye on this point.[2] As to man's relationship with God and Christ, Stuart considered it a relationship of revelation. He said, "God is perfect personality and he is expressed within the limitations of human life. When human character becomes perfect, then is the revelation of God perfect. In proportion as we have the life of God controlling our affections and minds will we become perfect revelations of God, just as we are now imperfect revelations of God."[3] He continued, "Jesus revealed man in proportion as he revealed God."[4]

In this framework, man is connected with God and Christ through divine revelation, so a continuity between them is established. This principle of continuity was also a very representative liberal position as opposed to an older theology which believed that there was a vast gulf between God and man.[5] Furthermore, if God used revelation to reach man, then man came to know God through personal, conscious experience.

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[1]Stuart, "Addresses," p. 13.

[2]For the Christocentric liberals' position on the relationship between God and Christ as one of love, see Cauthen, The Impact, pp. 80, 104-5.

[3]Stuart, "Addresses," pp. 15-16.

[4]Ibid., p. 16.

[5]Cauthen, The Impact, pp. 9-11.

This emphasis on personal experience was also a liberal attitude toward religion and was in contrast to the orthodox emphasis on the objectivity of religious faith.[1]

Fourth, Stuart accepted the same views of the Kingdom of God as were expressed by leaders of the Social Gospel movement such as Walter Rauschenbusch. "If Jesus lived today," Stuart wrote, "he would talk about organizing an ideal society; an ideal human brotherhood; a new social order."[2]

Stuart's interest in social and political reform began at least as early as 1913, when he admitted that he had been trying to interest his students in the seminary "in their country's problems, and to relate in their minds the Christian evangel to Chinese social and political needs as well as to those of the individual soul."[3] Since then he had been postulating Jesus as a social reformer whose ultimate intention was to establish a Kingdom of God on earth. For instance, in early 1914, he spoke of Jesus' unswerving purpose "to establish in absolute supremacy and perfection a reconstructed human society, a veritable Kingdom of Heaven among men."[4] He claimed that the Book of Revelations was not so much concerned with the distant future, but offered "the social message of Christianity."[5]

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[1]Ibid., pp. 36, 210, 212, 215. For the orthodox emphasis on the objectivity of religious faith, see Smith, American Christianity, 2:311-12.

[2]Stuart, "Addresses," p. 14; on Rauschenbusch, see Smith, American Christianity, 2:401-7.

[3]Stuart, "Letter from Rev. J. Leighton Stuart to the Central Church, Washington, D.C., "The Missionary Survey, November 1913, p. 1038.

[4]Stuart, "Revelation of Jesus Christ," CR, February 1914, p. 101.

[5]Ibid., p. 94.

Lastly, Stuart rejected the orthodox interpretation that the human and the divine elements in Jesus were distinctly different elements and asserted that they were instead unified in Jesus.[1] "It seems to me," he said, "the old creedal statements no longer meet the case. To talk about two natures, two wills, etc., as though the divine and the human were separate things, is something impossible for us today. To retain them is to retain them because of a sense or attitude of loyalty, but finds no response in our own way of thinking."[2] On this question, Stuart's view was essentially one of Christocentric liberalism.[3]

Of the Holy Spirit. Three major issues centered around the Holy Spirit. The first of these concerned the importance of the Holy Spirit as a religious power. Stuart sensed an indisputable emphasis on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in recent Christian thought and attributed this both to the rise of the sciences of psychology and biology and to the human need for a religion that generates power:

> Psychology in its religious application, having to do with our conscious fellowship with God, and biology our spiritual life, both relate themselves at once to the Holy Spirit. Conscious fellowship with God, and the life derived from God, if they are true at all, are mediated through the Holy Spirit, and whatever we say about the Holy Spirit, we all recognize these are the two phases of Christian thought which have most meaning and interest for people today--conscious fellowship with God, and life derived from God--a life of power. (Italics mine.)[4]

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[1]For the orthodox interpretation, see J. Gresham Machen, Christianity and Liberalism (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1923), pp. 114-16.

[2]Stuart, "Addresses," p. 15.

[3]Smith, American Christianity, 2: 263-64.

[4]Stuart, "Addresses," p. 17.

To illustrate the Christian faith by applying psychology and biology was a common practice among most Christian liberals of the time.[1]

Next, Stuart discussed the uniqueness of the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit and its special attractiveness and usefulness to the Chinese. "The thing that makes Christianity absolutely unique," he wrote, "is its belief that there is now available for every individual person this living fellowship with God which we call the Holy Spirit."[2] He went on to write, "When we come to the Holy Spirit we have something that has never been thought of, which has no suggestion and no comparison in any other religious faith."[3] Stuart pointed out that the doctrine was useful to the Chinese because it was "a living transforming dynamic," offering a power which Chinese religious thought lacked:

> That [the Holy Spirit] is the thing in Christianity which gives its appeal to the Chinese mind, and it is an appeal which every Chinese will admit the force of, at least in a negative way. Chinese people admit they lack power. There is no power in Chinese religions; there is no power in their present-day life.[4]

This unique dynamic would make the Chinese reach "personal, social, and national righteousness."[5]

The last major issue which Stuart discussed pertained to the concept of the Trinity. Some Christocentric liberals, such as William Newton

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[1]Smith, American Christianity, 2: 256, 260; Sydney E. Ahlstrom, ed., Theology in America (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1967), pp. 64-73.

[2]Stuart, "Addresses," p. 17.

[3]Ibid., p. 18.

[4]Ibid., pp. 18-19.

[5]Ibid., p. 19.

Clarke, favored a tritheistic explanation--that the Trinity was of "three modes" and each mode was "a centre of conscious life and activity." Others, like Horace Bushnell and William Adams Brown, had adopted interpretations in terms of "revelation" and "experience."[1] Stuart's response to this problem was not to discuss it at all, for he felt that theological speculations were not as important as finding that which would help people live. He said, "Hasn't one trouble been . . . an attempt to harmonize a lot of Bible texts and work out theology, rather than to find something that would help people live, and isn't it better to let the doctrine go altogether than to have it as a sort of intellectual harmonizing of Bible texts that to our Western mind seem to call for some explanation?"[2]

But if he had to discuss the Trinity, he would approach it the way Bushnell and Brown had done and reject the tritheistic explanations. He pointed out that the "person" in the creedal "Three Persons" did not mean a physical "person," but "personality."[3] Therefore, the "Three Persons" did not mean three separate Persons or Gods, but a "three-fold relationship" between God the Father, God the Son, and God the Spirit.[4] He was convinced that only through revelation and personal experience could man comprehend the Trinity:

> We say that God has revealed Himself to men in these three ways: God the Father, Creator, Source of Life, the Soul of the Universe; then the perfect revelation in human life and character; and the personal religion of each one of us. A great many people seem to feel that

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[1]Smith, American Christianity, 2: 262-63.

[2]Stuart, "Addresses," p. 22.

[3]Ibid., p. 20.

[4]Ibid., p. 21.

> is all there is to it. As a practical matter it could stop with that; we can all accept it; the facts of Biblical revelation and Christian experience put that above all question. (Italics mine.)[1]

He went on to write:

> The Holy Spirit is personal because God is personal, but not personal in the sense of being one of the three persons. It is not merely a sort of divine influence or stimulus in us, it is a personal God in us, for the reason that God is personal. "Religion is the life of God in the soul of man."[2]

Of the Holy Scriptures. Stuart raised four questions about the Holy Scriptures. Problems with the Scriptures themselves included their dating, authorship, style, the original method of compilation, and innate worth.[3] Stuart's most radical ideas involved the innate worth of the Scriptures. Because of the compilation of the Scriptures was done by many different Christian believers in the early centuries and many human-made errors might have crept into them, Stuart believed that man should not blindly take every book in the Scriptures as having absolute value. He wrote, "The canon we have may include books not essential and there may be books outside that would be worth having." Therefore, "Some of the time we spend in reading books in the Old Testament we might spend in reading other books that might just as well be in the Bible."[4]

Because of scholarly problems with the Bible, Stuart raised the question of its reliability or infallibility. He believed that the

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Ibid., p. 23.

[3]Ibid., pp. 25-26.

[4]Ibid., p. 28.

inspiration received by the Biblical writers was no more special than what all men received from God:

> Why should we say that the inspiration of the Biblical writers is different in kind from the inspiration of today? . . . Isn't the fact that their experiences are one with that which we are seeking and which we all, more or less feel--?[1]

And,

> The writers of the Gospels had peculiar opportunities and used them, but in kind they are not different from the writings of people today. There is nothing they wrote that would indicate they were conscious of some peculiar inspiration.[2]

Furthermore, the inspiration received had only "influenced" the Biblical writers, who were then left with their human talents to actually write the Gospels. Stuart stated:

> Can we state that the expression of the Bible was inspiration of God's spirit, influencing those men according to their circumstances to give just the revelation they were able to give and which the people to whom they gave it were able to receive; just as we believe God is revealing himself increasingly as men are able to receive the revelation? Isn't the natural way to think about it? (Italics mine.)[3]

In other words, Stuart believed that the Bible was not an inspired record, but a record of inspired men:

> If we believe the Bible to be a record of inspired men we save every thing that any theory would try to save.[4]

One can infer from this, of course, that the Bible may contain some human errors.

Stuart's position was definitely offensive to the orthodox position.

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[1]Ibid., pp. 24-25.

[2]Ibid., p. 25.

[3]Ibid., p. 28.

[4]Ibid., p. 30.

To Dr. J. Gresham Machen, the divine inspiration given to the Biblical writers was "plenary" and the Bible was absolutely infallible. Stuart's limited view of divine inspiration, his denial of a miraculous quality to it, would be seen to be downright heretical.[1]

If the Bible was not an absolutely infallible record, how could human beings circumvent its human errors and come to know its true meaning? Stuart's solution was to resort to the revelation of the Holy Spirit, to one's religious experience, and to the application of Biblical Criticism. "Any theory we have about the Scriptures," Stuart wrote, "must be in harmony with our conclusions as to the Holy Spirit and His place in our individual lives. Any theory that is mechanical or superficial, or that clashes with our conception of the Holy Spirit can not hold. Christianity is not a book religion; it is a living religion; it is not dependent upon a book."[2] (The "mechanical" theory mentioned by Stuart referred to the orthodox theory of "plenary inspiration.")

The importance of personal religious experience or conscience was vital to Stuart: "The authority of the Bible is our own experience of its value in our own spiritual life."[3] This assertion once again revealed his liberal position and were in conflict with the orthodox views. Dr. Machen criticized religious experience as very unreliable, "for individual experience is endlessly diverse, and when once truth is regarded only as that which works at any particular time, it ceases to be truth. The result

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[1]Machen, Christianity and Liberalism, chap. IV.

[2]Stuart, "Addresses," p. 24.

[3]Ibid., p. 29.

is an abysmal skepticism."[1]

Stuart also affirmed Biblical criticism, both the textual and the literary and historical criticisms, by saying that "there is nothing destructive about it," and that "it is simply trying to get at the facts."[2] Stuart's refusal to condemn Biblical criticism was also out of step. The orthodox had opposed scriptural critiques because they pointed up inconsistencies and discrepancies which aroused doubts about the Bible's veracity.[3]

Lastly, Stuart discussed the ultimate authority of Christianity. Was it the Bible or Christ? Stuart's choice was Christ:

> Isn't Christ to us the final authority? Don't we give him that place in our lives? The Bible did not give us Christ; Christ gave us the Bible.[4]

But the orthodox choice was the Bible, as can be seen from the following statements made by their able spokesman, Dr. Machen:

> The words of Jesus, spoken during His earthly ministry, could hardly contain all that we need to know about God and about the way of salvation.[5]

And,

> The Christian man, on the other hand, finds in the Bible the very Word of God . . . Christianity is founded upon the Bible. It based upon the Bible both its thinking and its life.[6]

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[1]Machen, Christianity and Liberalism, p. 78.

[2]Stuart, "Addresses," p. 29.

[3]On Biblical Criticism and the orthodox opposition to it, see Van A. Harvey, A Handbook of Theological Terms (New York: Macmillan Co., 1964), pp. 42-44.

[4]Stuart, "Addresses," p. 30.

[5]Machen, Christianity and Liberalism, p. 76.

[6]Ibid., pp. 78-79.

From the above we see clearly that Stuart's theology was on every point in conflict with orthodoxy. Therefore, it is no surprise that in the early twenties he was consistently challenged and denounced by orthodox leaders of the Southern Presbyterian Church, such as Machen.

On the other hand, his theology was still too conservative in comparison with that held by religious radicals. He could never have accepted any kind of Unitarianism because of the Unitarian denial of both the Trinity and the divinity of Christ.[1] Stuart would have had more sympathy for Modernism, particularly as represented by Shailer Mathews.[2] Its scientific outlook, its emphasis on Jesus as a moral example, and its social concerns would have appealed to him. But his differences with Modernism were many. Stuart was definitely at odds with Mathews' doctrine of God. Mathews defied almost all the traditional concepts by defining God in terms of the cosmic environment.[3] Also, Mathews did not consider God's internal nature and attributes and the doctrine of the Trinity,[4] but Stuart discussed and accepted them. To Stuart, they were indispensible elements of Christian theology.

Stuart's theological affinities with other radical religious groups, besides Unitarianism and Modernism, were also tenuous. Henry Nelson Wieman's naturalistic theology, which avoided all references to God's personality and mind and which accepted nothing but scientific method in

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[1]Smith, American Christianity, 2:222-23.

[2]On Mathews' theology, see his The Faith of Modernism (New York, 1924) and The Atonement and the Social Process (New York, 1930); also see Cathen, The Impact, pp. 150-65.

[3]Cauthen, The Impact, pp. 164-65.

[4]Ibid., pp. 158-59.

studying religion or God,[1] was definitely against Stuart's obsession with Christ's personality and with man's subjective religious experience. Stuart's moderate position in trying to mediate between radical "Left" and orthodox "Right" would have allowed him little sympathy for Mary Baker Eddy's Christian Science Movement. Stuart would have found several of its doctrinal positions unacceptable: its claim that God was Mind rather than a person; its unorthodox replacement of the Trinity by Life, Truth and Love; its sharp separation of the personal Jesus from the impersonal Christ; its total denial of the reality of matter; and its operation as a healing cult.[2] Nor could Stuart have accepted the humanism espoused by John Dewey and his intellectual confreres, although he might have sympathized with certain of its positions. Its exclusive reliance on science as the sole mode of discovering reality and its skepticism toward the supernatural would have repelled Stuart as being secularistic.[3]

In conclusion, we can safely say that Stuart's theology was within the general framework of Christocentric liberalism. Within this framework, his Christology was close to that of William Adams Brown or William Nelson Clarke, but his ethico-social thought was largely that of Walter Rauschenbusch, or even Shailer Mathews.

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[1]Smith, American Christianity, 2:245-49.

[2]F. E. Mayer, The Religious Bodies of America (St. Louis, Concordia Publishing House, 1961, 4th ed.), pp. 532-43.

[3]Smith, American Christianity, 2:249-53.

PART II

THE YENCHING YEARS

CHAPTER VIII

EDUCATIONAL AIMS AND PROGRAMS

Stuart assumed his official duties at Yenching in June, 1919 in the midst of the May Fourth movement. His first official duty was to deliver a Commencement Sermon. When the occasion came, to his surprise, not a single soul was present from a student body of one hundred or so, for the majority of them had been locked up by the Peking Government for their patriotic demonstrations, and the rest had gone to the city to wait for their comrades' release. Stuart saw the student action with understanding and sympathy. Indeed, he now had become indignant over the Japanese aggression in China.

Stuart's mood at this time was revealed in a letter he wrote to his friends in America. In it Stuart criticized Japan's rulers, who had "followed German ideas and methods" in China. He also denounced Japan for its attacks on "Democracy, President Wilson, America, missionaries," which Stuart termed as four elements obstructing Japanese aggression in China. The Chinese students, he said, had revealed the "latent virility of the Chinese people" and represented the great hope for China. He called the Christian movement in China a great international service to save China from internal decadence and foreign aggression. And he declared that the May Fourth Movement had given Yenching "The greater opportunity for service in this supremely important crisis of China's history."[1]

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[1]Stuart, "My Dear Friends," June 16, 1919, SLF.

It was in this anti-Japanese and pro-Chinese mood that Stuart started off his work at Yenching and what he had said in the first days of his work became obsessive with him for the following two decades.

A. The Aims of Christian Mission Education in China

Stuart's primary aim for Christian education was to train Chinese youth to meet the needs of the Chinese people and to compete with Chinese Communism for a place in China. In May, 1920, one year after assuming the presidency at Yenching, Stuart wrote that since the Chinese were now intensely concerned about their social, economic and international problems, Christian workers in China should consecrate themselves to help China solve them.[1] In the wake of the anti-foreign movement of the 1925-27 period, Stuart became even more convinced that missionaries must assume such a responsibility. In an article published in 1931, Stuart cautioned his Western colleagues that, unless they could offer services to meet the various needs of the Chinese people, the Christian movement would not survive in China. Stuart believed that the danger to the Christian movement was not from Chinese governmental obstruction, nor from the new Chinese intellectual imphasis on scientism, but from missionaries' failure to become responsive to Chinese needs.[2]

But Stuart's concern was not only about the need to help the Chinese people. He was also worried about the threat of Chinese Communism against the Christian movement in China. For instance, in 1931,he called

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[1]Stuart, "Where Should the Emphasis Be Put on the Christian Message," CR, May 1920, pp. 349-50.

[2]Stuart, "One of the Greatest Dangers to Protestant Christianity in China," CR, May 1931, p. 307.

Communism "a swelling menace" for its opposition to the established order and its malevolence against religion.[1] Since Communism promised social betterment for the Chinese people, Stuart's strategy to counter it was to train Chinese youth to compete with Communism in the work of social betterment. Thus, Stuart constantly reminded the Christian church in China to engage in social service work rather than in religious conversion. In an article published in 1940, Stuart asserted that if the church would do so, it would attract the allegiance of Chinese students just as successfully as Chinese Communism would.[2]

The second major aim of Christian education in China was to offer moral and spiritual training to the Chinese youth. Several months after assuming his presidency, Stuart stressed the importance of such moral and spiritual training. The way to implement it was through religious instruction and moral example, for religion was "the motive power for moral character."[3] In an article, "The Outlook for Missionary Colleagues," published in 1921, Stuart elaborated his ideas on this question. In his judgment, Chinese governmental education was atheistic and materialistic and supplied no moral training. By contrast, Christian education existed to supply China with moral leadership. Regardless of the anti-religious agitation in the early 1920's, Stuart still believed the Chinese welcomed the Christian morality, for in his view the Chinese "at heart are still

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[1]Ibid., p. 302.

[2]Stuart, "College Graduates and the Chinese Church," CR, May 1940, p. 293.

[3]Stuart to Dr. Eric M. North, November 12, 1919, J. Leighton Stuart File, Record of Yenching University, United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia, New York, New York (hereafter cited as JLS-RYU).

more interested in moral and human issues than in science and its supposed negations."[1]

The third aim of Christian education was to train students for democracy. In a speech made in 1932, Stuart showed his concern over the contemporary advocacy of Communism and Fascism in the world, calling it a revolt against democracy.[2] Two years later he pointed out that for national salvation China would need a new generation of intelligent, public-spirited citizens. To produce these citizens, the Christian institutions should practice democracy in their campus life. Democracy could be learned and demonstrated in several ways: by maintaining a harmonious and happy relationship between teachers and students and between foreigners and Chinese; by keeping academic standards strict and sincere; by instituting an honest financial accounting; by having a student self-government and sportsmanship in athletics; and by stimulating students' concern over the political and economic problems of the country.[3] Stuart tried to realize all these aims for Christian education in his work at Yenching.

B. Emphases in Academic Program

Yenching University was a conglomeration of several mission institutions that had joined in its founding: North China Union College (founded in 1904), Peking University (Hui-wen shu-yüan, founded in 1890), North China Union Theological College (1904), and North China Union College for Women (1904). Except for the last institution (which joined

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[1]Stuart, "The Outlook for Missionary Colleges," Educational Review (Shanghai) 13, No. 1 (1921): 61-62

[2]Stuart, "Convocation, September 5, 1932, Address by the President," JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart to B. A. Garside, September 7, 1933, JLS-RYU.

Yenching University in 1920) the first three combined in 1916 to form a union institution with the name of Peking University in English and Yenching Ta-hsüeh in Chinese.[1] In 1928, the university adopted Yenching as its name in both English and Chinese.[2] The mission boards involved in the support and control of Yenching University were the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., the ABCFM, the Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and the London Missionary Society.[3]

During Stuart's presidency at Yenching (from 1919 to 1941), the university underwent tremendous growth. In student enrollment and faculty appointment, Yenching grew from 103 students and 25 faculty members (instructors and those above) in 1919 to 1,156 students and 137 faculty members in 1941.[4] In academic program and structure its growth was even more impressive. In 1919, Yenching was at best a junior college, offering very rudimentary college courses.[5] But in 1941, it offered both bachelor and masters programs and its structure included three colleges: Arts and Letters (consisting of Departments of Chinese, Western Languages, History, Philosophy, Psychology, Education, Music, Journalism, and Pre-nursing); Natural Sciences

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[1]Lutz, Christian College, p. [533]; and Dwight W. Edwards, Yenching University (New York: United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia, 1959), chaps. I-X.

[2]Edwards, Yenching, pp. 111-12.

[3]Ibid., p. 80.

[4]For the 1919 figures, see Peking University Bulletin, No. 1, Announcement of the College of Arts and Sciences, 1919-1920, in "Bulletins," RYU; for the 1941 figures, see Stuart to Trustees, September 25, 1941, p. 1, JLS-RYU and Directories of Faculty and Students, 1940-41, in "Bulletins," RYU.

[5]See Peking University Bulletin, No. 1, RYU.

(Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Home Economics, Pre-engineering, Pre-medicine, and Pre-nursing); and Public Affairs (Political Science, Economics, and Sociology).[1] Besides these colleges, there was also a School of Religion. In endowment, Yenching grew from half a million U.S. dollars in 1919 to close to three million in 1941.[2] Furthermore, Yenching started off as a lonely mission institution with no academic connection with any outside academic body in 1919, but by 1941 it had established relationships with many prestigeous American universities such as Harvard (supporting its Harvard-Yenching Institute), Princeton (supporting its College of Public Affairs), Wellesley (supporting its Women College), and Missouri (supporting its Journalism Department).[3]

Yenching, in its life under Stuart's presidency, had developed many programs for meeting the practical needs of China. Since these programs are too numerous to be discussed here and their establishment and operations were the result of many people's work, it is impossible to make a separate appraisal of Stuart's contribution. A few programs, however, deeply involved Stuart and demanded much of his time, and they will be considered subsequently.

Helping China in Her Industrial and Economic Development

To help China in her industrial or economic development, Stuart believed that Yenching, instead of offering an exclusively liberal arts

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[1]See table on Total Number of Students Registered, Fall Semester, 1939, in "Statistics," RYU.

[2]For the 1919 figure, see "Peking University, 1920-1921," in "Statistics," RYU; for the 1941 figure, see ibid., "Statistics Revised to January 23, 1941."

[3]Edwards, Yenching, pp. 166-77; 293-99.

education, should emphasize vocational training. In 1922 the mission boards of North America organized an educational commission to visit China and study mission education. Under the chairmanship of Professor Ernest Burton of the University of Chicago, the commission toured nearly every province in China and issued a report in 1922.[1] Among other things, it recommended that China should not follow the liberal arts education of American colleges but should adopt a curriculum with the first two years devoted to general courses and a third year devoted to vocational training.[2] As a member of the commission, Stuart gave his whole-hearted support to this recommendation.[3] In the following years, Stuart frequently pointed out both the unsuitability of American liberal arts education for China and the need for vocational training. For instance, in 1928 Stuart stated that American educational theories were the outgrowths of an advanced economic system; since China's development and needs were different, the American system should not be duplicated there.[4]

Yenching's vocational programs had come to include animal husbandry, leather manufacture, business training, journalism, Bureau of Industrial Service, pre-nursing, pre-medical studies, and social work.[5] Stuart was in one way or another involved in all of these vocational programs. For

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[1]On the work of this educational commission, see Christian Education in China: A Study made by an Educational Commission Representing the Mission Boards and Societies Conducting Work in China (New York, ca. 1922).

[2]Stuart to the Board of Managers [of Yenching University], April 1922 JLS-RYU.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Stuart, "Education in Applied Economics," China (New York), April 1928, in RYU.

[5]Edwards, Yenching, chap. XX.

instance, he set up a Bureau of Industrial Service under Yenching's auspices in Peiping. Several months after assuming his presidency, Stuart explained the purposes of this bureau to a New York industrialist: to investigate industrial needs; to introduce Western capital into China; and to advise Chinese industrial leaders in matters of technical knowhow, proper treatment of laborers, possible fields of industrial developments, and so on. Stuart was very concerned with the economic exploitations of Western and Japanese firms in China. Because of these exploitations, he feared that the Chinese people would become susceptible to Bolshevik and anti-Western propaganda. This bureau was, for Stuart, a means to help China stop such exploitations.

Stuart associated the Bureau of Industrial Science with Yenching's Department of Economics so as to give Yenching students an opportunity to participate in China's industrial and economic development.[1] He and the head of the Economics Department formed an advisory committee to supervise the work of the bureau.[2] Stuart's enthusiasm in this project was fully revealed in a letter he wrote to a friend, in which he said, "It thrills one to think of men trained in a Christian school going out into the charge of factories or business houses, applying their Christian principles to the treatment of employees, to commercial standards."[3]

To promote this project, Stuart obtained the services of Joseph Bailie, formerly of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry at the

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[1]Stuart to Max Farrand, November 26, 1919; Stuart to North, December 12, 1919, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to North, December 12, 1919, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart to Dr. J. Walter Lowrie, March 1, 1920, JLS-RYU.

University of Nanking, and later of Yenching. Bailie helped Stuart draft a plan for the bureau; it was to be a joint project of Yenching and the Chiao-t'ung University in Shanghai. Next, Stuart sent Bailie to the United States to seek support from American companies. Ford Motor Company was the most responsive, and Stuart was later able to send some Chinese workers to Ford's tractor plants to receive training as mechanics. But other than Ford, no American company offered cooperation.[1] With no further support coming from Chinese industrialists either, the bureau had an inactive and short existence, though later the National Christian Council revived it to form the North China Industrial Service Union, utilizing Yenching's facilities and personnel for its operations. In the 1930's, under the support of the Rockefeller Foundation, this union played some role in the field of village industrial development in the North China areas.[2]

Rural Reconstruction

Substantial Christian work on rural improvement and reconstruction first started in the early 1920's. The pioneer work to eliminate rural illiteracy was undertaken by Hugh W. Hubbard and his Congregational associates of Paoting, Hopei, in 1923-24, based on James Yen's 1,000 character model which had achieved great success in urban areas.[3] In 1926 Yen also moved his mass education movement into the countryside.[4] The

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[1]Edwards, Yenching, pp. 191-92.

[2]James C. Thomson, Jr., While China Faced West (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 137.

[3]Ibid., p. 52.

[4]Ibid., p. 48.

Congregational Church at Lu-ho Hsiang of Tungchow, Hopei, probably took the earliest leadership to improve agricultural production. In 1922 it sponsored agricultural exhibitions and helped agricultural seeding and planting work.[1] These Christian works in the 1920's were all done in a sporadic fashion and were limited to only a few areas.

Following on the heels of the Christian workers, China's own reformers joined rural development work immediately, but they undertook it on a larger scale. To promote rural literacy, T'ao Hsing-chih in 1927 founded a teachers' school in the village of Hsiao-chuang, near Nanking.[2] To reconstruct the Chinese countryside, Liang Sou-ming in 1929 established his Honan Rural Reconstruction Institute and started various agricultural projects at Chou-p'ing, Shangtung.[3] In 1930, James Yen's Ting-hsien Institute expanded its literacy work to include rural economic development and citizenship training programs. Compared with other concurrent Christian and Chinese rural work, Yen's Tinghsien experiment was the most successful and was given universal acclaim.[4]

The situation in the year 1931 gave extra impetus to the work of rural reconstruction. In that year, the summer flood disasters caused by the Yangtze and Huai Rivers, the Manchurian Incident in September, the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic in November, and the worsened economy due to worldwide economic depression, all pushed the Chinese rural

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[1]Yü Mu-jen, Chi-tu-chiao yü Chung-kuo hsiang-ts'un chien-she yü-tung (Shanghai, 1948), p. 52.

[2]Philip A. Kuhn, "T'ao Hsing-chih, 1891-1946, An Educational Reformer," in Harvard Papers on China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) 13: 174; Thomson, China, p. 47.

[3]Yü, Chi-tu chiao, p. 1; Thomson, China, p. 48.

[4]Thomson, China, pp. 48-52.

situation to the breaking point. The Christian forces in China decided to join in remedying the rural sufferings. From 1932 on, many Christian service agencies and programs were founded. For instance, the North China Christian Rural Service Union was founded by the National Christian Council (NCC), the largest Christian organization in China, representing at least one-third of the church bodies there.[1] In April,1933, the Tinghsien Institute on Rural Reconstruction was established under the support of NCC. In a conference held in the same month, 180 delegates from 14 provinces joined the discussion on, "What is the Christian Church's Task in Rural Reconstruction?" The areas of work they explored included mass education, citizenship, rural survey and recreation. The salvation of China for the delegates lay not only in economic improvement, but also in helping China to resist Japanese aggression and stamp out Communism.[2]

Not only Christian workers and other Chinese reformers, but also Chiang Kai-shek and his wife were concerned with the rural problem in general and with the anti-Communist campaign in Kiangsi in particular. In August,1933, Mme. Chiang sent an invitation to NCC to ask that body to undertake the task of rural reconstruction in Kiangsi.[3] Though the NCC was not prepared for such a stupendous task, it nevertheless decided to accept the challenge and established the Kiangsi Christian Rural Service Union two months later.[4] Chang Fu-liang, who was the rural secretary of NCC and who was later put in charge of the reconstruction project in

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[1]Ibid., p. 55.

[2]Ibid., pp. 55-58.

[3]Ibid., p. 65.

[4]Ibid., p. 70.

Kiangsi, justified Christian involvement in rural work in that such involvement might well "vitalize our Christian religion" and offer "an adequate and concrete answer to the challenge of communism."[1]

Besides the KMT leaders and the Christian and Chinese reformers, the Rockefeller Foundation also plunged into rural work in China. The foundation had already given substantial aid to China before this time. Between 1913 and 1937 it granted US$37 million to its various projects in China, the largest sum given by it to a country outside of America.[2] In the 1930's, the foundation focused its work in China on rural reconstruction. It first sent its vice-president Selskar M. Gunn to visit China in both 1931 and 1932. During his visits, Mr. Gunn became aware of the various existing rural reconstruction projects in China. But after careful investigation he found them unsatisfactory on two counts. First, these projects were not well coordinated. Second, they all were short of personnel trained for rural work. To help China train such personnel, Gunn suggested in 1934 that the foundation begin to aid six institutions in China to train workers in rural reconstruction and to develop effective rural programs: Yenching university (to train men and women for rural service), James Yen's Tinghsien Institute (to serve as a field laboratory for teachers and students from Yenching), Nankai University (to study the major economic and political problems in Tinghsien), the University of Nanking (to engage in agricultural experiments and to cooperate with Tinghsien Institute), Peking Union Medical College (to be in charge of preventive medicine), and North China Industrial Institute (to help in

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[1]Ibid., p. 74.

[2]Ibid., p. 126.

village industrial development). Gunn's suggestion was finally approved, and the Rockefeller Foundation gave these six institutions a grant of US $1 million to use for a period of three years beginning in July 1935.[1]

Yenching's share of this grant in 1935 was $77,325 and its chief responsibility was to train students in the work of education, natural sciences, and social administration for the Tinghsien work.[2] After the North China Council for Rural Reconstruction was established in April, 1936, with headquarters in Tinghsien, Hopei and Tsining, Shantung, Yenching students also joined in the Tsining work. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Tsining program first moved to Kweiyang and then to Chungking in 1940.[3]

Out of zeal to help the Chinese rural masses, Stuart developed an early interest in rural service work. His earliest, complete statement in this regard was an article published in April, 1928. In it he first criticized the Chinese returned student as "being impractical, too conscious of his own sperior qualities and unwilling to do the dirty detail." Then he lamented the fact that schools which taught Western subjects were only imparting theories and institutional forms which had grown out of Western experience and which were not related to Chinese conditions. He believed that the need was in teaching not the form and substance of Western learning, but its method. What was its method? Stuart explained that it was the application of scientific and analytical processes to

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[1]Ibib., pp. 136-39.

[2]Ibid., p. 141.

[3]Ibid., p. 126.

solve actual problems. Then he turned to the questions of rural reconstruction. Yenching would soon establish a village service project. The project would take Yenching's classes into an agricultural village to survey the production and consumption pattern of farm produce; to study the health, wealth and other problems of the village and then to decide ways to solve them. Stuart expressed his great hope that the Chinese villages would profit by the program. Once their "self-contained powers of improvement" were organized and set in motion," Stuart argued, "villages would be revitalized."[1]

The proposed Yenching rural service project was realized in 1930. At Ch'ing Ho, a town three miles from Yenching, a Rural Experiment Station was established to work for forty villages with a total population of 22,444. Yenching's projects included rural economics, education, health, and research. The inital staff for the station was a little over one dozen; it became a laboratory for students interested in rural problems.[2] Though it started in a small way, Stuart's hope for it was exuberant: "It supplies a hopeful augury of the awakening among Chinese thinkers of a new social purpose based on a combination of scientific inquiry and reforming idealism."[3]

When the Chinese national crisis deepened after the Manchurian Incident, Stuart's obsession with rural reconstruction also intensified. When George Shepherd started the rural reconstruction work at Lichuan, Kiangsi

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[1]Stuart, "Education in Applied Economics," China (New York), April 1928, RYU.

[2]Edwards, Yenching, pp. 286-87.

[3]Stuart, Foreword to Ch'ing Ho: A Sociological Analysis: The Report of a Preliminary Survey of the Town of Ch'ing Ho, Hopei, North China (Peiping: Yenching University, 1930), p. 1.

in the spring of 1934, Stuart promised to send Yenching personnel to help. Later, at least one professor and several students were sent to Lichuan as administrative officers. Stuart called the Christian work in Kiangsi "a unique and significant opportunity" and asked all who were interested in the Christian cause to be ready to sacrifice for its success.[1]

In March of 1935, when the Rockefeller Foundation was considering its massive grants to aid rural work in China, Stuart wrote a letter to the Yenching trustees to express his thoughts on Yenching's obligations in Chinese rural work. Discussing Yenching as an institution for the infusion of Christian spirit and for the betterment of China, he now doubted whether the policies of the university could achieve these purposes. He felt that administrative enforcement of religious observances and courses of study had produced no effective results except on a minority of the student body. Furthermore, since Yenching's call for good citizenship and patriotic service had been based largely on students' own nationalistic emotions and not on any constructive programs offered by the university, its own contribution to the welfare of China was really limited. Therefore, he asked the trustees, "How can we do more for the moral and spiritual welfare of our students and thus for the country?" Stuart's answer was that Yenching from now on should make students identify with "the awakening concern over rural reconstruction" and not to pursue individual success. He believed that only by so doing could Yenching's religious and ethical ideals be implemented. In concrete terms, Stuart declared that Yenching's future undergraduate courses would be offered as

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[1]Thomson, China, pp. 105-19; Stuart to Garside, May 10, 1935, JLS-RYU.

a preparation for "internship" at Tinghsien, and that the staff at Tinghsien would be invited to come to Yenching for theoretical training.[1]

In the mid-1930's, in view of the rise of Japanese and German militarism and Italian Fascism, Stuart became concerned with the clashes between nations and nationalisms. Therefore, he considered the combined rural service efforts made by the Rockefeller Foundation and its Chinese counterparts as not only helping the Chinese people but as also contributing to a better international order. Of the establishment of such an order he said, it "must be brought into being if the fierce nationalisms of our time are to be prevented from destroying all the most precious values of our common heritage."[2]

After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Stuart became further engrossed in how to make Yenching more effective in rural reconstruction work. In November, 1938, he informed his trustees that he intended to mobilize the whole institution for this task by the following measures: 1) to have each department explore the practical applications of its courses in relation to the existing rural reconstruction projects; 2) to contract other rural reconstruction agencies to employ Yenching graduates trained in such work; 3) to select twenty members of the forthcoming graduating class of eighty-six to work for two years on rural reconstruction projects. To support these field workers, Stuart asked for a sum of $4,000 from the New York board and asserted that it was "a supremely practical medium for expressing the sympathy of American people for China."[3] Though Stuart

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, March 7, 1935, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, August 25, 1936, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart to Garside, November 10, 1938, JLS-RYU.

did not specify where his student-workers would be sent, to judge by his usual high praise for students serving in areas still under KMT control they would most likely be sent there.

Another area of Stuart's thinking that should be considered was his concern with helping the Yenching graduates gain meaningful employment after graduation. Not only his larger concern with the welfare of China and her people, but also his concern with his graduates' employment affected his policies for the academic programs at Yenching. Stuart was afraid that if Yenching could not place its graduates in suitable employment, out of frustration or desperation they might become socially and politically dangerous. In July, 1933, he remarked that "these more or less eager and idealistic young people turned out from our schools into a disordered society that has no use for them are certain to become embittered and an easy prey to radicalism."[1] When, in 1934, he saw the figures of unemployment of Chinese college graduated reported as 2,000 out of 7,000 and learned that one of the causes reported was the lack of vocational training in their college education, Stuart was sufficiently alarmed.[2] In an article published the following year, "Has China Too Many College Graduates?" Stuart pointed out that this unemployment situation not only reflected an unproductiveness of money spent on college education, but also was "socially dangerous." He warned China to take note of "the fermenting of destructive revolutionary activities by the discontented young intelligentsia of India and elsewhere."[3]

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[1]Stuart to Garside, July 28, 1933, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to Garside, September 18, 1934, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart, "Has China Too Many College Graduates," Asia, No. 35 (1935): 244-46.

In 1936, the unemployment situation of Chinese college graduates was still serious. One source indicated that in that year out of 2,104 graduates only 1,050 had found employment.[1] This deplorable situation alarmed many keen observers of Chinese higher education. Besides attributing the causes to lack of vocational training in college education, some also blamed the selfish and unmotivated character of the Chinese students. For instance, one observer in a Peking newspaper of 1936 heaped scathing criticism on lassitude in the Chinese students. He pointed out that the majority of them chose to concentrate in cities like Shanghai, Tientsin, Peiping, Canton, and Hankow to live, for they claimed that they were accustomed to city life. What they should have done, this observer continued, was to join the various reconstruction work, rural or otherwise, that were being undertaken in Kiangsi, Szechwan, Shensi, Kansu, and other interior provinces, as many mission college graduates had done. This observer made further sarcastic remarks: "Students are known to have spent sleepless nights, crowded in freight trains like sardines in tins, on their way to Nanking to petition the Government on certain national problems in the name of patriotism. Then why not show some of your love for the country and for your lowly compatriots by rendering useful service in the interior?"[2] With this criticism, Stuart was generally in agreement. In 1935 he also criticized graduates' "lack of self-reliant initiative too common among a people whose social fabric has developed a supine dependence on others," and their "querulous expectation of government jobs as the right of every graduate."[3]

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[1] Peiping Chronicle, May 29, 1936, JLS-RYU.

[2] Richard L. Jen, "Deliberate Unemployment--The Responsibility of the Graduate--Room for All Ready to Work," Peiping Chronicle, June 12, 1936.

[3] Stuart, "Has China Too Many College Graduates," Asia, No. 35 (1935) p. 246.

In contrast with other colleges, Yenching's graduates fared consistently rather well, and Stuart was very proud of the fact. In June, 1936, Stuart reported that according to the official figures released by the Chinese Ministry of Education, of 9,622 unemployed college students who had graduated in 1934-35 throughout China, Yenching had only five.[1] Yenching's impressive employment record did not diminish even in the heat of the Sino-Japanese War. In April, 1941, Stuart reported to his trustees that at least 250 Yenching graduates were working in Chungking and its suburbs, taking up governmental, educational, religious and other positions.[2]

How can we explain this exceptionally good employment among the Yenching graduates? One of the reasons was of course their English proficiency. It is common knowledge for anyone who has lived in twentieth-century China that students with English proficiency were usually more readily employed. But apart from this, the vocational and rural service training offered at Yenching might have been another reason for its students' success in employment.

The Promotion of Chinese Studies at Yenching

Stuart, throughout his career at Yenching, frequently emphasized that the school was "a synthesis of the abiding values in two [Western and Chinese] confluent civilizations."[3] He also often lamented the fact that the whole missionary enterprise was originally founded "due to a naive

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[1]Stuart to Garside, June 5, 1936, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, April 28, 1941, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart, "Faculty Professional Conference, September 5-6, 1930, President's Address," p. 2., in "Faculty Conferences," RYU.

sense of racial superiority or an ignorant contempt for other and older civilizations."[1] Therefore, to make Yenching truly a synthesis of two civilizations and to remove the Western sense of racial superiority and the Western ignorance of Chinese civilization, Stuart decided to promote the study of Chinese culture at Yenching. But before we discuss his actual decisions in this matter, we first should examine his experience with, and feelings toward, Chinese culture and also the convictions which finally led him to promote Chinese studies.

Stuart's acquaintance with ancient Chinese works started when he first began his missionary career in 1905. The language course set up by the mission station at Hangchow required him to study the Four Books. His enthusiasm for such classics never diminished, as evidenced by his remarks made in his last years that as a personal preference he still favored the wen-yen over the pai-hua literature, and that the study of Chinese classical literature "would help to an understanding of the [Chinese] people, their mental habits, their reaction to the Christian message, their social attitude toward us."[2] But besides his taste for the classics, Stuart also supported the Literary Revolution of late 1910's wholeheartedly and held that such a revolution was "affecting such radical changes throughout the country and can contribute so much to popular intelligence."[3]

Stuart was also prompted to promote Chinese studies at Yenching by Chinese criticism of the poor quality of such studies in mission schools.[4]

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[1]Stuart, "The Future of Missionary Education in China," The Chinese Students' Monthly, April 1926.

[2]Stuart, Fifty Years, pp. 83-84.

[3]Stuart, "Second Annual Report of the President to the Board of Managers, June 1921," JLS-RYU.

[4]Stuart to North, July 1, 1927, JLS-RYU.

But the most important ideological reason for his support of Chinese studies was his concern at the erosion of Chinese culture in modern times, for he was aware of the contribution Chinese culture could make to world civilization. In an article published in 1929, "Conflict of Cultures in China," Stuart expressed himself very clearly. He asked the people of both China and the West not to fatalistically anticipate cultural conflicts. Speaking like a Meiji reformer or Hu Shih in the 1930's, Stuart asked the Chinese to realize that truth is universal, and therefore that to accept Western knowledge through missionary agencies was not to become Westernized, but cosmopolitan. Even the ideal of Western democracy should not be considered a Western import, for the ancient Chinese sages had offered similar democratic teachings (here Stuart obviously had Mencius in mind).

Westerners, on the other hand, should learn the fine elements of the Chinese cultural heritage. Stuart listed three: the philosophy that man should seek harmony with, rather than conquest of, Nature; the Chinese ethical and social emphasis on family life; and the ineradicable belief in the moral order of the universe. Stuart believed these Chinese cultural elements were useful in countering the lust for material achievement which was threatening the world. After having thus mediated between China and the West, Stuart next turned to defining the role of the Christian movement in China. To him, it should be not only the imparting of Christian faith to the Chinese, but also the preservation and revitalization of the fine Chinese cultural heritage before it could be crushed by materialism.[1]

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[1]Stuart, "Conflict of Cultures," CR, August 1929.

Stuart, by the late 1920's, had become much more favorable toward Chinese culture than before. He now would not disparage certain aspects of the Chinese culture as he had occasionally done in the 1900's and 1910's. This new, favorable attitude revealed itself in many of his writings, such as a paper under the title of "Christianity and Confucianism," delivered at the Jerusalem Meeting of the International Missionary Conference in 1928. In the paper Stuart declared that he would not criticize Confucius, for doing so would not strengthen the Christian cause in China.[1] The West should only use the Christian gospel in China to supplement, not to destroy, "the noblest aspirations of Confucian teaching," and the West should accept Confucian teaching as a corrective for defects in Western civilization, which might lead to "a broader, better-balanced understanding of our (Western) religious faith."[2] As noted in Chapter I, these views were in full accord with the dominant mood of the Jerusalem Meeting.

It was out of Stuart's personal respect for Chinese culture and his convictions about the value of such culture that he undertook to promote Chinese studies at Yenching. When he first took over as president, the Chinese Department had only six faculty members.[3] From then on it grew rapidly. In 1927-28 its faculty increased to nineteen.[4] Even at the

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[1]Stuart, "Christianity and Confucianism," in The Jerusalem Meeting of The International Missionary Council, March 24-April 8, 1928, vol. 1: The Christian Life and Message in Relation to Non-Christian Systems of Thought and Life (New York, 1938), p. 49.

[2]Ibid., p. 45.

[3]See Peking University Bulletin, Autumn, 1919, in "Bulletins," RYU.

[4]See Peking University Bulletin, 1927-28, in "Bulletins," RYU.

time of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 it still maintained a faculty of fifteen.[1] Throughout the decades of 1920's and 1930's, many famous Chinese scholars were brought to teach in the Chinese Department: Ku Chieh-kang, Ch'ien Hsüan-t'ung, Feng Yu-lan, Wen I-to, Chou Tso-jen, Yü P'ing-po, Hsü Ti-shan, Chu Tzu-ch'ing, just to mention the most illustrious.[2]

One of the major events in the growth of Chinese studies at Yenching was the founding of the Harvard-Yenching Institute of Chinese Studies in January, 1928. The institute was founded by a generous grant from the Charles M. Hall Estate, a trust fund established by the famous aluminum tycoon. It maintained a Chinese studies program at all levels at Harvard University and a pure graduate research center at Yenching.[3]

During the time of planning for this institute, Stuart in 1927 wrote to the trustees to point out the important contributions it could make. He said that the Literary Revolution since the late 1910's had replaced the "old classical models" with pai-hua style and this had affected adversely the pursuit of classical studies. Furthermore, Chinese government education had neglected Chinese studies as a result of political disturbances and the anti-traditional mood of the time. Yenching's promotion of Chinese studies not only would remove the bad reputation of the mission school in such studies but also would further "Chinese-American relationships of good will and cultural exchange."[4]

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[1]See Yenching University Bulletin, 1936-37, in "Bulletins," RYU.

[2]See the annual catalogues of Yenching University, in "Bulletins," RYU.

[3]Edward, Yenching, pp. 173-77; 274-77.

[4]Stuart to North, July 1, 1927, JLS-RYU.

The institute had indeed produced impressive results since its establishment. Its publications, such as Yen-ching Hsüeh-pao (Yenching Journal of Chinese Studies), Yenching Monograph Series (fifteen monographs published by 1936), Yenching Index to Classical Literature (77 volumes by 1950) are all well known. The institute also provided funds to Lingnan University, Shantung Cheeloo University, Fukien Christian University, University of Nanking, and West-China Union University to develop their Chinese studies. Besides these Chinese institutions, the institute has also subsidized the University of Kyoto in its Sinological publications.[1]

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[1]Edward, Yenching, pp. 274-78.

CHAPTER IX

TO DEVELOP YENCHING INTO A MORE CHINESE INSTITUTION

A. Registration

In November, 1925, the Ministry of Education of the Peking Government issued new regulations for the registration of mission institutions with the Chinese government. The chief administrators of these institutions were now required to be Chinese, and if they were not, their deputies were required to be so. Likewise, the majority of the boards of managers were to be Chinese. The new regulations also forbad making religion courses required, and proscribed religious proselytism as an educational aim in such institutions.[1] In 1926 and 1929, the Nanking Government issued even more stringent demands which required that the heads of mission institutions as well as two thirds of the members of their boards of managers be Chinese. Not only would religion courses have to be dropped as required subjects, but students could not be compelled to attend religious ceremonies.[2]

Mission colleges had no choice but to function within these stringent government regulations. Since registration with the Chinese government meant that the diplomas issued by the mission institutions would gain the recognition of the Chinese Ministry of Education and thus facilitate the placing of their graduates, almost all mission institutions complied

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[1]Chiang Shu-ko, Chung-kuo chin-tai chiao-yü chih-tu (Shanghai, 1934), p. 161.

[2]Ibid., pp. 162-63.

with these regulations as did Yenching.[1]

Stuart was willing to cooperate with the government demand to make mission institutions more Chinese. As early as 1922, when the Burton Commission on Mission Education recommended in its report that Christian schools be "more efficient, more Christian, and more Chinese," Stuart expressed his full agreement.[2] Moreover, in 1923 Stuart wrote that the most serious administrative defect in Christian education in China was its inability to secure and retain qualified Chinese to assume larger control of the mission institutions. He considered this situation had resulted not only in "practical losses" but also in a "spiritual failure" in Christian education.[3] Though Stuart was inclined to improve the situation, no action was really taken until the issuance of regulations on mission schools by the Peking Ministry of Education in November, 1925.

In the following month, Stuart called up a meeting of Yenching's board of managers. They decided to take necessary steps to get Yenching registered with the government. On December 14, Stuart wrote to the Secretary of the board of trustees asking him "to get the final action from the Trustees on the matter of reorganization as soon as possible."[4]

In the meantime Yenching made necessary reorganizations in its structure. To comply with the stricture that a chief administrator be Chinese, it appointed Wu Lei-ch'uan to be vice-president. It also

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[1]Lutz, Christian Colleges, pp. 263-65.

[2]Stuart, "China," Educational Yearbook of the International Institute of Teachers College (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), p. 329.

[3]Stuart, "Some Administrative Problems," Educational Review, October 1923, p. 334.

[4]Stuart to North, December 14, 1925, JLS-RYU.

readjusted the composition of Yenching's board of managers by appointing to it twenty-one Chinese and only thirteen Westerners (most of them mission board representatives).[1] The board of trustees also made religion courses elective.[2]

Yenching faced a dilemma in defining its educational aims, for they could no longer under the new regulations be preeminently those of religious proselytism. The statement of aims in Yenching's English constitution, in force since the school's founding, read as follows:

> . . . to establish and maintain in Peking, China, a University to be known as Yenching University, founded and conducted on strictly Christian and evangelical, but not sectarian, principles, and to aid the youth of China and of other countries, in obtaining in such University a literary, scientific or professional education.[3]
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> (Italics mine)

Obviously, the blatant religious principles in the constitution would not be accepted by the Chinese authorities. Since the deletion of these principles would betray the founding purposes of the institution and could not be approved by its trustees, Yenching in Peking decided to substitute a Chinese Constitution for the English one and to rephrase the aims of the institution:

> The aims of this university are for the instruction of academic subjects; the development of talent, virtue, and physical fitness for students ; the training of national leaders; and the meeting the national and social needs of the Republic of China.[4]

By thus leaving out religious aims in its constitution, Yenching

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[1]Stuart to North, December 1, 1925, JLS-RYU; see "Ssu-li Yen-ching ta-hsüeh hsiao tung-shih-pu ming-tan" in Yenching University files for the years 1926-27, Records of the Ministry of Education (Taipei, Taiwan).

[2]Stuart to North, December 23, 1925, JLS-RYU.

[3]See enclosures in "Minutes of Trustees of Peking University," April 10, 1928, Document B, in "Minutes of Trustees," RYU.

[4]See "Ssu-li Yen-ching ta-hsüeh tsu-chih ta-kang" in Yenching University files for the years 1926-27, Records of the Ministry of Education (Taipei, Taiwan).

finally met all the government's requirements. On November 18, 1926, Yenching applied for registration. It was granted in February, 1927.[1] The only college of Yenching University that was not included in the registration was its School of Religion.[2] Yenching knew that the Chinese educational authorities would not accept the School as an educational unit, and thus just omitted mention of it from the application.

Another interesting aspect of Yenching's application for registration was the absence of any mention of its board of trustees in New York. Yenching's explanation of the board's function was given orally to the officials in the Ministry who were sent to investigate the institution pending approval of its registration. According to these officials, Yenching promised that though the board of trustees at that time was in control of the university endowment and other finances, those responsibilities would be turned over to the board of managers in Peking when "the university endowment reaches an amount that is sufficient to meet the financial needs of the university." Though the officials were doubtful about this arrangement, they comforted themselves that the board of trustees was, after all, an integral part of the university, and that even if the board would not eventually transfer its control of the endowment, the endowment would still belong to the university and could not be diverted to other uses.[3] Stuart explained the very cooperative attitude of the investigating officials and their quick approval of Yenching's application for registration by pointing up that they were mostly American-

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Ibid.

[3]See "Yen-ching ta-hsüeh shih-ch'a pao-kao shu," in Yenching University files for the years 1926-27, Records of the Ministry of Education (Taipei, Taiwan).

educated students and well disposed toward Yenching.[1]

Shortly after Yenching's successful registration, the Chinese political situation became very tumultuous as a result of the Northern Expedition of 1927-1928. Fearing a more nationalistic policy toward mission education by the victor in this power struggle, Yenching officials became very apprehensive. Stuart came to be especially concerned with the Communist wing of the Nationalist Party. During the hectic months from February to June, 1927, he wrote many letters and reports discussing how to meet the future uncertainties. He believed that the adjustments that Yenching would have to make included the securing of both a Chinese chancellor and an increased number of Chinese administrators and faculty. Therefore, in February, he offered his resignation to the board of trustees. No action was taken.[2]

In June, he offered his resignation again to the board of managers, whose decision was to appoint him as provost and Wu Lei-ch'uan, the former vice-president, as vice-provost, pending the election of a Chinese chancellor.[3] Since the decision had to be approved by the board of trustees, Stuart went to New York in December and presented it to them on December 9. At this meeting Stuart made strong statements endorsing the Chinese Nationalist movement. He praised it as thoroughly responsible in its various demands, ones which "any self-respecting people have a right to make."

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[1]Stuart, "The Registration of Yenching University," Educational Review 19 (April 1927): 145.

[2]Stuart, "President's Report, 1926-27," p. 19, in "Report 1," RYU.

[3]Yenching University Bulletin, Annual Reports of the President and Deans and Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Board of Managers for 1926-27, p. 3, in "Reports 1" RYU.

He also offered many valuable suggestions for reorganizing the University. In addition to his request that the trustees approve his being made provost and the future election of a Chinese chancellor, he also suggested that certain changes in the duties of the board of trustees and board of managers be made to meet possible Chinese demands in the future. He suggested that the board of trustees be changed to a "Foundation" and that it lease or entrust the university property to the board of managers in Peiping to administer while still owning the actual property rights. Stuart suggested that the appointive power of the trustees should henceforth be restricted to chancellor, provost and vice-provost. (Heretofore, the president, vice-president, deans and teaching faculty above the rank of Associate Professor had all been appointed by the board pending the recommendation of Yenching's Faculty Executive Committee in Peking.)

To assuage the fear of the trustees over their possible loss of control of the institution, Stuart pointed out that they still held several powerful modes of influence: their maintenance of a spiritual fellowship with those working in Peking; their ownership of the institutional property; and their control of the operating funds of the universtiy. But what would happen if the board of managers in Peking decided to sacrifice all support and buy the entire university property in the future? Stuart answered that if the field people would decide rashly to assume full control of the university, then the trustees, being all foreigners and located so far away from China, could not salvage the institution anyway.[1]

In discussing the reorganization of the board of managers, Stuart

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[1]See "Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Trustees of Peking University," April 10, 1928 and the enclosed documents, in "Minutes of Trustees of Peking University, vol. 3," RYU.

suggested that all its mission board members be made to function in an advisory capacity and that a purely Chinese board consisting of Chinese Christians be instated. His justifications were that mission appointment in the board was out of tune with the nationalistic tendencies in China; that the denominational distinctions now made no sense since Yenching had become an integrated institution; and that by having a purely Chinese board with its resultant usage of Chinese as the working language the Chinese "consciousness of the masterfulness of the Westerners" would be decreased. Stuart candidly admitted that while his proposals regarding the reorganization of the board of trustees were shared by the Yenching people in the field, his suggestions regarding the board of managers were his personal ones.[1]

The trustees, as expected, were not impressed by Stuart's bold suggestions. A mission-board trustee told Stuart that he doubted "whether it would be possible to keep the groups in America feeling interested in or responsible for giving funds to an institution in China over which the donors would have no control." When the trustees discussed placing appointive power in the hands of the Chinese, a question was raised as to whether "there would not be a tendency to elect fewer and fewer foreigners." Stuart's reply was that on the part of the Chinese "he felt there is no desire to reduce the proportion of foreign staff or to get more Chinese control." Some also questioned the effect on the Christian character of the institution if Stuart's reorganization plans were to be carried out. Stuart consoled the worried trustees that they need not worry since the membership of the reorganized board of managers would all be Chinese

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[1]Ibid.

Christians.[1]

The formal response of the trustees to Stuart's recommendations can be found in the revised Constitution of Yenching University, the By-Laws of the Board of Trustees, and the By-Laws of the Board of Managers, all adopted by the trustees in their meeting on April 10,1928. From these documents we can ascertain which recommendations made by Stuart were accepted and which rejected. The trustees accepted Stuart's recommendation to appoint a Chinese chancellor and to make him a provost. They ignored his recommendation to reorganize the board of trustees into a foundation and to entrust its property to the board of managers. They did consent to his recommendation to let the board of managers make all decisions on faculty appointments. The trustees would not allow the board of managers to become a purely Chinese board and insisted that "in filling vacancies special consideration shall be given to the relationship to the university of the Chinese churches and of the missions supporting the University," which meant that foreign mission board representatives would still be appointed.[2]

For our purpose of trying to appreciate Stuart as a missionary educator, his various recommendations made to the trustees deserve our special attention. The significance of his proposals to have a purely Chinese board of managers to transfer property rights from the American trustees to the Chinese managers is that they all went beyond the existing formal requirements made by the educational authorities of either the Peking or Nanking Government. In the April 10, 1928 meeting, Stuart

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[1]Ibid.

[2]See, "Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Trustees of Peking University," April 10, 1928 and the enclosed documents, in "Minutes of Trustees of Peking University, vol. 3," RYU.

admitted this fact but still urged the adoption of his proposals for two major reasons. First, it would be far wiser to make changes in advance of further public or government demand so as to win "the good will of the Chinese people, the only protection for a foreign institution at this time from attacks and interruptions." Second, the proposals themselves were "desirable and represent the things toward which the [Yenching] administration has been looking." If the trustees were not convinced by these reasons, nevertheless in this instance Stuart's stand was certainly more responsive to the rising Chinese nationalism than theirs.[1]

With some compromises won from the trustees, Yenching went ahead to make itself more Chinese. In December, 1928, Yenching elected its first Chinese chancellor in the person of Wu Lei-ch'uan, the former vice-president of Yenching and vice-minister of the Ministry of Education from October, 1928, to early 1929. Stuart became President (Hsiao-wu-chang).[2] In 1919, Yenching's board of managers was reorganized to make Chinese membership a two-thirds majority in a body of 21. Famous Chinese members included H. H. Kung, Minister of Industry and Commerce, Yen Hui-ch'ing, and T'ao Hsing-chih. After having made these changes, Yenching applied for registration with the Nanking Government in April, 1929, and the registration was speedily granted in June. In this application for registration also, Yenching left out its School of Religion, aware that the Chinese government would not accept it.[3]

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[1]Minutes of April 10, 1928, pp.6-7.

[2]Stuart to Garside, December 7, 1928, JLS-RYU.

[3]Yenching University files, 1929, Records of the Ministry of Education (Taipei, Taiwan).

B. Stuart and Yenching's Presidency

To understand how much Chinese character Yenching had achieved during Stuart's presidency we should examine Stuart's relationship with the series of Chinese chancellors elected between 1929 and 1941. Altogether, four Chinese served either as chancellor or acting chancellor during that period: Wu Lei-ch'uan served as chancellor from January, 1929, to February, 1933; Y. T. Tsur (Chou I-ch'un) as acting chancellor from June, 1933, to June, 1934; Luh Chih-wei as acting chancellor first from February to June, 1933, and then from June, 1934, to April, 1937; and H. H. Kung as chancellor from April to July, 1937.[1] In a period of eight years Yenching had four chancellors or acting-chancellors. What does this constant change of chancellors mean and why did it occur? Also, what was Stuart's role in this unusual leadership shift?

Wu Lei-ch'uan had served as vice-president under Stuart from 1926 to 1928 before being appointed as chancellor. Having obtained the scholarly eminence as a chin-shih degree-holder and having served as Vice-Minister of Education under Minister Chiang Meng-lin in the Nanking Government between late 1928 and early 1929, both his intellectual and political backgrounds were solid. Wu accepted the chancellorship only after repeated urgings from Yenching's board of managers. By giving up his prestigeous position with promising political future in the newly established National Government and accepting a position in a mission college, it would be reasonable to assume that he must have had some serious purposes. He certainly did not come to Yenching simply to become a figurehead. Wu's frame of mind in this respect was fully revealed in the statement he made during his first attendance as chancellor at a board of

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[1]Regarding the tenure of each chancellor, see Minutes of the Board of Managers from 1928 to 1937, in "Managers' Minutes," RYU.

managers meeting. He declared:

> 1), that according to the regulations of the Ministry of Education the board of managers has full power to elect the Chancellor;
> 2), that the Chancellor, having been elected by the board of managers, assumes full power and responsibility.[1]

But after having a few months of administrative experience, Wu was convinced that he could not make himself the real head of the institution, and he complained thus to Howard S. Galt, the acting president during Stuart's absence in America. Wu felt that Stuart's stature obstructed his becoming real head of the institution, and also that Stuart had no intention of letting him obtain real power. Galt's letter to Stuart in January, 1930 reported that Wu felt

> . . . he [Wu] is not really wanted here as administrative head. He repeatedly refers to you as the center of administration in Yenching, and considers that problems should be adjusted from that point of view. Furthermore, he seems to think it is the intention of you and T. T. Lew [Professor of Religious Education and Psychology at Yenching] to cooperate in heading up university administration, . . . and thus he feels that his presence would stand in the way of both of you. Apparently in your intercourse with him you have not been able to convince him that he is really wanted as an active head of the institution. I have tried repeatedly to convince him of this fact, but he professes to feel that this is not really your point of view.[2]

Was Wu imagining things? One occurrence may be seen as a measure of his real authority as head of the university. One month after Wu had complained to Galt about his nominal position at Yenching, he wrote a letter to Stuart to suggest the converting of a proposed donation for building a university chapel into a scholarship endowment. Wu was concerned with the high tuition at Yenching, for it was higher than at either of the neighboring schools, National Peking University or Tsinghua University.

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[1]See "Minutes of the Board of Managers," June 22, 1929, RYU.

[2]Howard S. Galt to Stuart, January 10, 1930, JLS-RYU; see Philip West, "Yenching University And American Chinese Relations, 1917-1937," (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1970), p. 359.

Though most of the Yenching students came from more or less well-to-do families, there were still some unable to pay Yenching's high tuition. In order not to lose these financially poor but otherwise qualified students, and so as not to make Yenching gradually turn into "a school for the 'aristocrat,'" Wu suggested the tuition fund. Another reason for his suggestion was that the Chinese public attitude demanded it: "Nowadays the general attitude of the Chinese public toward Christianity is one of searching criticism. They care very little for traditional forms and external observances, but they test us by the concrete Christian service we render." In this letter Wu also indicated that his suggestion had the support of most of the leading faculty members at Yenching.[1]

Stuart passed on Wu's suggestion to the donor, but was met with a threat to withdraw the donation. Fearing the loss of this large donation, Stuart explained to the donor's family that his passing on Wu's suggestion to them was "purely as a courtesy" to Wu, that "this old gentleman knew very little about financial affairs," and that "any such proposal was not to be taken seriously."[2]

Considering the circumstances under which Stuart was trying to salvage the donation, certainly we can not thus judge Stuart's real feeling toward Wu's suggestion and his real attitude toward Wu. The yardstick that could be used in making a judgment in this case would be whether Stuart had made other efforts in implementing the recommendation made by Wu. In this regard, we can find no evidence to prove that Stuart has done so. Therefore, it would not be unreasonalbe for us to feel that Stuart in

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[1]Wu Lei-ch'uan to Stuart, February 12, 1930, in "Wu Lei-ch'uan," RYU.

[2]Stuart to J. Allen Farley, September 17, 1932; West, "Yenching University," p. 360.

reality took very lightly both Wu as chancellor and Wu's suggestion, one by no means unreasonable, very lightly. The phrase he had used to describe Wu, "this old gentleman," might somewhat reveal his true feeling toward Wu.

With no support forthcoming from his administrative subordinate, Stuart, Wu in this case must have felt offended. Wu's unhappiness with his nominal position finally brought him to submit his resignation in June, 1931, at the conclusion of his two-year appointment. But the board of managers refused and requested his continued service. Wu in the end consented upon two conditions:

1. That his term of office would be limited to two years.
2. That during his tenure of office with the exception of official correspondence, all other University business should be dealt with by the President [Stuart].[1]

During his second term of service, Wu's nominal situation was not improved. Whether out of disgust or despair, Wu first took a leave of absence in February, 1933, and then resigned from Yenching in June of the same year.[2]

Wu's term of chancellorship was indeed without authority or glamor. Stuart's attitude toward Wu's chancellorship was no more than a passive acceptance. Searching through all of Stuart's personal papers and Yenching's administrative files, one can find not a single document to show that either Stuart or Yenching had made any effort to make Wu a real head of the university.

Wu's successor as acting chancellor was Dr. Y. T. Tsur, former president of Tsinghua University and a prominent banker in Peiking. In his

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[1]See "Minutes of the Board of Managers," June 20, 1931, RYU.

[2]"Minutes of the Board of Managers," February 8, 1933; June 17, 1933, RYU.

letter accepting the appointment Tsur set certain conditions for his service: namely, that "besides . . . representing the University officially in its formal relations with the [Chinese] Government and the educational public," he would "assume no other responsibility" and would "serve the University in a purely honarary capacity." Whether these conditions were occasioned by Dr. Tsur's larger interest in his banking business, by his genuine preference to have a nominal position with the University, or by his fear of falling into his predecessor's predicament it is impossible to ascertain. For reasons unknown to us, Dr. Tsur resigned after one year's service.[1]

Luh Chih-wei then became the acting chancellor from the fall of 1934 to June, 1937. Luh, a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago and formerly on the faculty of Southeastern University (later, National Central University) in Nanking, was Chairman of the Department of Psychology at Yenching. His true feelings toward his chancellorship were at the least not enthusiastic, for in his three years of office he tendered his resignation twice.[2]

During Luh's tenure in office Yenching's students and alumni became impatient with the constant turnover of chancellorship. One indication was the resolution passed by the first National Conference of Delegates of the Yenching Alumni Association in June, 1936, which stated "that the Board of Managers [of Yenching] be requested to select a regular Chancellor at an early date."[3] Stuart read the situation very accurately and

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[1]See "Minutes of the Board of Managers," June 17, 1933; June 23, 1934, RYU.

[2]See, "Minutes of the Board of Managers," December 10, 1934; June 24, 1935; June 24, 1936, RYU.

[3]See, "Minutes of the Board of Managers," June 24, 1936, RYU. (Italics mine.)

in a letter written in July to the Secretary of the Associated Board for Christian Colleges in China, which was a coordinating body for all Christian colleges in China, he expressed himself with candor. This letter not only revealed his attitute toward Chinese administrative control at Yenching but also his ultimate thinking on American interests in the institution:

> I can sense a growing desire to have a really functioning Chinese "hsiao-chang," with the reasons for which I fully sympathize. It seems undesirable, however, for the immediate present that my duties should be substantially changed. Nonetheless, we ought to be looking forward to the time when I retire and for a provision under very different terms for adequate representation here of the American interests. I am more than ever convinced that this is vital to the best maintenance of those interests and there can be no better investment for this purpose than caring for Harry Price. . . . that Dr. C. W. Luh has generously agreed to continue Acting Chancellor for one more year. This is easily the best solution, although it only postpones the next step for that period [of transition to having a real Chinese chancellor].[1]

The Price mentioned in the letter referred to a junior faculty member teaching at Yenching, who was the son of Frank P. Price, Stuart's old friend at Nanking Theological Seminary.

The importance of Stuart's disclosure in this letter is that it revealed his reluctance to abdicate his presidency and his apprehension of the day when a fully functioning Chinese president would be instituted, a development he feared might threaten American interests at Yenching. This disclosure also adequately explains why Yenching during his tenure could not have a real Chinese leadership. It also demonstrates that the type of Chinese chancellor Stuart had been looking for was a figurehead who would not attempt to assume actual leadership at Yenching.

Finally, in April, 1937, Stuart found the ideal man for the post of Yenching chancellorship. It was H. H. Kung, the long-time chairman of

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[1]Stuart to Garside, July 1, 1936, JLS-RYU.

Yenching's board of managers. Kung indeed fitted Stuart's requirements: a Christian, American educated (Oberlin and Yale), high Chinese official, and also a person unable to take active leadership at Yenching due to his own heavy administrative duties with the Nationalist Government. Therefore, when Kung accepted the offer, Stuart was exuberant. In his letter to the trustees Stuart emphasized the importance of the event by saying that for a man in Kung's stature to accept Yenching's appointment was "symbolic, I trust, of the established place which Yenching has achieved in the national life."[1]

But Kung's usefulness in this regard was soon ended. Soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July, 1937, Stuart assumed both the presidency and chancellorship to avoid antagonizing Japanese authorities who were occupying northern China.[2]

We have shown Stuart's reluctance to step down from his leadership. Why was he reluctant? As we have seen, his personal sentiment as expressed in his administrative policies at Yenching throughout the years had been toward making the school a more Chinese institution. Why in the matter of chancellorship had he violated this long professed policy? The obvious, mundane reason--that no man would want to deprive himself of his own job--seems not to satisfactorily answer the question. Could there not have been reasons less mundane, more noble? To answer this question, we shall have to refer to Stuart's larger Christian and educational ideals.

As pointed out before, Stuart was fully in agreement with the Burton Commission's recommendation that Christian schools be made "more efficient, more Christian, and more Chinese." Probably our answer lies

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, June 17, 1937, JLS-RYU.

[2]Edwards, Yenching, p. 350.

in Stuart's interpretation of this statement . To make Yenching efficient or effective, American money would have to be constantly sought in view of the difficulty in securing Chinese funds for Yenching. A Chinese president, whoever he might be, could not be expected to achieve a better result in financial procurement than an American who had the confidence of the trustees and the American donors. Moreover, a Chinese president could not reassure trustees and donors of the school's steadfastly Christian character so well as an American Christian with mission connections. This was why Stuart was very much concerned with the cultivation of young Americans at Yenching like Harry Price, whose Christian sympathies would seem unimpeachable to Yenching's American constituency. If we can accept these analyses, then Stuart's reluctance to allow a genuine Chinese leadership at Yenching can be understood; it was based not only on personal interests, but also on considerations of financial survival and religious proselytism.

C. The Appointment and Treatment of the Chinese Faulty

American mission colleges during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries all had a predominant percentage of Western faculty members,and Yenching was no exception. In 1919, Yenching's total faculty numbered 34, with a ratio of 21 Western to 13 Chinese members.[1] To make Yenching more of a Chinese institution, certainly this unbalanced faculty ratio had to be adjusted.

Stuart pondered this problem at least as early as 1921. In June of that year, he noted that "nowhere do mission schools in China seem to

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[1]Stuart, "Report of the President of Yenching University to the Managers, 1928-29," p. 1, in "Reports 1," RYU.

be failing more completely than in the number and quality of Chinese on their teaching staff. The consequences of success or failure in this respect are vital."[1] During the period of rising Chinese nationalism, from 1925 to 1927, Stuart became even more concerned with this matter. In the midst of massive withdrawal of missionaries and mission funds from China as a result of the Nanking Incident of March, 1927, Stuart suggested that the mission boards should transfer their funds to support Chinese members in such mission institutions as Yenching rather than to continue other kinds of mission investments. Other investments would entail a risk of being confiscated or destroyed, Stuart argued, while supporting Chinese faculty would be a lifelong investment which could perpetuate Christian institutions "as a permanent stronghold for Christian faith."[2] With such thoughts in mind, Stuart and Yenching moved with almost lightening speed to strengthen the Chinese faculty. Thus, while in June, 1927 Yenching's faculty ratio between Chinese and Western faculty was 1 to 1 with 56 in each category,[3] by December of the same year the ratio changed to about two-thirds Chinese to one-third Western, a ratio Stuart felt should be "well maintained."[4] And this favorable ratio was indeed maintained till the 1930's.[5]

Not only in the number of faculty did the Chinese dominate Yenching, but also in the number of administrative officers. Throughout

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[1]Stuart, "Second Annual Report of the President to the Board of Managers of Peking University," p. 7, in "Reports 1," RYU.

[2]Stuart to North, April 14, 1927, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart, "President Report, 1926-27," p. 17, in "Reports 1," RYU.

[4]See "Minutes of the Board of Trustees," December 9, 1927, p. 1, RYU.

[5]See Stuart to Trustees, June 17, 1937, JLS-RYU.

Stuart's presidency most of the administrative officers were Chinese, including two deans and most of the departmental chairmen. Exceptions were the dean of Woman's College, which was affiliated with Wellesley College, and the dean of the College of Natural Sciences.[1]

Another problem related to making Yenching more Chinese was that of equal treatment for Chinese and Western faculty in their salary, housing, and pensions. Yenching's faculty were divided into two categories: mission board appointees (who all appeared to be Westerners) and university appointees (who included both Westerners and Chinese). The salaries of mission board appointees in the beginning of Stuart's presidency were paid by their mission boards. Of university appointees, the Westerners' salaried were paid by the university on a scale comparable to that of the mission appointees, but the Chinese salaries were paid by the university at a substantially lower scale. The inequity in these arrangements was obvious, for they were not determined by personal merit but more by ecclesiastical or racial considerations.[2]

One case will illustrate this inequity. In the year 1927, the highest paid mission appointee received LC$7,780, while the lowest, a single man, received LC$2,260. But in the same year the leading Chinese faculty members generally received a salary which was not only meagre but humiliating. For instance, Liu T'ing-fang, a Ph.D. from Columbia, who had previously taught at Yale and the Union Theological Seminary in New York and was a scholar with many publications, only received LC$4,875. Chou Tso-jen, the famous Chinese literary figure, received only LC$2,400.[3]

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[1]See the Yenching University Bulletins in the late 1920's and 1930's, in "Bulletins," RYU.

[2]West, "Yenching University," pp. 314-22.

[3]Ibid., pp. 319-20.

The reasons offered at the time by many mission boards and institutions for such discrepancies in salary and fringe benefits were basically three. First, a larger salary for the Chinese teaching faculty would impede the self-support of the Chinese Christian constituency. This meant that Chinese churches or Christian communities were expected to find their own funds for the support of their own Chinese faculty teaching in the mission institutions. Second, mission boards could not afford a larger salary for the Chinese. Third, the different life-styles of the Western faculty, the larger sums needed for the education of their children in the United States, and large expenses for their travel on furlough, all dictated a higher salary for them.[1]

Stuart turned his attention to the salary issue very early. In 1923, sensing Chinese resentment of different salary schedules at Yenching, he wrote that the salaries of all Chinese teachers be based on three considerations: (a) the Christian principles of stewardship, service, and sacrifice; (b) academic efficiency, enabling each to do his best work without financial worry; (c) Chinese standards of social obligations, such as obligations to support their large families. The argument that an equal salary for Chinese and Western faculties would hurt the self-support of the Chinese church was denounced by Stuart as an argument of expediency. The claim that the mission boards and other Christian agencies were short of funds to support higher salaries for the Chinese Stuart criticized as untrue, for these boards and agencies always had funds to appoint new Western missionary workers to come to China. Stuart was only willing to agree that the Western members had larger needs in child education and

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[1]Stuart, "Some Administrative Problems," Educational Review 15, No. 4 (October 1923): 333-37.

travels.[1] But though Stuart was opposed to salary inequity and made his opposition known as early as 1923, a uniform salary schedule for both Western and Chinese faculty members at Yenching was not instituted until 1931. In this new schedule, both Chinese and Western members were paid according to personal merit, with Western members receiving an extra amount for their children's education and travel expenses.[2] This slow improvement was mostly due to reluctance on the part of the Yenching's trustees and the Western faculty members concerned, since their approval and support were the prerequisites for such an improvement.[3] Also it should be noted that in this new schedule the mission board appointees were not affected; obviously the mission boards did not share Stuart's sense of equity.

The distribution of university housing among Western and Chinese members was another issue that was potentially explosive. Before 1925 Yenching did not supply all of its full-time faculty with houses. The result was that Western faculty, with a larger salary and accustomed to modern facilities, had usually lived in houses more comfortable or better equipped than their Chinese colleagues. Fearing the perpetuation of this situation would create an impression of racial differences if not inequality, and wanting to improve living conditions for its faculty members, Yenching in 1925 started to build its own houses for its faculty, to be

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Stuart to Garside, February 13, 1931, JLS-RYU; [Howard S. Galt], "Notes for the President's Report, Prepared by the Acting President," June 20, 1931, in "Reports 1," RYU.

[3] Interview with Philip Fugh, Washington, D.C., April 7, 1972. For more relevant information about this problem, see Stuart, "Faculty Presessional Conference--September 5-6, 1920, President's Address," p. 2, in "Faculty Conferences," RYU.

free except for modest salary deductions. The assignment of houses was based entirely on the order of academic rank, irrespective of racial origins.[1]

Stuart also took this housing reform very seriously and made the supervision of it a part of the duties of his office. His basic attitude toward this matter was to try to imbue both Chinese and Western members with a sense of racial equality and even Christian brotherhood in their living patterns. He believed that the Chinese would want to enjoy domestic comforts of heat, light and plumbing just as the Western members did, and a uniform university housing system could give the Chinese members these comforts at no additional cost to their meagre income. Stuart was opposed to giving housing subsidies. If it were done, he believed that the Chinese with their larger family burden would rent cheaper houses in order to save money for their other family expenditures. He also believed that the Chinese faculty members would take this policy as a sincere gesture on the part of Yenching to create racial equality and would therefore be willing to sacrifice the monetary advantages of living in less expensive houses of their choosing.[2] Convinced of its soundness, Stuart, since 1925 had implemented this equal housing policy and when in 1929 the trustees could not remit more funds to build more university houses, Stuart even volunteered to apply for a personal loan from a local Chinese bank to secure funds for constructing more houses.[3]

Was Stuart's arrangement really welcomed by the Chinese faculty

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[1]West, "Yenching University," pp. 315-16; Stuart to North, January 2, 1925, JLS-RYU.

[2]Ibid.

[3]West, "Yenching University," p. 324.

members? Without sufficient information, we cannot say one way or the other. But we do know that with their lesser salary before 1931, although they would welcome this equal housing arrangement, they might not be happy with their monetary loss. The crucial issue here is their low comparative salary. As their salary became substantially equalized after 1931, we can be certain that the Chinese members would have every reason to welcome this equal housing policy. On this housing issue we can see how painstakingly Stuart tried to infuse his concept of justice into the details of Yenching's life. Though we might criticize his policy before the salary adjustment in 1931 as one of contrived equality between Chinese and Western members, his sincerity and commitment toward racial equality at Yenching cannot be doubted. Besides salaries and housing, fringe benefits such as pensions and medical allowances were also equally provided to both Western and Chinese members.[1]

In conclusion, we can say that after 1931 Yenching's treatment of Chinese faculty members was substantially the same as its treatment of the Western members; to this equal treatment of faculty members Stuart had made an undeniable contribution.

D. Building a Chinese Constituency

Yenching's life from 1919 to 1941 was intertwined with that of China. Living in the midst of turmoil and ever-present danger, Yenching had to secure recognition and support from Chinese political authorities and the general Chinese public to become a genuine Chinese university. In other words, a Chinese constituency had to be built for the permanent life of the university. Let us now discuss Stuart's ideas and efforts in this

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[1]Ibid., pp. 322-23; Stuart to North, February18, 1925, JLS-RYU.

regard.

To Stuart, the cultivation of good relationships with China's powerful political figures was "the best insurance" against turmoil and instability.[1] During his presidency Stuart was able in one way or another to establish good relationships with almost all the leading Chinese political figures in the early decades of the twentieth century. In the pre-1928 Peking Government, Stuart had an amicable relationship with such high-ranking officials as Dr. W. W. Yen and Wellington Koo, who both served as premier and foreign minister one time or another.[2] Outside of the Peking Government he had established relations with such prominent figures as Yen Hsi-shan, Sun Ch'uan-fang, Han Fu-ch'ü, Sung Che-yüan, Chang Tso-lin, Chang Hsüeh-liang, Feng Yü-hsiang, Li Tsung-jen, Pai Ch'ung-hsi, Wang Ching-wei, and Chiang Kai-shek.[3] In establishing cordial relationships with these Chinese officials, Stuart had able assistance from Philip Fugh, a Manchu royal descendant whose connection with the Chinese officialdom was wide.[4]

After assuming his presidency, Stuart made the cultivation of good relationships with prominent Chinese figures a constant policy. For this purpose he made many trips to visit different parts of the country. For instance, he went to Nanking in 1928, trying to "feel out" the attitude of the Nanking Government toward mission education in general and toward Yenching in particular. During this trip, largely through the introduction of H. H. Kung (Chairman of Yenching's Board of Managers), he

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[1]Stuart, Fifty Years, p. 105.

[2]Stuart to Harry W. Luce, November 8, 1926, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart, Fifty Years, pp. 105-25.

[4]Ibid.

met all the KMT dignitaries: Generalissimo and Mme Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, Sun Fo, Feng YÜ-hsiang, Hu Han-min, Chiang Meng-lin, Wang Ch'ung-hui. To the last figure, the Minister of Justice, he even offered him Yenching's chancellorship, but met with no success. The friendly attitude of these KMT officials toward Stuart was such that when he later reported to the trustees he stated that he would not believe "Christian scholars or any Christian work has anything to fear from the new government if wisely planned according to new conditions."[1] The KMT's friendly response was of course largely due to its motive in cementing a closer relationship with the United States and also due to the pro-Christian sentiments of the Chiang-Soong families. Stuart was well aware of these facts and his trip to Nanking was his effort to capitalize on them in order to secure a safe place for Yenching in the new Nationalist Government. Stuart's efforts were well made, for Yenching's relationship with the Nationalist Government remained cordial throughout Stuart's presidency, a fact we shall demonstrate in a later chapter.

Another important aspect of establishing a Chinese constituency was the procurement of Chinese financial support for Yenching. In its early years, Chinese contributions were almost non-existent. For instance, for the academic year of 1917-1918, out of a total budget of seventy thousand Mexican dollars, eighty-seven per cent came from mission boards and the rest was largely from student tuition fees.[2] In the early twenties, because of the turmoil and civil wars there was no hope of raising large Chinese funds. As the Chinese political situation became somewhat stabilized after the establishment of the Nationalist Government in 1928,

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, October 25, 1928, JLS-RYU.

[2]West, "Yenching University," p. 268.

Stuart began to seek Chinese financial contributions. The first was his asking a Chinese banker to match a Rockefeller grant. In the summer of 1929 the Rockefeller Foundation offered a grant of $250,000 as the endowment for the study of natural sciences at Yenching, but with the condition that Yenching should raise a like amount. Stuart was delighted with the offer and started to negotiate with his banking friends in Peking to match the grant. Mr. Chou Tso-min, the banker of the Chin-cheng Bank in Peking, proposed that if the Rockefeller grant could be deposited in his bank, he would be willing to deposit an equal amount in there for investment. When the interest on this total deposit reached his share of the contribution he would then turn the whole deposit back to Yenching. The banker estimated that under the current interest rate, it would only take four years to complete the whole process. Stuart readily accepted the offer and considered the Chinese banker's offer a matching fund with the Rockefeller grant, for the bank would be contributing its services, lending half of the depository capital, and turning all the profits to Yenching. Therefore, Stuart cabled the trustees for their acceptance. To Stuart's surprise, the trustees balked. They felt the Chinese banker's offer entailed uncertainty and danger and would not accept the offer unless the total deposit be placed in the hands of a specially organized committee appointed by Yenching. When Stuart reluctantly conveyed the feeling of the trustees to the Chinese banker, the banker felt that the trustees had shown no trust in him and therefore withdrew his offer.[1]

Stuart was very unhappy about the trustees' decision. When he heard of the banker's final withdrawal of the offer, he first complained to the trustees that this affair had put him in a bad light with the

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[1]Edwards, Yenching, pp. 228-30.

banker and had dashed his hope of raising other funds from other Chinese bankers. He then challenged the trustees to raise the matching funds "in their own American way."[1] Finally, Stuart even threatened to resign from his post as a protest over the trustees' decision, which he felt was a sign of their lack of confidence in his judgement. Stuart's threat of resignation was also occasioned by his concern with the increasing difficulty in raising funds in America due to the economic depression after 1929. To him, now was the time to cultivate Chinese contribution, and the trustees' decision was really short-sighted and foolish.[2] Due partly to his demoralization and partly to the impaired relationship with the Peking banking circle as a result of this episode, Stuart suspended his effort to seek Chinese financial contributions for several years.

Stuart's second major effort in raising Chinese funds was to launch a One Million Dollar Campaign in 1933. His expectations for this campaign were modest, and he did not expect that the total amount would be raised. He saw the campaign more as an educative effort to make the Yenching alumni aware of their duties to their alma mater, and also as an opportunity to exert some pressure on the Chinese public to show their true feelings toward an institution that had been educating their children.[3] During the campaign Stuart made many visits to many parts of China. Generally, the response among the KMT officials was warm and encouraging. For instance, in Shanghai, Mayor Wu Tieh-ch'eng, a KMT old stalwart, gathered all his wealthy friends in his home and collected pledges totalling

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[1]Stuart to Olin D. Wannamaker, November 5, 1930, JLS-RYU.

[2]Interivew with Philip Fugh, April 7, 1972.

[3]Stuart to N. Gist Gee, Januart 24, 1933, JLS-RYU.

$46,000.[1] In Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei gave a reception in Stuart's honor and many donations were made. At the reception the KMT leaders told Stuart that they would only do this for Yenching and not for other schools.[2]

Through the efforts of Stuart and that of the Yenching staff, the end result of the campaign was to reach one-third of the stated one million goal--LC$320,000, equivalent to US$97,000. Out of this, Yenching's faculty and alumni contributed at least one-third, a not insignificant demonstration of their affection for the university.[3] Though the campaign was not totally satisfactory, Stuart was not too disappointed for, as noted earlier, he had not expected total success anyway.

But during the campaign Stuart developed an ambivalent feeling toward seeking Chinese contributions. On the one hand he took pride in the donations received, but on the other he was wary about the bearing of these Chinese contributions on the future of Yenching as a Christian institution. He became afraid that if the Chinese funds became a substantial factor in Yenching's existence, the university's American constituency would gradually lose control of the university, especially its control of the religious character of the institution. In a letter to a friend in California, Stuart called such a loss to be "unfair to the original constituency."[4]

In 1934, when Yenching's financial situation became more precarious due to the accumulated effects of American economic depression, Dr. Hu Shih

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[1]Stuart to Gee, October 12, 1934, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to "Dear Friends, March 1, 1935," JLS-RYU.

[3]Edwards, Yenching, p. 233.

[4]Stuart to C. J. Liu, July 11, 1934, JLS-RYU.

and other friends succeeded in getting Yenching an annual grant of $60,000 from the Chinese Ministry of Education. About this grant Stuart became even more ambivalent. In his letter to the trustees he pointed out that this and similar government grants would gradually make Yenching dependent on the Chinese government and promote a subtle tendency toward secularization. To guard against such a tendency, he wished the trustees could do more for Yenching financially. In these lofty and persuasive words he gave the trustees a mild caveat:

> Some interested person in the future, a few decades or centuries from now, can be imagined as reviewing the present situation and pointing out how much wiser it would have been if those who started and have perpetuated this group of Christian colleges had not attempted more than they themselves were able to support, and thus have been better able to control them in the interest of the purpose for which they had been founded.[1]

How do these words reflect Stuart's attitude toward making Yenching Chinese? Was this letter to the trustees simply his shrewd way of raising more aid for Yenching? If so, how are we going to square this letter with the one he wrote to his friend in California? Upon comparing the main ideas in these two letters, they cannot but reflect his mixed feeling toward a larger share of Chinese financial control in the operation of Yenching. If we accept this judgement, then Stuart's commitment to making Yenching a more Chinese instutition was a qualified one. In other words, to make Yenching more Chinese was fine, but not at the expense of the religious character of the institution. Stuart in his presidency had a higher commitment: that Yenching should remain primarily as an American institution dedicated to its original religious purpose. In view of this attitude and his reluctance to relinquish his presidency to Chinese educators, we can even say that his effort to make Yenching more Chinese was not

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[1]Stuart to Garside, September 18, 1934, JLS-RYU.

much more than a half-hearted one.

CHAPTER X

THE PERMEATION OF CHRISTIANITY AMONG YENCHING STUDENTS

As a missionary worker, Stuart was constantly occupied with the problem of how to infuse Christianity among his students at Yenching. During his early years there he suffered greatly over an episode which almost ruined his reputation as a religious worker, one which also damaged Yenching's relationship with many conservative missionary forces. He became the intended victim of a heresy hunt. Since this episode illustrates both his theological position and the nature of his religious work at Yenching, it deserves a detailed analysis.

A. The Heresy Trials and Their Impact on Yenching

The Heresy Trials

Approximately two and a half years after the publication of Stuart's lecture series, delivered before the Y.W.C.A. Conference in 1919, open attacks charging heresy began against him. From 1921 until late 1926, when the harassment for his alleged heresy came to a close, the attacks took two channels: through religious and secular periodicals and through church bodies. The opening shot against Stuart's heresy was fired by Dr. W. H. Griffith Thomas in the Princeton Theological Review for October of 1921. Criticizing the rise of "modernism" in China, Dr. Thomas singled out Stuart's YWCA lectures as a typical example. He attacked all the major theses in Stuart's lectures. Thomas objected to the following statement in Stuart's first lecture, "God," which he said could not

"fairly be called evangelical or true to the full teaching of the New Testament":

> If revelation is permanent and universal, then we must admit that the Christian religion is not the only religion. . . The Christian religion is the fullest, the finest and the final revelation, but not different in kind from the revelation of earlier ages, when you get down to the reality through the incrustations of the outside.

Obviously, what Dr. Thomas had found unevangelical in this statement was Stuart's acceptance of the revelations of earlier ages, which would include those of non-Christian religions. To Dr. Thomas, these religions were different from Christianity not in degree but in kind.[1]

Thomas attacked Stuart's second lecture, "Jesus Christ," particularly his distinctions between Jesus and Man. To Stuart, although Jesus represented a "new type of humanity," man's difference with Him was only one of degree. Dr. Thomas criticized this idea for being "not only inadequate but inaccurate" and argued that it ignored Jesus' divine uniqueness.[2]

In Stuart's third lecture, "The Holy Spirit," Dr. Thomas found the following statement--defining the relationship between God the Father and God the Son--to be "curious and really unthinkable":

> God the Father, God who had to be because he was personality in perfection; had to know that he existed; conscious of himself and his possibilities, in a certain way thought of himself objectively, God the Son.

Though Thomas did not explain exactly what in this statement was "curious and unthinkable," the fundamentalist bias revealed throughout his article suggests that his objection was based on the fundamentalist conviction that in the God-head there are three persons, each predestinately and

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[1]W. H. Griffith Thomas, "Modernism in China," The Princeton Theological Review (October 1921), pp. 653-54.

[2]Ibid.

individually divine. To Thomas, God the Father would have seemed divine in Himself, not for reason of any perfect personality. God the Son would likewise have been seen as divine in Himself, not to be explained as something grown out of the cognizance of God the Father.[1]

Thomas found the following words in Stuart's last lecture, "The Holy Scriptures," to be "decidedly open to objection," "in need of careful qualification," and "subversive of any objective authority" for the Bible:

> The canon we have may include books not essential and there may be books outside that would be worth having . . . The authority of the Bible is in our own experience of its value in our own spiritual life, reinforced by religious teachers through all ages.

Here too, Thomas revealed his solid fundamentalist stand by denying man's subjective experience as a way to understand God's teachings. In conclusion, Thomas said that Stuart's theological ideas were "not safe teaching to give to the Y.W.C.A. secretaries, or indeed, to anyone else, in China or in America."[2]

Stuart's reaction to this criticism was swift and angry. Though he had not seen Dr. Thomas' article and only learned about its general content from friends, Stuart wrote a letter in December to the editor of the Princeton Theological Review to register his protest. He first expressed his dismay over Thomas' exclusive reliance on his lectures to judge his evangelical position, and asked that his evangelical beliefs be examined in the light of his whole life and work in China. Then he declared his right to use historical criticism to make theological interpretations and formulations. Stuart claimed that this right was what "our Protestant--and especially our Presbyterian--forefathers had fought and

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Ibid., p. 655.

suffered for." If he had to be branded as a religious liberal because of this, he declared, quoting from Martin Luther, "Then here I stand, I can not do otherwise." In this letter Stuart also claimed that he had "passionate belief in the Bible as God's inspired word."[1]

The editor of the Princeton Theological Review, Professor Oswald T. Allis, responded to Stuart's letter in February, 1922, and in a very unfriendly way. He first chastized Stuart's hurried manner of registering a protest even before having learned the exact nature of Dr. Thomas' criticism. Then, among other things, Allis challenged the truthfulness of Stuart's claim that he had "passionate belief in the Bible as God's inspired word." Such a claim, Allis argued, contradicted Stuart's accepting other works as sharing in lesser degree the same truth as the Bible's. Allis rebuffed Stuart by insisting that Dr. Thomas had neither misinterpreted Stuart's Y.W.C.A. lectures nor misjudged Start's liberal theological views. Allis concluded by daring Stuart to show just where he was misinterpreted or misjudged.[2] It was a dare which Stuart never took. While Stuart remained silent, Professor Allis further committed himself to the ranks of Stuart's enemies in their efforts to expose alleged heretical elements in Stuart's liberal theology. Two years after Allis's exchange of letters with Stuart, Allis in the January 1924 issue of the Princton Thoelogical Reivew singled out another of Stuart's works for attack. This was Stuart's New Commentary on the Apocalypse of St. John the Divine, published in Chinese in 1923. The part of the Commentary that particularly aroused opposition in Allis and other fundamentalists

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[1]Stuart to the Editor of The Princeton Theological Review, December 13, 1921, Edward Mack Papers, Presbyterian Historical Foundation, Ashville, North Carolina (hereafter cited as MP).

[2]Oswald T. Allis to Stuart, February 17, 1922, MP.

was Stuart's discussion of the characteristics of the Apocalypse and the nature of the Book of Daniel.

Stuart had written that a key to understanding the cryptic imagery and ideas of the Apocalypse was to be found in the Jewish apocalyptic literature. According to Stuart, this literature had three preeminent characteristics: first, it employed a fierce tone or style in its withering condemnation of gentile oppression, the Maccabean priest-kings, and the Sadducees. Therefore it had lost "the New Testament's original spirit of benevolent love." Second, it used borrowed imageries, such as stars, horns, and wild beasts so as not to arouse the suspicion and hostility of the Roman government. Third, it invoked such ancient worthies as Moses and Isaiah to impress its readers.

Stuart here was only trying to explain the influence that the Jewish apocalyptic literature had had on the New Testament Apocalypse. But Allis felt that Stuart had emphasized this influence excessively while giving insufficient affirmation to the unique apocalyptic features of the Biblical book. To Allis, these apocalyptic features were the permanent value of the book, which man should appreciate. To say that its fierce style had caused the loss of the New Testament's original spirit of benevolent love, as had Stuart, was simply a blasphemy.

Stuart in his Commentary had interpreted the visions and wonders in the Book of Daniel as directed to national and international affairs of either the past or contemporary time but not to things of the future. Stuart had also contended that the author of the book was really not Daniel. The book had been attributed to Daniel for other purposes: to stimulate the faith and patriotism of the Jews, to inspire them to overthrow oppressive governments, and also to avoid the persecution of the

real author by the Gentile rulers. Contrary to the usual fundamentalist claim, Stuart affirmed that Daniel could be dated to the reign of the Syrian King Antiochus (i.e. 175 to 154 B.C.).

Except for Stuart's dating of the book, Allis found almost all of his ideas on it to be unacceptable. Allis strongly objected to Stuart's interpretation of Daniel as aiming at past and contemporary events. Nor could he accept Stuart's explanation of its authorship. Allis, like all the fundamentalists, believed that Daniel was a book of prophesy, dealing with future hopes. He also believed that the prophet Daniel was the true author of the book. Because of the "fallacies" that Stuart had purveyed about both the Book of Apocalypse and that of Daniel, Allis in the end of his criticism reiterated his charge of two years before that Stuart was a "theological liberal" whose theology was "in direct conflict with the plain teachings of the Scriptures."[1]

The next church organ joining the Princeton Theological Review to attack Stuart was the Sunday School Times in Philadelphia. In the fall of 1921 it carried a vehement attack on Stuart's Y.W.C.A. lectures.[2] As far as can be determined Stuart made no direct reply. His strategy of defense since the beginning toward attacks in church journals or newspapers was to refute them with general affirmations of his religious faith, not to engage in any point-to-point theological debate. His was a shrewd move. To engage in such debates, Stuart would have had to reveal his true, liberal beliefs in print, thereby just offering more targets for his opponents to fire at. His adversaries were aware of this strategy but felt compelled

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[1]Allis, "Dr. J. Leighton Stuart's New Commentary on the Apocalypse of St. John the Divine," The Princeton Theological Review (January 1924), pp. 120-26.

[2]See Stuart to the Editor of The Princeton Theological Review, December 13, 1921, MP.

to continue their attacks. For instance, Rev. C. G. Trumbull, the editor of the Sunday School Times, wrote to Stuart in June, 1923 asking him to declare his attitude toward the authority of the Bible, and with the following request:

> Would you have any objection to writing me whether you personally believe in the inerrancy of the Bible, -- that is, that the original autograph manuscripts, as written by the original authors, under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, were free from error or mistake of any sort, whatsoever, both in their statement of historical facts, scientific fact, and spiritual truth?

Trumbull conluded his letter with an admonition that "members of the professing Christian church today center, many believe, in their attitude on this particular doctrine."

Angered by the insistence of Trumbull and aware of the danger behind his request, Stuart simply gave out a summary reply that he "did not care to have any active part in fomenting an issue which seems to me to be curiously foreign to the spirit of Jesus and to the teaching of the Bible."[1]

Concurrent with the attacks launched in church media Stuart's case was also brought to the attention of the Southern Presbyterian church bodies, and therein a strong wave of attack was soon fomented. In December, 1921, the aged Secretary of the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions for the Southern Presbyterian Church, Rev. S. H. Chester, wrote a letter of inquiry to Stuart. As we recall, Stuart and Chester had had a run-in shortly before Stuart's departure for China in 1904. Since Stuart was probably conscious of this old grudge and did not want to open another battle with "old Chester," he again resorted to generalities in his reply. Of those statements in his Y.W.C.A. lectures that had been singled out by

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[1] [William M. McPheeters], "Memorial to East Hanover Presbytery," (Columbia, S. C.: McCaw of Columbia, 1924), pp. 14-15.

Thomas for attack, Stuart simply said that he did not choose to explain on paper what he had been trying to express, nor would he give the Biblical texts which might confirm his statements, since to do so "would lead to unprofitable argument and further misunderstanding."

But Stuart assured Chester that whatever he had said was "either based directly on the New Testament teaching or a clear inference from it." To show his theological orthodoxy, Stuart then enumerated his beliefs in these doctrinal absolutes: the Trinity, the New Testament records of our Lord's person and teaching, His birth, miracles, vicarious atonement, resurrection, spiritual presence, and His perfect revelation and salvation. Then Stuart explained that his method of studying theology was one of historical criticism and that his theology was "in line with Paul, the Reformers, and the general spirit of our Church." Stuart expressed sympathy for Modernism and ridiculed Thomas' effort in attacking it, for Modernism was simply "an effort to restore the eternal truths of our faith in language current today." Finally, agonizing over the possibility of leaving the Church should his theological beliefs be found heretical, Stuart wrote to Chester, "I love it as the Church of my forefathers did because of my own firm convictions, and should be deeply grieved if the necessity ever came to be severed from this precious heritage."[1] We have no record to show the reaction of Chester to this forceful and somewhat moving defense, nor any record of any action taken by the Executive Committee of the Foreign Missions against Stuart. Possibly the old Chester was satisfied with Stuart's defense.

Facing attack from religious media and inquiries from the mission board, Stuart knew that he had to take some direct action in order to

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[1]Stuart to Rev. S. H. Chester, January 30, 1922, MP.

protect himself and silence his inquisitors. According to the regulations of the Southern Presbyterian Church, the examination of doctrinal soundness of a church member could only be taken up with the presbytery to which he belonged. Therefore, Stuart decided to request such an examination, for he hoped that it would clear up the matter once and for all. During April of 1922, when he was touring the United States to raise funds for Yenching, Stuart went to Richmond, Virginia, and requested the East Hanover Presbytery to examine his doctrinal position. This was the presbytery to which his parents had belonged, and to which he had belonged before departing for China in 1904. In making this request, Stuart was not following the rules, for his official connection was with the Mid-China Mission belonging to the Kiangche Presbytery. But since his attackers at this time were mainly associated with the Princeton Theological Seminary, Stuart obviously felt that a confirmation from the respectable East Hanover Presbytery would help his case more than such an action from a presbytery in China. Anyway, the East Hanover Presbytery bent the rules, complied with his request and formed an examination committee to resolve the matter. As the Presbytery had long been associated with the Stuart family and held a deep respect for the work that Stuart and his parents had done in China, Stuart must have expected a favorable decision. On April 18 the Presbytery by unanimous vote passed a brief resolution declaring its entire confidence in Dr. Stuart's loyalty to the Standards of the Church, its belief in his genuine sincerity, and its cordial endorsement of the work which Stuart was undertaking in China. The resolution was later published in Southern Presbyterian Church papers.[1]

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[1]Minutes of East Hanover Presbytery (Richmond, Virginia), The Presbyterian Church of the U.S., April 17, 1922, pp. 13,25; Christian Observer, May 17, 1922.

With such strong support from his presbytery, Stuart seemed to have temporarily succeeded in quieting his opponents in America. But once he returned to China, a new wave of attack broke on him and Yenching University. It was triggered by an editorial of November 15, 1922, in the Peking Leader, an English-language paper published in Peking. In essence, the editorial described Yenching as an institution not working for either religious instruction or conversion but rather for social service through educating the Chinese youth. While the editorial was sympathetic and even endorsed Yenching's educational direction, the response from some readers was hostile. A Mr. A. Kok of the Netherlands Legation in Peking immediately sent a letter to the editor accusing that university of having lost its Christian character "both in the Biblical and historical sense of the word." Mr. Kok in the same letter demanded that Stuart or other Yenching administrative officers affirm or deny the description of the university made in the editorial, for the public and the church organizations that had been giving financial support to the university had a right to know "what is being done at Yenching University and on what lines it is developing." In a second letter to the editor, Mr. Kok expressed his puzzlement as to the contradiction between Yenching's liberal tendency and Stuart's affirmation of his orthodox religiosity in America.[1]

Mr. Kok's attack came shortly before Stuart's departure for the United States on another fund raising tour. Stuart offered no reply, nor did any Yenching officer. But the spread of the attack to Yenching worried Stuart, for such a development could very well hurt the church support in America that Yenching had been relying upon. To ensure such support, the church bodies in America would have to be reassured of the religious

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[1]In McPheeters, "Memorial," pp. 10-14.

soundness of both him and his institution. Therefore Stuart resolved to act during this trip to America to seek a renewed support from the East Hanover Presbytery and Yenching's board of trustees.

Stuart first went to the board of trustees in New York during early 1923. The support from the board was quick and satisfying as reflected in the resolution passed on April 12, which consisted of three parts. The first part called attention to the founding purpose of Yenching, which was to conduct the institution "on strictly Christian and evangelical, but not sectarian principles." The second part declared that the trustees were fully assured that the administration of the University was "in faithful accord with" the above purpose and that "the policy and program of the University are in thorough agreement with the principles of the constituent mission boards supporting the University." In part three, the trustees declared that they "heartily endorse the policy hitherto followed by the University of refraining from public controversy on divisive theological or ecclesiastic questions," a point obviously in reference to Stuart's refusal to engage in theological debate with his accusers.[1]

After having secured the support of the trustees Stuart left New York and went to Richmond, Virginia, in the same week. He now requested the East Hanover Presbytery to reexamine his religious orthodoxy. As such an examination was usually made upon an application for presbytery membership, Stuart submitted his application. The Presbytery accepted the application and formed an examination committee of three, chaired by Professor Edward Mack, an Old Testament scholar and a theological liberal at the

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[1]"Minutes of the Board of Trustees," April 12, 1923, RYU.

Union Theological Seminary in Richmond.[1] The basic materials used for the examination was still his Y.W.C.A. lectures. The committee was serious in its undertaking and the copies of the Y.W.C.A. lectures used in the examination were those supplied by one of Stuart's accusers, on which he had marked the areas that he had found unsound.[2] The committee held several conferences with Stuart to examine his theology in general and those questioned areas in particular.

Finally, the committee issued a report of its findings. It first declared that regarding Stuart's theology it "was satisfied on every point by the explanatory and supplementary statements of Dr. Stuart." The committee then offered several justifications for its satisfaction. First, many statements in Stuart's lectures had been designed to assist the Chinese minds to comprehend certain Christian truths which were difficult for them. These statements were not, therefore, a normal expression of Stuart's views. Second, the published lectures were based on stenographic copies and were published without Stuart's personal verification. Third, Stuart had refused to own as his views any statements in the published lectures which might tend to contradict the standards of the Church. Fourth, Stuart had reaffirmed his whole-hearted adherence to the doctrines of the Southern Presbyterian Church as contained in the Catechisms and the Confession of Faith. At the end of the report, the committee unanimously recommended the acceptance of Stuart into the Presbytery. The Presbytery accepted the recommendation and Stuart thus renewed his membership in the

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[1]Interview with Professor Ernest T. Thompson, Richmond, Va., June 5, 1973. Prof. Thompson indicated that Mack was a theological liberal in the 1920's, though became conservative in the 1930's.

[2]Minutes of East Hanover Presbytery, October 17, 1923, p. 25.

Presbytery.[1]

If indeed Stuart had hoped that a renewed support from his Presbytery and an endorsement from the trustees would silence his opponents or muzzle their attacks, he was soon disillusioned. The examination committee's published report only ignited more and stronger opposition. New inquisitors joined in, but adopted a different strategy for their attack. Instead of presenting their views through the church media, they now presented them to the church bodies, for only these bodies could rescind the decision made by the East Hanover Presbytery. Among the new inquisitors that figured most prominently or most actively were Professor J. Gresham Machen of the Princeton Theological Seminary in New Jersey; Hugh W. White of the extreme fundamentalistic North Kiangsu Mission of the Southern Presbyterian Church in China; and Professor William M. McPheeters of the Columbia Theological Seminary in Columbia, South Carolina.

Machen, as noted in Chapter VII, was a leading conservative theologian at the Princeton Theological Seminary. One month after the decision of the East Hanover Presbytery was made known, he wrote to Mr. Mack denouncing Stuart's theology as one of naturalism. He called Yenching "an outstanding source of anti-evangelical propaganda in the Orient--very much as the University of Chicago is in this country." Furthermore, he implied duplicity on the part of Stuart for his affirming the standards of the Church when before the East Hanover Presbytery, but for taking other and liberal views when in China.[2] Two months later, citing some statements made by Stuart in an article published in the Chinese Recorder, Machen

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[1]Minutes of East Hanover Presbytery, April 17, 1923, pp. 21-23.

[2]Machen to Mack, May 19, 1923, MP.

further wrote to Mack to complain of Stuart's unorthodox position.[1]

Hugh W. White, one of the leaders in the fundamentalist Bible Union of China, attacked Stuart even more severely. In late 1923 he charged that Stuart's ideas on the Book of Daniel were unbiblical because of Stuart's denial of Daniel as the real author of the book and his lack of emphasis on the book's prophetic nature. Stuart went beyond these unbiblical ideas, White charged, to in fact imply that the book is "a forgery and has no place in the Bible." White was dismayed by the countenancing of Stuart's guilt by the East Hanover Presbytery and now claimed that at the moment "the Southern Presbyterian Church is on trial."[2] White warned in yet another attack that unless such wrong was to be corrected, "our descendants for thousands of generations will lose their Bible, their faith, and their hope of eternal life."[3]

White indeed had reason to hate Stuart. White in the early 1920's had been undertaking a heresy hunt in Nanking Theological Seminary, to which his Northern Kiangsu Mission was a supporting constituent.[4] One time when he and his comrades were trying to force a suspected "modernist" faculty member in the Seminary to resign, the suspect's retort was, "Why do you attack me? Why do you not take up your own man Leighton Stuart?"[5] Recollection of episodes like this one had made White reluctant to let Stuart escape from punishment. He could not do very much against Stuart in China, so his attacks were made in his numerous letters to his church

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[1]Machen to Mack, July 22, 1923, MP.

[2]White, "The Leighton Stuart Case," [late 1923], MP.

[3]White to Mack et al., September 11, 1923, MP.

[4]James Bear, "China Mission," 5: 366-86.

[5]White to Mack, November 21, 1923, MP.

friends in America. In one of his letters to Mack, he disclosed his frustration by complaining that there was no way to persecute Stuart through the Mid-China Mission, for the mission was bound by sentiment to Stuart and the leading members of that mission, such as the Prices and the Moffetts, were either intermarried with the Stuarts or had a protective attitude toward Stuart.[1]

Of all the inquisitors no one was more insistent and vengeful than William M. McPheeters. After the decision made by the East Hanover Presbytery in April, 1923, he soon presented a formal memorandum to the Presbytery challenging the decision. This document reveals his uncompromising theological stand and that of his fundamentist comrades. McPheeters cited many theological heresies that Stuart had committed. First, Stuart had claimed that man and Jesus were only different in degree and not in kind; therefore, Stuart had denied the distinctive difference between what is human and what is divine. Second, Stuart had criticized the "Back to Christ" movement somewhat negatively. (Here McPheeters seemed to verge on accusing Stuart of being the anti-Christ.) Third, Stuart had denied the Holy Spirit its distinctive place in the Trinity; therefore, Stuart had violated the Presbyterian catechisms and Confession of Faith, which, McPheeters pointed out, affirms that "there are three persons in the Godhead, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." Fourth, Stuart had taken an unorthodox stand by refusing to preach God's forgiveness of sinners, but, rather, by preaching a gospel of personal, social, and national righteousness. Fifth, Stuart had violated the doctrine of the plenary inspiration of the Holy Scriptures by claiming that the Biblical authors had

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[1]Ibid.

received no peculiar inspiration. Because Stuart had committed these theological errors, McPheeters suggested that Stuart should be made to publicly correct his views and be chastized.[1]

The Presbytery now knew that it faced an entangling theological embroilment with a fundamentalist theologian. Fearing this eventuality, the Presbytery decided to thwart McPheeters by resorting to general disclaimers as Stuart had done. Thus, the Presbytery in its October 16 reply to McPheeters simply noted that it had been satisfied with Stuart's theology and felt no need for further action on it. In reply to the specific points of disagreement raised by McPheeters, the Presbytery said that Stuart during the examination session had disowned every statement in his pamphlet which was at all questionable, including the very words to which McPheeters had taken exception in his memorandum.[2]

Besides presenting formal complaint to the Presbyter, McPheeters engaged in private correspondence to press his case. He responded to the Presbytery's report on April 17, 1923, which indicated that Stuart had denied and renounced certain statements in his lectures, by suggesting that Stuart had lied. To that effect his letter written in June to Mack charged Stuart with "lack of candor" and pointed out that Stuart's lectures represented "a body of thought that is marked by a singular consistency throughout." McPheeters also expressed doubt of the judicial integrity of the Presbytery, and claimed that its support of Stuart was due to its long relationship with the Stuart family and to its kind feelings toward Stuart personally.[3] Upon getting no satisfactory answer to this letter, McPheeters two

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[1]McPheeters, "Memorial," pp. 3-9.

[2]Minutes of East Hanover Presbytery. October 17, 1923, pp. 24-25.

[3]McPheeters to Mack, June 20, 1923, MP.

months later sent another letter to Mack. In it he asked Mack to indicate, 1) which statements made by Stuart were considered inadequate; 2) which were the reverse of Stuart's true views; and 3) which were made from the point of view of the Chinese secretaries whom Stuart was addressing.[1] Seeing this questioning as an effort to corner Stuart, Mack refused McPheeters' request.[2]

McPheeters was terribly disappointed with the Presbytery's and Mack's response, which to him was simply inadequate. To press his charge McPheeters in 1924 appealed his case to the Synod of Virginia, the organic, superior body over the East Hanover Presbytery, and also charged the Presbytery with "covering up" for Stuart.[3]

In view of this new development, which involved the Presbytery in a ecclesiastical litigation, Stuart decided to voluntarily withdraw from the Presbytery so as to spare it and himself further agony. Two months before the 1924 Meeting of the Synod, scheduled in September, Stuart wrote to the Presbytery expressing his willingness to be relieved of his membership if that seemed appropriate. He also informed the Presbytery that he had decided not to receive further presidential salary from the Church's Executive Committee for Foreign Missions. Then Stuart expressed his indignation over the whole affair: "I should . . . be loath to believe that there is no place in her [the Church's] ministry for one who has lived--however imperfectly--with the controlling life purpose which I have always had and with the Christian faith which alone has made this possible." Stuart

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[1]McPheeters to Mack, August 31, 1923, MP.

[2]Mack to McPheeters, [September 1923], MP.

[3]See "Terms of Agreement Entered Into Between Drs. R. Cecil & C. L. King & Dr. W. M. McPheeters and Between Both The Above Named Parties And The Judicial Committee of The Synod of Virginia," [September 1924], MP.

concluded his letter with these moving words:

> With this statement of the case I leave the matter with Presbytery. I have had ample evidence of your love and sympathy and trust, and am entirely sure that you will deal wisely with the issue. Let your decision be made wholly upon the basis of what is best for the peace and prosperity of the Church. My own life is consecrated to the cause of Jesus Christ, my divine Lord and Savior, and if that cause requires that I leave the Church of my fathers I cheerfully accept this loss, and shall retain unaffected my affectionate esteem for all of you.[1]

Whether out of true conviction as to Stuart's innocence in theological heresy or moved by the letter's fine spirit, the Presbytery refused to consider Suart's offer of withdrawal.[2]

Two weeks later, Stuart sent a copy of this letter to McPheeters together with a statement that "you will probably accomplish all that you have sent out to do, yet I cannot believe that the larger interests of the Kingdom of God can be really advanced by such treatment of a fellow-worker, nor that is is in accord with the spirit of the Master to whose cause we both consecrated our lives."[3] McPheeters was not moved by Stuart's statement and continued pressing his charges before the Synod of Virginia. But McPheeters had no better luck there than he had had with Stuart's Presbytery. The church elders of the Synod had no intention of persecuting Stuart or of repudiating the Presbytery. The Synod also lacked power to try Stuart for heresy, for according to church law a heresy case can only be tried by the presbytery to which the heretic belongs. When the Synod finally refused to judge the appeal and merely ordered the East Hanover Presbytery to review its decision, McPheeters complained in March, 1925, that the action of the

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[1]Stuart to the Members of East Hanover Presbytery, July 15, 1924, MP.

[2]See "Report To East Hanover Presbytery On The J. Leighton Stuart Discussion," [1925 or 1926], MP.

[3]Stuart to McPheeters, July 28, 1924, MP.

Synod would make the Presbytery both "judge and jury" in its own decision. Therefore, he vowed to make further appeal to the next meeting of the Synod in 1926.[1]

The controversy by this time must have become unbearable for Stuart. In May, 1925, he applied to the Mid-China Mission for his withdrawal, and the request was granted. His brother Warren also took the same action and then joined the Northern Presbyterian Church Mission in China. The Mission's approval of the Stuart brothers' requests indicated that it had either joined ranks with Stuart's opponents or had simply decided that Stuart's departure could best insure its peace with other fundamentalist groups, especially with the Northern Kiangsu Mission.[2] Upon the death of Stuart's mother four months earlier,[3] all the Stuarts had left the Mid-China Mission, a mission with which they had been associated for more than fifty years. Stuart's sorrow over this development must have been deep.

Meanwhile McPheeters' complaint was placed again before the Synod of Virginia to be decided in its 1926 meeting, scheduled for September. Because of the larger theological implications of Stuart's case and in view of the ongoing Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy, both the Synod and the Presbytery were reluctant to have the case brought to the open meeting of the Synod. Also, Stuart's profitable work in China, which was probably the most impressive done by a Southern Presbyterian missionary, and Stuart's recent loss of both his mother and wife (who had died in June, 1926)[4]

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[1]McPheeters to the Presbytery of East Hanover, March 28, 1925, MP.

[2]Bear, "China Mission," 5:365-66.

[3]P.F.P., "In Remembrance: Mrs. Mary Horton Stuart," CR, March 1925, pp. 186-88.

[4]Stuart, "To those who loved Aline best . . . ," June 6, 1926, SLF.

naturally made the Synod and the Presbytery reluctant again to open his case. Furthermore, as was pointed out earlier, most of Stuart's examiners were theological liberals themselves; they certainly had no intention of persecuting one of their own. For all these reasons, the leaders in both the Presbytery and the Synod decided to persuade McPheeters to withdraw his complaint and substitute for it a protest over Stuart's lectures to be recorded in the Synod minutes. As a result of this decision, a series of letters was exchanged between church leaders and McPheeters in the months before the September meeting.[1]

Mack, freshly returning from a trip to China and where he had been impressed with Stuart's work at Yenching, wrote several letters to McPheeters in August and early September. In these letters Mack pointed out that Stuart was probably the most influential missionary in China, that Stuart's influence was a restraint upon the radicalism there, and that Stuart would make a great contribution to the growth of an indigenous church in China. Mack reminded McPheeters that since the controversy began Stuart had given up his salary support from the Executive Committee for Foreign Missions, had withdrawn from membership in the Mid-China Mission, and had also suffered the death of his mother and wife. Mack then pleaded with McPheeters to withdraw his complaint, for "men's hearts are human and sympathetic." In these letters Mack also informed McPheeters frankly that the Synod was "weary" of the case and would act adversely on his appeal if pressed.[2]

To Mack's and some other church leaders' sincere petitions, McPheeters reacted with his usual bull-headedness. In all of his replies

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[1]See McPheeters to C. D. Gilkeson, August 18, 1926; McPheeters to C.R. Stribling, August 23, 1926, MP.

[2]Mack to McPheeters, August 19, 1926; September 8, 1926, MP.

to these petitions, he continued his denunciation of the Presbytery for its blind affection toward and patronage of Stuart. He also criticized that the Presbytery, in its absolution of Stuart's theological "errors," had practiced the principle that "the King can do no wrong."[1] McPheeters now forthrightly charged that Stuart had perjured himself in his testimonies before the Presbytery in order to cover up his heretical statements made in China. Therefore, McPheeters demanded that the Synod examine Stuart's lectures more carefully so as to rescue Stuart from his error. Declaring that he acted "with malice towards none and charity to all," McPheeters insisted that his complaint be decided in the Synod by an open vote.[2]

Upon McPheeters' insistence, the Synod had to act upon his complaint; it was rejected unanimously, as expected. And with this decision, Stuart's heresy case was finally brought to a close. The Presbyterian of the South, the official paper of the Synod, on September 26 adjudged the case with these words:

> No man has ever had his views of theology more carefully gone into by a Presbytery than has been the case with Dr. Stuart, and no man ever more fully convinced a Presbytery of his holding the faith once delivered to the saints and now held by the Southern Presbyterian Church. The Presbytery feels that the attacks upon Dr. Stuart were entirely uncalled for and entirely groundless. He has shown his high Christian character by not entering into a public controversy on this matter, but leaving it entirely in the hands of the Presbytery, while he went quietly on with his great work in far away China.

In 1973, nearly fifty years later, Dr. Ernest T. Thompson, Professor of Union Theological Seminary in Richmond, Virginia, who recently finished a three-volume work on the history of the Southern Presbyterian Church, commented on the case. He pointed out that Stuart's case was the

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[1]McPheeters to Gilkeson, August 18, 1926, MP.

[2]McPheeters to Stribling, August 23, 1926, MP.

first clash in open forum between the fundamentalists and the liberals within the Southern Presbyterian Church. Since the Church had begun its liberalizing tendencies in theological matters since the late 1910's and early 1920's, the defeat of McPheeters and company in Stuart's case really anticipated the final break of the fundamentalists from the Church in 1973.

The Impact of the Heresy Trials on Yenching

While campaigning in 1923-24 for ecclesiastical punishment of Stuart's "heresy," Rev. Hugh W. White also tried to involve Yenching in the case, and thus to force some changes there according to his liking. In a letter written in October, 1923 to Mack, White complained that Stuart had been drawing Yenching along the line of the liberal Union Theological Seminary in New York. Evidence for this included Stuart's having first sent his protégé Liu T'ing-fang to study in that Seminary and his then having appointed him to be Dean of Yenching's School of Religion. Because of this appointment and also Yenching's reputed liberal image, White called Yenching "a hotbed of radicalism."[2] To White and his fundamentalist comrades, not only was Yenching theologically an "unsafe" institution, but so were all the China's mission colleges. White remarked in 1924, "There is not one of the China [church] colleges and universities where we can safely send our boys."[3] In order to correct the liberal tendencies in those Chinese schools with which the Southern Presbyterian Church was connected, White thought out a strategy. In early 1924 he campaigned for the adoption of a resolution by the Church's General Assembly, demanding that the board

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[1]Interview withProf. Thompson, June 5, 1973.

[2]White to Mack, October 30, 1923, MP.

[3]White to A. M. Fraser, January 30, 1924, MP.

members of such schools be required every year to sign a statement affirming their evangelical beliefs, and that these schools be subject to direct doctrinal investigation by the Church. Should any schools refuse to comply, the Church should withdraw its support. Anticipating Yenching's refusal, White hoped that the Church could then terminate its relations with Yenching by suspending its payment of Stuart's salary. If Stuart could be thus humiliated, White believed, he "would then be an exotic from our church working without our approval, and in the course of time his ecclesiastical standing would atrophy, be forgotten, die of its own poison."[1] Fortunately for Stuart and for Yenching, the General Assembly never passed such a resolution. Alarmed, Stuart took a precautionary measure by voluntarily giving up his salary support from the Executive Committee for Foreign Missions (mentioned earlier).

Concurrently with White's efforts against Stuart and Yenching in the Southern Presbyterian Church, other enemies also attacked. For instance, Rev. J. Walter Lowrie, a stalwart fundamentalist of the Northern Presbyterian Mission in China, in late 1923 made a recommendation to his mission board asking it to withdraw from Yenching because of Stuart's and Yenching's unsound theological stand. When Stuart heard of this recommendation, he immediately wrote to Lowrie challenging him "to give evidence other than rumors and suspicions" as to why his or Yenching's religious stand was unsound.[2] The reaction of Lowrie's mission board must have been negative, for the Northern Presbyterian Church was to remain a constituency of Yenching until the end.

The fundamentalists were indeed unhappy with Yenching. Besides

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Stuart to J. Walter Lowrie, January 11, 1924, JLS-RYU.

being angry at Stuart, they were also angered over certain personal activities of Yenching's faculty members. For instance, on Easter Sunday of 1925 Dr. Liu T'ing-fang and Dr. Philippe de Vargas, a member in Yenching's School of Theology, attended an inter-faith gathering in Peking at which some Christians, Confucianists, Taoists, and Buddhists joined with the Panchen Lama of Tibet. Because of the gathering's being an association with "heathens," the Sunday School Times in Philadelphia attacked it as a "tragic apostasy."[1] Another Southern Presbyterian Church paper, Presbyterian of the South, also criticized the event very severely and called upon the Southern Presbyterian Church and all Christians, at home and abroad,to refuse to hold Christian fellowship with those like Professors Liu and de Vargas.[2] Even though Stuart did not attend the gathering, his church's Executive Committee for Foreign Missions asked Stuart for an explanation. To this request, Stuart managed to offer some defense for his "strayed" subordinates.[3]

Because of these instances and because of Stuart's "heresy" trials and Yenching's liberal image, the fundamentalists in China began to "boycott" Yenching by refusing to send young men there to study. Stuart was very unhappy with this boycott. In a letter to a friend in New York, in 1924, Stuart complained of the increasing difficulty of supporting young men to study theology at Yenching, for "the fundamentalist reaction out here prevents certain bodies from supporting students with us."[4] But while

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[1]Sunday School Times (Philadelphia), July 11, 1925.

[2]The Presbyterian of the South, July 29, 1925.

[3]Egbert W. Smith to Stuart, August 26, 1925; Stuart to Smith, September 3, 1925, JLS-RYU.

[4]Stuart to James Lewis, June 28, 1924, JLS-RYU.

the individual fundamentalists in China had succeeded in causing some damage to Yenching, no evidence can be found to show that her major church constituencies had deserted her in the wake of Stuart's heresy trials.

The heresy trials and the fundamentalist boycott of Yenching revealed Stuart's conundrum of being an evangelical worker on the one hand, a university head on the other. To win unanimous support from all the church workers in China, he had to hold to an uncontroversial theology. But to function effectively as a university head in the midst of rising Chinese nationalism and mounting Chinese material needs, some of the evangelical elements of mission education had to be sacrificed in favor of more general goals, such as "character building" and social services. Fortunately for Stuart, the fundamentalists' attack on him and on Yenching had ceased by the end of the 1920's when the fundamentalist-liberal controversy in the American Protestant Church declined.[1] From the 1930's, he could proceed with his duties without further harassment.

B. Stuart's Religious Policies at Yenching

As noted before, Stuart believed that the unique contribution of missionary education lay in moral training or character building. In an article, "The Religious Policy at Yenching University," published in 1925, Stuart declared that, in contrast with the Chinese government institutions, Yenching in its corporate life was to witness "the transforming dynamic and spiritual idealism of this [Christian] faith."[2] In a letter to the trustees

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[1]For the fundamentalist-liberal controversy, see William B. Gatewood, Jr., ed., Controversy in the Twenties: Fundamentalism, Modernism, and Evolution (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969).

[2]Stuart, "The Religious Policy at Yenching University," China Mission Year Book, 1925 (Shanghai), pp. 160-61.

during the same year, Stuart reaffirmed that Yenching's Christian life could exert "incalculable influence upon the winning of China to Christ and the establishment of international friendship across the Pacific in a time of rapid and radical change."[1] These statements of 1925 fully represent Stuart's controlling thought throughout his years at Yenching.

The School of Religion

The School of Religion's problem throughout its whole existence was its small enrollment. There were two kinds of programs in the School: the regular B.D. program, open only to college graduates; and the short course program, a non-degree training program for ordinary church workers. From 1916 to 1941 the enrollment in either of the two programs had constantly been from several students to less than a score. For instance, in 1926, there were only 5 regular students; in 1930, 11 regular and 11 short-course students; in 1936, 9 regular and 9 short-course students; and in 1941, 10 regular and 17 short-course students.[2] Because of this shortage of students, the student-faculty ratio was very high, generally three to one.

The student shortage soon alarmed the trustees. In 1928, when Stuart and Liu T'ing-fang were in the United States for university business, the trustees expressed their concern. Under questioning, Stuart offered several reasons for it. Students in China had become obsessed with nationalism; their anti-foreign feelings had made them unwilling to join church work because of its foreign connections; anti-religious intellectual currents in China had not yet subsided; poor salaries for church work had

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[1]Stuart, "To The Board of Trustees of Peking University, 1925," p. 6, JLS-RYU.

[2]Edwards, Yenching, p. 305.

discouraged students from taking it up as a profession; the religious influence of Yenching faculty had been ineffective; and last, some church bodies had not cooperated with Yenching fully in sending their students. To these reasons Professor Liu T'ing-fang added another--the high intellectual standards of Yenching's School of Religion.[1]

Though Liu T'ing-fang's claim of Yenching's higher standards had some validity, it only explains a small part of the picture. While both Stuart and Liu gave no relative weight to each reason, Yenching's lack of support from other church bodies in China was probably the most important one. This becomes clear if we compare Yenching's enrollment with that of the Nanking Theological Seminary. With such negative factors as Chinese nationalism and low material rewards for church work being equal, Nanking's enrollment picture was much brighter than that of Yenching. For instance, in 1926, Nanking's enrollment was 129; in 1933, 58; in 1937, 64; and in 1941, 54.[2] No matter which year is considered, Nanking's enrollment is always several times larger than that of Yenching.

Stuart was somewhat embarrassed by such low enrollments, but tried to justify Yenching's distinctive contribution by its more liberal approach to theological education. In his letter to the board of trustees in 1935 he claimed that "there ought to be in China both types of theological school, and that the existence of each tends to neutralize the dangers inherent in the other."[3] To understand the distinctive contribution of Yenching's School of Religion, we should examine certain activities of

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[1]"Minutes of the Trustees of Peking University." April 10, 1928, pp. 5-6, RYU.

[2]Price, History of Nanking Theological Seminary, pp. 17, 18, 26, 28.

[3]Stuart to Trustees, August 12, 1935, JLS-RYU.

the faculty members of the school.

In May, 1920 a group of twenty-nine Christian leaders, both Chinese and Westerners, banded together to form Cheng-tao t'uan (Truth Witnessing Society). The group soon put out a journal, Sheng-ming yüeh-k'an (Life Monthly), to "expound Christian truth and promote the Christian reform movement."[1] Stuart and many faculty of the School of Religion were founding members of this society.[2] In October, 1924 this witnessing society changed its name to Shen-ming she (Life Society). In its announcement it stated that it was a free association of individuals without regard to their denominations, affiliations, and nationalities. Its purposes were, among others, to use historical and scientific methods to study Christianity, to reform Chinese church and society, to promote international goodwill, and to make Chinese culture a contributing factor to the world.[3] Many members of Yenching's School of Religion also became leading members of this society, such as Wu Lei-ch'uan, Hsü Pao-chien, Liu T'ing-fang, William Hung, Chao Tzu-ch'en, Jen Yu-wen.[4] Besides joining this Life Society, they also joined with some Chinese Christian leaders in Peking to publish another religious journal, Chen-li chou-k'an (Truth Weekly).[5] In 1926 the Life Monthly and the Truth Weekly combined into Chen-li yü sheng-ming (Truth and Life), a fortnightly published until 1937. It became not only the journal of the School of Religion, but also one of the most important Protestant journals in China for its period. During

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[1]Sheng-ming yüeh-k'an, 5, No. 1 (1924): 2.

[2]West, "Yenching University," pp. 3-4.

[3]Sheng-ming yüeh-k'an, 5, No. 1 (1924): 3.

[4]See various issues of Sheng-ming yüeh-k'an.

[5]See the title pages of Chen-li chou-k'an (Peking), 1923-1926.

its existence Stuart gave it his unreserved support, especially in the form of financial grants.[1]

Theological and political attitudes of the School of Religion faculty can be seen in the writings published in these journals. Their theology varied from Christocentric liberalism to social gospel; in cultural discussion, they all tried to develop a synthesis between Christianity and Chinese culture; and they moved politically from supporting the Chinese demands for abolition of the enequal treaties during the 1920's to calling for national unity in resisting Japanese aggression in the 1930's. To judge from the content of their publications, Stuart was indeed justified in saying that Yenching's School of Religion faculty had contributed uniquely by relating spiritual redemption to social betterment and national salvation.

One crisis in the life of the School threatened its very existence. It was created when the Chinese Ministry of Education proscribed the School from being included into Yenching's institutional structure. Therefore, the School had not been included in Yenching's registration with the Chinese Ministry of Education, and since its founding it had been carrying on an unrecognized existence. This anomalous situation continued so long as the Chinese government did not press the issue. But in 1930, when the School's Short Course Program appeared together with other university programs in a Yenching advertisement placed in some Shanghai papers, the Chinese Ministry of Education became annoyed and demanded that the School thenceforth be separated from the university, and that the School register itself with the Chinese Ministry of Interior as all other professional schools had done in China. To this demand, Chancellor Wu,

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[1]Stuart to Garside, October 3, 1928, JLS-RYU.

Dean of the school, and the majority of the faculty members were willing to comply, but Stuart hesitated.[1]

Since the trustees were already unhappy with the low enrollment of the School and had been urging better recruitment, any suggestion of closing it down or reducing its stature within the university structure would certainly meet with their opposition. To refuse the government's demand would mean an open break in a long, painfully nurtured relationship and might provoke the government to cancel its recognition of the whole university. But, Stuart had another reason for hesitation. To establish a first-rate graduate school of theology had been his long cherished dream. And since the first days of Stuart's presidency he had been doing his best to create one. He simply could not let the School of Religion decline or die. Because of all these considerations, Stuart's response to the problem was to persuade, to placate, and to do nothing.

Stuart assured the trustees that the Chinese government was questioning not "our right to teach religion," but the place of a professional school for religious indoctrination in the overall structure of the university. He pointed out that the Chinese demand was not unreasonable, for many other nations had made the same demands.[2] He soothed concerned friends in America by explaining that the Chinese government policy was "not intended to be a persecution of Christianity," for the same policy "equally applied to other religions."[3] He indicated to the Chinese government that the short course of the School of Religion was not a regular academic program and therefore did not belong to the university system,

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[1]Stuart to Garside, September 18, 1930, JLS-RYU.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Stuart to Cyrus McCormick, November 18, 1930, JLS-RYU.

and that plans for the separation of the School of Religion from the university was "in process," pending securing a new site, the necessary construction of new buildings, and the approval of the trustees.[1]

But once the issue had quieted down and the Chinese government did not pursue the issue, Stuart simply stopped doing anything to further the separation of the School from the university. Thus, once again, Stuart had disregarded Chancellor Wu, who was willing to obey the Chinese government in this matter. Stuart's strong hopes for the School and his carefree attitude toward the Chinese government on this issue can be seen from a letter he sent to the trustees in 1937:

> I have always wanted this faculty [of the School of Religion] to regard itself as the chief religious influence in the whole university, the dynamic source of its organized religious life, a sort of spiritual power house. . . . I have been advocating steps that integrated even more fully with the institution as a whole, and have never been seriously concerned over government restrictions.[2] (Italics mine.)

This case reveals once again Stuart's basic policy at Yenching: he was willing to make Yenching a Chinese institution, or an institution that follows the Chinese law, but he would not sacrifice Yenching's religious character or structure if he could help it.

Overall, Stuart was satisfied with the achievements of the School. The publication of Truth and Life and the compilation of The Union Church Hymnal (which had sold over 300,000 copies and was used by an estimated 500,000 Protestant Chinese in the 1930's), were both distinguished contributions made by the School.[3] The Appraisal Commission of the Layman's Foreign Mission Inquiry in its reports published in 1932 praised Yenching's

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[1]Stuart to Garside, September 18, 1930, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to Garside, January 28, 1937, JLS-RYU.

[3]Edwards, Yenching, pp. 306-07.

contribution to religious education.[1] When, in 1939, an international church conference was being held in Amsterdam, Yenching contributed seven out of twenty-eight delegates, whereupon Stuart remarked that "we are proud of their qualitative as well as numerical contribution."[2]

The Yenta Christian Fellowship

As noted earlier, Stuart wanted Yenching in its corporate life to witness the transforming dynamic and spiritual idealism of the Christian faith. But because of the government's ban on religious instruction and the subsequent inability of Yenching's School of Religion to be integrated with the university, Stuart had to decide on a different means of spreading Christianity among his students. He responded by creating the Yenta Christian Fellowship.

On October 12, 1926 Stuart wrote a personal letter to the university community which pointed out the lack of ecclesiastical organization at Yenching. To remedy the situation he proposed a Christian fellowship organization. He welcomed both Christians and non-Christians on campus to join the new organization. The only requirement for admission was a declaration on the part of the member that he intended "to grow in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus and to live according to the way which he taught and lived." Stuart's leadership at Yenching was indeed compelling, for within two weeks three hundred out of eight hundred members of the university responded to his call. They included faculty and administrative members, students and working men on campus. In order not to violate the Chinese government regulation, the Fellowship explicitly announced

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[1]Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry, Fact-Finders' Reports: China (New York: Harper, 1933), 5:302-53 passim.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, October 9, 1939, JLS-RYU.

that it was a free union of all classes of the university, divorced from university administrative structure, and not integral to the school.[1]

The student membership of the Yenta Christian Fellowship after its establishment remained constantly from one-fourth to three-fifths of the student body: in 1932-33, it was 31.1% (245:788); in 1935, 24.7% (219:885); in 1938, 31.3% (305:942); in 1939-40, 52.7% (518: 982); in 1940-41, 64.8% (665:1,026). In the midst of strong anti-foreign feelings in the 1920's and the intense nationalistic obsession with Japanese aggression in the 1930's, such a constant student participation in the life of the Fellowship was a significant phenomenon.[2]

The activities of the Fellowship throughout its years of existence were diverse. On campus, besides chapel services and other religious activities, student discussion groups were established on topics such as the relation between Science and Christianity.[3] The members

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[1]See Wu Lei-ch'uan, "Yen-ta Chi-tu-chiao t'uan-chi ti ch'eng-li yü Chung-kuo chiao-hui ti kai-tsao," Chen-li yü sheng-ming 1, No. 10 (November 1926): 286-87.

[2]For the 1932-33, 1939-40, 1940-41 figures, see Edwards, Yenching, pp. 359-60. For the 1935 figure, see "Memo: Office of the President, Fall 1935," and "Statistical Table of Students by Department, Fall 1935," in "Statistics," RYU. For the 1938 figure, see "Classification of Registered Students By Major Departments, Fall Semester, Oct. 1, 1938," ibid.; and Stuart to Trustees, November 24, 1938, JLS-RYU. Professor West argued in his dissertation that there was a gradual decline in Yenching students' interest in Christianity from the 1920's to the mid-1930's (pp. 410-29). This was generally true only up to 1937, at the most. From 1938 to 1941 that interest exhibited a phenomenal growth as indicated by the high percentage of student enrollment in the Yenta Christian Fellowship. Though the inhibitive wartime atmosphere for the period of 1937-1941 might have turned many Yenching students to spiritual pursuits, the effort of Stuart and his religious workers must have made also great contribution to the growth of the Fellowship. The crux of the matter to me is that Yenching students' interest in Christian activities, whether before mid-1930's or afterwards, not only survived but also grew very substantially by 1941. Because of this, I consider it a significant phenomenon.

[3]Edwards, Yenching, pp. 330-33.

raised funds and built a workmen's center with a library, a lecture hall, and a recreation room. They set up schools for poor neighborhood children wherein they served as teachers.[1] The Fellowship also established a Social Service Committee carrying on relief work to aid the nearby villages.[2] All these activities were conducted under the supervision of an executive committee, whose membership drew not only from the faculty and the students, but also from campus workmen and servants.[3] The Fellowship also absorbed the Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., and other campus religious bodies to form a single organization.[4]

Stuart gave much thought to the development of the Fellowship. To create a pervasive religious atmosphere at Yenching, he adopted two strategies: the recruitment of religion-conscious students to come to Yenching and the enlistment of faculty assistance in campus religious activities. We shall discuss them separately.

Stuart observed that young men and women in America and other Western countries usually made their religious decision in high school days. Therefore, he tried "to catch them young," as the saying goes.[5] Throughout the 1920's and 1930's, Stuart repeatedly emphasized the importance of operating mission high schools with religious and educational excellence, for they could later furnish mission colleges with religiously minded students. Only when the mission colleges had a majority of this

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[1]Ibid., p. 332.

[2]Ibid., pp. 287-88.

[3]Ibid., p. 331.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Stuart, "Mission Policy and Middle Schools," Educational Review 25, No. 2 (April 1932): 124-27; and Stuart to E. M. McBrier, December 20, 1938, JSL-RYU.

kind of student, Stuart believed, could they survive secular or nationalistic influences.[1] Besides this general policy of recruiting mission high school graduates, Stuart's other strategy was to select from among the more religious students, those whose religious dedication was the highest, in order to form a hard core group of active campus religious work. To aid these young protégés, the university would support their studies at Yenching with scholarships. In order not to make them feel they were being used, they were usually not told of the reason for their receiving the scholarship. Stuart often would assume the responsibility for selecting these students himself, bypassing the university scholarship committee. Largely due to Stuart's patient work, the hard-core group came to consist of forty to fifty students. To prepare them for campus religious work, Stuart invited them to meetings in his home every week. He came to be very pleased with the religious work done by this special group. For instance, in 1933 he reported to the American financial supporters of this group that members of the group had become "the leaders in the student division of the Yenta Christian Fellowship and are working in this with fine results."[2]

During his presidency, Stuart frequently emphasized the importance of enlisting Chinese faculty members for campus religious work. For instance, in an article published in 1928, he stated that a devout and enthusiastic Chinese faculty was an absolute necessity to create corporate Christian living on campus, "without which the permanent Christian character of these institutions is doomed."[3] To mobilize faculty support,

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[1]Stuart, "Mission Policy," pp. 124-27.

[2]Stuart to McBrier, December 10, 1930, October 6, 1933; Stuart to Garside, May 11, 1934; all in JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart, "The Crisis in Christian Higher Education," CR, October 1928, p. 645.

Stuart in 1931 organized a faculty conference on religious life and campus religious needs, and hosted its meetings regularly in his residence.[1] But even with the aid of this conference and the faculty of the School of Religion, no wide support from the whole faculty was gained.[2] Of those who did help, Stuart felt their assistance was meagre and ineffective. In 1933, Stuart wrote to the trustees to complain that even among the most genuinely Christian Chinese on the faculty, "there is a lack of interest in public worship and in specifically religious effort on students." While this gave him "no slight anxiety," Stuart comforted himself that this was "so general a phenomenon among intellectuals in China." Stuart explained the Chinese faculty's lack of interest in several ways: they reacted against earlier days of missionary domination; as Chinese, they were traditionally self-abnegating; they were too absorbed with national problems; they were unsure of the best method in religious work.[3]

Stuart had two remedies to solve this problem. One was to recruit young Western workers with "forceful and winsome personalities" to come to Yenching under mission board support. Their special assignment would be to inspire young Chinese collegues to do effective religious work.[4] The second remedy was to send some Yenching graduates, who were "promising alike in scholarly ability and in religious zeal," to study abroad. They would then be called back after their graduation to serve at Yenching. In

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[1]Stuart, "Notes For the President's Report, Prepared by the Acting President," June 20, 1931, p. 4, in "Reports 1," RYU.

[2]For instance, see Stuart to McBrier, May 16, 1934; Stuart, "Notes on Christian Life in the China Colleges, December 13, 1940," all in JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart to Garside, September 7, 1933, JLS-RYU.

[4]Stuart, "Notes on Christian Life in the China Colleges," December 13, 1940, JLS-RYU.

this way the number of religiously conscious faculty members could be increased.[1] Stuart did try each remedy several times,[2] but the escalation of the Sino-Japanese conflict in the 1930's, and then the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, ended all his efforts for good.

Though he worked without the general support of the Chinese faculty Stuart still succeeded in disseminating Christianity among his students. This success was largely due to his own "winsome" personality, the support of the School of Religion faculty, the establishment of the Yenta Christian Fellowship, and such other efforts as his recruiting of religious-minded students and workers. This success was remarkable, for conditions in the 1920's and 1930's were not favorable to religious cultivation or consecration. The competition of rival ideologies, such as Communism and Fascism, was also damaging to Stuart's efforts toward spiritual salvation. Yenching withstood all these, as evidenced by the constant student enrollment in the Yenta Christian Fellowship especially after 1937.

Stuart was indeed satisfied. On September 7, 1941, three months before Yenching's closing, he told the Yenta Christian Fellowship, attended by more than half of the 1,000-member student body, that Yenching had prepared a group of youth which combined material knowledge with morality toward the construction of a future China.[3]

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Stuart to Garside, November 7, 1940, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart, Yen-ching hsin-wen, September 13, 1940.

CHAPTER XI

STUART'S PRESIDENCY DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF NORTH CHINA

On July 7, 1937, the Sino-Japanese War broke out, and within a few days Peiping fell under Japanese occupation. From then until Yenching's final closure on December 8, 1941, it functioned under the shadow of Japanese military rule.

A. Decision to Stay Open

The first decision Yenching administrators had to make in the midst of fighting was whether to continue or to close the university. Actually, Stuart had considered this question as early as 1935. With the increasing Japanese military pressure on North China after the Tanku Truce Agreement of 1933, Stuart had anticipated the eventuality of a Japanese takeover of Peiping. In July, 1935, he wrote to West China Union University (Hua-hsi hsieh-ho ta-hsüeh) in Chengtu, Szechwan, to discuss the possibility of Yenching's evacuating to the university in case of a Japanese occupation of North China. Stuart had two considerations at the time. First, would the eighty percent of Yenching students from provinces other than Hopei be prevented from coming to Peiping by the war? Second, would the Japanese occupation be such as to make normal functioning of the university impossible?[1]

Once the Sino-Japanese War did break out, Stuart decided to stay

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[1]Stuart to Joseph Beech, June 14, 1935, JLS-RYU.

on in Peiping. He did so for several reasons. First, the other two foreign institutions in Peiping--Fu-jen and Sino-French--had deicded to remain. Second, his faculty did not wish to leave the university because of such practical considerations as risky travel and difficulties in the unoccupied areas. Third, the Japanese occupational authorities did not give Yenching as much difficulty as expected. Fourth, a little over 300 students had come for registration after the outbreak of the war, which was only 220 less than the previous year.[1]

Stuart was at first surprisingly complacent about the continued existence of the institution. His letter to the trustees in September described the decision of the Chinese faculty to stay on as a reflection of their loyal "spirit." He took pride in noting that Tsinghua University had disintegrated "with the first outbreak of danger." He also pointed out that Yenching in its past existence had made contributions to such ideals as "freedom, truth, brotherhood, righteousness, service and love," and should carry on in order to further these ideals for the present and for the postwar future.[2] Four months later, Stuart offered another reason for Yenching's continued existence. He pointed out that since most Chinese institutions would not attempt to carry on in the occupied areas, Christian institutions had a "peculiar opportunity" to continue to meet the educational needs of people in such areas.[3]

Once he had decided to stay on, Stuart soon implemented several measures to insure the safety of Yenching. Since Chancellor H. H. Kung

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[1]Edwards, Yenching, pp. 357-58.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, September 3, 1937, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart to Garside, January 31, 1938, JLS-RYU.

was a cabinet minister in the Nationalist Government whose appointment at the university might irritate the Japanese authorities, Stuart immediately assumed the additional title of chancellor. To emphasize Yenching's American connection, Stuart flew an American flag at the front gate of the university. To insure that students not antagonize the Japanese authorities, Stuart issued a series of orders to the university community: 1) the Yenching Student Association was to be discontinued; 2) other student organizations were to be registered with the university and their meetings authorized; 3) no student notices were to appear on the bulletin board; 4) students must register before leaving campus; 5) all manuscripts must be approved before publication; 6) there must be no subscription to or holding of literature unsatisfactory to the Japanese authorities; 7) failure to observe the above rules might result in dismissal.[1] To promote good relations with the Japanese authorities, Stuart also engaged in many kinds of social contact with the Japanese militarists and the Chinese puppet leaders in Peiping.[2] All the above measures proved to be successful, and Yenching at least temporarily appeared to be safe.

Although Stuart worked for Yenching's continued existence, its faculty, students, and alumni gradually voiced either mixed feelings or open criticism toward Yenching's existence under Japanese occupation. Stuart was aware of it and was tormented by it. In February, 1938, he intimated to the trustees that Yenching faculty and students had become conscious of "the insidious deadening within themselves of patriotic sentiments." They felt that by carrying on as before they had acquiesced

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[1]Edwards, Yenching, pp. 350-51.

[2]Ibid., p. 352.

in the Japanese domination. Stuart admitted that during his visit to Shanghai he had noticed "a somewhat critical or even disapproving concern" among Yenching's alumni.[1]

To assuage the consciences of those on campus, Stuart invoked the university motto--Freedom through Truth for Service--to justify Yenching's continued existence in Peiping. In a lecture delivered in April, 1938 to the university as a whole Stuart emphasized the importance of freedom to the life of a university. Citing Patrick Henry, "give me liberty or give me death," Stuart emphasized that freedom was most important to the life of a university. Whether Yenching should stay open or not depended upon how much freedom it could enjoy in its search for truth and in its service to the nation.[2] Stuart's message was very clear: since Yenching had not lost its substantial freedom under the Japanese rule, it should stay open. Stuart did not raise certain issues which tormented his listeners, such as at what point practical compromise with the occupation forces should amount to out-and-out collaboration. Stuart assured the critical alumni of Yenching's loyalty to China and swore that Yenching would not "adopt any policy of which our own graduates would be ashamed."[3]

But Stuart's speech about "loyalty" and "freedom" were not convincing enough for many Chinese faculty members and alumni. In 1938 some Chinese faculty members began to leave Yenching for the unoccupied areas.[4] Also, many alumni letters were sent to Stuart asking for Yenching's closure.

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[1]Stuart to Garside, February 17, 1938, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart, Yen-ching hsin-wen, April 5, 1938.

[3]Ibid., March 30, 1938.

[4]Stuart to Trustees, June 4, 1938, pp. 2-3, JLS-RYU.

For instance, a letter signed by all the alumni in Chengtu, Szechwan, expressed their doubt that Yenching had held to her ideals under Japanese rule. It insisted that Yenching maintain its reputation as a loyal institution and never compromise its traditions. The letter's signatories requested that Yenching move to Chengtu.[1]

Professor Fei Hsiao-t'ung, the famous Chinese sociologist, also wrote Stuart a personal letter from London. He offered convincing arguments against Yenching's continued existence in Peiping. Calling himself as "a child of Yenching," Fei contended that Yenching's existence in Peiping was contrary to the Chinese government policy to mobilize for victory and prevent Japanese authorities in China from stablizing their gains. He wrote, further, that Japanese authorities might use Yenching's undisturbed existence to propagandize about their "friendship with the Chinese people." Also, continued existence in Peiping would turn Yenching into a collaborating agency and would ruin its future in China.[2]

Under these criticisms Stuart knew that he had to make a final decision on Yenching's future. On June 4, 1938, in a lengthy letter to the trustees, he discussed the continuation of the institution and suggested that most of Yenching's work in Peiping be closed down except for certain units in the College of Natural Sciences and the Harvard-Yenching Institute of Chinese Studies. Though the Japanese authorities had not yet deprived Yenching of its freedom of operation, Stuart feared that they would soon apply "the cruelly suppressive tactics as they have adopted in Korea and Manchuria" and would thus suffocate Yenching's academic freedom, all important to Stuart. He also offered other reasons for cutting back:

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[1]Cheng To-k'un to Stuart, April 6, 1938, JLS-RYU.

[2]Fei Hsiao-t'ung to Stuart, April 28, 1938, JLS-RYU.

Chinese faculty members disliked remaining in the enemies' hands and felt "a betrayal of the patriotic cause"; loyalty to the teaching and example of Jesus would require Yenching to break away from Japanese control; Yenching's continued existence would neither serve the national cause nor win the respect of Yenching's students. Stuart concluded:

> Even if property is injured and lives are lost we shall add our testimony as to the imperishable supremacy of those spiritual values, belief in which has made possible the existence of Yenching University and will determine the form in which we shall hereafter continue to function. It may well be that we can thus become even more a medium through which American friends of China can help to prepare its youth for useful service to their country and to the cause of enduring freedom and justice and peace in the Pacific area.[1]

But curiously, Stuart changed his mind the following day. He was affected by a four-page long "Footnote" written on June 5 by Howard S. Galt, an old friend who had often served as acting president during Stuart's absences. Galt argued that Yenching's ultimate concern should be with the welfare of the Chinese people and not with any political authority or form of government, for in "human life there are many fundamental interests and aspects, of which political relationship is but one." Therefore, Yenching should remain in Peiping so as to serve the youth of North China. Galt further argued that Yenching should only worry about Japanese barbarism if and when it came about.

Galt countered Stuart's citation of the example of Jesus as a reason for Yenching's closure by analysing other contrary aspects of Jesus' life. Jesus had not tried to escape the alien Roman rule, Galt said, and did his work in the midst of oppression and suffering. Therefore, Jesus would demand that Yenching continue its work in Peiping. Galt further disagreed with Stuart's strong emphasis on freedom as the most important

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, June 4, 1938, JLS-RYU.

element in Yenching's motto. Galt argued that truth and service have more ultimate values than freedom, for "even though freedom may be badly impaired truth may be sought and service be performed in utmost devotion." Furthermore, Galt asserted that the "Christian spirit" was "broader than the 'Yenching spirit' and service for humanity is broader than service for the [Chinese] nation."(In this instance, Galt reminded Stuart of Yenching's internationalism as stipulated in its Charter.) Galt hoped Stuart would even enlarge his educational setup to admit Japanese students and faculty as "the logical, expedient and the Christian thing to do."[1]

On this well-argued and extremely idealistic footnote, Stuart made a comment: "I agree in all his contentions."[2] Then, he sent it together with his own letter to the trustees for their consideration. From this time on, Stuart determined to continue Yenching in Peiping.

In the meantime, Yenching alumni's disapproval of Yenching's work in Peiping also gradually softened. At least by 1940, some alumni were even willing to come to Peiping to help out.[3] The Chinese government was friendly toward Yenching's continued operation in Peiping and even awarded Yenching an annual grant during the war years.[4] This support was largely due to the Chinese government's trust in Yenching as an educational institution loyal to Chinese interests. Another reason was that Stuart during the period of 1937-41 was performing a useful service for the Nationalist Government, serving as an observer of Japanese activities in

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[1]Galt to Trustees, June 5, 1938, JLS-RYU.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Stuart to Trustees, June 5, 1940, JLS-RYU.

[4]Edwards, Yenching, p. 231.

North China and working as a mediator for peace between China and Japan. (We shall discuss Stuart's service in these capacities in the next chapter.)

Stuart expressed himself on this issue of closure for the last time in March of 1941, when he thought that Yenching must close should hostilities break out between Japan and the United States.[1]

B. Policies toward Japanese Military Authorities

During the four years (1937-41) of existence under Japanese occupation, two major disputes flared between Yenching and the Japanese military authorities. Stuart handled them personally and, because of his success, Yenching was able to survive. The first dispute was over the right of Japanese soldiers to visit the campus and the right of security search by the Hsin-min hui (the New People Society), an organization designed to monopolize political expression and mobilize economic and military support for the puppet Provincial Government, established in Peiping. Stuart simply forbade Japanese military visits by posting notices at the university gates. This strategy proved successful in most cases.[2]

But it was not so easy to refuse the security search, which was usually requested under the pretext of searching out anti-Japanese or Communist elements in Yenching. To anticipate such a search and to prevent it, Stuart in the early fall of 1937 offered his personal guarantee to the Japanese that he would prohibit anti-Japanese and Communist activities on campus; that if any member of Yenching was so suspected he would

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[1]Stuart to Garside, March 13, 1941, JLS-RYU.

[2]Edwards, Yenching, pp. 352-53.

deliver him to the military authorities for investigation; and that Yenching would tolerate no direct Japanese search or arrest on campus. Stuart's ground was that Yenching was American property and as such a search or arrest would raise "international complications."[1]

This strategy proved to be successful. Only once a Hsin-min hui official, accompanied by twenty gendarmes, tried to enter the campus to search for a Communist student. Because of Stuart's strong opposition, the attempt was thwarted.[2] During the four-year period, at least three Yenching students were demanded by the Japanese military authorities on suspicion of alleged Communist connections. Stuart advised two of them to go to Japanese authorities voluntarily for investigation. The third was arrested by the Japanese in his hospital bed. In all these cases, Stuart invariably sought their release, but with only limited success.[3]

Some Yenching students still carried on anti-Japanese and anti-Communist activities on campus clandestinely, despite Stuart's official policy of prohibiting them. In late 1938 Stuart found out that some twenty or thirty students had organized themselves into an action group to assassinate both disloyal Chinese and Chinese leaders in the puppet Provisional Government. Stuart promptly called in the group leader and gave him a serious reprimand, but one which produced no effect. On New Year's Day of 1939, two members of this group tried unsuccessfully to shoot the famous Chinese novelist Chou Tso-jen, who was teaching part-time at Yenching. Their reason was Chou's connections with the Japanese and

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[1]Stuart to Lawrence E. Salisbury, October 3, 1938; "Yenching Varsity," a dispatch dated July 18, 1938 in Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury; all in JLS-RYU.

[2]Edwards, Yenching, pp. 352-53

[3]Stuart to Salisbury, October 3, 1938, JLS-RYU.

his revising Chinese text-books to make them more pro-Japanese. Though Stuart soon discovered who the culprits were, he did not turn them in.[1]

Because of violent acts like this, Japanese authorities forced a few Yenching students under the threat of torture and other severe punishments to serve as campus informers for them. When one of these informers confessed his assigned duties to Stuart, Stuart called the Japanese intimidation "diabolical," but felt that he could do very little about it.[2]

Not only had some of Yenching's students carried out clandestine anti-Japanese activities; Stuart himself had also engaged in some. In 1941, Professor Michael Lindsay of Yenching was secretly procuring telegraphic equipment for the Chinese Communist guerrillas in North China. To help Lindsay transport this equipment to the Communist agents in Peiping and to avoid Japanese detection or search, Stuart frequently lent Lindsay his car, which enjoyed diplomatic immunity.[3]

The second major dispute with the Japanese authorities was over hiring Japanese teachers at Yenching. Two months after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Stuart, in a communication with the Japanese military authorities in Peiping, indicated that Yenching was looking forward to having a Japanese professor teach at Yenching "as one method of helping to create better understanding" between China and Japan.[4] On October 1, 1937, he also expressed the wish that "Yenching would welcome additional teaching of Japanese, the presence of Japanese students, and any other contacts that

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, January 10, 1939, JLS-RYU

[2]Ibid.

[3]Interview with Lord Michael Lindsay, April 18, 1975, Notre Dame, Indiana.

[4]Stuart, "Memorandum on the Proposal to Invite a Japanese Professor to Yenching University, February 23, 1938," in JLS-RYU.

made it [Yenching] more international in character, and more qualified to help especially in creating a better understanding" between China and Japan.[1]

Japanese military authorities soon pressed Stuart to keep his promise. On one occasion the Japanese Embassy in Peiping suggested that Yenching should hire a young Japanese teacher to teach the Japanese language.[2] When Stuart saw the Japanese were serious about the matter, he tried to reverse his stand. He argued that Yenching would only make such an appointment if no Chinese resentment would be incurred. For the sake of academic freedom, he argued, such an appointment would have to be carried out entirely on Yenching's own volition and not under Japanese coercion.[3] The Japanese authorities took Stuart's attitude as showing bad faith, and therefore brought more pressure upon him. In February, 1938, the chargé de'affaires of the Japanese Embassy urged Stuart to use common sense, warned him not to talk about vague principles such as academic freedom in this matter, and warned him that doing so might incite the military authorities to deal with Yenching students in their own way.[4] Major General Kita Seiichi of the North China Area Army also pressured Stuart to appoint Japanese teachers beginning in the fall semester of 1939, in order to allay Japanese misgivings about Yenching.

Stuart's response was an appeal to the local American Embassy

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[1]Stuart, "Summary of a Statement to Mr. S. Matsukata," October 1, 1937, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart, "Memorandum," February 23, 1938, JLS-RYU.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

together with a request to the trustees to take the matter up with the State Department.[1] By these counter moves Stuart was able to quiet the issue temporarily. But in July, 1938, the Japanese authorities renewed their demands. This time Stuart toughened his stand by threatening to close Yenching if Japanese demands were imposed. In Stuart's words, his defiance caused "a tang of excitement." Because of his firm attitude, the Japanese authorities agreed not to force the matter for the following academic year. Stuart was certainly pleased and exuberant. He exclaimed, "We may not need to fear them [the Japanese] after that [academic year] !"[2]

Despite his adamant refusal to obey the Japanese authorities, since he first made the suggestion of appointing a Japanese teacher to Yenching he had been secretly preparing for such an appointment. By February, 1938, he already had Professor Ryuzo Torii in mind, an internationally known specialist on Tartar tribes who had been sympathetic toward the Chinese people during the 1930's. The record shows that had Stuart not been pressured by the Japanese authorities he might have tendered the appointment to Professor Torii, to begin in the fall of 1938. However, in order to maintain Yenching's academic freedom, he could not make the appointment under Japanese pressure.[3] With the cessation of Japanese pressure in the spring of 1939, he did appoint Professor Torii to the Harvard Yenching Institute. Professor Torii and his wife joined Yenching in the fall of 1939.[4] When Stuart reviewed the whole matter, he could indeed claim that

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, June 4, 1938, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, July 29, 1938, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart, "Memorandum," February 23, 1938, JLS-RYU.

[4]Stuart to Trustees, June 1939, JLS-RYU.

he had not compromised Yenching's academic freedom.

After Stuart had appointed a Japanese professor, his difficulties with the Japanese authorities ceased until mid-1941, when they demanded that more Japanese be hired. By early 1941, the attitude of the Japanese authorities had changed to their making active efforts to force Yenching's closure. Whether this was because of the deteriorated relationahip between Japan and the United States, or simply because the Japanese authorities could no longer tolerate Yenching's somewhat defiant existence, we do not know. Whatever the reason, Stuart reported to the trustees in January, 1941, that the Japanese authorities in Peiping had tried to force Yenching's closure by warning Chinese students against attending, and by barring Yenching graduates from all employment.[1] In June, 1941, Stuart reported that the Japanese had pressed Yenching to take one Japanese teacher in each of Yenching's three undergraduate colleges. Stuart decided that, should the Japanese pressure continue, he would appeal to the local American Embassy and would also ask the trustees to give the matter the largest publicity in America, for such publicity was "the thing they [the Japanese] seem to fear most and it therefore becomes our strongest weapon."[2] Probably due to Stuart's determined opposition and to Japanese reluctance to exacerbate already strained Japanese-American relations, the Japanese authorities in Peiping soon gave up their new demand.

There were also other and smaller clashes between Yenching and either the Japanese authorities or the Chinese puppet government in Peiping. One was over the frequent orders from the Provisional Government asking

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, January 14, 1941, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, June 23, 1941, JLS-RYU.

Yenching to join other schools in demonstration parades supporting the Hsin-min hui and condemning the Kuomintang Government and Chiang Kai-shek. Stuart refused all these orders. In a letter to the Japanese Embassy, he stated that Yenching, being a non-political institution, had no authority to compel students to engage in such demonstration parades; and that, being an American entity, it could have no official relationship with the Provisional Government until the United States government recognized it.[1] Another dispute occurred in 1938 over the Japanese demand to remove a campus monument in honor of a Yenching female student who had been killed during the March 18th Incident of 1926. This order Stuart also refused.[2]

By these uncompromising stands, Stuart maintained the institutional integrity of Yenching and justified Yenching's continued existence in the Japanese occupied area to his Chinese friends and alumni. When Stuart reported in 1940 that he had earned the confidence of many alumni he was probably not overstating his case.

C. Stuart's Last Views on Yenching's Meaning and Mission

Despite Stuart's early apprehension over the dismal student enrollment once Peiping fell under Japanese occupation and after the dismal academic year of 1937-38, which saw a drastic decline in comparison with the pre-war years, Yenching's enrollment rose consistently. In the fall of 1938, Yenching's enrollment was 942, the highest in Yenching's history.[3] In the fall of 1941 Yenching's student enrollment increased to 1,156,

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[1]Edwards, Yenching, p. 354.

[2]Hong Kong Daily Press, July 18, 1938, in JLS-RYU.

[3]See "Classification of Registered Students by Major Departments, Fall Semester, October 1, 1938," in "Statistics," RYU.

badly overcrowding the institution.[1]

Stuart was delighted to see Yenching's growth in the midst of the occupation. On September 7, 1941, exactly three months before the Pearl Harbor attack, he delivered a "Presessional Sermon" to the university body. He examined the nature and tendencies of university education in the Western democratic nations and in the Fascist countries. He also discussed Yenching's meaning and mission in the midst of worldwide conflict. This sermon represented Stuart's last statement of views on college education.

Stuart said that university education in the democratic West was simply "the discovery and dissemination of factual information in each segregated subject rather than [of] any coherent philosophy for molding the character and aims of its students." Because of this detached or non-spiritual approach, education had not only become "completely secularized," its influence had also become "on the whole negative." Stuart felt that modern Chinese education had also fallen under this secular and negative Western spell.[2] Stuart went on to say that education in "high-powered totalitarian states" had shriveled "free inquiry into authoritarian patterns, leaving only propagandist formulae and technological improvement, all in absolute submission to the state."[3]

What then was the best educational system? Stuart believed that it should be one committed to a Christian philosophy of life, one which is impressed upon its students. Only such an education could turn out strong defenders for the democratic way of life who could contribute to

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, September 25, 1941, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart, "Presessional Sermon, September 7, 1941," p. 1, JLS-RYU.

[3]Ibid.

the rebuilding of a better world. Stuart called Yenching a good example of an institution that had a Christian philosophy in its variegated life. Yenching's Christian life, he said, was reflected in several ways: in the observance of high standards in both academic and non-academic work; in its efforts to train Chinese youth to solve the social, economic and political problems in China; in the maintenance of good relationships between Chinese and Western faculty members and between teachers and students; and in the infusion of spiritual vitality into student lives.

For the future, Yenching should continue to practice Christian principles in order to join with others to reconstruct China in the post-war period. And in this reconstruction, Yenching, because of its Christian character, would have a special contribution to make, such as in building a true democracy for China. In Stuart's estimate, Chinese Communist power would grow in North China. To offset rising Communist power, Yenching's Christian influence could be applied for the development of a true democracy in China.[1] In the following resounding words, Stuart concluded his sermon:

> We who care most and are most convinced must somehow make this [Christian philosophy of life] a contagious passion permeating our colleagues, inspiring the students, reaching out among employees and neighbors, and radiating throughout the free and flourishing Republic of China that is to be.[2]

These words, indeed, well summarized the spirit of Stuart's whole educational career at Yenching.

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[1]Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[2]Ibid., p. 4.

CHAPTER XII

PERSONAL POLITICAL VIEWS AND ACTIVITIES, 1919-1941

In this chapter, we shall survey Stuart's political views and activities during the period of 1919-1941. They were personal and had little to do with his official capacity as Yenching's president. He acted as a private American who had a deep interest in China's political developments and who was trying to affect them.

A. The Support of Chinese Nationalism During the 1920's

Stuart involved himself most deeply with Chinese nationalism following the May 30th Incident of 1925 and the March 18th Incident of 1926 in Peking.

Chinese Nationalism After the May 30th Incident

Four days after the May 30th Incident, Yenching's faculty issued a strong statement, deploring the "shooting of the students," and expressing their apprehension of the "estrangement and misunderstanding" between China and the West. They placed the "heavier responsibility" for this development on the foreigners. Therefore, they called upon foreigners to be in closer touch with the Chinese life, to remove unequal treaties, and to put Sino-Western relations on a basis of mutual goodwill.[1] In the same month Yenching students staged a strike, calling it, "Not bolshevistic, not

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[1]"Minutes of the General Faculty Meeting," June 3, 1925, in "Minutes of Faculty Organizations," RYU.

anti-foreign, not anti-Christian, but a cry for humanity."[1]

Stuart was in full sympathy with the reaction of his faculty and students. In his letters and reports written during June and July, he commented that "faculty and students, Chinese and Westerners have lived through the hardest experience since Boxer days," and yet, because of Yenching's international and interracial fellowship, it could eventually become "in truth a family."[2] He was also glad that a Yenching student had been selected to go to Shanghai for further student action on behalf of all the fifty-five schools in Peiping.[3] He believed that such a selection demonstrated the deep trust on the part of the Chinese youth in Yenching students' patriotism. Therefore, Yenching could well answer "once for all the wild criticisms of the anti-Christian movement."[4] Besides praising the patriotic behavior of his faculty and students, Stuart acted during his trip to the United States in the summer and fall of 1925 to support the rising Chinese nationalistic movement.

In June the Chinese government requested a comprehensive revision of all the aspects of the unequal treaties concluded between China and foreign powers,[5] and in August it invited representatives of the powers to attend the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff, to be

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[1]Stuart, "Dear Friend," June 29, 1925, SLF.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Stuart to North, July 21, 1925, JLS-RYU.

[4]"Yenching University Bulletin: Annual Reports of the President and Deans for 1924-25," July 1925, in "Reports 1," p. 7, RYU.

[5]Borg, American Policy, p. 56.

held on October 25, in Peking.[1] The powers answered on September 4 by insisting on a Chinese guarantee to protect foreign lives and properties in China as a basis for treaty revision. It gave no reference either to ultimate Chinese tariff autonomy or to a comprehensive revision of the unequal treaties.[2] By this time, Stuart had arrived in New York City. When he was interviewed by the New York Times on September 5, he expressed his basic thinking on the matter of treaty revision and commented on the best policy in dealing with Chinese nationalism. He first called the powers' demand for a guarantee of protection of foreign lives and properties "both futile and likely to cause friction." In his view, the Western demand demonstrated a failure to understand the Chinese psychology which he termed, "an inferiority complex, a feeling that she is being despised among nations."

To deal with such psychology, Stuart suggested that foreign powers should first show their sincere desire to treat China as an equal nation and show their faith in China's ability to assume her own responsibilities. He believed that, once the powers had done so, China would admit her weakness and cooperate in every way to engage in internal reforms. Otherwise, China would retaliate with a policy of "non-cooperation," which would mean not only that "not a single Chinese coolie would draw the jinrikisha of a British lady, not a single piece of luggage of an Englishman would be transported by a porter," but also that "railroads, foreign schools, trade, would all be barred."[3]

Two weeks later, Stuart was invited to attend the Conference on

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[1]Ibid., p. 63.

[2]Ibid., pp. 63-64.

[3]New York Times, September 5, 1925, JLS-RYU.

American Relations with China, held at Johns Hopkins University from September 17 to 20. It was an unofficial gathering of many missionaries and other persons interested in China. Stuart tried to influence this conference through his speech, entitled "The American Response to Chinese Opinion." In it, Stuart first welcomed the Chinese nationalistic movement as "a striking instance of real democracy"--the whole Chinese people were behind it. Never before in history had "the Chinese people been so unanimous, so well informed, and so deeply stirred as they are now over their sovereign rights in relation to other nations." Because of the strength of this popular movement and the transient nature of the Chinese government in Peking, Stuart stated that public opinion was the "present real government of China."

Stuart then explained the moral foundation of the Chinese movement. He pointed out that Mencius, four centuries before Christ, had justified the right of the people to rebel against a tyrant who had exhausted the will of heaven. In the present situation, the tyrant was the combination of foreign powers who had kept China in subjugation through the unequal treaties; therefore, the Chinese people had every right to rebel against the foreign powers. Stuart further pointed out that the Chinese philosophy is a moral philosophy and the Chinese culture stresses ethical values. Therefore, nationalism to the Chinese is not "anti-foreign as such, it is moral."

In contrast, Stuart continued, the Western nations held to a "Nordic superciliousness, of imperialistic and capitalistic exploitation, of self-seeking domination on a white man's planet." Stuart warned Western powers not to use force against the Chinese to solve the Sino-Western conflict. He believed that such measures would be both immoral and ineffective.

The Chinese government was so shifting and so weak that it could not carry out any obligations, even if coerced. Therefore, "the very weakness of the Chinese political organization is the strength of the Chinese position."

Stuart concluded with a recommendation that the U.S. Government take the initiative to negotiate with the Chinese government to relinquish all the privileges that she had acquired through the unequal treaties. Stuart believed that such a magnanimous policy by the U.S. would produce several positive results. First, it would strengthen the long-held, genuine friendship between China and America and prevent the development of a permanent hostility. Second, such a policy could "help and hearten the Chinese people" to undertake internal reforms which both the Chinese and their foreign friends were anxious to bring about. Stuart defended his recommendation as not based on "visionary pro-Chinese sentimentalism," but as the best way "to help China put her own house in order," and "to stimulate the finer urgings of that great people with their noble traditions and their many lovable qualities."[1]

While we do not know the reaction of the audience to this highly pro-Chinese speech, it did affect several of Stuart's friends in America. One of them was J. Lionbugn Davis of St. Louis, who forwarded Stuart's speech to Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis.[2] Another friend was Charles D. Walcott, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington D.C., who sent this speech to Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg.[3] The only response from both Davis and Kellogg was a simple acknowledgment.[4] Within

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[1]Walcott to Kellogg, October 10, 1925, United States, State Department Archives 893.00/6651 (hereafter cited as SDA).

[2]Davis to Kellogg, October 26, 1925, SDA 893.00/6722.

[3]Walcott to Kellogg, October 10,1925, SDA 893.00/6651.

[4]Ibid.

the State Department, Nelson T. Johnson, Chief of the Far Eastern Division, also read the speech, but commented that "it did not amount to much."[1] Obviously, the American officials, while sympathetic toward China, did not agree with Stuart.

After the conference, Stuart continued his effort to push for a more favorable U.S. policy toward China. In a memorandum written to Nelson T. Johnson one week after the conference, Stuart offered two suggestions for the use of the U.S. delegates who would be attending the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff in Peking the following month. The first was that the U.S. delegates should announce the American government's commitment to the revision of the unequal treaties, especially to abolishing extraterritoriality. Stuart hoped that the American delegates would mention no prior conditions for such a treaty revision, in order to create "the best psychological effect" on the Chinese.

His second suggestion was that after having made the announcement, the U.S. delegates should then invite the Chinese government to work out the details for treaty revision, "on a basis fair and just and satisfactory to the peoples of both nations." Fearing that his suggestions might be thought to concede too much to the Chinese, Stuart pointed out to Johnson that until the details of treaty revision could be worked out, "no change would actually take effect." Stuart emphasized that the chief merit of his suggestions was in their appeal to the Chinese psychology. Johnson's reply to Stuart's letter was again a lukewarm statement that it had been read "with interest."[2] When the Special Conference on Chinese Customs

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[1]Davis to Kellogg, October 26, 1925, SDA 893.00/6722.

[2]Stuart to Johnson, September 25, 1925, SDA 500.A4e/386.

Tariff opened its session, the American delegation not only did not adopt Stuart's suggestions, but listed ten provisos for the granting of tariff autonomy to China.[1]

Johnson's indifference toward Stuart's suggestions was no surprise. It was basically due to his more realistic assessment of the Chinese situation and to his stronger concern with the protection of American interests in China. Though he was sympathetic toward China, he was only willing to let the Chinese enjoy tariff autonomy and abolish extraterritoriality on the condition that they make reforms pari passu for the protection of American interests in China.[2]

In January, 1926, Stuart gave his concluding views on the causes of the May 30th Incident. In an article published that month, he attributed both the incident and its underlying Chinese nationalism to the failure of foreigners to grasp the facts of life in China. Westerners, he said, had "no intellectual or social contacts with them [the Chinese], no appreciation of their ancient civilization, no interest in the new currents of thought that are producing so violent a ferment among them."[3]

Toward the March 18th Incident, 1926

Stuart's second major effort in support of Chinese nationalism was made during the March 18th Incident in 1926. He tried to restrain the American Minister, J. V. A. MacMurray, from adopting a harsh policy toward China over the incident.

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[1]Borg, American Policy, pp. 99-100.

[2]Ibid., pp. 57-58; Russell D. Buhite, Nelson T. Johnson and American Policy Toward China, 1925-1941 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), pp. 23-25; Tang Tsou, review of ibid., in The China Quarterly, April-June 1970, pp. 145-48.

[3]Stuart, "Western Students of Chinese Culture," The New Mandarin (Peiping) 1, No. 1 (January 1926): 1, in "Yenching Publications and Miscellaneous, P12," RYU.

In early March, the Peking-Tientsin area was involved in fighting between the forces of Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu on the one hand, and the Kuominchun of Feng YÜ-hsiang on the other. In the midst of the fighting, the Taku channel, which was the sea outlet for the area, was mined by the Kuominchun and thus made extremely dangerous to ships. Also, the railway line between Peking and Tientsin was interrupted due to military engagements. On March 9, MacMurray wrote to Secretary of State Kellogg that the situation had become contrary to the letter and spirit of articles VIII and IX of the Boxer Protocol of 1901, and recommended that a display of international naval force be undertaken for the maintenance of the "American and foreign treaty position" in China. To this recommendation Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew gave his approval.

On the same day, MacMurray sent a note on behalf of all the Protocol ministers to the Chinese Foreign Minister demanding that the Chinese government make efforts to keep communications open to the sea through the Taku channel. Two days later, MacMurray informed the U.S. Commander in Chief in the area that the Protocol ministers had agreed to a policy. In case the Chinese military authorities at Tuka had failed to remove the obstructions at Tuka channel by March 15, the U.S. Commander should clear them himself. Because the Japanese delayed authorizing military action at Taku, MacMurray formally notified the Peking government on March 16 that its deadline for removal of the obstructions in the channel had been extended to March 18 at the latest.

Before the expiration of the deadline, the Chinese authorities at Taku, Tientsin and Peking had complied with the demand, though the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Peking complained to the Protocol powers about their impatience and their ultimatum. Upon hearing that China had complied and

that no military action had been needed by the forces of the Protocol powers in the area, Secretary of State Kellogg was pleased to inform MacMurray, "I think that in general it should be our policy not to use force of arms to enforce treaty rights unless such action is necessary in order to protect the lives of Americans."[1]

While the Peking Government was willing to comply with the powers' demands, the Chinese public was furious over them. On March 17, the Kuomintang elements in Peking besieged the Chinese Foreign Office and demanded that a rebuttal be sent to the powers. On the following day, some two thousand Chinese demonstrators tried to enter the office of the Chinese Chief Executive, Tuan Ch'i-jui, to demand the cancellation of the Boxer Protocol and the eviction of the Protocol ministers from Peking. The demonstrators were fired upon by government forces, resulting in 17 killed and 40 wounded. Among those who died was a female student from Yenching.[2]

Stuart and his Chinese sympathizers were alarmed by the rigid demands made by the Protocol powers to the Chinese government. On March 16, the day of MacMurray's delivery of the ultimatum to the Chinese Foreign Office, Stuart and seventeen American educators and church workers gathered together in Peking to send a memorandum to MacMurray. Stuart was elected chairman of the group. In this memorandum, they challenged the legitimacy of the powers' demands. In their judgement, since there was no "definite or clearly apparent prospective danger of armed attack on foreigners," the powers had overreacted. MacMurray was criticized for playing a

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[1]U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1926, I:592-604 (hereafter cited as FRUS).

[2]Ibid.; Galt, Yenching, p. 148

prominent role in representing the ministers of the Powers. Stuart and his friends feared that MacMurray's sending an ultimatum to the Chinese government would bring a "marked increase of anti-foreign feelings," and would "seriously injure the American interests in China." Therefore, they demanded that MacMurray take steps "to prevent American participation in any foreign military or naval action" against the Chinese government. After the above memorandum had been delivered, Stuart also distributed it to the local American reporters. Though Stuart meant it for their use in sending home dispatches, thereby to gain American public support, the reporters released it locally and caused strong repercussions among those who had read it.[1]

MacMurray was very unhappy with the chastisement from his fellow citizens in Peking. He was expecially angry over the release of the memorandum in China by the reporters, which he thought had been undertaken at the request of Stuart and his friends. Therefore, in his reply to the memorandum he particularly chided them for having made their memorandum public. Such a revelation, he contended, would convince the Chinese that the U.S. position was opposed by many Americans and was therefore a "reactionary one." Such a revelation, he claimed, would embitter the relationship between the Chinese and American governments. MacMurray did not try to defend the legitimacy of the powers' demands.[2]

On March 17, Stuart and nine other Peking educational and missionary leaders called upon MacMurray to present their formal complaint to him. In this new complaint, they told MacMurray that in their opinion

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[1]MacMurray to Kellogg, April 6, 1926, Enclosure no. 1, SDA 893.00/7378.

[2]Ibid., Enclosure no. 2.

the American public opinion would not countenance American support of the ultimatum to the Chinese government. They offered two major criticisms of MacMurray's action. First, the American policy was unprecedented in dealing with problems such as the Taku case. In the U.S. dispute with Ecuador over maritime rights at Guayaquil, for instance, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish had ordered that the American minister there should on no account use force during the period of hostilities in that country. Furthermore, since the Kuominchun authorities were in the midst of military action in the Taku case, they had the right to declare a blockade at the Taku port. Secondly, the Boxer Protocol was designed to protect the legations in Peking against Chinese anti-foreign action. Because no Chinese action had been taken against foreign quarters in Peking, the Protocol ministers had acted wrongly.[1]

In reply, MacMurray offered three counter-arguments. First, if the Protocol Powers had not acted, the Chinese would have been encouraged and might have disastrously harmed the interests of both the foreigners and the Chinese people, as had happened during the Boxer incident. Secondly, MacMurray cited an 1893 case dealing with Rio de Janeiro to support his strong policy. He noted that in this case the American Government had authorized its naval forces to maintain free navigation. Thirdly, though no overt anti-foreign action had been taken in the Taku case, forcible measures by the Powers might still be necessary in order to restrain the Chinese from engaging in any anti-foreign action in the future.[2]

Stuart and his friends soon found allies in their struggle against MacMurray's militant action. On March 18, thirty-two American missionaries

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[1]Ibid., Enclosure no. 4.

[2]Ibid.

in Tientsin sent Secretary of State Kellogg and Senator William E. Borah a cablegram to protest American endorsement of an ultimatum to China.[1] Ten more missionaries at Paotingfu, two days later, wrote a joint letter to MacMurray which denounced his action and ended most firmly: "We should be willing to endure much inconvenience rather than insist on our treaty rights in such a way as to arouse the enmity of the Chinese people."[2] Furthermore, the editor of the Peking Leader also joined the ranks to challenge MacMurray's policy.[3]

While Stuart and his friends in the missionary and educational circles were mounting their attacks on MacMurray, many segments of the local American community found the behavior of the Stuart group traitorous and disastrous, for it was against the official policy of the U.S. Government. These segments included the local press group and the business community. They immediately threw themselves into defending MacMurray's policy.

In the press, with the exception of the Peking Leader, praise and support of MacMurray's policy were unbounded. For instance, Rodney Gilbert of the North China Daily News on March 18 claimed that MacMurray's policy had the support of the majority of American citizens in Peking. He impugned the motives of the missionary opposition. By disassociating themselves from the policy of their government, he said, the missionaries deserved the "most profound contempt by all members of the American commercial community."

If the United States' policy was to be shaped to please "the

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[1]Ibid., Enclosure nos. 17 and 18.

[2]Ibid., Enclosure no. 21.

[3]Ibid., Enclosure nos. 8 and 9.

vociferous and destructive elements" in China, Gilbert countered, "Red enterprise" would be aided and abetted. Therefore, any leniency was "really much more unfriendly than a good spanking would be."[1] In a letter to MacMurray, Gilbert further disparaged the missionaries as people who were "so blinded by their zeal that they are wholly incapable of understanding the workings of the Chinese mind." He declared that the Chinese only understand force, not "patient conciliation."[2]

In the North China Standard, on March 21, a person who signed his name "Anti-Humbug" further ridiculed the missionaries, saying that they "are like the little girl with the curl in the middle of her forehead--when they are good, they are very, very good, and when they are bad, they are horrid!"[3]

Charles Dailey, the Far East Correspondent of the Chicago Tribune, not only believed that 85 to 90 per cent of the American colony in Peking were behind the U.S. action in the Taku case, he further claimed that a majority of the missionary colonists were in sharp disagreement with their outspoken leaders. Dailey defined these leaders as a minority exclusively located in Yenching University, the Y.M.C.A. and the Methodist Mission in Peking.[4]

Another leading paper in the area, the Peking-Tientsin Times, on March 19 gave its full support to MacMurray's action. It accused the missionaries of "cooperating together with the Bolsheviks in inflaming

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[1]Ibid., Enclosure no. 10.

[2]Ibid., Enclosure no. 12.

[3]Ibid., Enclosure no. 24.

[4]Ibid., Enclosure no. 13.

Chinese public opinion against the Foreign Powers."[1] In another editorial several days later, the paper harshly blamed Stuart and his collaborators for being the real cause of the student casualties. The editorial argued that the "direct incentive" given by these missionaries and educators had enticed the Chinese students into the streets.[2]

The American business community also gave MacMurray enthusiastic backing. The American consul-general in Tientsien, C. E. Gauss, reported on March 19 that the American chamber of commerce had wanted to formally support the action of the American Government, but had been restrained by him.[3] The Manager of the American Bank Note Company in Peking wrote to MacMurray on March 18, offering to use his company's influence in Washington to help MacMurray sail through the missionary protest and attack.[4]

After the Taku incident was over, Yenching raised a monument on campus to honor the dead female student. This movement was not only a perfect proof that Yenching students' patriotism was unfettered by mission education, but was also a landmark in Stuart's long march to support Chinese nationalism--a fact we shall demonstrate later. This was why Stuart adamantly refused the Japanese demand of 1938 to remove the monument from the campus.

B. Views on the Nationalist Government and Chiang Kai-shek

Stuart first turned his attention toward the Nationalists in 1927,

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[1]Ibid., Enclosure no. 23.

[2]Ibid., Enclosure no. 26.

[3]Ibid., Enclosure no. 17.

[4]Ibid., Enclosure no. 15.

in the midst of the Northern Expedition. His first acquaintance with Chiang Kai-shek was in 1928. From then until 1949, when he left China, his relationship with both the Nationalist Government and Chiang was intimate and strong.

Views on the Nationalist Government

On April 10, 1927, the right-wing Kuomintang (KMT) established its "purge committee" (ch'ing-tang wei-yüan hui) and two days later a massive purge and extermination of the Chinese Communists took place in Shanghai, Nanking, Hangchow, Foochow, Canton and other places.[1] On April 14, Stuart wrote to the trustees that "the present outlook seems to be in the direction of a coalition of the moderate or right wing of the Kuomintang, who have the military strength, and the Northern Militarists."[2] The Northern Militarists spoken of here were the forces of Feng Yü-hsiang, whom Stuart had known for many years.[3] Stuart also informed the trustees that a representative of Feng had assured him of Yenching's safety once Feng's troops reached Peking. Happy over this assurance, Stuart declared in this letter that Yenching would soon "become established under a truly National regime," and would "render incalculable service to the Christian cause and to all that makes for the welfare of China."[4]

By late 1927 Stuart became further encouraged by the Chinese situation. The Russian advisers for the KMT had departed in July; the Chinese Communists had been ousted from the left-wing KMT in Wuhan in the same

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[1]Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 620.

[2]Stuart to North, April 14, 1927, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart, Fifty Years, pp. 112-13.

[4]Stuart to North, April 14, 1927, JLS-RYU.

month; and the various factions of the KMT had merged in the fall. In November he wrote a personal letter to "the American friends of Yenching University" which praised the Chinese Nationalist movement enthusiastically. He asked them not to take the movement as "evidence of any wide-spread anti-foreign or anti-Christian sentiment on the part of the Chinese people," but as an "encouraging evidence of the stirrings of new life." He also expressed a hope that the Nationalist movement would soon carry out its "unquestionably patriotic and progressive programs," and establish a stable government for China.[1]

In late 1928, when Chang Hsüeh-liang pledged his allegiance to the Nationalist Government and a seeming national unity was achieved, Stuart embarked on his first visit to Nanking. He reached it on October 10, the founding day of the Republic of China. There he met nearly all the important KMT leaders, as pointed out in Chapter IX. He was so impressed by them that he proclaimed that "the head men in the government are working as earnestly and effectively as they know how . . . I doubt if any more capable or conscientious group could be found in China." He also praised "the new purpose and spirit" of the Nationalist Government and its "distinctly broad, forward-looking, constructive and international" attitude.

But he had some misgivings. He found that in the very capital of the KMT government widespread dissatisfaction and pessimism were everywhere, heavy taxes were levied with no corresponding benefits to the taxpayers, and graft riddled the bureaucracy. He also realized the inherent weakness in the system of political tutelage of the KMT government: because of the military nature of the tutelage system, the leader of the

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[1]Stuart, "To the American Friends to Yenching University," Peking News (New York), November 1927, p. 1, in Missionary Research Library, Union Theological Seminary, New York.

party government might be "thrown out any time by an irresponsible and intangible crowd at the instigation of any visionary or disgruntled member." He made the significant and far-sighted comment that he hoped the KMT leaders could maintain "the idealism of the Party," and settle eventually into a "real republican government."[1]

Stuart gave more extensive comments on the Nationalist Government during the Sino-Japanese conflict in the 1930's. Despite his deep anxiety for China's fate, he was heartened to see that in the 1930's she had developed a strong national consciousness and a will to resist the Japanese aggression. Stuart continued to praise the leadership of the Nationalist Government as "high principled and public-spirited" and perhaps the first such leadership "since the days of China's legendary sage-kings."[2] He agreed with Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, a British financial expert sent to China in 1936, that the government had made strides in the areas of public administration, taxation and transportation.[3] Because of these achievements, Stuart believed that China was no more the "disorganized mass of venal mandarins," but a nation on its way to modernization.[4]

Stuart's sympathy toward the Nationalist Government was so strong that he would often come to its defense. When a Chinese public outcry had been raised in the 1930's against the reluctance of the government to resist the Japanese, Stuart defended the government's position. In a public letter written in March, 1935 to Yenching's friends, Stuart explained

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, October 25, 1928, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart, "Of New China - And Yenching," Yenching News, June 1937, in "P14," RYU.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Stuart, "Memorandum, February 24, 1936," JLS-RYU.

the dilemma of the Nationalist Government. He explained that if the government offered resistance, it might win popular support and loyalty, but would also expose those in the affected areas to more ruthless repression by the Japanese. Japan had long been trying to provoke the Chinese government to take action against her, Stuart said, so she could enlarge her scope of operations in China. Based on these considerations, Stuart believed that for the moment a conciliatory policy seemed to be "the only feasible one" for the Chinese government.[1]

After the Sino-Japanese War had broken out, Stuart was impressed by the determined Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression. In a letter to the trustees in September, 1937, Stuart profusely praised the Chinese people for having finally stood and fought, for otherwise they would have lost their "national soul" and become "cringing serfs of their arrogant conquerors."[2] During the early years of the war Stuart continued his faith in the Nationalist government and gave it his support, however discouraging the war effort appeared to be. For instance, one week after the fall of Nanking on December 12, 1937, Stuart wrote that "if the Chinese government and people could pass that [the Nanking] occurrence and keep their spirit, this may well be the turning point in China's favor. The Japanese can never do anything quite so spectacular again."[3]

But Stuart's faith in the Nationalists gradually faded, not because of the many military defeats that the government had suffered, but because of his closer contact with it during his visits to the war-time

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[1]Stuart, "Dear Friends," March 1, 1935, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, September 3, 1937, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart to Ts'ai, December 20, 1937, JLS-RYU.

capital of Chungking. Between 1938 and 1941, Stuart made four trips there, one long trip each year.. While he offered no negative report on the Chinese government after his first two trips, after his last two he began to show his dissatisfaction with it. For instance, in his report to the trustees written in April, 1940, on his recent trip to Chungking, Stuart began to criticize KMT policies. He saw that the wide official corruption was in disregard of "the national danger and nascent patriotic urgings," and warned the trustees to be "on guard against too unrealistic optimism" about the Chinese situation.[1]

On his next trip during April, 1941, Stuart became further alarmed by what he saw. In his report to the trustees, Stuart expressed his disenchantment. Except for a few slightly favorable comments on matters such as the abundant supply of military manpower, the sound monetary procedure and the undiminished morale, Stuart dealt extensively with the dark side of the KMT rule in Chungking. The style and tone of this report was so negative toward the KMT government that it can be mistaken for a piece of writing done by such KMT detractors as Graham Peck or Edgar Snow.

Stuart wrote that "a chauffeur makes more than a cabinet minister; a pair of woman's silk stockings costs more than the monthly salary of a bureau chief." He had been told by some American pilots that luxuries for the prominent officials were stowed in the planes from Hong Kong in place of necessary medicines and other supplies. But Stuart's main displeasure was with the KMT autocratic rule and the danger ahead as a result of it:

> The Kuomintang is becoming more dictatorial in method as well as attitude, and is thus somewhat in danger of destroying within the

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, April 5, 1940, JLS-RYU.

> country under its control the very freedom which it is striving to win back from the Japanese aggression. This alienates youth and all those of liberal tendencies who are charged with Communist leanings and often severely punished. The emotional reactions thus tend to influence each the other side. When the war is over there may be a period of internecine conflict or of somewhat totalitarian suppression by the dominant party.[1]

This statement was the most derogatory toward the KMT that Stuart had made since the late 1920's. It accurately prophesized what would happen in the late 1940's between the KMT and the CCP. Stuart's disappointment must have been tormenting, for the KMT government betrayed what he had hoped of it since the 1920's.

But while Stuart had finally developed serious misgivings toward the Nationalist Government, the latter maintained its appreciation of Stuart's educational service in China. In fact, the Nationalist Government in October, 1936 decorated Stuart with a first class medal, the cravate rouge aux bordeurs blanc et bleu. Several other prominent Americans also received this medal, including former Secretary of State Kellogg.[2] In 1946, the Chinese government decorated Stuart yet again for his wartime service at Yenching.[3]

Relationship with Chiang Kai-shek

When Stuart first met Chinag Kai-shek during his trip to Nanking in late 1928, he seemed to have no strong impression of Chiang. In his report to the trustees on this trip, he mentioned Chiang only briefly.[4] According to available records, the second meeting between the two was in

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, April 28, 1941, JLS-RYU.

[2]Nelson to Kellogg, November 2, 1936, SDA 093.932/149.

[3]In Yenching University files, 1946, Records of the Ministry of Education (Taipei, Taiwan).

[4]Stuart to Trustees, October 25, 1928, JLS-RYU.

Nanchang in early March, 1934, less than a month after the launching of Chiang's New Life Movement. During this second visit, Stuart developed strong admiration for Chiang. In a letter written at this time to his friends in America, Stuart stated that he was "thoroughly" convinced that Chiang was devoting himself to the welfare of China. Stuart also disputed the popular resentments against Chiang, such as his having amassed a large fortune, his dictatorship, and his weak-kneed conciliatory policy toward Japan. Stuart called the charges "unfounded" and claimed that whatever might have been blameworthy in Chiang's earlier career had now been outgrown. In the same letter, Stuart defended Chiang in his dispute with T. V. Soong, calling it a dispute between policies and not between factional interests.[1]

From this time on an intimate relationship developed between Stuart and Chiang, and in the following years Stuart would often serve as Chiang's confidant and sometimes even as his envoy in political negotiations. For instance, in 1935, Governor Han Fu-ch'ü of Shantung, who was worried over Chiang's real attitude toward him and uncertain about Chiang's real policy toward Japan, asked Stuart to sound out Chiang. Stuart willingly did so. He not only brought back Chiang's reassurances to Han, he also succeeded in converting Han to Chiang's side.[2]

In early November of 1936, Chiang fetched Stuart from Peking to his headquarters at Loyang, Honan and asked him to assess the real attitude of Sung Che-yüan, the Garrison Commander of Peiping-Tientsin, toward the Japanese in North China. In reply, Stuart told Chiang that Sung "would prefer to resist the Japanese if assured of moral and military

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[1]Stuart, "Dear Friends," March 24, 1934, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart, Fifty Years, pp. 108-09.

support by Nanking."[1] Stuart had meetings with Sung upon returning from Loyang and urged Sung to meet Chiang face to face in order to frame a united policy toward Japan. Sung initially was hesitant, but finally agreed. In January, 1937, Stuart happily reported to Chiang Sung's agreement to meet with him.[2]

A further example of this amicable relationship was Stuart's writing of a forward for Chiang's book, which was published after his escape from the Sian coup d'état. In this foreward, Stuart gave his unreserved praise to Chiang and his wife. He praised Chiang's leadership as a moral one which had earned "the spontaneous admiration" of the whole Chinese people. He further praised Chiang and his wife for "their heroic behavior" during the coup d'état, which had sprung from "their belief in the supremacy of spiritual realities."[3]

Two months later Stuart went on to explain what these "spiritual realities" were. In an article entitled, "Chiang Kai-shek, An Appreciation," Stuart listed three spiritual realities that made Chiang a noble patriot. The first was Chiang's subscription to the political idealism of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The second was the Christian influences of Chiang's "saintly" mother-in-law and wife. (Stuart called Mme. Chiang "a potent factor" in broadening Chiang's outlook and in deepening Chiang's moral emphasis.) The third was Chiang's Christian faith, from which Chiang had learned the "teaching and example of Jesus."[4] Significantly, Stuart did

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[1]Peck to Hull, November 7, 1936, SDA 793.94/8333.

[2]Stuart, "Very Confidential [Report]," January 11, 1937, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart, Foreword to Sian: A Coup D'État, by Mayling Soong Chiang; and to A Fortnight in Sian: Extracts from a Diary, by Chiang Kai-shek (Shanghai, 1937), pp. vii-x.

[4]Stuart, "General Chiang Kai-shek--An Appreciation," Democracy (Peiping) 1, No. 2 (May 15, 1937):55-56.

not mention Chiang's Neo-Confucianism, possibly because he believed that Chiang's Neo-Confucianism--an emphasis on li (propriety), i (moral principle), lien (incorruptibility), and ch'ih (shame)--was subsumed under the higher Christian values, and therefore not worth pointing out separately.

Stuart's admiration for Chiang deepened during the years of the Sino-Japanese War. Stuart was especially heartened by Chiang's reputed religiosity. In a letter to the trustees in July, 1939, Stuart claimed that Chiang's conversion to Christianity was "one of the best instances" that he had ever known.[1] After a trip to Chungking in February, 1940, Stuart was so convinced of Chiang's religious sincerity that he even wrote up a special memorandum on the matter. He gave detailed examples of Chiang's religious life, disclosing that the Chiangs always had devotions together both in the early morning and in the late evening. In addition, every afternoon Chiang would go off alone for a session of prayer. Stuart further reported that Mme. Chiang had asked him to recommend good devotional literature in Chinese for Chiang to read. From all of these instances Stuart concluded that "the success of the present Chinese struggle for independence is due in no small degree to the reality of their [the Chiangs'] religious faith."[2] Stuart's trust and respect for Chiang never diminished during the war years. Whatever his apprehension toward the Nationalist Government, Chiang was a perfect example of Christian conversion. As a religious worker himself, Stuart took no small pride and satisfaction in this.

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, July 30, 1939, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart, "The Religious Life of General and Madame Chiang Kai-shek," May 1940, JLS-RYU.

C. Views on Chinese Communism

Stuart's earliest comments on Communist activities in China were made in 1924. In a letter written in August to the home board of Yenching in New York, Stuart complained that Soviet propaganda in China had become distinctly hostile to America and criticized Western Christian work in China as "either bigoted or disguised political effort."[1] In early April, 1927, shortly before the formal breakup of the KMT-CCP alliance, Stuart informed the home board of Communist techniques for fomenting trouble in schools: grievances were manufactured against the school authorities, and then the whole student body was incited to riot when the opportune time came. But Stuart assured the home board that Yenching students would not fall victim to these techniques.[2]

While Stuart was confident of his own students' behavior, he was less sure about what radical elements in the Peking-Tientsin area might do to Yenching. In the same month Stuart informed the home board that these elements were mostly working-class people who had been "worked upon" by Communist agitators. They intended to attack foreigners and the rich, and they had also singled out Yenching as a Christian stronghold to be dealt with. Stuart feared that they might even try to execute him in order to wreck Yenching.[3] In late April he received a coded telegram from Wuhan saying that if the left-wing KMT and CCP armies could advance into Peking they might confiscate Yenching.[4] In the face of such threatening developments imagined or real, Stuart's policy was twofold. On the

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[1]Stuart to Lewis, August 20, 1924, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to North, April 1, 1927, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart to North, April 14, 1927, JLS-RYU.

[4]Stuart to North, April 20, 1927, JLS-RYU.

one hand, he urged the trustees to adopt measures to make Yenching more Chinese in order to win the support of the Chinese public. On the other hand, while he resolved to accept whatever might happen to Yenching he vowed never to compromise with the Communists.[1] Fortunately for Yenching, the left-wing KMT and the CCP soon parted ways, the CCP influences in China declined after 1927. After the success of the Northern Expedition and the establishment of the National Government in 1928, Yenching's safety was almost guaranteed.

Even so, Stuart's apprehension over the Communists did not subside during their temporary waning after 1927. In the midst of Chiang's second "Encirclement and Extermination Campaign" in May, 1931, Stuart still wrote that Communism was "a swelling menace" not only because it opposed the Nationalist Government, but also because it was malevolent against religion.[2] In an article published two years later, Stuart further accused the Communists of being the culprits of the Nanking Incident of March, 1927, and praised Chiang's anti-Communism as a great feat that had saved China from a Red takeover.[3]

We can conclude that, in general, up until 1933 Stuart's attitude toward Communism or the Chinese Communists was one of apprehension and hostility. He could not see that Christianity could co-exist peacefully with Chinese Communism.

But gradually Stuart softened his rigid opposition toward Chinese

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[1]Stuart to Johnson, May 24, 1927, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart, "One of the Greatest Dangers to Protestant Christianity in China," CR, May 1931, p. 302.

[3]Stuart, "China," in Educational Yearbook of the International Institute of Teachers College, Columbia University, 1933, ed. I. L. Kandel (New York, 1933), p. 312.

Communism. By 1936 he had begun to show signs of moderation. In fact, from 1936 to 1941 Stuart even developed favorable views towards it. He now called the Chinese Communist movement simply an "agrarian discontent" and not a Russian-type Bolshevism. Therefore, he asked his listeners not to take the "so-called Communism" in China seriously.[1]

In 1938, in view of the successful Chinese resistance work carried out in North China against the Japanese, Stuart became somewhat enthusiastic for the Chinese Communists because they were the leading force in the Chinese resistance movement there. He praised the resistance for certain tremendous successes: salaries for all the officials, protection against banditry, reduced taxes, civic justice, education and propaganda, systematic organization, and training of population. But while he was willing to acknowledge these achievements, he refused to credit them to be Communistic, for this would be "entirely misleading."[2] If the resistance was not Communistic, what was it? Four months later, in January of 1939, Stuart finally answered that it was "a somewhat radical social reform movement," which had started before the Sino-Japanese War.[3] In other words, it was an indigenous movement for social reform and not a Communist revolution.

Later in the year, Stuart's interpretation was further confirmed by a report written by Ralph Lapwood, a Yenching faculty member, which described the situation in the Communist Border District of Shansi, Chahar and Hopei. Lapwood perceived "a very remarkable experiment in democracy

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[1]Stuart, "Head of Yenching U. Says Pacific Will Be Theatre of Future History," an undated (March, 1936) newspaper clipping in "McBrier Foundation M2," RYU.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, July 29, 1938, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart to Trustees, January 10, 1939, JLS-RYU.

in extremely difficult conditions." He called it a "democracy" because the Border Government was elected by delegates from every group of society --including even monks from Wu-t'ai Mountain--on the simple principle of resistance to Japan. It was also a United Front Government, for its officers had come from diverse sources. In his estimate, 80 per cent of them were non-party men, 12 per cent were KMT members, and 8 per cent were workers in other parties, including the CCP.

Lapwood further reported that taxes throughout the whole region had been greatly reduced. The Eighth Route Army, a quarter of a million men, was really a "People's army" which he respected highly. Lapwood's basic disappointment with the Border Government was that its public psychology was only geared toward hating the Japanese, with no trace of Christian influence or love. At the end of the report, Lapwood showed his confusion over what he had seen. Was it Communism or nationalism? In the end, Lapwood seemed to reluctantly settle upon nationalism. Stuart obviously agreed, and took this report seriously. He not only included it in his personal papers, a rare practice, but also sent it to the trustees.[1]

Strengthened by reports like Lapwood's, Stuart had become fully willing to accept the CCP as a legitimate political party by 1940-41. His only hope was that it would give up its own army and then join the Nationalist Government and to compel the KMT "to live up more consistently to its own socialized program."[2] In June, 1941, Stuart went so far as to say that the CCP could be "counted to strive toward real democracy." Therefore, Stuart recommended that pressure be exerted on the KMT to reach

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[1]Lapwood to Stuart, September 2, 1939, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, April 5, 1940, JLS-RYU.

an agreement with the CCP.[1]

Stuart's de-emphasis of the Communistic aspect of the CCP was closely related to his view that the relationship between the CCP and Russian Bolshevism was tenuous and unimportant. Stuart first commented on this question in February, 1937, when he claimed that "there are very few Chinese who are communistic first and Chinese afterwards. They are Chinese first and communistic afterwards." Stuart cited as proof the CCP's rapprochement with the KMT after the Sian Incident and its war efforts against Japan.[2] In January, 1939, Stuart further claimed that the CCP had been influenced by Russia only very slightly and only early in its existence.[3] Two years later, in a conversation with Wakasugi Kaname, later to become Japanese minister to the U.S., Stuart continued to assert that the Chinese Communists were "first of all Chinese and only incidentally and in a diluted or modified form Communists."[4]

In determining the ultimate future of Communism in China, Stuart feared little from Communism as a Chinese social reform movement. In February, 1937, Stuart called Russian-type Bolshevism "state socialism" leading to an eventual Communism,[5] but asserted in October that it would have no future whatsoever in China, for it was in conflict with the Chinese tradition, especially with "its social patterns and deepest loyalties."[6]

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, June 21, 1941, SDA 793.94/16771.

[2]Stuart, "Dr. J. L. Stuart Discusses the 'Problem of China'," The China Weekly Review, February 27, 1937, p. 456.

[3]Stuart to Trustees, January 10, 1939, JLS-RYU.

[4]Stuart to Trustees, January 14, 1941, SDA 711.94/2038.

[5]Stuart, The China Weekly Review, February 27, 1937, p. 456.

[6]Stuart, "Summary of a Statement to Mr. S. Matsukata," October 1, 1937, JLS-RYU.

Stuart never explained why Bolshevism and Chinese culture were in conflict and what these "social patterns and deepest loyalties" were. In January, 1939, he even boldly claimed that the Chinese people, whether they were Communists or otherwise, were all for American democracy and not for a Russian-type dictatorship, because the Chinese were "far more democratic by instinct and heritage than communistic." Again, Stuart gave no explanation as to the nature of this so-called "instinct and heritage."[1] But whatever he meant, it was clear that, at least down to 1939, he believed that Bolshevism would have no future in China. Chinese Communism would have a future, but only as a social reform movement.

However, after the outbreak of the Russo-German War in June 1941, Stuart's attitude toward Boshevism changed to one of positive affirmation. While he had previously called it "state socialism" with no praise attached, now he called it "economic democracy" by contrast with the "political democracy" of the democratic countries. He believed that the two should join hands to produce a true and complete democracy for the world. These views were expressed in a speech he delivered in September, 1941, to the whole university of Yenching.

The speech compared Western democracy and Russian Bolshevism. Western democracy, especially in the United States and England, was a democracy of political freedom but with the shortcoming of "economic bondage." Stuart stated that, regardless of the hostility and violence of the Russian system toward the democratic countries in the past, it had now become an economic democracy. Stuart further stated that, since Russia was now fighting on the side of the democracies, he hoped that after the war there would be "a development in both types of democracy, leading to

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, January 10, 1939, JLS-RYU.

a fuller, more complete democracy, both political and economic."[1]

A recent study on the encounter between Americans and the Chinese Communists from 1927 to 1945 divides the changing American images of the Chinese Communists into several periods. Before 1928, the Americans viewed the CCP members as revolutionaries. From 1928 to 1936 they came to be seen as bandits, though from 1931 onward such an image was occasionally controverted. By 1937, the bandit image gave way to a more glamorous one.[2] In this last period, they were viewed either as "super-human beings" or "Prince Valiants," and their territory became a "Land of Five Withouts" --without beggars, opium, prostitution, corruption or unjust taxes.[3] Most believed of the relationship between the CCP and Soviet Communism that the CCP was not Moscow's minion, but "an autonomous organization whose ties with Moscow were 'nominal.'"[4] America's view of the CCP's social programs varied from the naive one that the CCP members were "agrarian democrats" and "no more communistic than Americans," through an irresolute one that the CCP elements were possibly democratic nationalists and possibly genuine revolutionary Communists, to the affirmative view that they were genuine revolutionary Communists.[5] But American viewpoints shared an overall positive assessment of the CCP. The influential Americans who commented on the CCP include Pearl S. Buck, Helen and Edgar Snow,

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[1]Stuart, "The Meaning to us at Yenching University of Contemporary World Events," September 11, 1941, JLS-RYU.

[2]Kenneth E. Shewmaker, Americans and Chinese Communists, 1927-1945: A Persuading Encounter (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp. ix-x.

[3]Ibid., p. 201.

[4]Ibid., p. 236.

[5]Ibid., pp. 260,244, 245-48, 254-60.

Owen Lattimore, Michael Lindsay, Nathaniel Peffer, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, Freda Utley, Theodore White, George Taylor, and James Bertram.

If we examine the background of these twelve figures, we shall find that five of them had either studied or taught at Yenching: the Snows, Lindsay, Taylor and Bertram.[1] Besides his knowing these five, Stuart also had personal friendships with Buck and Peffer.[2] In other words, of those twelve, influential commentators on the CCP, Stuart had either very close or some personal contact with at least seven. The Snows, Lindsay and Taylor were probably the ones closest to Stuart. Several other Yenching faculty members also had contact with the CCP, such as Claire and William Band and Ralph Lapwood,[3] and their views coincide with the generally favorable ones toward the CCP already cited.

Therefore, it seems safe to assume that Stuart's adoption of a favorable attitude toward the CCP in the late 1930's was in no small degree influenced by the change of opinion among leading American observers.

D. Stuart's Views on Japanese Militarism and His Peace Mission During the Sino-Japanese War

Among Stuart's massive collection of personal papers for the period of 1931-1941 are many comments on and analyses of Japanese militarism, along with reports on his secret missions undertaken during the Sino-Japanese War to arrange peace between the two countries. Most of these documents were sent to the U. S. Government for its reference.

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[1]Ibid., p. 48, 78, 117, 131, 94, 74.

[2]Stuart, Fifty Years, pp. 45,221.

[3]Shewmaker, Americans, p. 131, 117.

The Causes and Failure of Japanese Militarism in China

In February 1940, Stuart stated that for the past several decades, the Japanese "Continental Policy" toward China had been for economic exploitation and political conquest.[1] Stuart had held this view consistently from as early as the Manchurian Incident in 1931.

His comments on the Manchurian Incident of 1931 stressed the theme of economic exploitation. He denounced the Japanese invasion as being in direct violation of international law, the Kellogg Peace Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty. While conceding that Japan had economic interests in Manchuria which were vital to her national interests, he criticized Japan severely for using military means to achieve them. Such means were "incredibly stupid," for they had aroused a Chinese nationwide economic boycott which would damage Japanese long-term economic interests in China. The right way for Japan to promote her economic interests in China would be to seek Chinese consent and cooperation.[2]

After the signing of the Tangku Truce in 1933 and the Japanese penetration into North China, Stuart began to believe that Japan had now escalated her economic exploitation in Manchuria to an effort at political conquest or subjugation of all China. Commenting on the Amau Statement of 1934, he said that the Japanese "whole intention is unquestionably to keep China disunited and to thwart all constructive efforts."[3] This interpretation of political conquest gained further strength after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. He termed the Japanese aggression an

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[1]Garside to Hull, February 24, 1940, SDA 793.94/15712.

[2]Stuart to Kantzler, December 8, 1931, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart to Trustees, April 29, 1934, JLS-RYU.

effort to shatter the growing Chinese "national consciousness" and "political integration." Once again, he called the Japanese move self-defeating, for it had created an effect opposite to furthering Chinese national consciousness and political integration.[1]

Stuart held a number of views on the several failures of Japanese militarism in China. The first failure of Japanese militarism was its misrule in the subjugated areas. In criticizing the Japanese misrule, Stuart's basic purpose was to show how inconsistent it was with the professed aims of Japanese Pan-Asianism. In a lengthy memorandum written in February, 1938, Stuart pointed out that Pan-Asianism had been proclaimed a sacred Japanese policy to benefit the Asian peoples and to liberate them from Western imperialism. Japan's actual deeds in Korea and China had totally belied this proclamation. To Stuart, the most unforgivable behavior was the killing, looting and raping of Chinese women by the Japanese army. Citing an unnamed source, Stuart claimed that, in the Shanghai-Nanking area, the Japanese army had killed 300,000 civilians since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. Stuart called the Japanese behavior in Nanking in December, 1937, "bestial savagery."[2] In November, 1940, he described Japanese rule in Manchuria as a "total failure," for it had turned the whole region into "a vast prison camp."[3]

Another aspect of Japanese misrule was their army's lucrative management of the planting and open selling of opium and its derivatives.

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[1]Stuart of Trustees, July 29, 1938, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart, "Japanese Propaganda in the Mirror of Events," [February] 1938, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart to Trustees, November 9, 1940, SDA 793.94/16367.

Citing a study done on the drug situation in the Nanking area by Dr. M. Searle Bates, Professor of History at the University of Nanking, Stuart further contended in early 1940 that this Japanese "calculated debauchery" had not been limited to the Nanking area, but covered all the areas under Japanese control. He stated that the profit made from this "drug racket" had been perhaps "the chief source of revenue for the Japanese army and its puppet governments." Because of this atrocity and other massive brutalities, Stuart concluded that the so-called Japanese "Holy War" in China was a revelation "of the basest of human passions and of solidly selfish motives."[1]

The second Japanese failure stemmed from an exaggerated fear of Communism and Japan's counterproductive policy in dealing with it. As pointed out before, Stuart's position in the 1930's toward Communism --whether of the Chinese or the Russian type--had been accommodating. He especially held no fear of Chinese Communism. The Japanese government and its militarists always justified their action in China as necessary to counter both Russian and Chinese Communism, and so Stuart in the 1930's often tried to allay their fear of Communism. He recommended more intelligent policies for them to follow. His ultimate purpose was to induce Japan to give up its aggression in China. Stuart obviously hoped that the Japanese leaders would believe his assurances that Chinese Communism was no peril to them, so that they might withdraw from North China if not from all of China.

Stuart also pointed out to his Japanese acquaintances that Japan had made a mistake in waging war against the Nationalist Government. The first mistake was the Manchurian Incident. Because Chiang Kai-shek's

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, February 14, 1940, JLS-RYU.

Government was the only political and military force in China capable of defeating Chinese Communism, Japan might have eliminated Chinese Communism if she had supported that government against the Communists. Instead, Japan launched the Manchurian Incident in the midst of Chiang's third extermination campaign against the Chinese Communists, thus helping out the Communists. Moreover, Japan spread its aggression into North China and tried to prevent Western nations from giving assistance to the Chinese government; Japan thus further weakened that government's ability to deal with the Communists. It was because of these Japanese policies that Chiang Kai-shek was finally forced into a United Front with the Communists, which resulted in the spread of Communism in North China.[1] With regard to the Japanese fear of Russian Communism and the latter's vengeful attack on Manchuria, Stuart suggested that if Japan would give up its aggression in China and help build up a strong and unified China instead, then China could in turn help Japan fight against Russia.[2]

In short, Japan's stupidity in China since 1931 had been to weaken the Nationalist Government, for this in turn made that government unable either to defeat Communism or to resist a possible Russian invasion of China. Another basic defect in Japanese "Continental Policy" was Japanese misrule in such subjugated areas as Manchuria and Korea. Stuart believed that such misrule had caused the growth of Communism in those areas.

Stuart understood why Japan was strengthening Communism. He believed that the best way to prevent Communism in a given society was to

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[1]Stuart, "Japanese Propaganda in the Mirror of Events," [February] 1938, JLS-RYU.

[2]Ibid.

make social and economic improvements, to foster democratic processes, and to guarantee civic liberty and human rights. Once a progressive and healthy society was established, Communism would have no room to grow. But Japanese misrule in Korea and Manchuria had totally destroyed chances for the establishment of such a society; on the other hand, it had stimulated and made possible the growth of Communism there. Stuart cited the evidence to prove such growth from some Japanese official announcements, and concluded that there was a "close connection between Japanses rule and Communism," and that "Japan is the real source of the spread of communistic influence in Eastern Asia, both within Japan and wherever her military autocracy gains control."[1]

The third failure of Japanese militarism was its mistaken policy of establishing puppet regimes in China, and its failure to maintain the credibility of such regimes and the loyalty of their leaders. In using the puppet regimes to force Chiang's hand, the Japanese had misjudged his personality. Stuart had always believe that Chiang was a great moralist, a principled patroit, and different from collaborators such as Wang Ching-wei and Wang K'e-min. Stuart believed these collaborators were "defeatists" because of their fear of Japanese power and because of their inferiority complex toward Japan developed during their early years of living there.[2] Stuart attributed the Japanese failure to differentiate Chiang from the other collaborators to the peculiar mental blindness of the Japanese militarists, a blindness that had prevented them "from facing or

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, February 14, 1940, JLS-RYU; Stuart to Trustees, December 16, SDA 793.94/16471.

even seeing impalatable facts."[1] Thus, instead of forcing Chiang's surrender, the puppet regimes actually caused Chiang to fight to the bitter end, an eventuality the opposite of Japan's wishes.

Japan also committed another mistake in running the puppet regimes. After they had been set up, instead of strengthening their credibility, the Japanese militarists had ruined it by ordering the puppet regimes to implement policies that were humiliating to the Chinese. For instance, the Hsin-min hui in Peiping often forced the Chinese to celebrate Japanese military victories in China. Stuart believed that such forced celebrations could only result in hatred against both the puppet regimes and the Japanese invading army.

The Japanese also failed to maintain the trust and loyalty of the Chinese collaborators. Stuart had many personal experiences demonstrating this. For instance, in September,1938, he met a Chinese collaborator working for the Hsin-min hui in Peiping, who complained of the failure of the Japanese to trust the Chinese working for them. The result was that "nothing large or small could be done except with the direct oversight of some Japanese." This collaborator had repeatedly reminded his Japanese superiors of the productive policy of the Manchus in treating their Han collaborators with dignity and trust, but they never listened to him.[2]

Wang K'e-min also proved to be a grumbling disloyalist to the Japanese. In the 1930's Wang was always willing to help Yenching and constantly fed Stuart inside information on Japanese military thinking and moves. In October, 1938, Stuart reported to the trustees that his relationship with Wang was so intimate that Stuart could talk to him on any

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, February 12, 1940, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, September 1, 1938, JLS-RYU.

issue as freely as he "would have to any Chinese patriot." All this revealed to Stuart "how superficial and insecure is the Japanese hold even upon those whom they induce to work with them."[1] After Wang K'e-min's departure from office, Stuart also established a good relationship with Wang Yi-t'ang, the new head of the Peiping puppet regime. Stuart informed the trustees in January, 1941, that Wang not only was disgusted with his Japanese overlords, but even hoped for a Chinese victory in the war.

A further case also strengthened Stuart's conviction that the collaborators were not really on the side of the Japanese. In the same letter to the trustees, he further reported that the uncle of Henry Pu-yi, the Manchukuo emperor, had vented his anger at some Japanese before him with "expressive grimaces and epithets." In view of this and other episodes, Stuart concluded that the Japanese attempts to win Chinese support through the puppet regimes had "failed more completely than those by military force."[2]

The fourth failure of Japanese militarism in China was its lack of a clear policy, especially toward the Wang Ching-wei regime. On the one hand, nearly all the Japanese leaders from the late 1930's to 1941 had been trying to reach a peace agreement with Chiang; on the other hand, the Wang regime annoyed Chiang no end. Such a contradictory policy, Stuart believed, was doomed to failure both in its attempt to win over Chiang and in its efforts to establish Wang.[3]

Another example of tactical blunderings was the Japanese policy toward the CCP. Stuart was puzzled by information that the Japanese in

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, October 28, 1938, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, January 14, 1941, SDA 711.94/2038

[3]FRUS, 1940, IV: 466-67.

North China had tried to reach some kind of non-aggression agreement with the CCP. Stuart reported in November, 1940, that the Japanese had recently attempted "to come to an understanding with Chinese Communists by which they would divide the north and northwest between them, each agreeing not to interfere with the other, while the Japanese would be enabled to finish the campaign against Chiang."[1] In June, 1941, Stuart further reported that the Japanese had tried for the past few weeks to reach "a non-aggression pact" with the Chinese Communists.

Stuart felt that these alleged Japanese moves were not only contradictory to Japan's avowed anti-Communist stand, but also demonstrative of some kind of Japanese duplicity that he considered much worse than what Nazi Germany had done in Europe. He criticized this duplicity as "something much more elemental in their [Japanese] racial tradition."[2] Stuart had indeed become a "Nipponphobe" on the eve of the Pacific War.

Because of this failure and other failures, Stuart declared that Japan had been, in her fifty years of aggression and territorial expansion in China, "under no clearly formulated policy except a basic urge abbetted by opportunism and occasionally by expediency" and thus found herself "in a self-created quandary."[3] In this declaration, Stuart seemed to charge that the failure of Japanese militarism in China was due to a lack of intelligent thinking. To this charge at least, Stuart may find some supporters among today's specialists on Japanese militarism.[4]

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[1]Stuart to Jarside, November 26, 1940, SDA 711.94/1942.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, June 21, 1941, SDA 793.94/16771.

[3]FRUS, 1941, IV: 322-23.

[4]For instance, Akira Iriye; see his "The Ideology of Japanese Imperialism: Imperial Japan and China," in Imperial Japan and Asia, comp. Grant K. Goodman (1967), pp. 32-45.

Stuart's Peace Missions During the Sino-Japanese War

Stuart's basic attitude toward the Sino-Japanese War was well described in a letter to the trustees in February, 1941. He stated that as a missionary and educator his concern for the war had been based on "humanitarian and idealistic grounds" and his efforts during the war had been to recover friendly relations and to promote mutual advantage among China, Japan and the United States.[1]

On these grounds, Stuart engaged in four peace missions during the Sino-Japanese War.[2] The first mission occured in early 1938. In December, 1937, the North China Provisional Government was established under the supervision of the Japanese military authorities in Peiping. The Hsin-min Hui was established at the same time. The head of the Government was Wang K'e-min and the chief officer of the Hsin-min hui was General Kita Seiichi. By late February, 1938, Wang and at least some Japanese militarists in North China had become willing to end the China Incident provided China agreed to certain conditions. These conditions included: 1) the suppression of anti-Japanese movements in China; 2) the establishment of a good administrative area in North China (this meant in reality an independent government in North China); 3) economic cooperation between China and Japan; and 4) Chinese reparations. If China agreed to these conditions, the Japanese authorities in North China would be willing to make two concessions: to accept Chiang's government as the

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, February 18, 1941, SDA 793.94119/735.

[2]From late 1937 to 1940 there were a number of peace efforts made by various nationals. See John Hunter Boyle, China and Japan at War, 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 69-74; 156-60; 289-97; 299-303; Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., American Ambassador (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 308; and Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), pp. 174, 191-92, 199.

negotiation party for peace, and to accept Chiang's continuous leadership in China. But these two concessions were in violation of Konoe's Sho Kai-seki o aite ni sezu (no dealing with Chiang Kai-shek) policy of January 16, 1938.

Nonetheless, Wang K'e-min and Japanese militarist leaders such as Kita requested that Stuart pass on these terms to Chiang during Stuart's trip to the South to attend the meeting of the China Foundation and the meeting of the presidents of the Christian colleges of China. Stuart accepted the request. Though he was not sure of the acceptability of the Japanese terms, he hoped "at least to obtain from Chiang a statement of the basis on which Chiang would be willing to negotiate." After having notified the local American Embassy of his trip and its purpose, Stuart departed for Shanghai on February 26 en route to Hankow.[1]

When the State Department learned of the Stuart mission, Secretary of State Cordell Hull immediately ordered American Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson (in Hankow) to advise Stuart not to carry out his mission, for such a mission undertaken by a private individual would "create and entail tremendous personal responsibilities" and "often unfortunate rather than beneficial consequences." The U.S. Government in 1938 had no intention of getting involved in any peace negotiations between China and Japan. The Secretary also ordered Johnson to inform the Chinese government that Stuart was not acting on behalf or with the approval of the U.S. Government.[2]

When Stuart reached Shanghai on March 7, American Consul General

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[1]FRUS, 1938, III: 109-10. Regarding Konoe's aite ni sezu policy, see, Boyle, At War, 78-81.

[2]FRUS, 1938, III: 111-12.

Clarence E. Gauss, who had also been notified of Hull's order, tried to stop Stuart. But Stuart replied that in carrying out his mission he would be acting in a purely private capacity. Furthermore, his trip to Hankow was simply an attempt to understand the peace outlook better in its practical bearing on his university affairs.[1] When Stuart arrived in Hankow, Johnson immediately informed the Chinese Foreign Minister of the State Department's disapproval of Stuart's mission. Partly because of Johnson's obstruction and partly because of Stuart's own realization that the Japanese terms were too harsh for Chiang's acceptance, a realization he developed after his arrival, Stuart did not communicate them to Chiang. After his meeting with Chiang, he informed Johnson he was now convinced that peace between China and Japan was not possible. Thus ended Stuart's first try at peace work.[2]

The second peace mission took place in July, 1939. After having defected in December, 1938, from Chungking, Wang Ching-wei came to North China in June. 1939, to join General Doihara Kenji in recruiting Wu Pei-fu to participate in the proposed Central Government in China. This proposed government generally had the support of the Japanese government, especially of its War Minister, Itagaki.[3] For the formation of this government, the Plum Blossom Agency (Ume kikan), a semi-official agency, was established in early 1939 under the leadership of Col. Kagesa Sadaaki.[4] But this scheme of establishing a puppet Central Government under Wang Ching-wei was secretly opposed by the Kōain (Asia Development Board) and the North

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[1]Ibid., p. 117.

[2]Ibid., p. 124.

[3]Boyle, At War, pp. 249-50.

[4]Ibid., pp. 238-39.

China Area Army. Among the opponents, Lt. General Kita, who had become the director of the Peiping Office of the Kōain, and General Tada Shun, chief of staff of the North China Area Army, were the most prominent. To their thinking, the Wang scheme could not induce Chiang either to join the proposed government or to surrender his own government. The best way to end the China Incident was to negotiate with Chiang directly, for he more than any other Chinese leader had the authority and power to conclude that incident with Japan.[1] Therefore, they not only refused to cooperate with the Wang scheme, but also asked Stuart to undertake another peace mission in July, 1939.

In his personal papers, Stuart did not disclose the exact Japanese peace terms nor can we obtain them from the Japanese sources. But we do know that the peace terms that he later brought back from Chungking in August consisted of these items: 1) Japan should withdraw all its troops, puppet regimes and commercial projects south of the Great Wall; 2) any peace movement should exclude Wang Ching-wei; and 3) if Wang K'e-min and the Japanese military authorities in North China were sincere in peace negotiations, Chiang would dispatch Chang Ch'ün to meet with them.

From these Chinese proposals, we can be certain that the Japanese original terms must have been less generous than what Chiang wished. Stuart informed Wang K'e-min, General Sugiyama Gen (Commander of the North China Area Army), and Kita of these terms.[4] These transactions with Chungking soon became known to Wang Ching-wei and he asked that they be stopped. Wang claimed that Chiang's real aim in peace negotiations was to divide the various Chinese regimes. General Higuchi Sueichirō, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Army General Staff, was even more furious

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[1]Ibid., pp. 239-41.

over these transactions, for they were efforts to sabotage Wang Ching-wei's regime, which the Abe Nobuyuki government had decided to support to the end. Higuchi called Stuart "a habitual liar" and insisted that "to ignore Wang [Ching-wei] at this time would be to discard bushidō."[1] Under the strong protest of Wang Ching-wei and his Japanese supporters, Stuart's second peace effort also foundered.

The third peace mission took place during Stuart's trip to Chungking in March, 1940, to attend a rural reconstruction meeting called by the Rockefeller Foundation. Before his departure, General Tada Shun of the North China Area Army asked Stuart to convey to Chiang two Japanese terms: 1) if Chiang would oppose and purge the Communists from his government and stop fighting Japan, Wang Ching-wei might be willing to cooperate with him; 2) if he wished to engage in peace negotiations, Chiang should dispatch envoys to meet with Wang Ching-wei or Wang K'e-min for such a purpose.[2] Though these terms were hardly appealing to Chiang--and Chiang was extremely hostile toward Wang Ching-wei--Stuart still agreed to pass them on to Chiang.

In January, to prepare for this mission, Stuart sent a person, whom he called his "lieutenant" and who had wide contacts in Japan, to gain "dependable information" about Japan's desire for peace and her peace terms. Based largely on information from this "lieutenant," Stuart believed that "the most influential leaders in Japan" would accept these

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[1]Nihon kokusai seiji gakkai, Taiheiyō sensō gen'in kenkyubu, eds., Taiheiyō sensō e no michi: kaisen gaikō shi (The Road to the Pacific War: A Diplomatic History of the Prewar Years), 8 vols. (Tokyo, 1962-63), vol. 4, Nitchū sensō: ge (The Sino-Japanses War), pp. 213-14; Boyle, At War, p. 258.

[2]Chou Fo-hai, Chou Fo-hai jih-chi (The Diary of Chou Fo-hai) (Hong Kong, 1955), p. 29.

peace terms: recognition of Chiang's government; Japanese respect of Chinese administrative and territorial integrity; free economic cooperation between China and Japan; immediate withdrawal of all Japanese armed forces from China, except their temporary stationing in certain localities in North China for defense against Communism; leaving the Manchurian question for future negotiation; and Japanese cultivation of friendly relations with the U.S., Great Britain and other democratic nations.[1] Having obtained these supposed Japanese peace terms and Tada's specific messages, Stuart went to Chungking in March and stayed there for a week.

Chiang's response was quite uncompromising. According to Stuart, Chiang would never accept Wang Ching-wei as a peace partner and would only negotiate through Wang K'e-min. Moreover, in such a negotiation, the U.S. Government would have to join as a mediator to guarantee the results. Chiang insisted upon Chinese total independence and integrity in the area south of the Great Wall. Manchuria would be left as an unsettled issue to be dealt with later by diplomatic negotiation or otherwise. Stuart further reported that Chiang was determined to continue the fight against Japan for another five years.[2]

In the face of this uncompromising Chinese position, not much common peace ground could be found between China and Japan, and Stuart's third peace mission also failed. March was indeed a crucial month. Not only did Stuart's mission fail, another peace effort, Operation Kiri, also

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, February 12, 1940; Stuart to Trustees, February 14, 1940, JLS-RYU.

[2]Imai Takeo, Shina jihen no kaisō (Reminiscences of the China Incident) (Tokyo, 1964), p. 157; Nitchū sensō: ge, p. 235; Stuart to Trustees, "Confidential [Report]", April 5, 1940; Stuart to Roosevelt, April 10, 1940, SDA 793.94119/632; Ugaki Kazushige, Ugaki nikki (Ugaki Dairy) (Tokyo, 1954), p. 1410.

hit a snag, and largely for the same reason. And with these failures, Japan gave her permission for the establishment of the Wang Ching-wei regime at the end of the month.[1]

The last time that the Japanese militarists asked Stuart to arrange peace with Chiang was in February, 1941. On November 30, 1940, the Japanese government formally recognized the Wang Ching-wei government. At this time, when the Axis alliance had been concluded for two months, and when a consensus was emerging between the Japanese Navy and Army to invade Southeast Asia and prepare for a war with the United States, influential elements within the Japanese Center (Chūō) would no longer sue for peace with Chiang under his harsh terms.[2]

While the leaders in Tokyo remained tough on the China question, the Japanese generals under the command of Itagaki in China became further frustrated over the Sino-Japanese War and were willing to make great concessions to Chiang for a negotiated peace. Therefore, General Itagaki decided to seek Stuart's assistance. In January, 1941, Itagaki summoned Stuart to a meeting. Initially, Stuart was a bit hesitant to answer Itagaki's summons, for he "doubted if Chiang would ever agree to Japanese terms of peace."[3] Finally, he agreed and met Itagaki on February 13 in Shanghai. In this meeting, Itagaki disclosed that eighteen Japanese commanding officers in China in a recent conference in Nanking had unanimously decided to end the China Incident; that they were prepared to recognize Chiang Kai-shek's government and to withdraw all the Japanese troops south

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[1]On Operation Kiri, see Boyle, At War, pp. 289-97.

[2]Akira Iriye, "Japan's Policies toward the United States," in Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868-1941, ed. James W. Morley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 455-56.

[3]FRUS, 1941, V: 466-67.

of the Great Wall; and that they were also prepared to accept American mediation through the convening of a tripartite conference in which all issues could be discussed.

Itagaki further disclosed that one of his officers was to be proceeding to Tokyo shortly to lay their plans before the authorities. After disclosing these developments, Itagaki asked Stuart to make two trips to arrange peace between China and Japan: one to Tokyo to argue their case before the Japanese authorities and another to Chungking to present their position to Chiang.[1] Stuart was impressed with what he had been told and especially by Itagaki's sincerity and trust toward him. While he declined the trip to Tokyo on the grounds that it would be "strange" for him to argue on behalf of the Japanese militarists, Stuart agreed to make a trip to Chungking in April.[2] But just prior to his departure, Stuart was informed by some Japanese "local officials" that during Foreign Minister Matsuoka's trip to Moscow and Berlin in March-April, all the peace work with the Chungking government had been suspended in Japan.[3]

Undisturbed, Stuart still went to Chungking and arrived there in mid-April. From then on, we do not know what happened. We cannot determine from Stuart's personal papers whether he passed on Itagaki's peace terms. But this had already become irrelevant as far as Chungking was concerned. The passage of the Lend-lease Act in March, which would guarantee more American aid to China, and the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact in April, which would facilitate Japanese

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[1]FRUS, 1941, IV: 36-37.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, February 18, 1941, SDA 793.94119/735.

[3]Stuart, "The Japanese Foreign Minister's Trip to Europe," [late March or early April], 1941, JLS-RYU.

southern movement and result in a conflict with the United States, both strengthened Chungking's will to continue its fight with Japan.

More than ever before, Chungking viewed the war in China as part of a total struggle between the democracies and the totalitarian countries. With the anticipation of U.S. participation in such a struggle, Chungking believed that China would eventually emerge as a victor, together with other democratic nations.[1] These feelings were evident to Stuart. On April 28, he reported to the trustees:

> The government leaders are extremely competent interpreters of world events and are watching these with intense interest. They recognize that it has now become a world-wide struggle of the freedom-loving peoples against unrestrained military aggression, and especially that for all practical purposes, America, Britain and China are allies.[2]

Not only did Chungking's heightened hope of an eventual victory discourage its interest in peace negotiations with Japan, the Itagaki proposal could not be given serious consideration since it had not been sanctioned by the Japanese government. For all these reasons, Stuart's last peace mission also failed. Itagaki was later reprimanded by the War Minister Tōjō Hideki for his peace effort, and was removed from China to Korea in July.[3]

Stuart's feelings about this last peace mission were revealed in his criticism of the Japanese lack of a central leadership and any clear policy toward China:

> There is no authoritative commanding leadership in Japan, no consistent program, only increasing confusion and worry, desperate efforts

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[1]Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967), pp. 222-26.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, April 28, 1941, JLS-RYU.

[3]FRUS, 1941, V: 530-31.

to get out of the China mess, but no solution for doing so without the loss of prestige and pelf on a scale which no one person or faction would dare to urge.[1]

In retrospect, Stuart's peace mission could never have succeeded. Besides the differences between China and Japan on peace terms, there were several other reasons. The most important was that the sponsors of Stuart's efforts--the North China Area Army for the first three missions and the China Expeditionary Army for the last--could not unite the home government behind their peace moves. Stuart's criticism of the lack of central leadership and clear policy among the Japanese power elites was indeed justified.

For another reason, during his 1939 and 1940 missions he had received no support from the China Expeditionary Army. Once this army was established in September, 1939, the North China Area Army was placed under its control. Therefore, Stuart's efforts were less important than several other peace operations, such as Operations Kiri and Ch'ien, supported by by the China Expeditionary Army.[2]

Another impediment to Stuart's peace mission was its slow pace. With the probable exception of his 1939 mission, all his missions were undertaken as part of his participation in other business meetings dealing with his university's affairs. Therefore, it usually took him quite some time before he could return to Peiping with Chungking's peace proposals. These long delays brought complaints from the North China Area Army. Lt. Col. Imai Takeo, military attaché in the Japanese Embassy at Peiping, once complained that Stuart would spend too much time on the trips in

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, April 2, 1941, SDA 794.00/254.

[2]Nitchū sensō: ge, p. 234. On Operation Ch'ien, see Boyle, At War, pp. 299-303.

handling his other business and could not bring back information quickly enough to effectually advance peace negotiations with Chungking.[1]

Japanese Policy Toward the United States

Among Stuart's massive reports and memoranda sent to the trustees during the several years prior to the Pacific War, one major concern was whether Japan would move to Southeast Asia and whether Japan would then fight with the United States. Stuart's answer to these questions was, with very rare exceptions, a confident no. Since many of these communications dealt with sensitive matters and were based on secret information supplied by persons working for the Japanese in North China, the trustees would forward communications of a political nature to the State Department.

Stuart's first discussion on the possibility of a Japanese southward move was made in his report to the trustees on November 26, 1940. By now, U.S.-Japanese relationships had further deteriorated. Japan had joined the Axis Alliance in September. The U.S. had increased pressure on the Japanese by stopping its sale of gasoline, steel and scrap iron to her and by instituting a licensing system on the export of all war materials. In this first report, Stuart informed the trustees that Chinese friends in the North China puppet regime had told him Japan would continue her southward advance even if it led to a war with the U.S. The Japanese, said Stuart's informants, now had come to feel that "even a defeat by the United States would be preferable to the further continuance of the inconclusive struggle in China," and they held a "lingering belief that the United States is only bluffing and will not really fight." But Stuart could not believe that the Japanese militarists would really undertake

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[1]Imai Takeo, Shina jihen no kaisō, p. 157.

their southward advance. He commented that if the United States would soon make its opposition to such a Japanese advance "unmistakably clear," the Japanese "may even yet be deterred."[1]

On December 16, Stuart reported to the trustees that he had been told by the same friends that the mission of the Japanese Ambassador to the U.S., Nomura Kichisaburō, was to alter the U.S. anti-Japanese policy. Should he fail in his mission after several months of effort, wrote Stuart, the Japanese "extremists will insist on going ahead toward Singapore and the Dutch East Indies regardless of our [U.S.] interference." Stuart once again disagreed with his informants. He believed that many factors would stand in the way of further Japanese belligerence. The Axis Powers might run into difficulties in their war efforts, Chinese resistance might become further strengthened, and Japanese internal troubles might worsen. Stuart felt that all these probable factors would make the Japanese "less inclined next spring to so dangerous a venture."[2]

On January 14, 1941, Stuart gave a better reason for the impossibility of the Japanese southward advance. In his view, for the Japanese to undertake such an advance, three prerequisites would have to be met: U.S. energies must be entirely diverted to Europe to save England; Hitler must secure a Russian guarantee not to attack Japanese Manchuria; and peace with China must be concluded. Since none of these prerequisites seemed to be forthcoming, Stuart concluded that Japan would not undertake a southward advance in the near future.[3] On March 13, he still claimed that despite the German pressure, Japan would not take such an "irretrievabl

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, November 26, 1940, SDA 711.94/1942.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, December 16, 1940, SDA 793.94/16471.

[3]Stuart to Trustees, January 14, 1941, SDA 711.94/2038.

step" into Southeast Asia.[1]

During the month of April, Stuart changed his mind. Now he believed that Japan would soon move southward.[2] One reason for Stuart's change of mind was probably his apprehension about Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka's visit to Moscow and Berlin in March and April. He might have thought that during Matsuoka's visit to Berlin Hitler would pressure Japan to move south.[3] (Stuart's apprehension proved accurate.) But Stuart's belief in a Japanese southward advance at this time did not change his basic contention that Japan would never fight the U. S. Once the U. S. had taken a strong stand or shown a determination to fight, Japan would stop or retreat. Therefore, no general war between Japan and the U. S. could develop. To illustrate this point, he referred to the Japanese debacle over the Nomonhan Incident on the Manchurian border in the autumn of 1938. Stuart pointed out that once the Russian garrison forces repelled the Japanese troops there and showed their determination to fight, the Japanese learned their lesson and retreated.[4]

But Stuart's prediction of a Japanese southward move was only temporary. Sometime between April and June, Stuart went back to his original position that Japan would not go southward. On June 21, he told the trustees that many factors weighed against such a move. To the factors he had mentioned earlier--the uncertain fate of the Axis powers, the inconclusiveness of the China War, the Japanese internal exhaustion and

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[1]Stuart to Garside, March 13, 1941, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, April 2, 1941, SDA 794.00/254.

[3]Stuart, "The Japanese Foreign Minister's Trip to Europe,"[late March or early April], 1941, JLS-RYU.

[4]Stuart to Trustees, April 2, 1941, SDA 794.00/254.

struggles--Stuart added the factor of Japanese fear of the United States, especially among its naval officers, industrialists and financiers.[1]

By August, Stuart was further assured of a Japanese capitulation, for the U.S. had frozen all Japanese assets and had imposed a total oil embargo. In his mind, the U.S. action could only lead to Japanese capitulation. He never thought it might produce just the opposite effect in the form of a Japanese attack on the U.S. In elation, he predicted that Japan would soon renew a peace offensive in October: before many months "a substantial group of influential Japanese will be in a mood to advocate peace with China by negotiation and through the friendly offices of the U.S. president."[2]

In September, Stuart's faith in his accurate reading of the Japanese mind was further strengthened. When he saw no violent Japanese reaction to the American shipment of oil to Vladivostok in late August, he became certain that Japan would continue to remain passive in the days ahead. Therefore, on September 18, he told the trustees that "there never has been any serious threat of war between Japan and the U.S. There is less than ever now." He was so confident that he treated rather cavalierly an important item of information that he had received from an unnamed source.

He had learned that in the September 6 Imperial Conference, the whole trend of the discussion was in favor of opposing the American interference at any cost. But the war faction had been challenged by the recently retired Minister of Home Affairs, Hiranuma Kiichirō, who had

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, June 21, 1941, SDA 793.94/16821.

[2]FRUS, 1941, IV: 389-90; Stuart to Trustees, August 20, 1941, SDA 711.94/2459.

ridiculed the "war hawks" by saying that since they could not finish the China war after four years of endeavor, it would be profitless for Japan to start a war with the U.S. Stuart's information further disclosed that after Hiranuma had finished the speech, the Emperor nodded his head in approval and thus brought a confused silence on the conference. Having been convinced so long of Japanese unwillingness to fight the U.S., Stuart only paid attention to the alleged moves by Hiranuma and the Emperor and totally ignored the first part of the information that the majority of the participants in the Conference were willing to go to war with the U.S.[1] Though the information he had received was not quite indicative of the actual developments in the conference,[2] Stuart found it satisfactory enough to justify his belief that Japan was afraid to fight the United States.

From the above, we know Stuart seriously miscalculated the Japanese southward advance and the Japanese intention of fighting with the United States. His first major mistake was his failure to grasp the psychological mood of the Japanese leaders, especially those in the military. Confident in the righteousness of their thirst for a self-sufficient empire and sure of the legitimacy of Japanese hegemony in Asia, the Japanese leaders would fight at any cost rather than capitulate to American pressure. To Japan, the United States was simply an intruder in Asia, and as such, should be expelled. Bushidō or Nihon seishin called them to die for Japan's national honor. In this respect, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, obviously had a better perception of their mood. For instance, on August 27,

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, September 18, 1941, JLS-RYU.

[2]See Nobutaka Ike, Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 133-63. In fact, Hiranuma was not present at the Conference.

1941, Grew cautioned the Secretary of State that "in Japan, a psychology of despair leads characteristically to a do-or-die reaction."[1]

Stuart's second mistake was to overestimate the Japanese Navy's fear of a war with the United States. This fear was always there, but it did not prevent the Navy from advocating drastic action against the United States. In fact, the Navy first decided on a more belligerent policy towards the U.S. in late 1940 and then won the Army over to it in the spring of 1941.[2]

Lastly, Stuart had placed too much faith in the strength of the so-called Japanese peace party, as evidenced by his prediction in August, 1941, that such a party would soon mount renewed peace negotiations with the U.S. After the September 6 Imperial Conference, Japan became determined to fight against the U.S. unless her demands, such as restoration of trade with the U.S. and the right to station troops in North China, were met. These demands had nearly unanimous support from key leaders in the Japanese government. The so-called peace party was never strong enough to change the decision reached on September 6 or to challenge such a decision openly. With the collapse of the Konoe cabinet in mid-October, peace became more elusive, if not impossible.

Stuart's Influence on the U.S. Policy Toward Japanese Militarism

Stuart's reports and memoranda that had been sent to the State Department were read, not only by the officers in the Far Eastern Division, but even by officials as high as the Secretary of State. While it is impossible to evaluate the total effect of these materials on the State

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[1] FRUS, 1941, IV:397.

[2] Iriye, "Japan's Policies toward the United States," pp. 455-56.

Department's policy toward Japan, in several instances Stuart's influence can be detected, either through the information that he had gathered or through the analysis he had offered.

The first instance of Stuart exerting some influence was the intelligence he supplied on July 14, 1941. On that day, he informed American counselor Richard P. Butrick of the various Chinese estimates on the prospect of the ending of the Japanese war effort in China:

> Substantial Chinese opinion points to the ending of the war soon on terms acceptable to China and the United States if the latter gives prompt, effective aid to China. One qualified Chinese contact allows the Japanese 2 or 3 years more on a purely economic basis; another closely associated with the Japanese thinks that a combination of moral and material factors will force the Japanese to seek peace by spring or early next summer. The former chairman of the North China puppet regime thinks the Japanese may not last the calendar year.[1]

When this information reached the State Department, Stanley K. Hornbeck, Advisor on Political Relations, found himself "moved" by it and prepared a memorandum on July 22 for his superiors to read. In this memorandum, Hornbeck first gave an introduction supplying Stuart's background. He noted that Stuart had wide contact in both Chinese and Japanese circles and "had gained and passed many useful pieces of information." Hornbeck also praised Stuart's previous analyses of the situation in China as "useful." Then Hornbeck commented on the various Chinese estimates on the Japanese war effort in China:

> Reasonable attention should, I think, be given to these estimates that the time factor is running strongly against the Japanese. In our formulation of policies and procedures we should make the assumption that Japan can be defeated (in China) without China's having gained a military victory--provided that China's resistance can be maintained at a certain level of efficiency and for a sufficiently long period. In other words, Chinese effort plus American aid plus time can produce a situation wherein Japan's effort in China may be automatically

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[1] FRUS, 1941, IV: 322-23.

(but of course gradually) liquidated.

On the positive side, we should aid China toward the producing of that situation. On the negative side, we should avoid taking any steps which would tend to prevent a developing of the situation.

The essence of this comment was that the U.S. should stand firm toward Japan and continue her aid to China until Japan was "automatically liquidated."[1]

On the following day, Hornbeck wrote another memorandum, addressing it to Sumner Wells, the Under-Secretary of State. He asserted that "it is altogether improbable" that Japan would start a war with the U.S. upon some hostile action against her.[2] Less than a month later, Hornbeck became more belligerent by arguing that "the only thing" that would restrain Japan was a demonstration of American "armed capacity and intention."[3]

How much influence did Stuart's July 14 message have on Hornbeck's moving toward adopting a harsh policy against Japan? We know that Hornbeck had been favoring harsh or punitive action against Japan at least since late 1939, when he sided with Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau in suggesting an embargo of molybdenum of Japan.[4] Therefore, we cannot say that Hornbeck's hard-line attitude was a result of the message. But, it would still be fair to believe that the July 14 message must have either confirmed what he already had in mind or made him more determined

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[1]Typed sheet, July 22, 1941 (740.0011 P.W./260), Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

[2]Quoted in James C. Thomson, Jr., "The Role of the Department of State," in Pearl Harbor as History, eds. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 102.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid., p. 99.

to continue his harsh policy toward Japan.

An instance which occurred in September may be more convincing. Stuart's memorandum dated September 18 that had been forwarded to the State Department commented on the current negotiations between Hull and Nomura in Washington, and judged it to be a Japanese device to first gain a compromise with the United States, then wait for an opportune time to strike southward or into Siberia. Stuart concluded, "The danger in the present Washington conversations and in further diplomatic measures is not that they may lead to war, but rather that they will lead to a highly deceptive illusion of peace."[1]

Hornbeck's reaction to this memorandum was highly enthusiastic. Five days later (September 23), in a letter to Hull commenting on this memorandum, Hornbeck's opening remark was, "In my opinion, Dr. Leighton Stuart has hit the nail right on the head." Then in the remaining part of the letter, Hornbeck expressed his general agreement with Stuart's analysis of the Japanese motives in the Washington negotiation. In the end, he re-emphasized Stuart's judgement that such negotiation would only lead to "a highly deceptive illusion of peace."[2]

Two days later (September 25), in another letter to Hull, Hornbeck vigorously argued against the proposed Roosevelt-Konoe summit meeting and "any agreement between the U.S. and Japan."[3] One week later (October 2), Secretary Hull informed Nomura of the U.S. government's rejection of the Japanese position with regard to the trade issue, the China question, and

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, September 18, 1941, JLS-RYU.

[2]Hornbeck to Hull, September 23, 1941, Hornbeck Papers.

[3]Thomson, "The Role," pp. 103, 625.

the European war.[1] This rejection not only killed the proposed Roosevelt-Konoe meeting and triggered the resignation of the third Konoe cabinet on October 16, it also insured the outbreak of the Pacific War on December 8. In Hornbeck's "Draft Autobiography," he claims substantial responsibility for the rejection of the Roosevelt-Konoe meeting: he urged his views on Hull and Hull then urged them on Roosevelt.[2]

In this case, Stuart's influence on Hornbeck seems direct. At the very least we can say that what Stuart had written in this (September 18) memorandum had strengthened Hornbeck's faith in his own decision to oppose the leaders' meeting and other types of compromise between the U.S. and Japan.

Besides Hornbeck, some other U.S. foreign service officers also found Stuart's reports and analyses useful and worthy of serious consideration. For instance, John P. Davies of the Far Eastern Division commented on the same memorandum as "a particularly penetrating and significant contribution."[3] Butrick, in many of his dispatches to the State Department, also praised Stuart's various analyses and expressed his agreement with them.[4]

But this case also holds a further significance. While Stuart was enjoying the respect and confidence of Hornbeck and Davies within the State Department and was encouraging the "hawkish" faction there to take an uncompromising stand against Japan, Joseph Grew lost miserably in his

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[1] FRUS, Japan: 1931-1941, II: 656-61.

[2] Thomson, "The Role," pp. 103,625.

[3] FRUS, 1941, IV: 564.

[4] FRUS, 1941, V: 512-13; 526-27; FRUS, 1941, IV: 322-23; 562-63.

effort to influence the State Department with regard to the leaders' meeting. His failure in the issue was probably the greatest single failure in his entire ambassadorship from 1932 to 1941. In late September and early October, Grew became very unhappy over the State Department's refusal to listen. He was particularly sensitive to Hornbeck's obtrusive accusation that he was advocating a policy of "appeasement" and lamented that his views were not "particularly welcome nowdays."[1]

Thus, it would be safe to assume that in the last months prior to the Pacific War, Stuart's view enjoyed a much better reception in the State Department and had much more influence on the U.S. policy toward Japan than did Grew. Stuart's influence also seems to have been more important than that of the U.S. Ambassador to China, Clarence E. Gauss, who, like Grew in late 1941, was advocating a more compromising policy toward Japan.[2]

Why had Hornbeck's and Stuart's hard-line policy prevailed over that of Grew and Gauss? According to a recent study, Hornbeck was the guardian of a grand tradition that subscribed not only to abstract principles and moral precepts but also to the promise of China as a land receptive to the application of them. This tradition predominated during the years immediately prior to the Pacific War, and it explains the U.S. uncompromising policy. Of Hornbeck this study says:

> For he [Hornbeck] represented more than himself: a resilient, deep-rooted constituency within the nation. It was a constituency of men with continuing material and professional interests in the Far East: traders, bankers, churchmen, military men, journalists and academics.

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[1]Heinrichs, Ambassador, p. 349.

[2]Iriye, Across the Pacific, pp. 221-22.

> It was a group that shared a paramount interest in the promise of China and a belief in an activist American role in keeping open that promise.[1]

This judgement fits Hornbeck well; it also fits Stuart perfectly. Hornbeck and Stuart were indeed a pair. The friendship and cooperation that had developed between them during the years before the Pacific War lasted to the cold war years of the 1950's. It was no accident that when Stuart was writing his memoirs on his sick bed in the fifties, Hornbeck came to his assistance by finishing the concluding chapters for him.[2]

E. The Role of the U.S. in the Sino-Japanese Conflict and in the Future East Asia

To Come to China's Aid

Stuart in the 1910's had already accepted the belief that a weak and backward China would invite foreign exploitation and thus create disturbances and disorder for all nations. In the 1930's, Stuart continued to hold this conviction. For instance, in a speech given in Berkeley, California, in 1933, he declared that "China's weak government is not only a source of danger for Asia but also for the rest of the world as well."[3] Therefore, the best strategy for keeping peace in Asia and in the world, as Stuart saw it, was to help build a strong and unified China. Like most American liberal-internationalists in the first half of the twentieth century, Stuart subscribed to both the lofty Open Door Policy and the Nine Power Treaty.

Stuart's personal efforts to help China can be divided into two

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[1]Thomson, "The Role," p. 104.

[2]Stuart, Fifty Years, pp. 5-6.

[3]Stuart, "Expert Gives Solution for Crisis in China," Oakland Tribune (California), March 15, 1933.

different periods: before and during the Sino-Japanese War. Before the Sino-Japanese War, Stuart's main effort was to present to his American audience a positive and hopeful image of China so as to encourage them to continue economic aid to China. During the Sino-Japanese War, Stuart's effort became more active and intense, and, besides economic aid, he began to request U.S. military and political assistance for China.

Stuart's most important effort before the Sino-Japanese War, was his persuasion of Roosevelt from 1933 onward. Early that year, Stuart was in the United States to raise funds for Yenching, a difficult task due to the American economic depression. At a meeting between Stuart and President Roosevelt on May 1, Roosevelt mentioned his early family connection with the China trade and his sympathy for China's suffering under the Japanese aggression. On the other hand, Roosevelt also expressed his displeasure over the internal strife and civil war in China.

Stuart immediately snatched the opportunity to dispel such a negative impression of China's internal politics, explaining that the so-called factional disagreements among the Chinese political parties was "more apparent than real," that "the people were essentially united and that there had been constant progress toward a national consciousness and the precedence of claims of the nation above traditional loyalties."

Because of China's progress, he called the president's impressions "misconceptions" and "aggravated by unfriendly criticism." To this strong defense of China, we unfortunately do not know Roosevelt's exact response, but it could not have been a total disagreement, for Stuart later reported that the appointment with the president was "a very pleasant" one.[1] In addition to his presidential interview, Stuart also accepted an invitation

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[1]Stuart to Soong, May 3, 1933, JLS-RYU.

to appear before a nation-wide "hook-up" by the National Broadcasting Company.[1]

Encouraged by his warm reception in the United States, Stuart felt that the Chinese representatives in the U.S. should join with him to gain a hearing from the American people. So, several days later, he informed T.V. Soong of the content of his conversation with Roosevelt and of "the almost universal sympathy of the American people" toward China. He urged Soong to "take advantage of opportunities to arouse public interest" in China's predicament under Japanese aggression.[2]

China was very appreciative of Stuart's effort on her behalf. Upon his return to China, his stature and popularity skyrocketed. In June, he reported to Yenching's fund-raising agency in New York that "on landing in Shanghai I almost found myself famous," and that his pro-Chinese activities in the U.S. had been reported "all over China" and were also the subject of many editorials. He further said that while he had gained Chinese appreciation, he had also incurred "a corresponding amount of criticism in Japan."[3]

With the situation in North China getting worse after 1933, Stuart began to suggest that the U.S. give practical assistance to China in the form of economic aid. For instance, in June 1937, he suggested that the United States assist Chinese economic developments, for these developments would "become mutually beneficial to the people of both countries." He also hoped that England could do so. He believed that

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[1]Stuart to Cummings, May 8, 1933, JLS-RYU. We have no information about what he said there, possible the same things that he had told Roosevelt.

[2]Stuart to Soong, May 3, 1933, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart to Hedrick, June 23, 1933, JLS-RYU.

such joint Anglo-American assistance could be "the surest guarantee of peace in the Pacific."[1]

During the Sino-Japanese War, Stuart's work to help China was principally to secure varied kinds of aid from the U.S. in hopes of enabling China to survive the war. Besides economic aid, he also asked for military and political assistance. Stuart sought Roosevelt's direct help for economic aid. On April 10, 1940, Stuart sent a long telegram to Roosevelt, requesting either a direct U.S. government loan or a commercial loan to China. Stuart argued that this loan could "strengthen confidence in the Chinese currency and reduce the danger of inflation." To exert some pressure on Roosevelt, Stuart reminded the president that during their 1933 meeting he had promised "to do something for China."[2] We can find no reply from Roosevelt to Stuart, but Stuart must have been pleased to see what transpired ten days later. On April 20, the U.S. government signed an agreement to grant a $20 million loan to China.[3]

After the establishment of the Axis Alliance, Stuart began to ask for U.S. military aid to China. His most specific suggestion was made in January, 1941. He urged the United States to supply China with at least those airplanes which had already become obsolete in Europe and also with a few experienced pilots and mechanics to train Chinese to use them.[4] In April, when he learned that an aviation assistance agreement was to be signed between the United States and China, he was elated. He predicted

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[1]Stuart, "Of New China--And Yenching," Yenching News (New York), June 1937, p. 3.

[2]FRUS, 1940, IV: 315-16.

[3]Arthur N. Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 440.

[4]Stuart to Trustees, January 14, 1941, SDA 711.94/2038.

a "rapid progress in Chinese counter-offensive movement."[1]

Besides economic and military support to China, Stuart further wanted the U.S. to help China politically. For example, the U.S. government might abrogate unilaterally all the treaty privileges that the U.S. had obtained from China. Stuart made this formal request in April, 1941. He claimed two good effects from such a declaration: enhancement of the Chinese wartime morale and the refutation of Japan's constant accusations of Western imperialism in China.[2] The local American Embassy in Peiping endorsed this suggestion and forwarded it to the State Department. But the Embassy also advised that the abolition of treaty privileges should only be made after the hostilities in China had ended.[3] The State Department accepted both Stuart's suggestion and the embassy's advice, and in May and July the Department twice issued statements to promise the abolition of the unequal treaties, "whenever conditions warrant."[4] The United States finally fulfilled this promise in October 1942, nearly one hundred years after its first treaty with China.

To Exert Pressure on Japan

Stuart's attitude toward Japan became increasingly antagonistic after the Sino-Japanese War had broken out. When he learned of Roosevelt's "quarantine speech," which was delivered on October 5, 1937, he wrote to the Princeton-Yenching trustees that he was "inexpressibly delighted," and

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, April 2, 1941, SDA 794.00/254.

[2]Ibid.

[3]FRUS, 1941, V:733-74.

[4]Stuart, "Youth Strives for New China, Educator Says," Chicago Tribune, April 4, 1933.

urged the U.S. to adopt some economic sanctions against Japan.[1] When, on October 8, he read the State Department's caveat against the Japanese action in China, he stated to Garside, "I am happier this morning than perhaps at any time since that fateful outbreak on July 7." He also disclosed his heretofore "bitter disappointment and humiliation" for the American "smug neutrality and a timid desire to avoid any unpleasant consequences from Japanese aggression."[2]

By mid-1938, Stuart had become impatient with the lack of forceful economic measures taken against Japan. Therefore, on July 15, he wrote a long letter to Roosevelt, reminding the president of their conversation in 1933, in which the president had expressed his sympathy for China and his desire to help her. He chastized the president for not keeping his word. He requested that the president enforce the Neutrality Act through the impositon of a total embargo on Japan in all materials. Possibly feeling that his personal integrity was being somewhat challenged, Roosevelt asked Secretary of State Hull to prepare a lengthy memorandum to explain to Stuart the difficulties in meeting his request.

This memorandum explains that the Neutrality Act technically only forbade the exportation of finished armaments and did not include raw materials such as oil and scrap metals. Secondly, if enforced, the act would have to apply to all the belligerents, not just Japan. Thirdly, in the absence of the invocation of the act, the State Department had issued licenses for the exportation of arms, ammunitions, and implements of war to China in more value than those exported to Japan since July, 1937. Because

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[1]Stuart to Princeton-Yenching trustees, October 8, 1937, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to Garside, October 8, 1937, JLS-RYU.

of these factors, the memorandum concludes, "It would not be to the best interests of this country and our people as a whole to invoke the provisions of the act."[1]

Stuart was not convinced by this reply, and decided to mount some public pressure on the U.S. government to enforce a total embargo on Japan. Therefore, in November, he sought the assistance of his fellow Christians in America for his cause. His letter to "Fellow Christians of North America" urged them to help "break down the isolationist stand of America," and to stir up "public opinion against the sale of munitions and other articles which are contributing to the protracted destruction of lives" in China.[2]

In July, 1939, Stuart was pleased that the U.S. Government had announced its intention to abrogate the U.S.-Japanese commercial treaty. But he felt this action was not sufficient, and in November, asked the trustees to push for congressional authorization for a total embargo on Japan.[3]

In July, 1940, the U.S. Congress authorized the President to control American export of all weapons of war and all other materials for the production of weaponry. Stuart was pleased with this decision, but still not fully satisfied. In October, he urged the extension of this embargo to include Japanese imports to the U.S. in order to force a Japanese "withdrawal of all their armed forces from China and an abandonment of

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[1]Stuart to Roosevelt, July 15, 1938; Roosevelt to Stuart, August 22, 1938, President's Official File (OF) 150-C ("China"), Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

[2]Stuart to "Fellow Christians of North America," November 14, 1938, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart to Trustees, November 29, 1939, SDA 711.942/470.

the southward or oceanic expansion."[1] In the following month, he further urged the U.S. Government to induce England and South American countries to join the economic embargo against Japan.[2]

In 1941, Stuart continued his effort for a total embargo on Japan. He was finally satisfied when the U.S. announced in July its decision to freeze all Japanese assets in the U.S. and to impose an oil embargo against Japan.

Stuart's objectives in recommending these economic sanctions against Japan were not only to restrain the military sector, but also to induce Japanese liberal groups, or even the general populace, to rise against their military men. In his judgement, anti-military groups in Japan were industrialists, financiers, moderates in the government and in the Navy.[3] He had believed since the 1930's that the moderates in the Japanese government included Hiranuma Kiichirō, Abe Nobuyuki, Yonai Mitsumasa, Konoe Fumimaro, Ugaki Kazushige, Arita Hachirō, Hirota Kōki and Shidehara Kijūrō.[4] This list includes nearly all the major Japanese prime ministers and cabinet ministers from 1930's to 1941, leaving the army generals as the only aggressive elements. Though he was being too simplistic and sometimes erroneous in calling these men moderates, Stuart consistently did so. From 1937 to 1941, he unswervingly placed his hope on these "moderates" and other liberal groups in Japan to assert themselves and to restrain the military.

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, October 19, 1940, SDA 894.24/1202.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, November 26, 1940, SDA 711.94/1942.

[3]Stuart to Trustees, October 19, 1940, SDA 894.24/1202.

[4]Stuart to Trustees, October 14, 1939, SDA 711.942/361; Stuart to Trustees, January 18, 1940, JLS-RYU; Stuart to Trustees, November 26, 1940, SDA 711-94/1942.

In order to strengthen this supposedly liberal cabal, Stuart from the mid-1930's continually urged the United States and other democratic nations to take strong action against Japan so as to provoke Japanese liberals' opposition to the militarists. For instance, in September, 1935, he urged U.S.-England joint economic sanctions and other measures short of war against Japan, which he thought would win sympathy from the Japanese liberals and many of their common people who were "opposed to their military rulers."[1] In October, 1937, he continued, to urge economic sanctions against Japan to "pierce through the rigidly controlled censorship to the Japanese public."[2] Again he asked the U.S. government in October, 1939, to strengthen the hands of the Japanese moderate or liberal leaders, such as Hiranuma, Abe and Konoe, in order to help them resist the militarists.[3]

He claimed in January, 1940, that a stronger U.S. opposition to Japan could have the extra "beneficient effect in rallying this nascent Japanese public opinion to become articulate and to assert itself."[4] Even as late as August, 1941, Stuart still rested his hopes on the Japanese peace group, and believed that soon a substantial number of them would advocate peace with China by negotiation and through the friendly offices of the President of the United States.[5] Stuart indeed shared an undying hope with Grew for the Japanese liberals.

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[1]Stuart to American Friends, September 6, 1935, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to Princeton-Yenching trustees, October 8, 1937, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart to Trustees, October 14, 1939, SDA 711.942/361.

[4]Stuart to Trustees, January 18, 1940, JLS-RYU.

[5]Stuart to Trustees, August 20, 1941, SDA 711.94/2459.

Besides his suggesting economic measures in 1938, Stuart also suggested a political maneuver by the Western powers to dislodge the Japanese from North China. The Boxer Protocol Powers, such as England, France, America and even Russia, should take joint action to insist on neutralization of the Peking-Tientsin area.[1] Unhappily for Stuart, none of the powers accepted his suggestion.

To Mediate the War and to Build an Enduring Peace in East Asia

Another major element in Stuart's policy recommendations to the U.S. Government was that it should try to mediate the Sino-Japanese War and also to construct a sound diplomatic framework through which China, Japan and America could enjoy peace and prosperity after the Second World War.

The first formal recommendation for U.S. mediation was made on October 15, 1938, when Stuart held a long, cordial conversation with Dr. Yuasa Hachiro, ex-president of Doshisha University, who had resigned from his post because of anticipated difficulties with the Japanese militarists. Dr. Yuasa told him that the Japanese people would welcome American mediation of peace between China and Japan.[2]

Encouraged by this information and aware that President Roosevelt had made appeals to Hitler and Mussolini in September for the ending of the European conflicts, Stuart wrote a letter to Roosevelt on the same day, asking the president to offer mediation for the Sino-Japanese War.[3] Roosevelt made no reply. Undiscouraged, and exactly one year later, Stuart

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[1]Stuart to Garside, August 3, 1928, JLS-RYU.

[2]Stuart to Garside, October 17, 1938, JLS-RYU.

[3]Stuart to Roosevelt, October 15, 1938, JLS-RYU.

reiterated this proposal to the trustees and asked them to formally request that the State Department act upon it before the expiration of the U.S.-Japanese commercial treaty in January of 1940.

His letter to the trustees suggested that the U.S. conduct its mediation on three conditions: 1)the reaffirmation of the Nine Power Pact or the Open Door Notes; 2) the restoration of Chinese administrative and territorial integrity south of the Great Wall (i.e. Japanese withdrawal of troops, puppet regimes and Japanese commercial enterprises from south of the Great Wall); and 3) renewal of the U.S.-Japanese commercial treaty upon Japanese agreement to the first two conditions. Stuart believed that if these conditions were accepted and a successful mediation concluded, then China, the U.S., and Japan could form a "natural bloc" to resist Russian influence in Asia and to maintain peace in the Pacific. Though the trustees did not actually make a formal request to the State Department, they did dutifully pass on Stuart's letter to the Department.[1]

In April, 1941, encouraged by Itagaki's indication in February that he would be in favor of Roosevelt's peace mediation, Stuart continued to urge a U.S.-Japan-China tripartite conference to iron out mutual differences. He wrote to the trustees saying that such a conference could give Japan her "face," allow her to get out of "her present desperate dilemma," and satisfy "her genuine anxieties as to raw materials, foreign trade, etc." Stuart's hope for this conference was unbounded: it could further lead to "a Pacific Ocean regional alliance or association" to become a part of the new world order after the Second World War.[2]

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[1]Stuart to Trustees, October 14, 1939, SDA 711.942/361.

[2]Stuart to Trustees, April 2, 1941, SDA 794.00/254.

About such a new world order Stuart expressed his thoughts often in 1941. His basic idea was the establishment of a supranational government with police power to enforce international agreements. He also envisioned that China would play an important role in that organization because of her traditional ideals of universal brotherhood:

> The lesson of world events is that we must all become internationalists, must give up some rights. This is in harmony with the teaching of the great sages of the past in China. Chinese philosophy is full of it; it needs only to be applied to present-day conditions. China should take a leading part not because of her vast size but because of her distinctive culture which has come down from the far-distant past.[1]

In this statement, Stuart remained a faithful Wilsonian to the last.

In retrospect, while the U.S. Government did not openly act upon Stuart's mediation proposals, in many ways it had carried out their essence. During the Hull-Nomura negotiations in 1941, the U.S. Government held firm to its demand of Japanese withdrawal from North China and Indo-China, and Japanese subscription to principles such as a respect for Chinese administrative and territorial integrity. In other words, though no tripartite conference was held, the Hull-Nomura talks could be interpreted as an active U.S. mediation effort. The uncompromising U.S. position in this mediation was, of course, most pleasing to Stuart.

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[1]Stuart, "The Meaning to us at Yenching University of Contemporary World Events," September 11, 1941, JLS-RYU.

CHAPTER XIII

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

Stuart as a Missionary

It was reported that by 1949, a century and a half of Protestant missions had produced one million Chinese Christians.[1] Though the Protestant movement has been almost uprooted--at least on the surface--by the Chinese Communists Government, some sparks of faith still prevail on the Chinese mainland. For example, in 1959, at a Christian celebration in Soochow, some thirty persons were baptized.[2] As late as 1972, it was reported that some church services were still conducted in the city of Peking.[3] Though we cannot generalize on the present Christian situation in China, these cases do convey the impression that the missionary movement has not all been in vain. In 1967, the author had the occasion to listen to a Christian worker who had fled from the Chinese mainland a few years earlier. He testified that there were still many Christians in China, though their religious activities were being carried out underground.[4] What has been Stuart's place in this Christian movement? What distinguished him from other Christian workers?

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[1]Cheng Chi-pao, ed., Chinese-American Cultural Relations (Taiwan, 1965), p. 135.

[2]Ibid., p. 140.

[3]New York Times, October 14, 1972.

[4]This information was given to me by Rev. Chiao Yüan-lien, who is presently working for the Ambassadors for Christ, Inc., a Protestant organization in Washington D.C., working among Chinese students in the United States.

First, his love of the Chinese was more genuine and sincere than that of most of the missionaries. Though many of these missionaries might have been benevolent toward the Chinese, they usually harbored a sense of contempt. But Stuart's attitude was singularly compassionate and loving. This attitude had many origins. His Christian love, his appreciation of the Chinese way of life, and his respect for Chinese civilization all contributed to it.

Second, Stuart was the embodiment of the social gospel wing of the Christian movement, and was perhaps the most successful missionary of that faction in China. His major concern had never been saving souls, but, rather, the social welfare of the people. Many missionaries failed because of their one-sided emphasis on conversion. L. H. Lee, a Chinese Christian layman, thus criticized them:

> To, by and for the Chinese the Christian message was one of personal salvation. There was no clearly defined socio-personal preaching that one could be saved only in relation to the society in which he lives. The result has been that the Christian convert in China might become a better parent or child but not a new man of the world as St. Paul exemplified, nor a new citizen of his community. Without new citizens there can be no new China. Accordingly, Christianity has so far failed.[1]

Stuart can easily escape this criticism. If we agree with Mr. Lee and believe that Christianity has failed in China, then we must not attribute this failure to the social gospel advocates, but rather to "conversion" seekers.

Third, Stuart developed a plausible synthesis between Christian theology and ethics on one hand, and the Chinese religious and cultural tradition on the other. He never downgraded Confucianism or Chinese religious sentiments. He believed that God is immanent and truth universal,

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[1]Quoted in Varg, Missionaries, p. 307.

that Chinese religious sentiments and cultural heritage could compliment or reinforce Christian teachings, and vice versa. In this regard, his contribution was at least as significant as the best known of his contempories, such as Rawlinson and Chao Tzu-ch'en, and of his forerunners, such as Matteo Ricci. The significance of the Yenching religious synthesizers was their continuation of the seventeenth century religious or cultural synthesis formulated by the Jesuit fathers and their Chinese converts in the Imperial courts.[1] The Life Society in Peking was probably the only harmonious spiritual fellowship group that existed after its forerunner in the seventeenth century. As a founder and strong supporter of this society, Stuart's contribution to its historical and spiritual significance is undeniable.

Stuart as an Educator

In the early 1950's, Stuart stated that the most important influence that the U.S. had made on China was cultural.[2] If we accept this claim, then Yenching could easily pass the test to become the best example of this influence. Yenching provided many Chinese youth with a first-rate modern education. But Yenching has done more than just provide American cultural influence. Its rich spiritual atmosphere, its emphasis on social service, its patriotic concern as demonstrated in the December 9 Movement of 1935 were all worthy of praise in comparison with other Chinese higher institutions.[3]

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[1]For the Jesuit work in China, see Treadgold, China, pp. 1-34.

[2]Stuart, Fifty Years, p. 305.

[3]For the December 9, 1935 movement at Yenching, see John Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 11-56.

Stuart's contribution to making Yenching a distinguished institution has been well recognized. Its students, and others who benefited by it, all readily expressed their appreciation of Stuart's service there. For instance, when Stuart's sixtieth birthday came in 1936, a grandiose celebration was planned by the Yenching community. On that day, he was presented with forty-nine complimentary couplets and banners headed by one from Lin Sen, President of the Chinese Republic. The most moving scene was the presentation of a "pien"--a lacquered board as a sign of appreciation --by Yenching's workman's staff, on which was inscribed, "His instruction knows no class"--a direct allusion to Confucius. During the evening entertainment program, Stuart was even bowed to three times by the whole audience to show their respect.[1] In such displays, genuine affection for Stuart cannot be doubted.

We may better understand Stuart's merits or defects as an educator if we compare him with some other leading missionary educators before and during his time. Among Stuart's predecessors who had been missionary educators in China, probably the most prominent figure was W. A. P. Martin. Martin was born in 1827 and came to China about fifty years earlier than Stuart.[2] Martin had served as the Head Instructor (not necessarily the same as President) of the T'ung-wen Kuan (interpreters' college) and later was Dean of the Western Faculty (not president, as he claimed) of National Peking University.[3]

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[1]L. C. Porter, "Yenching Celebrates Leighton Stuart's Cycle of Cathay," in "Porter, Lucius C., P3," RYU.

[2]Jonathan Spence, To Change China (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), p. 130.

[3]Y. C. Wang, "Education, Modernization and Profiteering," Journal of Asian Studies 24, No. 2 (February 1965):302.

In both capacities, he doubtless made many contributions, but they were not as outstanding as came to be believed. The T'ung-wen Kuan was generally viewed by the Chinese as a school with low academic standards, and this accounted for the opposition to its existence by the Chinese modernizers and radicals toward the end of the nineteenth century. Its mediocrity was evidenced by the small number of translations published. Between 1871 and 1905, it only produced 26 translations of works while the Kiangnan Arsenal produced 178. The Chinese demanded a much more efficient school than the T'ung-wen Kuan and this demand helped later to create the National Peking University in 1898.

Martin has been criticized for his nepotism in school administration and for his vanity. But the most serious criticism made against him was his racial contempt for the Chinese. In 1900, after the Boxer Rebellion, Martin remarked that a "complete independence [for China] is neither possible nor advisable," and suggested American occupation of some Chinese island or seaport in order to expand American influence in China.[1] He even asserted that the Chinese people "were made to be ruled by others."[2] Though his views on these matters later changed,[3] Martin did for years hold contemptuous views on China and the Chinese.

In comparison, Stuart's successful administration of Yenching affairs, his social-oriented educational policy, and his high idealism certainly surpassed, and probably were even beyond the comprehension of, Martin. Stuart respected China and the Chinese. He never made any

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[1]Ibid., pp. 300-3

[2]Spence, To Change China, p. 159.

[3]W. A. P. Martin, The Awakening of China (London, 1907), p. 28; Varg, Missionaries, pp. 107-8.

derogatory remarks against them, nor offered any imperialistic suggestions to the U.S. Government. His strong affection for the Chinese people, his sympathy for Chinese nationalism, and his genuine respect for Chinese civilization had made him a most steadfast supporter of China and the Chinese.

But this comparison may be superficial or even irrelevant, for we are comparing men separated by a time span of almost fifty years. The revolutionary situation in China and changing intellectual currents in the twentieth century probably explain many of the differences between Stuart and Martin. Therefore, a fairer comparison should be made between Stuart and his contemporary missionary educators.

To do so, we might compare Stuart to Edward Hume of Yale-in-China. Hune was also a descendant of a family of missionaries dating back to his grandfather. They had all worked in India as missionary-educators. Hume reached China in 1905, just one year after Stuart's arrival there. He founded his small hospital in 1906 in an old inn in Changsha, Hunan, with a staff of two. He was made President of Yale-in-China in 1923, four years later than Stuart's assumption of the Yenching presidency. Hume wished to win China to Western ways and Western religion. In his training of Chinese youth, he wanted them not just to acquire knowledge but also moral character. Once he stated that his "educational work must be carried on under the strongest Christian influence and under the highest intellectual and scientific standards of teaching and research."

In winning Chinese support for his institution, Hume sought accomodation with the local political dignitaries and expecially with the warlords. More often than not, his hospital became "a regular sanctuary for fleeing officers and politicians, while the new men in power would summon

the Western doctors to attend them." As he faced the heightened Chinese nationalism of the 1920's, Hume furthered his efforts to make Yale-in-China an entirely Chinese institution. He believed if Yale-in-China was to survive, it would have to bend and graft itself "into the living tree of China." Because of this belief, he did not welcome Yale students to compus for fear of arousing Chinese resentment. He sometimes even refused to seek more funds from American donors, for he was not sure "if this would be the best thing for China so to do."

But his position and his policy proved unacceptable to his trustees in New Haven. He felt his trustees were uncooperative and foolishly studborn, so he resigned in 1926. By late 1926, Changsha had become a center of leftist activists, and students began to make too many unacceptable demands on Yale-in-China; its faculty therefore voted for its closure. Thus ended a colorful but unhappy chapter of American Protestant mission education in China. Hume's total submission to Chinese nationalism and his compromises with Chinese demands were later criticized as "conceived under the sway of emotions stimulated by an uncontrolled idealism." After being abandoned by his trustees and criticized by his faculty, Hume left China, "in a baggage car curled up amont the mailbags."[1]

From this description of Edward Hume's career as head of Yale-in-China, several similarities and contrasts between Stuart and Hume become clear. First, while they both tried to make their institutions places to impart not only knowledge but also spiritual influence, only Stuart succeeded in building up a very viable Christian atmosphere through the establishment of the Yenta Christian Fellowship. Because of this

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[1]All the above discussion of Hume's career at Yale-in-China is taken from Spence, To Change China, chap. 6.

spiritual atmosphere, a strong rapport developed among members of the Yenching community which must have contributed to the prevention of any student demonstration against the university authority.

Second, both men tried to make their institutions more Chinese in the spirit of Chinese nationalism, but only Yenching survived this nationalism. This survival was insured by institutional reorganization, the cultivation of friendly relations with both the national and local leadership, and the promotion of Chinese studies on campus. Hume, to the contrary, never implemented any respectable Chinese programs, and before a Chinese president could be selected, the institution had closed.

Third, in securing a sound academic and financial base for his institution, Stuart was more realistic in relying upon support from the United States. He established official connections with several leading American institutions of high education and secured large grants from organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation and the Hall Estate. Thus, Yenching was based on twin rocks of support, both American and Chinese. Yale-in-China fared very much worse by way of support.

It may be possible to extenuate the failure of Yale-in-China on the ground that it was situated in the more hostile environment of Changsha, Hunan; but the environmental factor alone cannot explain the school's debacle. Yenching's success had to be earned. Among the many personal efforts that contributed to its success, Stuart's was the most important. The contrast between Hume's sad departure and the glorious and jubilant celebration of Stuart's sixtieth birthday at Yenching should sweep away any doubt that Stuart was much superior to Hume as an educator.

Stuart's eminent work as a university president has won almost universal acclaim. Hu Shih predicted that "Dr. Stuart will undoubtedly be

remembered as one of the great representatives of the historic line of educational missionaries in China."[1] The grand missionary historian, Kenneth Scott Latourette, called Stuart "an outstanding example of American idealism at its best," and said, "no living American has over so long a period touched the Chinese so helpfully as has John Leighton Stuart."[2]

Stuart as a Political Activist or a Liberal Expansionist

A recent study on American liberal expansionism divides American expansionists in East Asia from the mid-nineteenth century to the 1940's into two groups: the nationalistic expansionists, a majority of whom promoted American expansion through territorial aggrandizement and the employment of force; and liberal expansionists, a minority of whom promoted expansionism through the imparting of American ideals by peaceful means. The former catagory includes men like Peter Parker, Alfren Mahan, Willard Straight, William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. In the latter category are W. A. P. Martin, William Taft, Charles Evans Hughes and Frank Kellogg. Between the two was Woodrow Wilson, who "at times embodies this [liberal expansionistic] tradition, but at other times, it was coupled with and even dominated by particularistic expansionism as well as nationalistic isolationism."

While the nationalistic expansionists gave whole-hearted support to their nation's particularistic policies, such as the Oriental Exclusion Acts and the protective tariff system, the liberal expansionists acquiesced in, or seldom challenged these policies. The result of these particularistic policies was the gradual undermining of the Washington Conference system established in the 1920's. And with the worsening of the world

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[1]Stuart, Fifty Years, pp. xii-xiii.

[2]Kenneth S. Latourette, review of Fifty Years in China, by John Leighton Stuart, in New York Times Book Review, October 17, 1954, p. 4.

economic crisis, Japanese militarism rose in East Asia and wrecked the whole peace framework in that area. This study concludes that, because of the inaction of these liberal expansionists, "they had no effective intellectual response to make to Japanese militarism and aggression in the 1930's which closed the door to American liberal expansion in East Asia."[1]

If such a framework of analysis and conclusion can be accepted, then Stuart's place in this larger picture is definite. He always shared the liberal expansionist perception with regard to China that America was a beacon of freedom and democracy and that, as such, it had a duty to share its ideals with the Chinese. Stuart also deplored American use of force, such as in the March 18 Incident of 1926, and he was also against the continuation of the illiberal treaty system in China. With regard to Japan, he was willing to recognize the Japanese needs for raw materials and normal economic expansion into other parts of the Asian continent, as long as the satisfaction of such needs was not made through military coersion or economic exploitation. In his larger vision, the U.S., China and Japan could form a "natural bloc" to promote peace and prosperity in Asia--a true liberal expansionist's dream. But he seldom questioned or challenged America's illiberal policies in the area of immigration and tariffs. His seeming indifference in this area was the same as that of his other liberal expansionist friends, such as Hughes and Kellogg.[2]

But Stuart's liberal expansionism turned into a Wilsonian armed crusade against militarism and totalitarianism. Therefore, as Wilson fought

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[1]Akira Iriye, "The American Liberal Tradition and East Asia," (First Draft, December 1969) (Typewritten), pp. 1-22 passim.

[2]Ibid., p. 17.

Germany, so Stuart was willing to fight, if necessary, against Japan. Thus, from the 1910's on to 1941, Stuart never ceased to urge a strong policy against Japan. In his hard line against Japanese militarism, he saw eye to eye with men like Hornbeck.

But Stuart was different from either the nationalistic or the liberal expansionists in having one unusual accomplishment to offer: his work at Yenching. In this work, he demonstrated a sincere exchange of ideas with, and a peaceful toleration of, many nationalities. When the first Japanese professor, Torii, joined the Yenching community in 1939, Stuart had completed, no matter how late and how little, a close to perfect picture of Pan-Pacific union. It is in this respect that the meaning of Stuart's life was most fully revealed. In this, also, he redeemed himself both as a genuine Christian worker and as a true American liberal expansionist. As such, he probably had no peer among the Americans who had gone to China either before or during his time.

APPENDIX

THE PROBLEMS OF EVALUATION OF AMERICAN MISSIONARY WORK IN CHINA

Chairman Mao Tse-tung in 1939, in an important CCP textbook, made the following comments on Western cultural aggression in China:

> . . . the important powers have never slackened their efforts to poison the minds of the Chinese people. This is their policy of cultural aggression. And it is carried out through missionary work, through establishing hospitals and schools, publishing newspapers and inducing Chinese students to study abroad. Their aim is to train intellectuals who will serve their interests and to dupe the people.[1]

On the eve of establishing the Communist government in China, Mao singled out American "spiritual aggression" for attack: "For a very long period, U.S. imperialism laid greater stress than other imperialist countries on activities in the sphere of spiritual aggression, extending from religious to 'philanthropic' and cultural undertakings."[2]

The reaction of the U.S. Government to this denunciation can be seen from the statement issued by its ambassador to the United Nations, Warren R. Austin. In 1950, Ambassador Austin pointed out that 250,000 Chinese students had graduated from primary and middle schools maintained in China with American funds; that one-eighth of all the Chinese college graduates had received their education at the 13 colleges founded by the American Protestant missions in China; and that 10,000 Chinese students had been educated in American colleges and universities. Ambassador

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[1]Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 4 vols. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965-67), 2:312.

[2]Ibid., 4:448.

Austin further pointed out that the American Catholic Church had maintained 320 orphanages in China. In view of these facts, he challenged the Chinese accusation of American cultural imperialism and called it an "evil propaganda."[1]

If the governments could not see eye to eye regarding American missionary and cultural work in China, the missionaries themselves by the 1950's also developed some doubts about the value of their work. While in 1900 Dr. D. Z. Sheffield could assert that the missionaries "are laying rock-foundations upon which the shapely structure of a new civilization is to be built in future years,"[2] in the 1950's some missionaries wondered whether they might have indeed unconsciously served as a part of Western imperialism in China. In an article written for the International Review of Missions in 1951, one missionary asked: "Can we not detect some justice in the charge of imperialism against our policies for institutions . . . which fitted them [the students] for that comprador class which was the agent of the western penetration of China?" The same author continued, "Ours is a religion of incarnation; that the Gospel can only take shape in social and economic and political form--that the 'pure Gospel' and the 'pure Church' not only do not but cannot in history exist; and that not all that is now for present purposes castigated as imperialism was wrong." Furthermore, he challenged the previous notion of Westernizing China and believed that the efforts of trying to make the Chinese culturally

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[1]Warren A. Austin, "U.S. Appeal to Chinese Communists to Stop Aggression in Korea," U.S. Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950) 23: 933.

[2]D. Z. Sheffield, "The Influence of the Western World on China," The Century Magazine, May-October 1900, p. 789.

Anglo-Saxon had been mistaken.[1]

The Chinese Christians also had mixed feelings about missionary work in China. Some Chinese Christians praised it and offered defense for it. For instance, in 1949 a group of Chinese Christians claimed that the Western missionary work in China had been "to serve the needs of the Chinese people," and that the missionaries had entertained "no other purpose than to preach the Christian gospel of love" to the Chinese.[2] But others criticized it for its failure to serve Chinese needs other than those spiritual. A Christian layman leader pointed out in the late 1940's that except for its preaching personal salvation, the Christian work had produced no new citizens for the construction of a new China. Therefore, "Christianity has so far failed."[3]

Since in passing judgement on American missionary work the government leaders might have been motivated by political considerations, and the missionaries and Chinese converts might have been influenced by emotional or religious biases, we shall next turn to the scholars, those that have studied the subject, to see their supposedly objective opinions.

1. The Pro-Missionary Arguments

In 1929, the most renowned missionary historian, Professor Kenneth Scott Latourette, listed many Christian contributions to modern China. Mission work provided China with good leadership during the revolutionary decades of the twentieth century. Chinese Christians like Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Foreign Minister Wang Cheng-t'ing, Premier Yen Hui-ch'ing,

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[1]A China Missionary, "First Thought on the Debacle of Christian Missions in China," International Review of Missions (October 1951); reprinted in African Affairs 51, No. 22 (January 1952): 38-41.

[2]Quoted in Varg, Missionaries, p. 307.

[3]Ibid.

and Chang Po-ling, President of Nankai University, were all illustrious examples. It also greatly promoted modern Chinese education by compiling textbooks and turning out competent teachers for Chinese schools. It facilitated the importation of Western learning. It stimulated China's own religions or philosophies, such as Buddhism and Confucianism, for their internal reform. Finally, it also served as an agency interpreting China to the Occident. As against all the above contributions, the only ill effects of the missionary work in Latourette's mind were the Taiping Rebellion and the missionary intrusion into Chinese politics and law that accelerated the breakdown of the Chinese state. On balance, Latourette concluded that the missionary work had brought China "into contact with the best in the Occident" and it had promoted "the greater welfare of the Chinese people."[1]

Three and a half decades later, Professor Liu Kwang-ching continued Latourette's praises for the Christian missionaries in China. He commended them as "often the best source of Western learning in China" in the nineteenth century; for their deep understanding of the problems and aspirations of the Chinese people; for their pioneering projects in rural reconstruction in the 1920's and 30's; and for their essential emphasis on the sacredness of the individual. In short, Liu believed that the missionary had indeed made a meaningful contribution to China:

> The idea that every soul is worth saving, that every individual should be given the chance to develop his capacities--this, in combination with the scientific and technical knowledge of the West, could and did make a contribution to China and the Chinese.[2]

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[1]Latourette, A History, p. 843.

[2]Liu Kwang-ching, American Missionaries, p. 1.

2. The Anti-Missionary Assessments

Among American scholars or intellectuals that have been critical of American mission work in China, we can trace some at least as far back as the 1920's. For instance, John Dewey in the 1920's found himself in disagreement with the general Western assumptions, including missionary ones, that China was a peril to the world, and that the way to deal with her was by either Westernizing or Christianizing her. Dewey criticized such assumptions as untrue to the reality of China and unfair to the Chinese:

> Persons who are irritated in themselves are always irritated about others. The principle applies in social psychology. Nations are now "projecting" their own troubles and uncertainty upon China. . . . For it is not true that Chinese difficulties have suddenly become a menace to the world's peace and prosperity. It is only true that western nations are in danger of condensing their own troubles and unloading them upon China.[1]

Dewey was also critical of the conversion-oriented nature of mission education. He believed that education and evangelism were two separate things and that mission schools should not try to achieve both in their work. In 1920 he advised the Christian workers in China that those who were evangelical-minded should stay away from educational enterprises and let those truly interested in education "throw themselves fully into their school work" and "build up a worth-while school system."[2] Besides Dewey, Professor Charles T. Holman of the University of Chicago in his article "I Don't Want to Christianize the World," published in 1935, attacked the missionaries for their doctrinal exclusiveness; their blindness to political and social injustices; and their parochial and vindicative

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[1]John Dewey, "As the Chinese Think," Asia 22, No. 1 (January 1922): 79.

[2]John Dewey, "Address Annual Meeting of the Chihli-Shansi Christian Educational Association, Peking," Educational Review (1920), p. 105.

attitude toward other religions and civilzations.[1]

But the criticism of American mission work made by the intellectuals and scholars in the early decades was a sporadic and casual affair. In the decades of the 1960's and 1970's this criticism has become a constant and heavy theme in most of the recent works dealing with the subject. For example, Professor Jonathan Spence in his To Change China: Western Advisers in China, 1620 - 1960 criticized the motives of the missionaries. He believed that their coming to China might have been due to their "feared or experienced frustrations at home"; their desire in China had been "not so much to help China as to help themselves"; and their work had been an effort "to prove their own significance."[2] After having surveyed the life histories of sixteen Western advisers in China, of whom six were missionaries, he concluded that their work in China had been a failure, for China had not been converted and neither Western democracy nor Russian-brand Communism had been accepted.[3]

Another scholar, Professor James C. Thomson of Harvard, in his While China Faced West discussed both the Rockefeller Foundation's rural reconstruction work in China in the 1930's and the missionary involvement in the reform projects such as the New Life Movement. From these discussions he drew two major conclusions. First, he considered these foreign efforts to be instances of liberal reformism and believes them to be total failures, for China "rejected their offering, threw them out, and embraced a Western heresy with which to resist the West."[4] Second, he questions

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[1]Varg, Missionaries, p. 174.

[2]Spence, To Change China, p. 292.

[3]Ibid., p. 289.

[4]Thomson, China, p. xii.

the values and validity of gradualism or reformism in the less developed countries.[1]

Probably the most virulent and penetrating attack on the whole missionary enterprise was that aired by Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. While disagreeing with the old accusation that the missionary is a part of the capitalist economy or the instrument of the State or Government, he nevertheless called him a cultural/psychological imperialist. Agreeing with Jean-Francois Revel that the most humiliating kind of defeat is a cultural defeat, for it entails not only acknowledgement of one's own weakness, but also the humiliation of having to save oneself by taking lessons from the conqueror,[2] Schlesinger went a step further to say that cultural aggression as practiced by the missionary "not only destroys the self-confidence of the violated nation but feeds the self-righteousness of the aggressor nation."[3]

Schlesinger built up his case by relying upon some psychological studies on colonialism. In 1950 French ethnographer O. Mannoni published his Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization, a study based on the French experience in Madagascar. In this work, the colonizer emerging from competitive Western society and having suffered defeat of one kind or another, is described having an inferiority complex requiring assuagement by the experience of domination; and the colonized, having lived in a static and traditional society, is described having a "dependence complex."

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[1]Ibid., p. xiii.

[2]Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Missionary Enterprise and Theories of Imperialism," paper presented at Cuernavaca Conference on Protestant Missionaries in China and America, Mexico, January, 1972, p. 43.

[3]Ibid., p. 55.

Mannoni suggests that these two complexes are symmetrically opposed to each other and that "these two different psychological climates serve to characterize two different types of personality, two different mentalities, two different civilizations."[1] As a result of these conflicts, a love/hate relationship develops between the colonizer and the colonized.

Besides Mannoni's work, the works of Franz Fanon, an African revoluntionist who received training in psychiatry in France, were also cited by Schlesinger. Fanon, accepting the fact that the conflict between the colonizers and the colonized was insoluble, insists on violence as the only means for the native to reclaim his identity:

> At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect.[2]

Fanon further stated that once self-respect was restored, the native could "assimilate the most modern forms of technology at an extraordinary rate."[3]

Basing his argument on the above works and on his own reading of history, Schlesinger drew some conclusions. First, in China and Japan, though the colonizer-colonized equation existed only metaphorically and the problem was Western intrusion, not Western conquest, the relationship between intruders and natives may still be meaningfully explored. This relationship was a form of cultural/psychological aggression, most devastating among all kinds of aggression. Since the missionaries wanted to change souls and societies, where traders only wanted to make money or

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[1]Quoted ibid., p. 49.

[2]Ibid., p. 53

[3]Ibid.

politicians to make treaties, it "contributed to the national [American] illusion that 'nation-building' was a distinctive American skill." Because of this illusion, Schlesinger asserts, MacArthur tried to reconstruct Japan; Hubert Humphrey espoused the dream of the Great Society to be realized in the great area of Asia; and the U.S. Government entered Vietnam to achieve the missionary goal. Schlesinger concludes his criticism of the missionary by saying that in his interpretation of cultural/psychological aggression "the missionary will find his most logical place."[1]

3. The Tension in the Historiography of the U.S.-East Asian Relations

The missionary, as Professor Fairbank said, is indeed "the invisible man of American history." His effort is a part, an important part, of the total American efforts abroad. Before we can form any meaningful opinion on his work, we have to understand the nature and the meaning of the larger U.S.-East Asian relationship. But regarding this larger picture, our vision is blurred by conflicting historical perspectives as offered by the leading scholars in the field. I have sensed a tension between what might be termed historicism and moralism in the historiography of the U.S.-East Asian relations. Two recent cases should be sufficient to illustrate this tension.

In 1972 Professor Akira Iriye published his Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911, a pioneer work on the subject. In oversimplication, most of Professor Iriye's earlier works can be described as trying to explain with objectivity the multi-dimensional relationship across the Pacific between the U.S., China, and Japan.[2]

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[1]Ibid., pp. 54-58.

[2]Such as his After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); and Across the Pacific (cited before).

He almost never judges, denounces, or praises the behavior of these three countries in dealing with each other, though occasionally he may express his hope for a more peaceful relationship among them. This new work of his is consistent with his earlier scrupulous methodology as an historian.

But this kind of detached, historical objectivity is seen as undesirable by Professor Marylyn B. Young. In her review of Iriye's work, while she praised the work in general she also expressed her disatisfaction:

> I am somewhat puzzled by his insistence that economic expansionism (usually coupled with the word "peaceful") is nonimperialistic. . . . Moreover, reading his discussion of Japanese and American behavior in China, one is apt to forget that, whatever the policy pursued, it was in the imperialist context of the unequal treaty system, established by force and involving a degree of territorial control. Thus "peaceful economic expansion" in China seems to me to be a somewhat anomalous notion.[1]

And,

> Professor Iriye's conclusion is, however, fairly sanguine. Expansion, he once again declares, is the way of the world. Even peaceful expansion can cause friction and suspicion. "Nevertheless, awareness of these difficulties is a positive factor that can in time build a bridge of common humanity across the Pacific." (237). Perhaps. But one might also want to question the notion that expansion is a necessary part of human nature. Or if it is, what possibilities of social mutation can we begin to imagine?[2]

In these words, Professor Young clearly expressed her moral sympathy for China and her annoyance over Professor Iriye's non-committal attitude toward foreign aggression in China. What Professor Young obviously wished to see in Iriye's new work was some kind of moral denunciation of American and Japanese imperialism in China. Though we do not know Professor Iriye's personal views on such imperialism, judging from his reluctance to make

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[1]Marilyn B. Young, review of Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansionism, 1897-1911, by Akira Iriye, in Journal of Asian Studies 33, No. 1 (November 1973): 123.

[2]Ibid., p. 124.

any moral judgment in his works, he most likely thinks that moral judgment is neither a necessary nor a legitimate part of historical writing.

Another case of historicism vs. moralism is an argument between Professors Jerome B. Grieder and Donald W. Treadgold. The second volume of the latter's The West in Russia and China: Religious and Secular Thought in Modern Times deals with the impact of Western religious and secular thought on China. Professor Treadgold's major theses are that it is a misfortune for christianity to have failed in China, while Communism has succeed instead; that had the missionaries followed the enlightened approach of missionaries like Matteo Ricci or Timothy Richard, who concentrated on building up a syncretism between Christianity and Chinese culture rather than on converting China, such a misfortune could have been avoided and a meaningful cultural interchange achieved.[1] Professor Grieder has considered these theses to be value-ridden and culture-bound and believes that historians should not invest their discussion with considerations of moral necessity. In other words, historical writing, must be distinct from moralizing. Grieder's view can be seen in the following passages from his review of Professor Treadgold's work:

> He [Treadgold] writes an intellectual history in which ideas are presented not as emotionally charged sources of belief and action enmeshed in the imperatives of a particular time, but rather as entities to be manipulated in pursuit of calculated historical ends.[2]

And,

> One comes, finally, to the realization that Treadgold's purpose is indeed culture-bound. He is more concerned in the final analysis, with the dissolution of Western values than with the effect

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[1]Treadgold, China, pp. 173-95.

[2]Jerome B. Grieder, review of volume 2 of The West in Russia and China: Religious and Secular Thought in Modern Times, by Donald W. Treadgold, in Journal of Asian Studies 33, No. 3 (May 1974): 464.

> of these values on China . . . It is a matter of deep regret that a study whose underlying themes are as spacious, as ambiguous, as full of pathos, of intellectual torment, aspiration and individuality as those touched upon here, should be imprisoned in the rigid judgment born of adamantine moral certainty.[1]

From the above two cases we see that while Iriye and Grieder seem to be more concerned with how history developed rather than with how history should have developed, Young and Treadgold prefer to see history moving toward a desired end, an end either morally sound or spiritually satisfying.

The foregoing distinctions are important to our discussion of the problem of evaluating American missionary work in China. They point up the ideological deliberations behind a historian's interpretation of a historical event or issue. If one is burdened with moral sympathy for the fate of modern China and is sensitive to the charge of imperialism, then most likely he will agree with the judgment made by the critics of missionaries, such as Thomson, Spence, and Schlesinger. But if he is more interested in cultural exchange or religious syncretism and has faith in such an undertaking, then he will be in agreement with the interpretations of Latourette, Liu and Treadgold. Historians, after all, are human beings, and, as such, are conditioned by their own moral sense, life experience, and philosophy. This is why they quite often find themselves disagreeing with each other on many historical issues. Such disagreement helps us discern which school of historical writing has been followed, or what kind of historical scholarship has been maintained. One can write history with a moral judgment as its end or goal, or as presentation and analysis only. In this study, I have been trying to follow the latter course.

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[1]Ibid., p. 466.

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Fu-jen University 輔仁大學
Philip Fugh 傅涇波
Han Fu-ch'ü 韓復榘
Higuchi Sueichirō 樋口李一郎
Hiranuma Kiichirō 平沼騏一郎
Hirota Kōki 広田弘毅
hsiao 孝
hsiao-chang 校長
Hsiao-chuang 曉莊
Hsiao-wu-chang 校務長
hsin 信
Hsin-min hui 新民會
Hsiung Shih-li 熊十力
Hsü Pao-chien 徐寶謙
Hsü Ti-shan 許地山
Hu-chou 湖州
Hu Han-min 胡漢民
Hu Shih 胡適
Hua-hsi hsieh-ho ta-hsüeh
華西協和大學
Huang Hsing 黃興
Hui-wen shu-yüan 匯文書院
Hung-hsien 洪憲
William Hung 洪煥蓮
i 義
I-ho 義和
Imai Takeo 今井武夫
Itagaki Seishirō 板垣征四郎
jen 仁
Jen Yu-wen 簡又文
Jinrikisha 人力汽車
Jōdō-shin-shū 淨土真宗
Kagesa Sadaaki 影佐禎照
K'ang Yu-wei 康有為
Kiangyin 江陰
Kita Seiichi 喜多誠一
Kiri 桐
Kiukiang 九江
Kōain 興亞院
Konoe Fumimaro 近衛文麿
Wellington Koo 顧維鈞
Ku Chieh-kang 顧頡剛
Kuling 牯嶺
H. H. Kung 孔祥熙
Kuo Mo-jo 郭沫若
T. T. Lew 劉廷芳
li 禮
Li Tsung-jen 李宗仁
Li Yüan-hung 黎元洪
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao 梁啟超
Liang Sou-ming 梁漱溟
Lichuan 黎川
lien 廉
Lin Sen 林森

Lingnan University 嶺南大學
Liu T'ing-fang 劉廷芳
Lu-ho Hsiang 潞河鄉
Luh Chih-wei 陸志韋
Manchukuo 滿洲國
Matsukata Saburō 松方三郎
Matsuoka Yōsuke 松岡洋右
Nankai University 南開大學
Nihon seishin 日本精神
Ningpo 寧波
Nomura Kichisaburō 野村吉三郎
Ouyang Ching-wu 歐陽竟無
Pai Ch'ung-hsi 白崇禧
pai-hua 白話
pien 扁
Pu-yi 溥儀
shan 善
Shangti 上帝
Sheng-ming she 生命社
Shidehara Kijurō 幣原喜重郎
shu 恕
Shun 舜
Sōgun 總軍
T. V. Soong 宋子文
Ssu-li Yen-ching ta-hsüeh hsiao tung-shih-pu ming-tan
私立燕京大學校董事部名單
Ssu-li Yen-ching ta-hsüeh tsu-chih ta-kang
私立燕京大學組織大綱
Sugiyama Gen 杉山元
Sun Ch'uan-fang 孫傳芳
Sun Fo 孫科
Sung Che-yüan 宋哲元
Sung Chiao-jen 宋教仁
Tada Shun 多田駿
T'ai-hsü 太虛
T'ai-hu 太湖
Tang Shao-yi 唐紹儀
Tanku Truce Agreement 塘沽協定
tao 道
T'ao Hsing-chih 陶行知
Tengchow College 登州書院
t'ien 天
Ting Li-mei 丁立美
Tinghsien 定縣
Tinghsien Institute 定縣實驗區
Tōjō Hideki 東條英機
Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei 蔡元培
Tsinghua University 清華大學
Tso chuan 左傳
Y. T. Tsur 周詒春
Tuan Ch'i-jui 段祺瑞
Tung-shih hui 董事會
Tungchow 通州
T'ung-wen Kuan 同文館
Ugaki Kazushige 宇垣一成

Ume Kikan 梅機関
Wakasugi Kaname 若杉要
C. T. Wang 王正廷
Wang Cheng-t'ing 王正廷
Wang Ching-wei 汪精衛
Wang Ch'ung-hui 王寵惠
Wang K'e-min 王克敏
Wang Yi-t'ang 王揖唐
Wen I-to 聞一多
wen-yen 文言
Wu Chih-hui 吳稚暉
Wu Lei-ch'uan 吳雷川
Wu P'ei-fu 吳佩孚
Wu-tai Mountain 武台山
Wu T'ieh-ch'eng 吳鐵城
Wu T'ing-fang 伍廷芳
Wuchang 武昌
yang 陽
Yen Hsi-shan 閻錫山
Yen Hui-ch'ing 顏惠慶
W. W. Yen 顏惠慶
Yen-ching hsin-wen 燕京新聞
Yen-ching hsüeh-pao 燕京學報
Yuasa Hachirō 湯淺八郎
Yenta 燕大
yin 陰
Yin-kuang 印光
Yonai Mitsumasa 米内光政
YÜ P'ing-po 俞平伯